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ABSTRACT
The $200 billion American electric power industry is in the early stages of its most
significant restructuring since the beginning of the century. Deregulation of the industry's
generation segment is the focus of most attention at present, but restructuring will have
profound implications for all aspects of the industry -- including transmission, the
industry's "integrating" segment. Using criteria grounded in economic principles and
research, and lessons learned from the deregulation of other industries, we evaluate five
leading restructuring proposals based upon their predicted impact on the long-term
economic efficiency of transmission. We find that none of the proposals fully addresses all
of the issues identified by our criteria or consider technological innovation in transmission.
Furthermore, only some of the proposals would explicitly employ transmission pricing
mechanisms that are consistent with efficient economic principles. While most of the
debate to date has focused on selecting the "best" framework for restructuring, we find that
the details of the restructuring proposals have an equally large, if not larger impact on long-
term economic efficiency in transmission. A policy implication of this is that the public
should continue to play an integral role in the decision-making process as the debate moves
from broad framework issues to more mundane proposal details. With respect to the
specific proposals we evaluate, we find that the FERC Mega-NOPR is deficient in several
areas. We also find that the California Public Utilities Commission appears to have chosen
the "best" of the three alternatives it considered, at least according to our criteria.
We also examine the prospects for non-utility transmission systems (NUTS). We find that
complete NUTS (which would be independent and competitive with existing systems) are
not economically viable in the short-term, nor would they be in the long-term without
revolutionary technological advances. Nevertheless, there are definite possibilities for
competitive provision of some transmission functions in the short-term. Non-utility firms
(partial Nutcos) should develop as new entrants are allowed into these niches. In the long-
term, these firms could propel further deregulation of transmission functions through the
evolutionary process of technology and policy advances. Provisions in contemporary
restructuring proposals that could serve as "headwaters" for later transmission deregulation
include: competitive solicitation of ancillary services to the greatest extent allowed by
technology, the creation of secondary markets for transmission service, transfer of system
control from utilities to independent system operators (ISOs), and market-based processes
for new transmission line construction and ownership. Other policy mechanisms, such as
favorable treatment for firms that use new technologies to supply transmission services,
could be used to stimulate technological innovation. By carefully considering the
consequences in advance, those who design today's deregulation proposals can lay the
groundwork for another radical and beneficial restructuring in the future.
Thesis Supervisor Richard Keith Lester
Title: Director, Industrial Performance Center
Professor of Nuclear Engineering
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PART I:
SETTING THE
CONTEXT

Chapter 1
Introduction
The electrical utility industry as we have known it -- especially in the past 15 years --
has been like ancient Rome. It was a bastion of civilization compared to the brawling,
deregulated world around it. It was an industry that was stable, profitable, and
predictable. It delivered electricity efficiently and economically to any and all
customers. As in ancient Rome, the barbarians are at the gate. And our glorious
civilization will never be the same. It need not be worse either.
-- John J. Barry (1994)
1.1 DEREGULATION COMES TO ELECTRIC POWER
1.1.1 Deregulation in the American Economy
The American economy has experienced a series of extraordinary changes during the past
two decades as industries that were once guided by command-and-control regulatory
structures have been opened to the free market. Starting with the airline industry in the late
1970s, numerous industries have undergone the liberating, yet wrenching process of
deregulation. The continued experience has been that:2
* Total costs always fall, they never rise;
* Productivity always increases, it never declines;
* Customers as a group always wind up with more choices, not fewer;
* Technological advance and new products are always spurred, never retarded;
* Responsiveness to customers improves, it does not degrade; and
* We never wish to restore regulated monopoly where it has been superseded by
genuine competition.
Now deregulation is beginning to encroach on the electric power industry, one of the last
bastions of command-and-control regulation, and one of the nation's largest industries. If
the experiences of other industries serve as a guide, electric power firms will soon
experience "a period of abrupt upheaval, intense competition, and rapid repositioning. '"3
1.1.2 What Makes Electric Power Special
With so many precedents in regulatory reform, it could be assumed that electric power
deregulation will be relatively straightforward and will follow a steady and predictable
course. Although the industry should benefit from the deregulation experiences of other
1Barry, 1994, 47.
2This list is quoted from: Bradford, 1994, 8.
3Gardner and Gilson, 1994, 24.
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industries, 4 it could also suffer from them. Noting that much of the discussion regarding
deregulation lacked a fundamental understanding of electric power technologies and
systems, Paul Joskow and Richard Schmalensee once commented, "Sound policy cannot
be made on the basis of casual analogies [to other industries, most notably airlines].
Airlines and electric utilities differ in fundamental ways that are central to the workings of
competition under deregulation."' 5 At least three sets of characteristics differentiate the
electric power industry from its deregulated predecessors.
1.1.2.1 Technical Reasons
Electric power systems are technically more complex than other deregulated production
systems. Paul Joskow comments,
An electric power system is an integrated physical network that operates as one
large machine, not a set of independent straws through which electrons flow.
While the laws of supply and demand and the invisible hand are very powerful,
they are not more powerful than the laws of physics and can operate efficiently
only by accommodating physical realities. 6
The physical laws that govern electric power flow lead to non-intuitive physical constraints
on the planning, operation, and economics of power systems.7 For example, electricity
cannot be stored (except at prohibitively high cost); and it must be moved over closely-
8coordinated, integrated systems that display large economies of scale. Furthermore, a
consequence of the interconnected nature of power systems is that competitors in a
deregulated industry structure would be intimately related to each other. This situation
would create significant opportunities and incentives for physical and economic
externalities. While the telephone and natural gas industries are often considered to be
analogs of the electric power industry, fundamental system operation differences exist
between them. For example, it is possible to store and direct the flow of natural gas
(neither of which can be done currently in an electric power system). Telephone systems
are designed to "switch" calls from a sender to his designated receiver. Furthermore, a
telephone system overload leads to busy signals for some callers, while an overloaded
electric power system could collapse. Restructuring implications and constraints arise from
these technical differences.
4 For example, the take-or-pay issue in the natural gas industry -- its version of "stranded investments."
5Joskow and Schmalensee, 1983, 8. While this quote was made in reference to the debate in 1983, when
talk of electric power deregulation was in its incipient stage, it is unfortunately still relevant to the current
situation.
6Joskow, January-February 1996, 69.
7 Kahn and Baldick, 1994, 191.8 Ruff, 1994, 25.
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1.1.2.2 Structural Reasons
Joskow and Schmalensee identify electric power system structural characteristics, some of
which are significantly different from those of other deregulated industries. Electric power9
systems are:
* Largely composed of immobile capital;
* Complex systems in general;
* Providers of a service which faced low demand growth;
* Financed through complex financing arrangements;
* Dominated by generating stations which still have long useful lives; 10
* Operated by a mix of private and public power agencies; and
* Subject to complex state and federal regulations.
When combined together, these structural characteristics make electric power industry
restructuring a particularly challenging undertaking.
1.1.2.3 Economic Impact Reasons
The industry is also "special" because of its large economic impact.
1.1.2.3.1 Industry size
The electric power industry is the most capital intensive part of the nation's infrastructure'1
(investor-owned utilities alone have $580 billion in utility plant assets), 12 and it is one of
the nation's largest industries in terms of employees (406,000)13 and revenues ($202.7
billion).14 In comparison with its deregulatory analogs, the electric power industry's
annual revenues are greater than those of the long-distance telephone, domestic airline and
natural gas industries, combined.15
1.1.2.3.2 The "Sun" of industry
Electricity is arguably the most fundamental input into the functioning of advanced societies
in the late twentieth century. As Schurr et al note, "In a remarkable profusion of
applications, electricity has penetrated deeply and brought important changes into virtually
every corner of American life." 16 We live in an age where electronics, and the information
technologies that are built upon them, are becoming the driving forces of our modern
9joskow and Schmalensee, 1983, 9.
10The current system is dominated by plants built in the 1970s and early 1980s. Source: Gillenwater,
1996, Chapter 4.
11 Source: "Vantage Point."
12 Edison Electric Institute, Statistical Yearbook of the Electric Utility Industry 1994, 85.
13Bureau of Labor Statistics, 1995, 96.
14 Energy Information Administration, November 1995b, 5.
15 Energy Information Administration, November 1995b; and Standard and Poors.
16Schurr et al, 1990, xiii.
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economy. The Japanese have described semiconductors as being the "rice" of 21st century
industries. To extend the metaphor, electricity could be described as the "sun" of industry
-- the energy source that powers semiconductors and most other high value-added
industries of today and tomorrow. Electricity also plays an important, often increasing role
in traditional industries. For example, the steel industry is undergoing significant change
as the result of electric arc furnaces. Indicative of this is the fraction of raw steel melted
electrically, which grew from 10 percent in 1965 to 35 to 40 percent today. 17
Because of these factors which make the electric power industry "special," it is important
that careful analysis, grounded in an understanding of the industry's technologies, be
incorporated into restructuring decisions.
1.2 CHANGING OBJECTIVES
The industry has traditionally been a classic example of a stable industry -- its structures,
players, and fundamental objectives have stayed constant or have been only marginally
modified over multiple decades. For example, during the 1970s and 1980s there were five
broad operating objectives for electric power systems: 18 satisfaction of consumer demand,
system security, cost minimization, fuel conservation, and minimization of environmental
impacts. While often conflicting, these were a well-defined and generally accepted set.
But the emergence of competition in the industry has turned this list on its head. Those
attempting to restructure the industry have proposed widely varying sets of objectives for
the industry's new competitive era.19 For example, the Wisconsin Public Service
Commission formulated three objectives for the restructuring process, 20 while the
Massachusetts Electric Industry Restructuring Roundtable developed eighteen.21 Thus, as
the industry moves from one era to another, its most fundamental assumptions, let alone
the details of how the industry should be constituted, are points of contention.
1.3 ISSUES IN THE CURRENT DEBATE
While industry restructuring raises many issues, two come to the fore in most deregulation
debates.
17 Gellings, 1994, 35. This is one of the major reasons that the energy intensity of steel production has
dropped 40% since 1960. Source: Ibid., 40-41.
18 Fink, 1983, 162-164.
19 See Appendix A for a listing of restructuring principles that have been advanced by regulatory bodies and
advocacy groups across the country.
2 0 Wisconsin Public Service Commission, July 1995, 3.
2 1Electric Industry Restructuring Roundtable, 1995.
Introduction 29
1.3.1 Stranded Investments
Probably the most divisive issue is determining how to handle stranded investments
(SIs).22 These "unused and useless" 23 investments include 24 "uneconomic" generating
plants, "uneconomic" power purchase contracts, regulatory assets, and public policy
programs. The SI issue is of particular importance to the nuclear power sector. While not
the only source of SI, uneconomic nuclear power plants are the largest contributors to it.
Utilities generally assert that they deserve full compensation for their SIs based upon a
fundamental agreement between state commissions and utilities, commonly termed the
"regulatory compact." In contrast, large industrial users and those who wish to enter the
generation market counter that these assets should be considered economic "sunk costs."
They further assert that any attempt to ameliorate these losses would produce pricing
inefficiencies and market distortions. Due to the tens or hundreds of billions of dollars at
stake, the debate over stranded investments debate is intense, and the parties will not easily
reach a compromise.
1.3.2 The Transmission Network and Open Access
The other focus of debate is the transmission network, which serves as the backbone of
modem electric power systems. Essentially all power that is produced for sale passes
through transmission systems. Electric utilities have traditionally built, owned, and
operated the transmission facilities located within their service area. Consequently, grid
ownership is highly fragmented -- there are approximately 166 investor-owned utilities
(IOUs) with transmission assets regulated by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
(FERC), 25 and numerous other regulation-exempt, transmission-owning public power
agencies.
The source of debate stems from the market power that vertically-integrated utilities would
have in a competitive generation market. Under the existing industry structure, utilities
would have financial incentives to prevent "competitive" power from being wheeled 26 over
22 For a more comprehensive discussion of the stranded investments issue, see Appendix B.7.6.
2 3Michaels, 1994.
24 The exact definition of stranded investments is a point of contention. For varying definitions, see:
Hirst and Baxter, 1995; Pierce, 1994; and Michaels, 1994.
2 5Source: "Electric Utilities to Provide Access for Competitors," D4.
2 6 Electric power is wheeled when the transmission lines of one or more utilities are used to transport
electric power from a seller to a buyer. Source: Kelly et al, 1987, iii.
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their transmission lines.27 Since transmission is a currently a monopoly function (and
28
many analysts believe that it is a natural monopoly), 28 vertical market power could allow
utilities an unfair advantage through their control of "bottleneck" transmission facilities.
The proposed remedy is to require that utilities offer transmission service to all users on an
equal basis (known as "open access"). Proponents advocate that open access would
eliminate the vertical market power of transmission-owning utilities, thereby facilitating the
development of an efficient generation market. However, those utilities that fear for their
future in a deregulated industry are reluctant to have these strategic assets converted to
"common carrier" status, since their control of the transmission system is their leverage in
restructuring debates and negotiations.
1.3.3 Moving Beyond Transition Issues
The focus on stranded investment and the portrayal of transmission as a "bottleneck" to
keep open, rather than as a valuable resource, are symptomatic of a debate that has the
lowering of near-term electricity rates at its heart. For example, in introducing its
pioneering proposed rulemaking on electric power industry deregulation, the California
Public Utilities Commission (CPUC) explicitly stated, "we are single-minded in its [the
rulemaking's] objective -- to lower the cost of electric service to California's residential and
29'business consumers without sacrificing the utility's financial integrity."9 With such a
perspective driving the process, it is not surprising that much of the debate has focused
upon transitional and short-term issues. However, this thesis argues that this near-term
focus is mistaken and we seek to look beyond the near-term.
1.4 THE IMPORTANCE OF THE LONG-TERM PERSPECTIVE
While transition issues are daunting and require careful study, they should be handled in
the context of a longer-term outlook. As Paul Joskow comments, "[In the year 2005] no
one will remember what a stranded cost is."30 Nevertheless, it is difficult to take a long-
term view when some industry participants face significant near-term issues. For example,
27 A less important, but non-trivial incentive for blocking wheeling is that increased line losses accompany
increased power flows. Approximately 3% of power is dissipated due to the resistance of transmission lines
and reactive power. Line losses increase as lines become more heavily loaded. There is no generally agreed
upon method for compensating for these losses, as a result, transmission utilities are forced to bear them.
2 8And as such, requires regulation. For instance, see: Hyman, 1994, 134.
29CPUC, 20 April 1994, 1. The analogous order by the Massachusetts Department of Public Utilities
featured a similar comment. See: Massachusetts Department of Public Utilities, 16 August 1995, 1.
30 Joskow, January-February 1996, 67.
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some utilities have stranded investments greater than their stockholder equity 31 and some
industrial customers are trying to cut costs in order to stay in business. Nevertheless,
taking the long-term view is important for the well-being of society and of the industry's
firms. As Richard Pierce notes:
Utilities also need to resist the tendency to become so preoccupied with
minimizing transition costs that they neglect the process of devising a new legal
regime that is capable of producing an efficient and reliable post-transition
electricity market. While the FERC must take the lead in that process, the task
is so difficult and multi-faceted that the FERC cannot hope to be successful
without the active assistance of utilities. The FERC desperately needs help in
crafting regulatory rules that will produce healthy incentives for socially
beneficial patterns of investment and transactions, and in nurturing the new
institutions and ways of doing business that are critical to creation of an efficient
and reliable post-transition electricity market. The electric utility community
cannot allow the bitter conflicts among market participants that will occur
throughout the transition process to mask the reality that all market participants
share an interest in creating a new legal environment that will allow the
electricity market to function efficiently once the transition is complete. 32
The desirability of creating the efficient legal environment mentioned above is just one of
several reasons that the public policy process of restructuring the electric power industry
should focus on the long-term.
Another reason for having a long-term focus is that pricing structures developed for short-
term issues can cause economic distortions in capital expenditures. Meyer and Tye
conclude from their study of deregulation transition pricing in the transportation and
telecommunications industries that:
Substantial departures from prices based upon long-run cost considerations,
even though sometimes bestowing short-run benefits, have a good deal of
potential for achieving misallocation of resources and other economic mischief
in the long-run. 33
Since many electric power assets (including transmission capital investments) are immobile
and long-lived, "improper" capital investment decisions caused by price distortions would
have decades-long consequences. 34
The desirability of technological development is yet another reason for having a long-term
focus. Economic research has found that the path of technological development is not
predetermined -- breakthroughs are a function of an industry's market structure and prior
3 1For instance, see: Baxter and Hirst, 1995.
32 Pierce, 1994, 349-350.
33 Meyer and Tye, 1985, 49.
34 Due to depreciation cycles, this issue is larger than electric power than in some other industries. For
example, in the semiconductor industry, massive capital investments are made on production facilities that
are used (and paid for) on the order of several years. Source: Lohr, 1995, 14.
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breakthroughs. 35 Technological adoption and development choices are influenced, if not
driven, by market incentives and explicit public policy decisions. As a result, future
efficiency improvements could be sacrificed if attention is focused on near-term issues and
contemporary technologies, rather than on incentives for technological development and
long-run efficiency.
Finally, responsible policy-making dictates a concern for the long-term. In order for
societies and firms36 to sustain themselves, they must look ahead and make provisions for
the long-run. Consequently, new institutional arrangements not only must function and
provide efficiency gains in the near-term, but must also provide for a sustainable system
over the long-term. Historically, the American electric power industry has been generally
successful at providing reliable power at a price in line with other developed nations. 37 A
long-term perspective should help ensure that this high technical performance continues as
new ownership and economic structures emerge from the restructuring process.
1.5 THE TRANSITION IN PERSPECTIVE
While we advocate that a long-term perspective is important, we also recognize that a
transition period that includes the resolution of significant issues must nevertheless be
traversed before a dynamic equilibrium, with its anticipated increased efficiencies, can be
reached. The industry has arrived at its current state as a result of a century-long
evolutionary process. It is naive to believe that it can be completely reconstituted overnight
in an efficient manner. Any attempt to do so would run counter to the incremental nature of
American policy-making, would ignore the constraints and commitments -- both implicit
and explicit -- of the former system, and would assume knowledge of the future that does
not exist.
Neither the length of the transition period, nor the work that must occur during it, are
trivial. Other industries, such as natural gas and telecommunications, have now been
moving through their transition periods for more than a decade. Evidence from practice
and theory indicates that the movement to a new industry structure is not deterministic --
dynamic efficiency could be reached in many different states, and at many different levels
of efficiency. As a result, the decisions that are made regarding how to handle transition
3 5 See, for example: Arthur, 1989.
3 6 For example, the MIT Commission on Industrial Productivity's findings illustrate the disastrous
consequences that can occur when firms become too focused on short-term performance. See: Dertouzos et
al, 1989, 53-66.
37 Kahn, 1996, 47; and Smith, 1996.
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issues impact the current players and their short-term interests as well as the industry's
long-term efficiency. These transition debates also occur in the presence of great
uncertainties about the future -- ranging from political issues to technological innovation.
Because of these factors and the iterative nature of policy-making, we should not expect
that decisions made today will be the "correct" and final ones. Rather, policies should be
designed such that they lead the market toward greater long-run efficiency (rather than
attempt to get there in one bold move). However, they should focus on achieving a more
efficient future, rather than benefits in the short-term.
The focus on short-term issues, such as opening the competitive bottleneck from
transmission systems, has brought with it another unfortunate result -- precious little
attention is being paid to the future development of transmission systems.
1.6 THE IMPORTANCE OF EXAMINING TRANSMISSION
Electric power transmission networks are technically and economically highly complex
systems. Consequently, their efficient operation in a restructured industry will not happen
by chance -- it will occur as a result of careful deliberation during the restructuring process.
The technical complexity of transmission systems stems from their function of moving
enormous amounts of power over a wide area, constrained by the necessity of
instantaneously 38 balancing load and generation, while preserving a stable power
frequency and voltage. Due to the many pieces of power generating and consuming
equipment that interact with transmission systems at any given moment, operating within
these constraints is especially difficult.
The economic complexity of transmission systems is related to their inherent externalities as
well as their high capital costs and low marginal costs. The intimate physical relationships
between the power flows of the grid's users create many opportunities for externalities,
which have implications for transmission pricing structures. The high fixed costs of
transmission assets also pose a challenge because, as noted by MIT economist Peter
Temin, "there is no uniquely correct way to allocate fixed costs to units of production." 39
Consequently, although transmission pricing mechanisms are partly arbitrary, they must be
designed to allocate capital costs in a manner which provides appropriate incentives for
system use and prevents or minimizes externalities. Pricing schemes must also provide
38 i.e. on a scale of 1/60 of a second and or less.
39 Temin, 1994, 11.
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sufficient revenues and appropriate incentives for capital improvements and maintenance.
Furthermore, it is important to consider incentives for technological development when
designing transmission pricing mechanisms. With trillions of kWh and billions of dollars
crossing transmission systems every year, even small technical performance improvements
would have significant financial benefits.
1.7 THESIS OBJECTIVES
1.7.1 Assumption of Increased Competition
The momentum for deregulating the industry is great, and the experiences of other
industries indicate that once unleashed, deregulatory forces are nearly impossible to
contain. As Alfred Kahn noted recently, "once you begin to admit competition, it
introduces strains and distortions that can typically be resolved only by further
deregulation." 40 Given the forces within the industry and in society at large, this thesis
operates under the assumption that the deregulation process will continue.
1.7.2 The Thesis Topic
This thesis evaluates the long-term implications for transmission systems of current
restructuring decisions. The basic approach is to evaluate five industry restructuring
proposals based upon their predicted impact on the long-term economic efficiency of
transmission systems. While we examine specific proposals, we also attempt to gain
insights on the relative merits of several restructuring frameworks (i.e. pool-based,
bilateral, etc.). The thesis also explores the prospect of deregulating the transmission
system itself, of parts thereof. Specifically, we explore whether it is realistic to
contemplate the emergence of non-utility transmission systems (NUTS). In our analysis
we consider two types of NUTS -- complete NUTS, which would be complete, competing
transmission systems; and partial NUTS, which would mean that some of the transmission
services on a common transmission system are provided competitively.
In order to carry out our analysis, we develop economic efficiency criteria that are based on
economic research and principles, and on lessons learned in previous deregulation
experiences. We strive to perform this analysis with a grounding in the technical details
and historical context of the electric power industry.
4 0 Kahn, October 1994, 27.
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1.7.3 The Thesis as Technology and Policy
At its core, this thesis deals with both technology and policy issues. Electric power
industry restructuring is a policy debate with many fascinating aspects. While deregulation
is being forwarded because it is expected to provide net benefits to society, it will also
result in large, direct transfers of wealth. With billions of dollars at stake, there will be
clear winners and losers.41 As a result, strong interests are being brought to bear on the
political process as it goes through the complicated task of reconstituting the industry. In
addition to its financial ramifications, the debate's outcome has significant implications for
the relationship between the government and the private sector.
However, these political processes must be bounded by the constraints of the industry's
physical and financial "technologies." The challenge in creating an efficient industry
structure is to make appropriate connections between two "parallel universes": the technical
operation of electric power systems and the industry's financial workings. While the
technical and financial "universes" function separately, they cannot function independently.
Decisions in one have implications in the other. In a deregulated industry, the physical
flows of electricity and the financial flows of money could be very different, but they must
be reconciled in a manner that signals the efficient use of physical and financial resources in
the short- and long-run. A further complication is that the physical universe is constrained
by existing massive infrastructures which must obey the laws of physics. These
infrastructures have traditionally been operated in a technically laudable manner.
Consequently, a restructuring objective should be to reconstitute the industry's financial
structures while maintaining (or making few changes to) its enviable physical operation.
The thesis seeks to bring this technical perspective to the debate in full recognition that the
ultimate decisions about industry restructuring will be made through political processes,
where compromise, political entrepreneurship, and power are often of greater importance
than technical accuracy.
1.7.4 Relevance to Nuclear Engineering
This thesis is also relevant to nuclear engineering because restructuring will have an
important impact on the future of the nuclear industry. The manner by which prices are set
and the network is configured could determine whether currently operating nuclear plants
will face "early" shutdown. The potential for future plants will also be affected by
deregulation. 42 If the public would once again accept the use of nuclear technology for
4 1Vamos, 1995, 24.
4 2For instance, see: "Deregulating the U.S. Electric Industry."
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electricity generation, the economics of the grid and the larger industry would determine
whether investors would be willing to build and operate them.
1.8 THESIS OUTLINE
The thesis is divided into three parts: setting the context, establishing evaluation criteria,
and analysis.
1.8.1 Part I: Setting the Context
The next four chapters lay the groundwork for the current debate. Chapter 2 describes
the basic technical characteristics of the industry, with a particular emphasis on
transmission.
Chapter 3 summarizes the industry's history, focusing on events that are crucial for
understanding today's restructuring. The chapter also discusses the industry's current
status and offers some thoughts on its future. This chapter is augmented by a fuller
discussion of the industry's history, which occurs in Appendix B.
Chapter 4 examines how utilities have made internal changes in recent years to better
prepare for the coming competitive era.
Chapter 5 discusses various electric power industry deregulation processes and
proposals. It begins with a brief survey of the electric power deregulation experiences in
other countries. The chapter then explores the deregulation debate in California, the state
leading the deregulation process in the U.S., and outlines several proposals which have
been considered there. Developments and proposals in several other states that are actively
pursuing deregulation are next discussed. The chapter also examines the March 1995
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission proposed rulemaking that is intended to facilitate
non-discriminatory open access to transmission systems. The chapter concludes by listing
the five proposals that are evaluated later in the thesis.
1.8.2 Part II: Establishing Evaluation Criteria
Criteria for evaluating the restructuring proposals are developed in the four chapters in this
part of the thesis. Chapter 6 examines the process of deregulation in two industries that
are often used as templates for electric power deregulation discussions: natural gas and
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long-distance telephone service. These cases are reviewed in order to gain insights on
long-run economic efficiency implications.
Chapter 7 examines three transmission technologies that are currently under development,
and their potential impact on electric power systems in the future.
Chapter 8 employs criteria based upon competitive strategy frameworks to explore the
question, "would divestment be economically efficient?"
Chapter 9 draws upon the previous chapters as well as economic principles and research,
to develop criteria by which the deregulation proposals are evaluated for their impact on
long-run economic efficiency in transmission.
1.8.3 Part III: Analysis
The final part of the thesis is devoted to analysis. Chapter 10 evaluates the five
restructuring proposals against the economic efficiency criteria developed in Chapter 9.
Chapter 11 probes the concept of non-utility transmission systems (NUTS). The chapter
identifies potential benefits, drawbacks, and impediments to their development. It also
explores the likely impact of current deregulation proposals on the development of NUTS,
outlines potential pathways for their development, and mentions potential NUTS
developers.
Chapter 12 presents the thesis's conclusions.
The Afterword provides a brief commentary on two major industry events which are
particularly relevant to this thesis, but which occurred as final revisions were being made.

Chapter 2
What Is Transmission and Why Is It
Important?
The role of the transmission network in transporting power and in coordinating the
efficient suppfy of electricity in both the short run and long run is the heart of a
moadern etectric power system. The transmission system is not just a transportation
network that moves electricity from individual generating plants to load centers.
Transmission plays the most fundamental role in achieving the economies of electric
power suppty that modern technology make possible. The practice of ignoring the
criticalfunctions played6y the transmission system in many discussions of deregulation
almost certainly feads to incorrect conclusions about the optimal structure of an
electric power system.'
-PaulL. Joskow and RichardSchmafensee (1983)
2.1 INTRODUCTION
Viewed in some ways, electricity is the consummate commodity -- the delivery of
electrons, one of the fundamental particles in all matter. In comparison, even potatoes
seem complicated, for while there are russets, Idahos, and California whites, there is only
one kind of electron (with respect to electric power delivery). But this perspective on
electric power production and delivery is over-simplified. While the production of potatoes
occurs through a series of somewhat connected, yet discrete steps, there is an intimate
interconnection between the production, physical delivery, and use of electrons in an
electric power system. As a result, although electric power provision exhibits some of the
economic characteristics of commodities -- product standardization and the ability to
quantify the product -- the intimate relationship between production and use makes
electricity a special product. In order to explain this, analogies to other systems, such as
natural gas or telephone service, are made. However, despite the many similarities to
telecommunications and natural gas systems, electric power systems have important,
unique technological characteristics, such the inability to "switch" or "gate" power flows
and the necessity of instantaneously balancing generation and load (electricity demand).
The intent of this chapter is to provide a basic introduction to the technology and economics
of electric power production. We briefly examine each of the three major components of an
1Joskow and Schmalensee, 1983, 63.
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electric power system: generation, distribution, and transmission. Through our discussion
we hope to provide the reader with an answer to the question, what is transmission and
why is it important? We begin our discussion with the industry segment that is largest in
terms of costs, and which is receiving most attention in the deregulation debates.
2.2 GENERATION
Electric power generation is the process by which electrons become excited, thus creating
electric energy. The most common type of generating stations are thermal-steam plants. In
these plants, water is heated into steam, which passes through a turbine, which in turn
propels a generator. The generator is a coil of wire that turns on a rotor in the midst of a
magnetic field.2 In the United States, the most common fuel source for heating the water is
coal, with uranium (in nuclear plants) coming a distant second (in terms of power
generated).
Table 2.1: U.S. Electric Power Capacity and Generation,
By Fuel Source and Prime-Mover (1994)
Capacity Net Generation
Fuel Source (MW) (Million kWh)
Fossil Steam 445,296 2,001,561
Coal-Fired 301,098 1,635,493
Petroleum-Fired 41,151 86,469
Gas-Fired 103,047 259,554
Nuclear 99,148 640,440
Gas Turbine/Internal Combustion 59,575 36,130
Petroleum-Fired 28,768 4,570
Gas-Fired 30,807 31,560
Hydroelectric Pumped Storage 21,168 -3,378
Renewable
Conventional Hydroelectric 75,196 247,071
Geothermal 1,747 6,941
Biomass 459 1,988
Source: Energy Information Administration, 1995b, 10, 22.
This thermal-steam process is based upon the Rankine cycle, and is a rather energy-
inefficient process. The Rankine cycle's limit on energy conversion efficiency is about
40%,3 which means that at least 60% of the energy input is "wasted." In recent years,
cogeneration and combined-cycle power plants, which use this "waste heat" for productive
purposes, have come into greater use.
2For more detail see: Graves, 1995, 2-15.
3 Yeager, 1994. This is the theoretical limit. Most plants have efficiencies of 28%-35%.
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The power produced in almost all American electric generators is three-phase alternating
current (AC) power with a frequency of 60 hertz.
Generation is the largest expense in the electric power production and delivery process,
accounting for approximately 57% of fixed costs, and 75% of operation and maintenance
(O&M) costs.4 (See Figures 2.1 and 2.2) Because of the large amount of money involved,
relatively small efficiency improvements have large financial benefits. This is one of the
factors that drives the push toward deregulating this segment of the industry.
Figure 2.1: Electric Power Production Expenses for Major U.S.
Utilities (1994)
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Source: Energy Information Administration, December 1995.
2.3 DISTRIBUTION
Distribution systems, which are at the other end of the power production and delivery
process, receive electricity from transmission systems and deliver it to end users. In most
cases, the power voltage is stepped down by transformers when it comes off a
transmission system and is delivered to customers at relatively low voltages. Distribution
4Energy Information Administration, December 1993.
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is a relatively capital-intensive process, accounting for 27% of total utility assets while only
6% of O&M expenses. 5 It is widely accepted that distribution's technical function ("the
wires") is a natural monopoly.6
Figure 2.2: Utility Plant Value for Major U.S. Electric Utilities (1992)
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Source: Energy Information Administration, December 1993, 46-47.
Distribution systems also aggregate their customers' loads and produce or procure
sufficient power to meet them. For example, a vertically-integrated utility has a service
territory and is responsible for meeting the power needs of its customers through power it
produces itself.7 Likewise, a distribution-only utility is responsible for procuring (rather
than producing) a sufficient amount of power for its customers. In both cases, the
aggregation function is a relatively passive activity -- projecting and summing demand.
This could change drastically once the industry is restructured. Because of new ownership
5Energy Information Administration, December 1993. Note, the latter statistic is slightly skewed since it is
for large, investor-owned utilities. These entities produce the power for a number of customers of other
entities, such as municipal utilities and electric cooperatives. Thus, distribution likely accounts for a
slightly greater share of the assets and costs in the total industry.
61n fact, the argument that it would be inefficient to have competing wires running down both sides of a
street is an effective example when explaining the concept of a natural monopoly.
7Only in recent years have wholesale purchases made up a significant amount of vertically-integrated power
sales.
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structures, information technologies, and economic incentives, aggregation could become
an active function and the necessity of bundling the "the wires" and aggregation functions
of distribution could be eliminated. In fact, many analysts believe that this unbundling is
possible and would be beneficial.8 The argument for retail wheeling is predicated upon this
belief. If unbundling occurs, the "wires" part of distribution would continue as a regulated
natural monopoly function while the aggregation function -- energy services -- would be a
separate, unregulated (or lightly regulated) activity.
2.4 TRANSMISSION
In between generators and distribution systems are transmission systems,9 which integrate
power supply and demand. While we speak of these as being separate, there is overlap
between transmission and generation and transmission and distribution. In both cases,
attempts are being made to define the boundaries between them more precisely, but to some
extent (especially between generation and transmission) the interconnectedness of electric
power systems makes the problem intractable.
2.4.1 General Discussion
Transmission systems are relatively insignificant in terms of their contribution to the cost of
electricity -- representing approximately 2% of O&M expenses1 0 and about 12% of capital
assets. 11 As a result, many analysts neglect the importance of efficiency in transmission.
However, because of the important role that transmission plays as an integrator of
resources in electric power systems, the long-term economic efficiency of transmission
systems is important.
2.4.2 Composition of Transmission Systems
An examination of the technical nature of transmission systems requires a discussion of
their composition on several levels.
8For example, see: Knight, 41995; and Tabors, Caramanis and Associates, 1995.
9 1t should be noted that there is no clear or consensus division between transmission and distribution
systems. In the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on transmission open access (Mega-NOPR), the FERC
attempted to do this, but was unable to draw a bright line. See: FERC, April 1995, 17711-17718.
10Energy Information Administration, December 1993, 31.
1 1Ibid., 46-47. The O&M cost figure is probably low by several percent, since some "transmission"
functions, namely the provision of some ancillary services, are provided by generators and therefore the cost
of their provision would be included in the generation O&M statistics.
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Figure 2.3 Principal Physical Elements of Electric Power Systems
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2.4.2.1 Control Areas
According to the most recent definition of the Institute for Electric and Electronic engineers,
a control area is,
an electric power system or combination of electric power systems to which a
common automatic generation control scheme is applied in order to: 1. match, at
all time, the power output of the generators within the electric power system(s)
and capacity and energy purchased from entities outside the electric power
system(s), with the load within the electric power system(s); 2. maintain, within
the limits of good utility practice, scheduled interchange with other control
areas; 3. maintain the frequency of the electric power system(s) within
reasonable limits in accordance with good utility practice; and 4. provide
abstation
^
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sufficient generating capacity to maintain operating reserves in accordance with
good utility practice. 12
Each control area has at least one energy control center (ECC) from which system dispatch
occurs. A control area can consist of the complete or partial assets of one utility or can
encompass those of a group of utilities. 13 There are approximately 140 control areas in the
United States.14
2.4.2.2 Transmission System Functional Components
Continuing the atomic structure analogy, we identify three transmission "sub-atomic
particles:" transmission lines, ancillary services, and system control. 15 For this thesis, we
here define the transmission system to be composed of these three functions and all of the
operations included in them -- even those provided by generators (i.e. several of the
ancillary services).
2.4.2.2.1 Transmission lines
When one thinks of transmission systems, what probably first comes to mind are the large
towers and long lines that cross the countryside. In 1995, there were 150,826 circuit miles
of 230 kV and above transmission lines in the continental United States16 and this number
is expected to grow to 159,677 by the year 2004.17 At least three conductors (at least one
for each phase of power) 18 are used for each circuit. The conductors are most frequently
made of dozens of strands of aluminum wire wrapped around a steel core. 19 These are
attached to the transmission towers by insulating materials. The cost of constructing a new
transmission line ranges from $500,000 to $1 million per mile,20 with the line's conductors
alone representing between 20% and 40% of the total cost.21 As a result, it is significantly
12IEEE Power Engineering Society, 1996, 3. According to the same source, an electric power system is
"the generation, transmission, distribution, and other facilities operated as an electric utility or a portion
thereof." Ibid., 4.
13 Wisconsin Public Service Commission, October 1995, 43.
14 Joskow, 1995, 20.
15 This characterization could be disputed. We use it because it is illustrative and because the debate on
defining transmission system functions has not yet reached consensus For example, see: Hirst and Kirby,
1995.
16 North American Electric Reliability Council, September 1995, 23.
17 Ibid. As of 1993, there were 642,377 circuit miles of 22 kV or higher power lines in the United States.
Source: Edison Electric Institute, 1993, 97.
18 1n order to eliminate the "corona problem," multiple conductors for each phase are often used.
19 Kelly et al, 1987, 16.
20 Factors such as number of circuits, terrain, population, and type of structure used account for the large
variation in cost. Source: FERC, 1989, 46.
2 1Orawski, 1993, 222.
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less expensive to add a second circuit to an existing line than to build an entirely new set of
structures when new capacity is needed.
Table 2.2 Relative Load Carrying Capacities of Transmission Lines
Voltage (kV) Year Introduced Maximum Power
on American grid Capacity (MW)
230 1920s 200
345 1952 550
500 1964 1200
745 1969 2700
Sources: Federal Power Commission, 1964, Vol. 1,149-151
Edison Electric Institute, Statistical Yearbook of the Electric Utility Industry, various years
Improvements in transmission technologies (in the form of higher voltage lines)
significantly expanded the feasibility of transferring large quantities of power, and in the
process allowed for increased exploitation of power pooling benefits. 22
2.4.2.2.2 Ancillary Services
Ancillary services are "those services necessary to support the transmission of energy from
resources to loads while maintaining reliable operation of the transmission provider's
transmission system in accordance with good utility practice." 23 In short, they are the
"glue" that hold the transmission network together. 24 The Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission (FERC) has identified six ancillary services: 25
* Reactive power/voltage control: providing or absorbing reactive power by
reactive power generation or static devices;
* Loss compensation: generating power to replace power lost in the transmission
system;
* Scheduling and dispatch: unit commitment and economic dispatch;26
* Load following: automatic generation control;27
* System protection service: spinning reserves, stand-by reserves, transmission
reserves, and local area security; and
* Energy imbalance service: compensating for differences in the scheduled and
actual power flows.
2 2 See Section 2.6.3.1.
23 IEEE Power Engineering Society, 1996, 2.
24 Ilic' and Graves, August 1995, 1.
25 FERC, April 1995, 17683-17685.
26 For a definition of these, see: 2.4.2.1.3.
27 For a discussion of this, see: 2.4.3.1.
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The concept and definition of "ancillary services" is relatively new. In the current industry
structure, each of these (often interrelated) functions is provided by vertically-integrated
utilities (where the generation and transmission provider are one in the same). However,
some of these "transmission" services -- such as loss compensation, dynamic reactive
power/voltage control, and load following -- are provided by generating plants. If
generation and transmission are unbundled, 28 the situation will become more complicated.
Defining ancillary services, 29 let alone ensuring their provision, is one of the most
technically complicated undertakings in the restructuring process.
Several of the ancillary services are part of the transmission function we call system
control, to which we pay special attention here.
2.4.2.2.3 System Control
System control pulls together the various transmission system sub-components. This
occurs in an ECC, where the system controller estimates power needs, schedules and
dispatches generating facilities, and makes appropriate adjustments as system events
(including emergencies) occur. The goals of system control are to maintain reliability (keep
the system together) and to produce and deliver power in an economically efficient manner.
Several system control tasks are of particular interest to this thesis.
2.4.2.2.3.1 Unit commitment30
The system operator's initial attempt to match load with appropriate generating capacity in
an economic manner occurs during unit commitment, in which the system operator
schedules plants in hourly blocks with an advance time horizon of one day to one week.
The two primary unit commitment tasks are:31
* Scheduling the on and off times of generating facilities; and
* Ensuring that startup and shutdown rates, and minimum up and minimum down
times are considered.
Factors that are considered in unit commitment decisions include: 32
* Maintenance scheduling;
* Nuclear refueling and production scheduling;
* Daily load forecasting;
* Hydro and pumped storage production scheduling; and
* Reliability analysis.
28 Generation and transmission are operated by separate entities. As is seen later in the thesis, such a move
seems inevitable.
2 9 There is not a consensus that the FERC has a complete list. For a critique of the FERC's list and
proposition of additional services, see: Hirst and Kirby, 1995.
30 The information for this section comes from Gruhl et al, 1975.
3 1Gruhl et al, 1975, 116.3 2Ibid.
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Depending upon how the industry is restructured, some, if not many of these unit
commitment (planning) functions might be eliminated, at least on a centralized basis.
Doing so, while retaining system reliability, would be a non-trivial technical challenge that
is not fully appreciated by many who advocate rapid, radical deregulation.
2.4.2.2.3.2 Economic Dispatch
The considerations taken into account for unit commitment are also important for economic
dispatch, which entails administering the output of generation assets on a time scale of
minutes and seconds. According to the FERC,
"Economic dispatch" refers to the process of operating the various resources of
the system so as to minimize costs... The ongoing problem is to determine,
preferably on a continuous basis, the combination of generation resources,
including purchases over the interconnections, which minimizes overall
electrical energy production costs while maintaining reliability...
When two or more generating utilities are dispatched as a single control area,
the process is known as "central dispatch." 33
Figure 2.4 A Sample34 Weekly Load Diagram
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In order to do this in the current electric power industry, the system controller must know
the production cost structure of each plant in the control area. As the FERC notes,
3 3FERC, 1981, 27.
34The data in this figure was made-up by the author in attempt to illustrate the point.
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The incremental cost of producing an additional kilowatt-hour on any electric
generator depends upon the characteristics of the unit... The minimum control
area production costs will occur when every on-line generating unit has an
incremental cost no greater than the incremental cost of any block of generation
not already loaded. The value of common incremental cost at any time is
referred to as the "system lambda." It is a function of economic dispatch to
determine the proper loading on each unit such that the total load is met at the
lower possible production cost consistent with other necessary constraints, such
as transmission line loading, transmission losses, spinning reserve
requirements, and environmental considerations. 35
The result of economic dispatch is that generators with low marginal costs, such as nuclear
plants, are run essentially all of the time. These are referred to as base-load plants. Others,
"intermediate" and "peaking plants," are turned on and off by the system controller, based
upon the plants' incremental production costs and changes in demand. (See Figure 2.4) In
deciding which plants should operate, the system controller performs optimal load flow
calculations.
We briefly explore the mathematics of these calculations by outlining their use on a system
with 5 transmission lines, two generators, 2 interconnections (to other transmission
systems), and three distribution system loads. (For a visual depiction of such a system,
see Figure 2.3.) The goal of economic dispatch is to minimize the total production cost:
4
min T = min c (P )
i=l i  Gi
Subject to: PG = PD + PL
(Equation 2.1)
where:
Tc = Total cost
PGi = Real power production at bus (generator) i (or power coming from an
interconnection)
c(PGi) = Production cost of P units of power at bus i.
PDj = Demand at busj
PLk(PG1, PG2, PG3, PG4, PD1, PD2, PD3) = losses along line k based upon the
generation and demand but neglecting transmission line limits
3
PD = P
j=1 Dj
4
PG = P
i=1 Gi
35Ibid.
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5
PD = PLk
k=1
(Note: This is a simplified case since it does not consider transmission line constraints.)
To find the solution, we solve the Lagrangian:
L(PGI, PG2, PG3, PG4,X) = C(PG1, PG2, PG3, PG4) + X (PD + PL-PG1 - PG2 - PG3- PG4)
(Equation 2.2)
dCGi
From this, it can be shown that system lambda, * = dPGidP(1 )
dGi (Equation 2.3)
When a further simplifying assumption is made (transmission losses are neglected), it can
be shown that optimal dispatch occurs when:
=G G2  =... G3  c. 4
dPGl dPG2  dPG3  dPG4
(Equation 2.4)
These solutions indicate that least-cost production occurs when the marginal costs of all
dispatched generators are equal, or, in the case of Equation 2.3, when the marginal costs
are equivalent when transmission losses are considered.
2.4.2.3 Interconnected Grids
To complete the "atomic" analogy, control areas are the building blocks of the
interconnected grids. Control areas in the Continental United States and much of Canada
and Mexico are interconnected into three larger systems: Eastern System (essentially east of
the Rocky Mountains), Western System, and Texas System.36 Within an interconnected
grid, the ECCs are responsible for maintaining reliability and balancing electricity supply
and demand in their own control area. However, they can turn to each other to meet some
of their supply needs during emergencies or through planned transactions.
36By having its own system, Texas escapes federal regulation of transmission.
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While control areas could function independently, the grid has been interconnected for
important reasons, which include:37
* Reserve capacity sharing;
* Improved reliability;
* Economic dispatch;
* More optimal capacity expansion; and
* Joint planning and maintenance.
Interconnections between control areas can also:38
* Provide flexibility for contingencies;
* Reduce installed generating capacity; and
* Allow economic sharing of generation among systems.
These benefits can be broken down into two closely-related broad categories: coordination
for reliability and coordination for economy. 39 Interconnection increases reliability because
of its larger "pool" of generators (compared to a single system). As a result, a control area
has the resources of multiple systems at its disposal when the need for a contingency
supply arises, and probabilistic characteristics of large pools are also more favorable.
Interconnection is economically desirable because a utility can partially rely on others for
emergency and non-emergency 40 contingencies, and therefore, it needs less reserve
capacity. Interconnection also allows for de facto economic dispatch of multiple utility
systems by facilitating beneficial power trades. Increasingly active wholesale power
markets have resulted from interconnections. Estimates place the value of wholesale
wheeling at $57 billion, up 40% over the past five years. 41
2.4.3 Physical Laws of Transmission Systems
The need for ancillary services and system control stems from the fact that transmission
systems, like all systems, obey physical laws. In the case of electric power systems,
however, the intimate relationship between the various system components and the wave
nature of electricity make the physical laws of system operation more constraining than for
almost any other production system. Let us examine several of the important "special"
physical laws of electric power systems.
2.4.3.1 Instantaneous Balancing of Generation and Load
An important constraint on electric power systems is that the amount of power generated
must match load on an essentially instantaneous basis. This constraint results from the
3 7Nelson, 1974, 19-27. A much more extensive list is presented by the FERC. See: FERC, 1981, 15-16.
3 8North American Electric Reliability Council, 1990, 28.
3 9 FERC, 1981, 2.
4 0 Such as taking a plant off-line for maintenance.
41Source: "Open Access Not Good For Everyone..."
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inability to store power economically, and has profound consequences for the industry.
Two of these consequences are the system operator's unit commitment and economic
dispatch functions, which "coarsely" and "finely" match generation with load, respectively.
For the "finest" adjustments, "natural" physical components, such as automatic generation
controllers (AGCs), work to match demand and load on an nearly instantaneous basis. 42
Another significant consequence is the need for spinning and standby reserves, which can
be called upon in the event of an emergency on an instantaneous and 10-minute time scale,
respectively. These two sets of consequences are among many that result from this
physical constraint.
2.4.3.2 Path of Least Impedance and Loop Flows
Electricity flows along the path of least impedance (rather than the path of least distance).
This physical law and the fact that "the electric grid was built purposely without "valves" to
capture the huge reliability benefits that come from allowing nature -- not contracts -- to
manage the flow," 4 3 makes electric power systems different from nearly any other
production system. In particular, power flows are guided by time-variant complex physical
interactions, subject only to indirect human control (through adjusting power generation)
on a normal operating basis.44 As a result, "loop flows" occur -- when power is sent over
the grid, some of it will go along the geographically "most direct" path, but some of it will
go along other "parallel" lines,. This has significant implications when attempts are made
to assign responsibility and recovery for the flows of power transactions. A recent report
by the North American Electric Reliability Council (NERC) states,
Electric power transfers in ac systems will be distributed, in varying degrees,
on all transmission paths between two areas. The resultant transmission line
loadings will be in accordance with known electrical network relationships, but
may not be in accord with any contract or agreement that established the
scheduled transfers between the two areas.
When such electric power transfers between two areas distribute onto the
facilities of other interconnect systems not contractually (or directly) involved in
the agreement between the transacting parties, the unintended electric power
flows on these neighboring or adjacent system facilities are known as "parallel
path flows." In some cases, the parallel path flows may result in transmission
limitations in the neighboring or adjacent systems, which can limit the transfer
capability between two contracting areas. 45
4 2For more details, see: Ilic' et al, 1996, 63.
43 Hogan, 1993, 19.
"In the case of emergencies, system controllers can "disconnect" transmission lines.
4 5 NERC, May 1995, 13.
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The result is that the same deleterious impacts (heightened transmission losses, and the
potential for reactive power and congestion problems) that are felt along the "primary" path
also occur along these parallel flow paths. However, if contracts are written so that only
the utility over whose transmission system a power transaction is theoretically wheeled
(based upon a legally defined "contract path") receives compensation, the neighboring and
parallel utilities, over whose lines some or much of the power might actually flow, would
not be equitably treated.
2.4.3.3 Reactive Power
Real and reactive power flow across transmission lines. Although real power is what is
intentionally produced and what is used for useful purposes, reactive power cannot be
ignored. Theoretically, reactive power is the imaginary part of the power function,
P(t) = V I cos(1l+cos(2omt)) + i V I sin)(2ot).
(Equation 2.5)46
Reactive power is produced (or consumed)47 when the AC voltage and current waves
become out of phase48 as the result of either wave being retarded by system loads or other
equipment (including transmission lines themselves). Reactive power results in real power
losses, and in extreme cases, damages system equipment. As a result, reactive power
production and consumption devices (inductors and capacitors) are placed on the system.
Some of these are static (such as capacitor banks on long transmission lines) while others
are dynamic (reactive power generated in power plants).
2.4.3.4 Counterflows
Because power flows through transmission systems without respect for contracts, if party a
were to send power across a line in one direction (for example, in Figure 2.5 from bus i to
bus j) to party b, and party c were to send an equal amount of power in the opposite
direction (from bus j to bus i) to party d, the power flows would be different from what
might be expected. Instead of "crossing" each other, the power flows would essentially
cancel out each other (at least as far as the line is concerned). Conceptually (although not
completely true technically), party a would send power to party d, and party b would
receive power from party c. This is a beneficial result, as it lowers the transmission line's
4 6 Ilic', 18 September 1995.
4 7 Some devices and loads produce reactive power while other consume it.
4 8For a more thorough discussion, see: Kelly et al, 1987, 30-32, 277-280.
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loading (which allows for additional power to be sent across it) and lowers the resistive
losses that occur on the line.
Figure 2.5: A Sample Transmission Line
c
2.4.3.5 Transmission Losses
Power is dissipated by resistance as it flows through transmission lines. It can be shown
that the real power dissipated by resistive losses as power flows from bus i to bus j across
the transmission line depicted in Figure 2.5 is:
Ploss - G( + j -v2ViVcos(&)) (Equation 2.6)49
where: = The conductance of the line
= Voltage at Bus i
= Voltage at Bus j
= Phase angle difference between buses i and j
As is seen in the above equation, resistive power losses depend upon several variables. In
general, one to six percent of the power flowing through a transmission line is dissipated
by resistive losses.50 Losses increase as a line is more heavily loaded.
In addition to resistive losses, reactive power losses occur as electricity flows across
transmission lines. It can be shown that the reactive power loss across the transmission
line depicted in Figure 2.5 is:
Qloss = B(Vi2+V ,2 - 2ViVj cos(ai)). (Equation 2.7)51
49 Ilic', 20 September 1995.
50 Office of Technology Assessment, 1989, 121.
5 1Ilic', 20 September 1995.
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where: B = The susceptance 52 of the line
Vi = Voltage at Bus i
Vj = Voltage at Bus j
8ij = Phase angle difference between Buses i and j
While reactive power losses are rarely mentioned, they can be an order of magnitude higher
than the resistive losses under certain conditions. 53
2.4.3.6 Transmission System Reliability Limits
In addition to obeying these physical laws, transmission systems must be operated within
three sets of limits in order to ensure system integrity (i.e. reliability). NERC describes
these (and the consequences for violating them) as follows:54
* Thermal limits -- Thermal limits establish the maximum amount of current that a
transmission line or electric device can conduct before it sustains permanent
damage by overheating; and
* Voltage limits -- Adequate voltage must be maintained on the transmission
systems at all times... Voltage limits establish the maximum amount of
electricity that can be transmitted without causing damage to utility or customer
facilities, or a "voltage collapse." The result of a voltage collapse is a blackout;
and
* Stability limits -- All generators on an AC transmission system operate in
synchronism with each other... Immediately following a system disturbance,
generators begin to oscillate relative to each other, causing fluctuations in line
loading and system voltages... If a new, stable operating point is not quickly
established, the generators will lose synchronism with one another, and
portions or all of the electrical network may become unstable. The result may
be damage to utility equipment and the interruption of electric supply to
customers.
It should be noted that some of these limits are soft -- while the constraints are real, the
limits within which transmission systems are expected to operate 55 are somewhat arbitrary.
Traditionally, significant safety margins have been built into transmission operation in
order to ensure system integrity. This reliability comes at a cost, however. Consequently,
renewed debates over appropriate safety margin levels are likely to occur as the industry
becomes more competitively-driven.
2.4.3.7 Congestion
A transmission line is said to be congested when it is loaded to its thermal limit (or close to
it). One potential negative consequence of congestion is out-of-order dispatch (plants with
marginal costs above the theoretical system lambda must run to meet demand because the
52The susceptance is a function of a line's inductance and resistance.
5 3Ibid.
54 North American Electric Reliability Council, 1992, 20.
55 The standards are set by the North American Electric Reliability Council.
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congestion has blocked power from less expensive plants). Another is that congested lines
dissipate power (in the form of resistive line losses) at a higher rate than uncongested lines.
2.4.4 Purpose of Transmission Systems -- Why Is Transmission Important?
The most obvious purpose of transmission systems is to physically deliver power from
generators to loads. In other words, on a purely technical level, the two primary roles of
the transmission grid is to:56
* Serve as a conduit for power flows between generation and load busses; and
* Provide voltage/reactive power support by means of distributed devices that are
located throughout the system.
However, as a result of the technical and economic complexities of electric power
production and delivery, transmission systems do much more than this. As Joskow and
Schmalensee comment, "Transmission plays the most fundamental role in achieving the
economies of scale that modem technologies make possible."' 57 We have witnessed this in
many ways in this chapter. From the economic interchanges made possible by
interconnected transmission systems to the increased reliability that occurs when the
generating resources of multiple control areas are combined (rather than customers being
served by just one local plant), the transmission system plays a crucial integrating role in
the electric power production and delivery process.
2.4.5 Economic Issues and Principles
There are two economic issues and principles that are especially important to transmission
systems, especially as the industry becomes more competitive. 58
2.4.5.1 Spot Pricing
In 1988, MIT's Fred Schweppe et al published a revolutionary book, Spot Pricing of
Electricity. In essence, the MIT group took the concept of economic dispatch, recognized
that the cost of system operation varies significantly over time, and developed a pricing
scheme that accounts for this. By making several adjustments to the system lambda
concept (see Equations 2.3 and 2.4), Schweppe et al defined the marginal cost of serving
the kth customer during hour t, and equated that to the market's spot price [pk(t)]. 59
According to their formula,
56 Ilic' and Graves, August 1995, 6.
57 Joskow and Schmalensee, 1983, 63.
58 More economic issues are discussed in Chapter 9 and Appendix J.
59 Schweppe et al, 1988, 34
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pk(t) = YF(t)
+ Y(t)
+ YQS(t)
+ TR(t)
+ TIL,k(t)
+ TlQS,k(t)
+ TnR,k(t).
Generation marginal fuel
Generation marginal maintenance
Generation quality of supply
Generation revenue reconciliation
Network marginal losses
Network quality of supply
Network revenue reconciliation
(equation 2.8)
Several elements of the spot price can be grouped into larger components:
= YF(t) + W(t)
= (t) + tYQS(t)
= 1L,k(t) + I1QS,k(t).
System Lambda
Marginal value of generation
Marginal value of network operation
(equation 2.9)
With the spot price established, customers can be charged electricity rates that change with
time (on the order of minutes or hours) instead of being charged time-invariant rates (prices
adjusted on the order of years). In the extreme, spot pricing would allow for almost
instantaneously changing rates. However, the authors propose that a hourly spot price be
used.60 A half-hourly spot pricing system has been used in Great Britain since 1990.
A benefit of spot pricing is that it gives customers incentives to adjust their electricity
consumption away from peak times. In terms of Figure 2.4, spot pricing seeks to fill the
troughs in the demand curve with some of the peaks through economic signals. Since the
"peaking" plants have high marginal costs, such a shift in demand would significantly
reduce total marginal production expenses even if total demand were to stay constant.
2.4.5.2 Equalization of Marginal Costs
A fundamental economic principle of electric power system operation is that "the marginal
cost of generating electricity at any two locations should differ by no more than the
marginal cost of transmitting electricity between them,"61otherwise known as equalization
X(t)
y(t)
TOk(t)
6 0 Ibid., 31.
6 1FERC, 1989, 86.
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of marginal costs across the grid.62 A more thorough discussion of this topic occurs
elsewhere. 63
Having now examined some important technical and economic characteristics of electric
power systems, let us turn our attention to how the electric power has evolved to being on
the verge of competition.
6 2 Kelly et al, 1987, 138.
6 3 See Sections 9.3.2 and 9.6.
Chapter 3
The Evolution Toward Competition
In The Electric Power Industry
Indeed, competition was so thoroughly recognized at the beginning of the industry as
proper andpossi6fe that in some cases generalfranchises were granted to all companies
describing to supply electric [ight andpower.1
-- Delos F. WilcoX (1910)
3.1 INTRODUCTION
The history of the American electric power industry has been characterized by continued
technological development and complex interactions between the government and private
firms. Although the deregulation of the industry which is now occurring represents a
major break from the industry's past structure, it is nevertheless a continuation of the
industry's evolution. This chapter explores the historical events which are crucial for
understanding the issues involved in today's restructuring, discusses the events of the past
two decades in the context of a policy-making framework, outlines several current and
future issues that are specifically related to transmission, and offers a brief perspective on
the industry's future.
3.2 THE INDUSTRY PRIOR TO 19782
3.2.1 The Early Years
3.2.1.1 The Industry's Beginnings
The electric power industry has its roots in the work of Thomas Edison, who, in
September 1882, began to generate and sell electricity at the Pearl Street Station. In its
early years, the industry consisted of many small firms which served a limited area, often
in competition with each other, and were operated under the purview of local (city)
authorities.3 Around the turn of the century, as transmission and generation technologies
improved, some people recognized that there were economies of scale in electric power
1Wilcox, 1910, 142.
2 This chapter assumes a high familiarity with the industry's history and presents many concepts briefly. A
more detailed history can be found in Appendix B.
3For example, 47 electricity company franchises were granted in the city of Chicago between 1890 and
1905. (Only a handful of these were city-wide, the remainder were for sections of the city.) Source: Wilcox,
1910, 143.
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production and distribution. Consequently, consolidation began to occur and utilities were
granted exclusive franchise territories.
3.2.1.2 The Industry Takes On its Fundamental Features
This era laid the foundation for several fundamental, interrelated features of the electric
utility industry: vertical integration, natural monopoly, regulation, and investor-owned
utilities (IOUs).4 It should be noted that these four features are generalizations which were
true of most, but not all of the American electric power industry. Vertical integration means
that one entity generates, transmits, distributes, and sells electric power to the customers
within its service territory. 5
Natural monopoly means that it is cheaper for one utility to perform these functions than for
multiple, competing firms to do so. Until recently, the economies of scale that drove the
natural monopoly structure existed in each of the industry's segments and were further
entrenched by technological improvements. 6 Of particular significance was the long-lived
trend that new generation technologies made increasingly larger generators less expensive
per unit output.7 Similar trends also occurred in transmission.
In the United States, unlike in most other countries, ownership of the electric power
industry has largely stayed in the private sector in the form of IOUs. Although the 250
IOUs are outnumbered by 2005 publicly-owned utilities and 939 cooperatives, 8 IOUs
generate and distribute more than 75% of the nation's electric power.9
Because of the industry's natural monopoly characteristics, these private firms have
traditionally been regulated through a rate-of-return (ROR) regulatory process. In an ROR
system, a utility receives an exclusive franchise service territory and an obligation to serve
all customers located within it on a non-discriminatory basis. The regulatory agency sets
the prices that the utility can charge customers in a manner that allows the utility to recover
its operating expenses and earn a fair rate-of-return on its capital expenses. 10
4For more details, see: Appendix B.2.4.
5An exception to this has been many of the public utilities and cooperative, 90% of which are distribution-
only, and receive their power from other entities, often IOUs. Source: Pierobon, 1994, 19.
6 At least until recent years when technological innovation has undermined them.
7 The overturning of this trend is one of the primary forces driving today's deregulation of generation. See
Appendix B.6.3.4.
8 These statistics were for 1994. Source: Energy Information Administration, November 1995a, 8.
9 Energy Information Administration, November 1995a, 1.
10 There are other regulatory structures which are similar to ROR in the sense that they feature an exclusive
service territory and obligation to serve, but would use different mechanisms for compensating utilities.
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3.2.1.3 The Formation of Holding Companies
As new transmission technologies allowed power to be distributed over larger areas, the
utilities expanded beyond the confines of cities (and their municipal regulators) and served
ever larger territories. To both facilitate and respond to this trend, thirty-three states
established regulatory bodies for electric utility oversight between 1907 and 1916.11 With
time, the electric (and gas) utilities continued to consolidate into massive organizations,
called holding companies. By 1932, the 16 largest controlled over 75% of the privately
owned industry. However, as the utilities grew, the regulatory authorities did not expand
with them. The Supreme Court, in a landmark 1927 decision (Rhode Island Public
Utilities Commission vs. Attleboro Steam and Electric Co.), found that "states could not
regulate the price of electricity generated in one state and sold in another." 12 Given the
interconnected nature of electric power production and distribution, and since there was no
federal regulatory body in place, utilities had incentives to form complicated organizational
structures which allowed them to run circles around state regulators during the late 1920s
and early 1930s. In addition, some of the holding companies created highly leveraged
financial structures, which collapsed during the Great Depression. The legislation that
ended the holding company era stated, "the holding company becomes an agency which,
unless regulated, is injurious to investors, consumers, and the general public." 13
3.2.2 The Federal Power Act and the Public Utility Holding Companies Act of 1935
The abuses practiced by the holding companies resulted in a strong backlash against them
during the Great Depression. In 1935, two pieces of legislation were passed concurrently,
the Federal Power Act (FPA) and the Public Utility Holding Companies Act (PUHCA),
with the intent of more effectively regulating the industry.
The latter (PUHCA) was designed to destroy the holding company empires and prevent
their reemergence. In the twenty years following the passage of PUHCA, the Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC) separated 759 gas and electric utilities from holding
company systems. 14 The holding companies that remained have operated under the
stringent oversight of the SEC. 15 PUHCA has had two lasting impacts on the industry.
The first is that it created a fragmented industry structure. In order to be exempt from
11Hyman, 1988, 68.
12Energy Information Administration, March 1993, 21.
13PL74-687, 803-804.
14 Hyman, 1988, 83.
15Today, there are approximately a dozen registered holding companies. Source: "SEC to Propose Repeal of
Regulations On Large Utility Holding Companies."
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PUHCA, utilities essentially had to either operate only in one state, or to operate a
contiguous system over a limited, multi-state area. The result is that today there are
approximately 250 IOUs, each with a relatively small service territory. Second, for almost
60 years, PUHCA served as an almost impervious barrier to entry into the industry by non-
utility firms. With very few exceptions, non-utilities that entered the industry would
become subject to stringent oversight by the SEC in all of their business affairs -- a
suffocating prospect to firms operating in competitive industries.
The FPA has also been significant in shaping the industry, serving as the "centerpiece for
federal economic regulation of the electric utility industry" 16 One way in which its impact
has been felt is in the division of regulatory authority between the states and the federal
government. The FPA established the Federal Power Commission (FPC), (which became
the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) in 1977), and gave it the authority to
regulate "the transmission of electric energy in interstate commerce and the sale of such
energy at wholesale in interstate commerce." 17 The FPA limited the role of the FPC/FERC
to "those matters which are not subject to regulation by the States." 18 Because of the
integrated nature of the grid, this authority sharing has evolved over time to mean that the
FERC has domain over wholesale power sales and over unbundled transmission tariffs.
Such a delineation of authority is an oversimplification, however, and is the subject of
continuing contention. 19 In fact, questions relating to the state/federal regulatory interface
are crucial issues in the current restructuring debate. 20 The FPA also established principles
to guide the FPC's work, the two most important of which are: (1) electric power rates
shall be "just and reasonable" 2 1 and (2) public utilities shall not "make or grant any undue
preference or advantage to any person"' 22 with respect to any transmission or wholesale
power transaction.
16 Energy Information Administration, March 1993, 21.
17 PL74-687, 847.
18 pL74-687, 847.
19 For example, see: Kemezis, 1996.
20 For example, see: "NARUC-FERC Dialog Spotlights Jurisdiction;" "Moler Rattles Peace Saber at
NARUC Meeting;" and "Fessler, Tomasky Have a Friendly Joust on Jurisdiction."2 1PL74-687, 848.
2 2Ibid.
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Figure 3.1: Average U.S. Residential Electricity Price, 1920-1994
Year
S Nominal - . Real
Notes: The "kink" in the graph in 1960 was due to inconsistencies in the data sources.
"Real" prices are in 1972 constant dollars.
Sources: Energy Information Administration, 1985, 60-61.
Energy Information Administration, July 1995, 229.
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3.2.3 The "Golden Era"
The several decades that followed the enactment of these laws can aptly be called the golden
era of the electric utility industry. 23 During this period, the industry was driven by a series
of incremental (yet substantial) improvements in generation, transmission, and distribution
technologies. As a result, from the industry's birth until the early 1970s, electric power
rates fell in both real and nominal terms, while the use of electric power skyrocketed (see
Figures 3.1 and 3.2).
Figure 3.2: U.S. Electric Power Production, 1938-1993
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23 We intentionally refrain from calling it the golden era of the electric power industry, since that may yet
be to come.
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3.2.4 The "Golden Era" Ends
Due to a series of events that commenced in the 1970s, the electric utility industry was
jolted out of its "Golden Era" and the underpinnings of its regulatory structure began to
unravel. As demonstrated by Figures 3.1 and 3.2, electricity became more, rather than less
expensive and demand growth slowed markedly. The contrast between the "golden era"
and the new era was stark -- in 1963, only three utilities in the country sought rate
increases, but in 1975, that number ballooned to 114.24 But why did this occur?
There is not one answer to this question. A major source of difficulty for utilities was the
energy crisis, as Peter Navarro comments,
In the 1970s, an 'energy crisis' turned this industry upside down, sent
electricity prices soaring, and all but unraveled a regulatory compact that had
delivered blue chip dividends to shareholders and ever decreasing rates to
consumers for over fifty years." 25
The energy crisis spurred high fuel prices, which increased electricity production costs
substantially, which, in turn, led utilities to request rate increases. Although it was clearly
an important problem, the energy crisis was only one of many factors that led to the end of
the utilities' golden era.
The environmental movement, which entered the mainstream in the late 1960s and early
1970s, increased the environmental compliance requirements of utilities, and in turn, the
costs of power production.
Two other exogenous events had a large impact on the industry: high interest rates and high
inflation. These were responsible, at least in part, for significant cost overruns on plants
that were under construction in the late 1970s and early 1980s. The high interest rates also
meant that utilities had to earn a higher rate-of-return on their investments in order to attract
capital. These phenomena placed upward pressures on electricity prices.
Limits in technological improvements were also reached during the late stages of the golden
era. In particular, the incremental improvements on Rankine Cycle generating plants that
propelled the dramatic productivity increases and cost reductions of the golden era reached
their thermodynamic limits in about 1960.26 Subsequent attempts to harness even greater
2 4Persons, 1995, 36.
2 5Navarro, 1995, 347.
2 6Yeager, 1994.
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economies of scale through larger and higher pressure generating plants had mixed, if not
inferior results.27
Poor demand planning was also a cause of the utilities' problems. Utility planners
projected that load growth would continue at its Post World War II 7% annual rate into the
1980s. Instead, the repercussions of the energy crisis -- higher electricity prices, energy
conservation programs, and reduced industrial output -- curtailed demand growth to 2%-
3% per year. Thinking it was an aberration rather than a start of a new trend, utility
planners were slow to adjust. As a result, the utilities continued to build plants, which had
up to 10 year construction cycles, to meet a constant 7% growth. When compounded over
a number of years, the result was predictable -- significant overcapacity in the early
1980s. 2 8
Furthermore, many utilities turned to large nuclear power construction plants in order to
meet the projected demand. Unfortunately, many of these plants became boondoggles.
While the cause of their problems was quite complicated, a leading contributor was the
accident at Three Mile Island which occurred at a time when dozens of the largest plants
were being built. Nuclear Regulatory Commission safety regulations written in the wake
of the accident delayed construction and mandated additional, expensive safety equipment.
These factors, when combined with the lethal combination of high inflation and interest
rates during the period as well as mismanagement, led to these plants costing, on average,
five times more than the anticipated construction cost.29
All of the aforementioned problems put upward pressures on prices in a regulated industry
that during its history had only seen rate reductions. Consequently, public utility
commissions felt strong pressures from their constituents to resist and minimize rate
increases. As a result, the commissions frequently responded to the upward cost pressures
by allowing utilities to earn rates of return below what the utilities needed to attract
sufficient capital. In more extreme cases, the commissions conducted prudence reviews.
Often, these reviews concluded that some or all of a utility's capital expense in question
2 7Joskow and Rose, 1985.
2 8As is seen later, implicitly if not explicitly, this capacity surplus facilitated more frequent coordination
contracts which allowed utilities with high-cost plants to purchase power from less expensive sources, and
utilities with high-fixed cost, relatively low marginal cost overcapacity to recover the cost of their plants.
With time, these coordination contracts have evolved into a wholesale market.
2 9Energy Information Administration, March 1986. Near the extreme case was Shoreham, in New York,
which cost 15 times what was exprected. Source: "Long Island Lighting, Still Detested, Nears a Takeover
by State."
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was an imprudent investment; and as such, could not be recovered through the rate base.
Nuclear power plants were a favorite target of prudence reviews. Between 1985 and 1992,
electric utilities faced write-offs of $22.4 billion on their nuclear plants.30
The final problem of utilities was that their productivity growth, which had been one of the
best of all industries through most of the century, 31 suddenly slowed and actually reversed.
For example, labor productivity declined more than 10% between 1977 and 1982.32
This litany of problems set the stage for a major structural change in the industry.
However, since the industry was firmly entrenched, change was not guaranteed. A
relatively obscure provision in President Carter's 1978 national energy policy served as the
catalyst that set in motion the forces for restructuring the industry.
3.3 ELECTRIC POWER DEREGULATION: A PUBLIC POLICY CASE STUDY
3.3.1 Motivation for this Discussion
The unfolding story of electric power deregulation is a public policy issue of substantial
import. The story is interesting not only because of the industry's financial importance and
its ubiquitousness in modem society, but also because it is a story about a changing
relationship between an important quasi-public industry and the government. At least two
benefits could be garnered from analyzing this story as an evolving public policy-making
adventure. First, understanding what has happened in the past within the industry could be
helpful in planning where it should go in the future. This is particularly useful for our
examination of the prospects for non-utility transmission systems.33 Secondly, gaining an
understanding of this story about technology-driven policy change could increase the
understanding of technology-driven policy changes in general.
3.3.2 A Public Policy-Making Framework
John Kingdon34 developed a useful framework for understanding the policy-making
process in his "revised" version of Cohen et al's35 "garbage can" model of organizational
behavior. The work of Cohen et al was designed to describe the behavior of "organized
anarchies" for which it used university governance as the empirical referent, since
30 FERC, April 1995, 17669.
3 1Kendrick, 1961, 136-137; and Kendrick, 1973, 79.
32 Bureau of Labor Statistics, 1985.
3 3See Chapter 11.
34 Kingdon, 1984.
3 5Cohen et al, 1972.
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universities can be viewed as "collections of choices looking for problems, issues and
feelings looking for decision situations in which they might be aired, solutions looking for
issues to which they might be an answer, and decision makers looking for work." 36
Kingdon's framework is especially designed for decision-making in the federal
government. He also describes this process as "organized anarchy" with an emphasis on
"organized." 37
3.3.2.1 The Three Streams
The central thesis of the "revised garbage can model" is that there are three "streams"
continually flowing: the problem, policy, and political streams. In the problem stream are
"problems" -- those conditions that people feel should be altered.38 Given this definition,
there are literally millions of problems in the problem stream at any given point in time.
The policy stream consists of potential "policies." These policies are not necessarily
solutions to problems that exist, but rather, they are often ideas on future policies -- "ideas
in search of a problem," in the words of Kingdon. For example, during the last years of
the utilities' golden era, some economists began to consider electric power deregulation. 39
This example is especially instructive as it demonstrates that ideas in the policy stream need
not be connected to a particular problem, and that policy ideas often take a decade or longer
to be enacted as "real" policy.40
The political stream and its dynamics include factors such as swings in national mood,
election results, changes of administration, changes of ideological or partisan distribution in
Congress, and interest group pressure campaigns. 41
3.3.3.2 Open Policy Windows, Coupling, and Policy Change
These three streams are continually flowing with seemingly limitless possibilities for
establishing new official policies, which occurs when the streams couple. However, the
policy-making ability of any government body is finite. Therefore, until the government
rations its time to tackle specific problems (at which time some contents of each of the
streams are coupled), these streams and their contents continue to flow through time in
36 Ibid., 1.
37 Kingdon, 1984, 92.
38 Ibid., 119.
39For example, see: Weiss, 1975; Primeaux, 1975; and Huettner and Landon, 1978.
4 0 Kingdon, 1984, 151.
4 1Ibid., 170.
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parallel with little or no policy impact. The streams couple during an open policy window,
which is an opportunity for action on a given initiative. During these relatively short
periods of time, policy entrepreneurs, "people who are willing to invest resources or
various kinds in hopes of a future return in the form of policies they favor,"42 have an
opportunity to promote stream coupling -- to match (or adapt) their policy solutions to the
problems that are on the institutional agenda. If policy entrepreneurs do not effectively act
during an open window, they must bide their time until the next time the window opens for
their issue -- often years, if not decades later.43
Policy windows are opened by the emergence of compelling problems or occurrences in the
political stream. An example of the latter is the health care legislation that was introduced
(and placed at the top of its agenda) by the then-new Clinton administration in 1993.44 An
example of a compelling problem opening a policy window is the Carter Administration's
numerous energy-related laws that were developed and passed in response to the energy
crisis.45
With an understanding of this framework in hand, let us now examine the recent evolution
of the electric power industry.
3.3.3 Application of the "Revised Garbage Can" Model to Electric Power Deregulation
The process of applying Kingdon's framework to the electric power industry case is more
complicated than to most because of the many decision windows that open, as a result of
the split jurisdiction over the industry between Congress, the FERC, and the states. In
order to simplify our analysis, we consider the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of
1978 (PURPA), FERC's implementation of the Act, and the subsequent state PURPA
implementation decisions as one policy decision, the product of the same currents within
the three streams. A similar amalgamation is made of the Energy Policy Act of 1992 and
the subsequent state and FERC actions with regard to competition.46
4 2 Ibid., 151.
4 3 Eliminating the federal government deficit is a classic case of this. In 1981 and 1995 opportunities to do
so came and went. Sources: Grider, 1981; and "Deficit Politics: Is The Era Over?"
44Another example is the barrage of legislation proposed in Congress in 1995, following the resounding
Republican victories in 1994.
4 5 A more recent example is the debate and eventual decision to start the Persian Gulf War, which was
precipitated by the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait.46 This amalgamation could be contested because EPAct promoted wholesale wheeling while the state
initiatives are generally promoting retail wheeling. However, the same forces are at work, so we will
consider them to be one.
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3.3.3.1 The Streams Before PURPA
3.3.3.1.1 Political stream
The most important current in the political stream prior to PURPA was the energy crisis
that was gripping the nation, which threatened both the lifestyles of individual Americans
(such as high gas prices) and the nation's economic well-being, because of the economy's
large dependence on foreign oil. President Carter's national energy policy was designed to
decrease America's reliance on imported oil. This was to be accomplished through many
mechanisms, which included the cogeneration 47 and small power production (renewable
energy) provisions in Section 210 of PURPA. These provisions required utilities to
purchase electric power from non-utility qualifying facilities (QFs) at a fair price, which
was determined later as the utility's avoided cost of production. In Congressional
testimony on the PURPA bill, Sen. Gary Hart discussed the benefits of the cogeneration
provisions in terms of American dependence of foreign oil, "We waste [through untapped
cogeneration possibilities] ... the equivalent of 8 million barrels of oil every day, [which is]
more than we import."48
A second current in the political stream was the environmental movement. While it was
less influential in the late 1970s than earlier in the decade, it was nevertheless a factor in
including the renewable energy provisions in PURPA.
3.3.3.1.2 Problem stream
Because of the consequences mentioned above, the energy crisis was also the dominant
current in the problem stream.
Another current in the problem screen was the perception that utilities were not sufficiently
concerned with conservation and environmental issues. Some environmentalists believed
that utilities were dragging their feet on developing and adopting new generation
technologies, such as renewable energy technologies, that were environmentally benign49
and/or which had energy conservation benefits. There was also a concern that utilities were
actively encouraging industrial plants which had cogenerators to come onto the grid, which
resulted in a long-term declining trend in cogeneration. 50 When the states implemented the
47 Cogeneration is the use of "waste" steam from power production for another use.
4 8Hart, 1977, 126.
49 0r at least not as damaging as coal plants.
5 0Industrial cogenerators produced 15% of the total power in the United States in 1950. By 1977, this
figure had dropped to 4%. Source: Energy Information Administration, March 1993, vii.
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provisions of PURPA, which occurred after the peak of the energy crisis, the
environmental/conservation current became the dominant one in the problem stream.
3.3.3.1.3 Policy stream
In one policy stream current were policies designed to improve environmental quality by
reducing pollution.
A second, closely connected current consisted of policies designed to stimulate renewable
energy development.
A third policy current, which was not much more than a trickle in the mid-1970s, consisted
of policies to deregulate the generation segment of the industry.
When one examines the currents that were flowing in the three streams in the late 1970s,
the result of their confluence is predictable: policies that stimulate the development of
environmentally friendly, renewable energy alternatives to foreign oil dependence.
3.3.3.2 The PURPA Window
The opening of the policy window for energy issues that ocurred during the 95th Congress
(1977-1978) was the results of both a political occurrence and a compelling problem. The
compelling problem was the energy crisis, and the former came from President Carter's
desire to handle the situation in a comprehensive manner. In short, the public was eager
for new energy policies, and the President's national energy policy provided the vehicle for
change. As part of this process, a policy entrepreneur was able to include provisions to
promote cogeneration and small power production into PURPA,51 one of five laws that
embodied President Carter's national energy policy. These provisions were such a small
part of PURPA, an Act designed to promote conservation and revamp the rate structures of
utilities, that they barely seemed worth mentioning at the time.52 Per the previous
discussion of the currents in the streams, it was relatively simple for a policy entrepreneur
to include the cogeneration and small power production provisions in PURPA in a non-
controversial manner, especially since they were included in such a marginal fashion.
The actual passage of PURPA is only one part of the story, however. While the law itself
was an important catalyst for the independent power industry, its impact was aided, if not
51For more details, see: Appendix B.6.1. The exact entrepreneur is unknown to the author.
5 2For example, in its one page, bulletted summary of PURPA, Congressional Quarterly Almanac did not
mention the provisions of Section 210. Source: Congressional Quarterly, 1979, 644-645.
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facilitated, by the series of implementation decisions made after its passage. The small
power production and cogeneration guidelines subsequently proposed and adopted by the
FERC were generous. The FERC took the statute's requirement, that rates be just and
reasonable to utilities and their customers, not discriminatory against the QFs[qualifying
facilities], 53 and not in excess of the incremental cost to utilities of alternative energy
supply,54 and set a standard that a utility must purchase QF power at 100% of the utility's
"avoided cost" of power production. Furthermore, some states, such as California, pushed
the envelope even farther -- by tying the definition of "avoided cost" to the predicted
(rising) price of oil. These implementation decisions created large incentives to enter the
"PURPA plant" business. This stimulation of demand led to a tremendous influx of QF
developers, and in turn, created incentives for generation technology development.
3.3.3.3 New and Revised Streams Between PURPA and EPAct
Following the passage of PURPA and its implementation, several important events
occurred that would affect the future of the industry. In terms of Kingdon's framework,
new currents were added to the streams.
3.3.3.3.1 Political stream
PURPA served as the headwaters for a tributary that made its way into the politics stream
from which a new current was created: non-utility generators (NUGs). The non-utility
power industry was essentially nonexistent prior to PURPA.55 By creating a new class of
generators, PURPA created a new political constituency. Quickly aligning with these new
entrants was a cadre of entrepreneurial utilities, such as Virginia Power, who saw
opportunities in a more competitive industry. These utilities joined the NUGs who were
clamoring for relief from the restrictive rules that had guided the industry since the mid-
1930s.56 As Linda Stuntz comments,
Since 1978, the independent power industry spawned by PURPA has become a
formidable economic and political force in its own right. Not content with
being 'boutique' generators, independent power producers (IPPs), including
many utilities and their affiliates, sought greater opportunity to participate in
generation markets by overcoming the limitations imposed by PURPA and ...
PUHCA. 57
5 3Those facilities which meet the technical and ownership criteria of being a cogenerator or small power
producer under PURPA.
54Paraphrased from: PL95-617, 3144.
5 5 Joskow, 1989.
56 Dominion Resources, 1989, 14.
57 Stuntz, 1995, 69.
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Figure 3.3: Electric Power Deregulation and the Revised Garbage Can Model
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This new constituency worked hard in the early 1990s to eliminate the ownership
restrictions it faced as a result of PUHCA, and to gain access to more potential
customers. 58
A second new current in the politics stream was that American industry became more vocal
about gaining access to less expensive electric power as it faced increased international and
domestic competition. To stay competitive, companies began to look into their budgets to
find potential savings. Electricity costs, which had been essentially ignored in corporate
accounting, became a target for cost reduction.59 Large users, which had previously been
relatively unconcerned with their rates, began to actively lobby government, through
entities such as the Electric Consumers Resource Council (ELCON).
Closely coupled with the lobbying efforts of users was a strong political desire to keep
industrial companies competitive. Local and national government policy-makers became
concerned with industrial competitiveness as a result of the significant decline of American
Industry in the 1980s 60 and the job losses that accompanied it. As a result, when high
electricity prices became defined as a problem that inhibits industrial competitiveness, the
force of this current pushed for policies to lower rates. This current has been especially
strong in states such as California and Massachusetts, where the desire to lower the (high)
cost of electricity in order to make manufacturers in these states more competitive with
companies from other states61 and nations has been used as explicit rationale for their
trailblazing deregulation proposals.
A third current in the politics stream was ideological -- the belief that competitive markets
set prices more efficiently than government regulators. PURPA was passed into law just
as the deregulation currents were beginning to spill over from the policy stream into the
political stream in the larger society. 62 The currents became increasingly strong during the
1980s and early 1990s as industry after industry was successfully deregulated. By the time
5 8For more discussion of this, see: Appendix B.6.4.
5 9Tabors and Parquet, 1995, 7.
6 0 Detailed in Dertouzos et al, 1989; and MIT Commission on Industrial Productivity, 1989.
6 1The Massachusetts case is a classic example of this. For example, see: Lester et al, 1995; and "What Do
You Mean Taxachusetts?"6 2 As marked by the deregulation of the airline industry. President Carter noted on the signing of the
Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, "For the first time in decades, we have deregulated a major industry."
Source: Carter, 1978, 1837. PURPA was signed into law on 9 November 1978, only 16 days after the
signing of the Airline Deregulation Act (24 October 1978). Quite ironically, the Energy Policy Act of
1992 became law fourteen years later, on 24 October 1992.
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that the Energy Policy Act was debated in Congress in 1992, these free market political
forces had become strong drivers of electric power deregulation.
3.3.3.3.2 Problem stream
The strongest current in the problem stream at the time that PURPA was passed into law,
the energy crisis, went away several years later. In the 1980s, new currents entered into
the problem stream, all of which were partially or directly the result of NUGs. Following
the passage of PURPA, QFs were quick to embrace new technologies, including a new
generation of gas turbines generators. Many of these new technologies allowed NUGs to
produce power at a lower cost than utilities, with their enormous inventory of conventional
technology plants. As a result, a new current in the problem stream was the price
differential between power produced by many NUGs and the traditional utilities, from
whom most customers were forced to buy power.
The price differentials were noticed, and viewed as a serious problem, by manufacturers
looking to cut costs wherever possible. As a result, the general "competitiveness" problem
of American industry found its way into the problem stream of the electric power industry.
Another problem was that the effectiveness of the new industry participants (the NUGs)
was stunted because they were operating within the constraints of an industry designed for
1930s-era electric utilities. While NUGs were producing inexpensive power and adding
more than half of the new generating capacity in the country, their growth was constrained
in the early 1990s by a market structure designed for franchised monopolies and which,
through PUHCA, placed limits on the geographical spread and ownership of individual
utilities. Furthermore, in order to reach new customers, NUGs needed to "wheel" power
over transmission lines that were owned and controlled by vertically integrated utilities,
who often had a financial interest in preventing NUGs from using their transmission
facilities. In the early 1990s, these barriers to NUG growth constituted an increasingly
strong current in problem stream.
3.3.3.3.3 Policy stream
While no new currents emerged in the policy stream after 1978, the dynamics of those that
remained changed greatly. The proposed policies for renewable energy development and
for improved environmental policies remained, 63 but the deregulation current became
6 3The latter, as witnessed by the passage of the 1990 Clean Air Act, were much more apt to be coupled
into policy than were the former.
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dominant by the early 1990s . The deregulation successes in other industries was one
contributor for this change in dynamics. Another reason was the successful operation --
both technical and economic -- of QF plants by NUGs. As Richardson and Nordhaus
note, "The PURPA program effectively demonstrated the feasibility of a competitive
generation sector in the electric power industry."64 Consequently, the deregulation idea
that seemed crazy to many in the 1970s, became accepted and advocated by those in the
mainstream of the policy community in the 1990s.
3.3.3.4 EPAct and Subsequent State Windows
3.3.3.4.1 The Energy Policy Act of 1992
In 1992 the policy-making window for electric utility regulation was opened again as a
result of several factors. One of them was that President Bush and the Congress believed
that it was time to develop a new national energy strategy, especially in wake of the Persian
Gulf War.65 This wide-ranging strategy came in the form of the development and eventual
passage of the Energy Policy Act of 1992.66 The legislative process for this Act became a
convenient vehicle for making policy changes across the spectrum of energy issues --
including electric power regulation. On the micro-level, the policy window opened for
changes in electric power industry regulation because of the strong currents mentioned
above that existed in the problem and political streams. Once the window opened, the
problem and political streams coupled with the strong deregulatory current in the policy
stream to change the course of the electric power industry.
EPAct provided the statutory authority to ameliorate the "impediments to NUG growth"
current in the problem stream through its Exempt Wholesale Generator (EWG) and open
access provisions. These changes were made in the context of increasing wholesale power
competition.
While the passage of EPAct resulted in some immediate actions -- the FERC received
petitions for plants to be declared EWGs within days of the law's signing,67 and overseas
expansion has exploded -- other developments have taken much longer. During the
ensuing three and a half years, some progress has been made to increase NUG access to
the transmission system, yet the FERC is still enmeshed in a process of making legislative
intent become functional reality.
6 4Richardson and Nordhaus, 1995, 66.
6 5 Burkhart, 1992, 72.6 6 PL102-486.
67 Source: "FERC Approves First EWG Request."
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A significant subcurrent in the problem stream that EPAct did not solve (although the law
explicitly indicated that states were the appropriate venue for solving it)68 was the ability of
(low cost) NUGs to deal directly with customers, including the large users who desire low
cost power. EPAct's non-solution to that problem has allowed the policy window to stay
open, while the forum for deregulation has changed from the federal government to the
states.
3.3.3.4.2 State initiatives
While for simplicity's sake we are considering EPAct and all of the current state initiatives
to be part of the opening of one large conceptual policy window, it should be noted that a
more realistic view would be to consider each state as having its own set of streams and
own policy windows. Even though the components of each state's streams would be
relatively similar (and similar to those of EPAct), each state's streams have different current
dynamics. 69 These heterogeneous dynamics result in different deregulation approaches
and policies.70 What is common to all of these debates is that the states are attempting to
"couple" the currents in the streams that were not combined by EPAct -- most notably, by
granting low-cost IPP generators access to price sensitive customers.
3.3.4 Implications of This Analysis
An important question to ask at this point is, what implications arise from applying the
garbage can model to the electric power deregulation case?
The most important lesson from this story is that PURPA was significant because it served
as the "headwaters" for several of the important stream currents that coupled fourteen years
later in the Energy Policy Act of 1992 and subsequent state deregulation decisions. A
implication of this is that the provisions of contemporary deregulation policy decisions will
serve as the basis for future (perhaps unanticipated) changes in the electric power industry.
Furthermore, by making reasonable predictions regarding directions of future technological
change, it could be possible to facilitate the development of (or prevent the foreclosure
upon) industry structures that would be more efficient in the future. Efficient industry
6 8 PL102-486, 2196-2197.
6 9 For example, the policy window opened in California because of generally high utility rates. In
Massachusetts, the efforts of one firm did much to pry open the policy window. In Wisconsin, the political
stream dominated by a torrential current of deregulation ideology served to open the policy window.
7 0For a more comprehensive discussion of the actions in various states, see Chapter 5.
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structures would create incentives for technological development and/or would be
accommodating of new technologies, even if the specific new technologies are not known.
A third implication is that the provisions that lead to significant changes in the future need
not be integral to the larger policies of which they are a part. For example, PURPA could
have easily been passed into law with out the cogeneration and small power provisions.
However, they were included in the Act, and the sea-change in the industry that is now
occurring is the result.
A final implication is that dynamic factors are important to consider when attempting to
shape the industry's future. For example, factors such as new technologies and
constituencies were very important in the PURPA-EPAct story. It could be assumed from
this that a deregulation proposal that would create new constituencies, with interests that do
not parallel those of the current constituencies, has a higher likelihood of instigating further
significant structural changes in the future than one which only includes current
constituencies.
3.4 ISSUES OF PARTICULAR CONCERN TO TRANSMISSION
3.4.1 Siting Concerns
The difficulty of siting and constructing new transmission lines is a significant constraint
on transmission systems. 71 There are several issues that stir public opposition to
transmission line construction:
* Aesthetic impacts;
* Environmental impacts; and
* Fear of health risks.
Aesthetically, transmission lines are towering structures that sometimes dominate the
scenery and that many people consider unattractive. Environmentally, transmission lines
are sometimes built across "environmentally sensitive" areas. For example, there is a
significant environmental impact when a line is built through a forest because reliability
requires a wide cutting of trees along the line's path. Yet it would not be efficient, nor even
practical, to consider building lines without crossing at least some of these areas. Some
environmentalists are also concerned with the impact of transmission lines on the health of
wildlife.
7 1In fact, the title of a recent Energy Daily article compared the difficulties of siting transmission lines
with those of siting nuclear power plants. See: "Transmission: The Nuclear Power Problem of the 1990s?"
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The "fear of health risks" from transmission lines is a major impediment to transmission
line construction. The most significant health risk fear is that those living near transmission
lines will contract cancer as a result of exposure to electric and magnetic fields (EMF). The
"C" word strikes fear into potential power line "neighbors," and can galvanize resistance to
line construction much better than aesthetic or environmental impact concerns. Despite the
evidence from "thousands of studies, including 70 epidemiological studies, [that] there is
no established cause-and-effect relationship between cancer or other diseases and EMF
exposure," 72 concern remains and transmission projects are often delayed, if not blocked as
a result. 73
The above concerns have made transmission line siting more difficult and could have
deleterious impacts on transmission system efficiency. Some states have recently added
more complicated certification requirements for lines and are reconsidering past permits.74
The consequence is that, "The powerful combination of NIMBY and cancerphobia will
induce state and local politicians to veto, or to delay interminably, projects that have the
potential to yield enormous benefits to millions of electricity customers in an entire region
of the country." 75 It is difficult to overcome local concerns for the economic good of a
region since the FERC cannot order the construction of transmission facilities, does not
have authority over transmission siting decisions, and does not possess the power of
eminent domain.76
The second manifestation of public concern is tort litigation, which could also serve as an
impediment to future transmission line construction. 77 Several recent court cases have
dealt with the issue. A lawsuit was filed against Houston Lighting & Power in early 1995
on behalf of 11 families whose children have cancer. However, the suit has since been
"nonfiled;" which removes it from the docket but allows the possibility of bringing it back
anytime in the next 15 years.78 A separate, recent Georgia Power Co. victory in an EMF
case was overturned by the Georgia Court of Appeals and will be reheard.79 While a utility
72 NERC, 1993, 10; and "Nobelists Dismiss EMF Link." Also see: Palfreman, 1996.
7 3Recently, for example, the New Mexico Public Utility Commission rejected a proposed line in Northern
New Mexico at the bequest of its neighbors, 73 a line that the utility claims is necessary to avoid blackouts
in the near future. Source: ''N.M. Regulators Nix Key PNM 345-kV Transmission Line."
7 4 NERC, 1992, 20.
75 Pierce, 1994, 333.
7 6FERC, April 1995, 17675.
7 7 Krieger and Withey, 1994.
7 8 Sources: "Electricity, Cellular Phones and Cancer;" and "Joe Jamail Passes (For Now) on Power Line
Litigation."
7 9Source: "Georgia Power EMF Victory Overturned."
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has yet to lose an EMF case, a Pandora's Box would be opened if that were ever to occur
that could have serious implications for transmission systems. 80
The siting and tort problems could make economically and technically efficient grid
expansions increasingly difficult to construct. 8 1 As the industry moves toward having
more interstate wholesale transactions, siting problems may be an increasingly large
impediment to a more efficient wholesale power industry, especially since current
transmission line siting criteria in most states place little or no value on regional economic
benefits or wholesale sales. 82
3.4.2 Access Issues
Access to transmission systems is a crucial issue in the current deregulation debates. 83
Vertically integrated electric utilities own the vast majority of transmission assets in the
United States. In order for power to flow from a generator to a customer, it is necessary to
use the transmission network in almost every case. Until the passage of EPAct in 1992,
the FERC could not force transmission utilities to wheel power across their lines (although
it did use some regulatory "carrots and sticks" to promote wheeling). The result of this
situation was predictable, a transmission-owning utility would not allow wheeling across
its lines unless it was in that utility's best interest to do so. In particular, if a wheeling
transaction would either directly take away a customer from a utility's service territory, or
would be used to compete with a utility's own wholesale power sales, the wheeling request
of a NUG would be denied.
This situation clearly imposed limits on the ability of NUGs and entrepreneurial utilities to
grow and sell less expensive power to customers. In order to alleviate this problem, after
long debate and overriding significant opposition by some utilities, Congress passed the
open access provisions in the Energy Policy Act of 1992, which gave the FERC the
authority to order wholesale (although not retail) wheeling.
80 Because of the potential money involved, as long as lawyers see even a remote chance of winning a case,
the industry will continued to be dogged by such suits.
81This is problematic for a deregulated industry because the transmission grid will be the transportation
system for the competitive electric power industry. For a more complete, and excellent discussion of this
topic, see: Office of Technology Assessment, 1989, 201-216.
82 Office of Technology Assessment, 1989, 209.
83 For example, see: Joskow, 11 April 1996.
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Passing a law is one thing, implementing it is another. The FERC began to implement the
law on a case-by-case basis, ordering wheeling after petitions were filed and evidence was
presented. This process has taken, on average, 9 months for each wheeling request.84
Realizing that this is not an optimum nor efficient manner to implement open access, in
March 1995 the FERC issued a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NOPR) on the subject.85
The transmission access issue and the "Mega-NOPR" are discussed in greater detail later in
the thesis.86
3.4.3 Pricing Issues
There are numerous ways to price transmission services. However, until recently, the
FERC only allowed the use of postage stamp rates.87 According to the postage stamp
method, a fixed transmission charge is levied; the distance that the power moves over a
transmission line does not matter. This pricing scheme also assumes that all of the power
flows along a defined "contract path" -- which is usually based upon the shortest
geographic path across the transmission system. Therefore, only the utility along the
contract path is compensated. There are several problems with the postage stamp method
that result from the physical properties of transmission systems:
* Power flows over the path of least impedance, not least distance; and
* Power flowing over a line creates effects on the functioning of the system as a
whole.
Postage stamp pricing cannot account for either of these significant physical laws.
In its 1994 Transmission Policy Pricing Statement, 88 the FERC expanded the types of
transmission pricing structures that it would allow. In doing so, the FERC established five
principles, which state that transmission pricing:89
* Must meet the traditional revenue requirement;
* Must reflect comparability;
* Should promote economic efficiency;
* Should promote fairness; and
* Should be practical.
The Commission also generated a list of pricing structures that it would accept from
individual utilities90 and from Regional Transmission Groups (RTGs),91 although it would
8 4FERC, April 1995, 17678.
8 5FERC, April 1995.
86 See Section 5.5.8 7 FERC, April 1995, 17674.
8 8FERC, November 1994.
89Ibid, 55034-55035.
90(1) Zonal "or" pricing based on power flows from zone to zone within a utility, or within the members
of a holding company system; (2) Flow-based line-by-line rates, based on embedded costs "or" pricing; and
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consider other pricing schemes as well. Included in these approved mechanisms were
distance-sensitive and flow-sensitive pricing. The latter attempts to compensate all of the
transmission owners over whose assets the power in question flows. The former
compensates transmission owners based upon the distance that the power flows through
their segment of the system.92
Another major transmission pricing debate concerns nodal and zonal pricing. This topic
was fiercely debated during the California deregulation deliberations. 93  Nodal
transmission prices are set using the marginal cost of transmission at each bus on the
system. Zonal prices are also based upon the marginal cost of transmission, but are less
accurate -- they are calculated at the zone-level94 rather than the bus level.
This overview of transmission pricing issues discusses some of the most important issues,
but leaves many others untouched. 95
3.5 THE FUTURE
While the precise path and pace of electric power restructuring cannot be predicted, 96 it
would appear that the continuing move to a less regulated industry is inevitable and the pace
of change will likely continue to accelerate. The industry's specific technological and
economic characteristics will play a role in shaping the future direction of the industry.
However, an equal or greater contribution to the industry's future direction and structure
will result from the political processes that determine the rules for the new competitive
era.97
(3) "or" pricing at the corporate level using the traditional contract approach. Source: FERC, November
1994, 55036.
9 1(l)"enhanced" contract path pricing; (2) flow-based pricing; (3) a MW-mile method; (4) postage-stamp
"or" ratemaking at the utility level that is combined with power flow analysis to determine the
compensation due to all transmission owners on parallel paths; (5) zonal "or" based pricing;
and (6) short-run marginal cost pricing with transmission prices based on line-by-line losses and
opportunity costs caused by power flow constraints. Excerpted from: FERC, November 1994, 55035-
55037. The RTGs were granted more latitude because they represent the combined interests of transmission
users and owners as well as state authorities, and because regional loop flow problems are more
appropriately handled through regional pricing structures. Source: FERC, November 1994, 55036.
9 2 FERC, April 1995, 17674.
9 3For example, see: Oren et al, 1995.
9 4These zones would need to be defined based upon the composition of individual transmission systems.
Their size has yet to be determined.
9 5For further discussion in this thesis, see: Appendix J.10 and Chapter 9.
9 6 Pierce, 1994, 349.
9 7 Dar, 1994. Also see: "Showtime for the Watchdog;" and Holden, November 1995.
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The challenge in creating an efficient industry structure is to make appropriate connections
between two "parallel universes": the technical operation of electric power systems and the
industry's financial workings. While the technical and financial "universes" function
separately, they cannot function independently. Decisions in one have implications for the
other. In a deregulated industry, the physical flows of electricity and the financial flows of
money could be very different (see Figure 3.4), but they should be reconciled in a manner
Figure 3.4 Old and Potential New Flows of Electrons and Money in the
Electric Power Industry
"OLD FLOWS" "NEW FLOWS"
The dashed line represents verticallj
integrated utilities that have no
wholesale power contracts.
Notes: Dashed lines represent financial flows
Solid lines represent physical flows of electrons
Natural monopoly functions are indicated by rectangle boxes
Figure concept: Hirst and Kirby, 1995.
that signals the efficient use of physical and financial resources in the short- and long-run.
A further complication is that the physical universe is constrained by existing massive
infrastructures which must obey the laws of physics and have generally been technically
operated in a laudable manner. Consequently, a restructuring objective should be to
Ml
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reconstitute the industry's financial structures while maintaining (or making few changes
to) its enviable physical operation. The task of the remainder of this thesis is to evaluate
how efficiently specific deregulation proposals connect these two universes with respect to
transmission in the long-term.
Chapter 41
The Internal Responses of Utilities to
Competition
Why is an industry which enjoyed sta6le and effective regulation for overfifty years
now moving with lightening speed towards afundamentalrestructuring unprecedented
in its history? The answer lies in a comple web of historical events andpublic policy
responses -- set against a backdrop of rapid technologicalchange, a seismic shift in the
American ideological center, andglobalization of the V.S. economy.2
-- (Peter Navarro (1995)
4.1 INTRODUCTION
The American electric power industry is undergoing rapid and fundamental changes as it
evolves from being an industry dominated by vertically-integrated, regulated, monopoly
firms to one in which competition plays an important role in at least some of its functions.
While there have been some visionaries, the recent changes have come as a surprise to
many within the industry. For decades, the electric utility industry was the embodiment of
a large, stable industry, where long-term planning ruled, and investors desiring safe returns
placed their fortunes.3 But now, as the industry changes, so too must its firms -- if they
are to stay in business. This necessity for utilities to change internally has been evidenced
in other deregulated industries, where one-time leaders have lost market share and even
gone bankrupt.4 Entergy Corporation expressed the industry's future well when it stated in
its 1993 Annual Report, "the industry will have winners and losers, champions and fallen
giants who lacked the vision to compete." 5 This chapter examines how utilities have
responded to the emergence of competition in their industry. It explores questions such as:
when did utilities recognize that competition would fundamentally change their industry?
Did all utilities recognize it at the same time, or were there some "leaders" and "laggards?"
1 Almost all of the content in this chapter comes from a term paper written for the MIT course 6.683
"Operation and Planning of Electric Power," which was instructed by Professors Richard Tabors and Marija
Ilic' during the Fall 1995 academic term. This research was not originally intended to be included in the
thesis, however, since it is related to the thesis and adds to the discussion, it was included ex post.
2 Navarro, 1995, 349.
3 Utility stocks have been described as "Perfect investments for those proverbial widows and orphans."
Source: "PG&E: One Step Ahead of Future Shock."
4 For example, see Gandt, 1995 for the history of the bankruptcy of Pan-Am Airlines.
5Entergy, 1993, B.
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Once they recognized that competition was coming, did they respond in the same ways?
Did some deny it? How did they change internally? Are there ways of measuring these
changes? And how have utilities performed according to these measures? Let us begin by
examining what the new competitive era will mean to utilities.
4.2 WHAT THE NEW COMPETITIVE ERA MEANS TO UTILITIES
After having lived in a remarkably stable environment for decades, where planning has
probably been longer-term in focus than in any other industry, electric utilities now find
themselves in a situation where their industry is changing dramatically, quickly, and
somewhat unpredictably. The days of the regulated monopoly are numbered -- if they have
not already passed -- as the industry moves into a new competitive era. In this new era, the
guaranteed rate-of-return from a captive customer base will be no more (at least in some
segments of the industry). Instead, utilities will have to compete to keep the customers
they have served for decades while they attempt to serve the former customers of
neighboring utilities. Instead of being able to pass through the expenses of bad decisions,
shareholders will become financially responsible for company mistakes. Utilities will need
to keep abreast of new ways to market electricity and attempt to develop new services that
create value for customers. Instead of focusing solely on decade-long planning horizons,
utilities will need to maintain their long-term perspective while being responsive to rapid
industry changes. While living in the past may be more comfortable for those who have
grown through the ranks of this generally successful industry, Richard Pierce outlines the
stakes of such an approach.
It is important, however, that utilities recognize the inevitability of the transition
for the purposes of their internal decision-making, notwithstanding the
predictable vigor with which many will resist the transition. Utilities that reduce
their costs rapidly and aggressively and make the many other changes in
corporate culture required to participate effectively in a dynamic competitive
market will survive the transition and will prosper in the post-transition
environment. Utilities that devote all of their resources to resisting the
transition, and indulge the tendency to deny the inevitabilitz of the transition,
will not be around to participate in the post-transition market.
Although it is fraught with complications and dangers, the new era offers utilities an
opportunity for higher returns than they could earn in the old era -- if they operate
efficiently and make sound business decisions. Utilities will have the opportunity to
expand beyond their ielatively small service territories and sell electricity regionally,
nationally, and globally.
6 6Pierce, 1994, 349.
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This new era, filled with both risks and opportunities, could hardly be more different than
the era that is now ending. Yet, the same utilities that have decades of experience in the old
era now must compete in the new one. While many core technological competencies will
be relevant in both, the new era will require many changes in organizational competencies.
In fact, due to the technological complexity of electric power generation and delivery, there
are few, if any, "commodity" industries that require as wide of a breadth of organizational
competencies as will the emerging competitive electric power industry.
With this as a backdrop, let us next examine how electric utility performance is evaluated.
4.3 UTILITY PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENTS
4.3.1 General Measures
Traditional measurements of utility performance have included both physical and financial
measures, such as heat rate, cost per kWh, cost per MW of capacity, employees per
customer, and employees per MW of capacity. While these may at first appear to be useful
statistics,7 they do not account for conditions which are beyond the control of management
in the short- and even perhaps the long-run. These factors include load diversity,
characteristics of installed plant, location, and economic and regulatory conditions.8
4.3.2 Financial Ratings Agencies
4.3.2.1 Purposes of Ratings Agencies
As would be expected from their name, investor-owned utilities (IOUs) are financed
through private capital. In order to raise this capital, either through stock or bond
offerings, IOUs must attract money from investors, who, in turn, want to be informed of
the credibility of their potential investments. While the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) enforces laws that require publicly-traded companies to provide
investors with financial information, investors recognize that this material is prepared by
the company who is seeking their money. Although the SEC mandates that companies be
honest, investors realize that the information could be tainted with bias, and consequently
seek out more impartial analyses. Furthermore, even if company-provided information
was completely impartial, most investors do not have the time nor the expertise to carefully
evaluate the material. As a result, investment ratings companies have emerged as impartial
evaluators to fill the "imperfect information" gap between investors and companies. These
7 And they can be, if they are: (1) used for cardinal, not ordinal judgments; and (2) are used in combination,
not as a stand-alone criterion.
8This list partially comes from Berndt et al, 1995, 69.
I
88 Chapter 4
agencies do extensive research on companies in order to rate potential investments on
characteristics such as risk and growth potential.
4.3.2.2 Changing Measures
Historically, when utilities served stable, monopoly markets with a quasi-public service
mandate, utility stocks and bonds were sound investments. Issues of primary concern to
investors (and therefore ratings agencies) were financial statistics such as debt-to-equity
ratios. On the other hand, characteristics like a utility's competitive position in the market
were not only unimportant, they were meaningless. However, the changes in the electric
power industry have prompted Standard and Poors9 and Fitch Investors Services to
reevaluate their utility performance measures and to incorporate considerations for the new,
competitive era. Whereas the old investment criteria were dominated by financial
indicators, the new criteria incorporate a utility's competitive position into its investment
rating. 10
Standard and Poors now has two large components that go into its stock and bond rating
process: financial position and business position.11 These are then qualitatively added
together to establish a rating. Key points in the business position ranking include: 12
* Market, service-area economy;
* Competitive position;
* Fuel, power supply;
* Operations;
* Asset concentrations;
* Regulation; and
* Management.
Fitch has switched even more of its emphasis away from the "old" era, by placing financial
and competitive considerations into the same framework. The new Fitch criteria, along
with their weighting value, are as follows: 13
SManagement (20%)
* Rate competitiveness (20%)
* Financial/legal performance (20%)
* Plant (15%)
* Local regulation (15%)
* Demographics (10%)
90'Driscoll, October 1993.
10 Moody's has also changed the focus of its analysis of utilities. "'Instead of the traditional focus on rates
of return, construction budgtets, and regulatory activity,' says Moody's, 'analysis is becoming wieghtd
towards cash flow, profit margins, and returns on assets as measures of the efficiency of a compay's
operations." Source: "Moody's: Customers Keep the Pressure On."
11The information in this section comes from: "Rating Investor-Owned Utilities."
12For a more in-depth discussion of S&P's new criteria, see: "The Measure of Management."
13Forde, 1994, 22-25.
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From this discussion it should be clear that historical methods for rating utilities are no
longer applicable. Yet the new criteria, while valuable for achieving their purpose of rating
utility investments, are not particularly effective at answering the questions that are being
asked in this chapter. Nevertheless, some insights can be drawn from them in establishing
our own set of criteria.
4.4 PREVIOUS RESEARCH ON THE CHANGING INDUSTRY
While questions regarding the adaptation of utilities to competition have not been asked
frequently, they have been asked by some researchers. With that being the case, let us
briefly examine what has been discovered.
The importance of competition to utility executives has surged in the past several years. In
its annual survey of utility executives, the Washington International Energy Group found
that competition was the #7 issue among utility executives in 1992.14 By 1995 it had risen
to the #1 spot on the list. 15
A 1992 survey of 244 utility executives found that the top four planned responses to
competition were (in order): increased attention to customer service, aggressive cost
cutting, modifications to long-term strategy, and enhanced management techniques. 16 Of
particular interest to researchers has been downsizing. Recent surveys have found that
between 64% and 89% of utilities have "downsized." 17 In 1993 alone, almost 17,000
utility employees were laid-off or opted for early retirement. 18 These numbers are borne
out when one examines the industry's employment trends. After reaching a peak of nearly
530,000 employees in 1986, the number of people employed in the industry had dropped
to only about 466,000 in 1994,19 while the customer base grew from 77.9 million to 88.4
million. This translates into a jump from a 147 to a 190 customer/employee ratio.20 While
it may not be appropriate to compare individual utilities based upon this statistic alone, such
a significant change at the aggregate level is a telling sign that something is afoot in the
14 Source: "WIEG: Transmission, Competition Key Utility Issues."
15 Source: "Competition is the Major Concern of Electric Utilities."
16 Source: "Competition, Regulation Top Utility Concerns."
17 Source: "Business Bulletin;" "Vanishing Act;" and Doughty and Rode, 24.
18Zanotti, 1994, 145.
19When one realizes that 17,000 lay-offs occurred in 1993, and downsizing continued in 1994 and 1995, we
can imagine that the overall downward employment trend has accelerated in the period since this data was
taken.
20 These statistics come from: "More Customers, Fewer Workers;" and Edison Electric Institute, Statistical
Yearbook of the Electric Utiltiy Industry 1994.
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industry. Yet another survey, this time of 60 utilities and IPPs, found that over 90% had
reduced O&M costs and over 70% had undergone reengineering. 21 Another survey
reported that 93% of the utilities had enacted some type of restructuring in the past 5 years,
with 68% expecting to do so in the next 18 months.22 In doing so, 40% of the utilities had
divided themselves up into strategic business units. 23
With the research that has been done already in hand, let us embark upon our own study of
the industry.
4.5 OUR RESEARCH METHOD
4.5.1 Research Questions and Hypotheses
While a plethora of questions are asked in this chapter's introduction, three primary ones
can be pulled from that list:
* When did utilities recognize that competition would fundamentally change their
industry?
* How did they change internally in response to this recognition?
* How effective have their responses been?
In conjunction with answering these questions, let us propose two hypotheses:
* The "quick fix" hypothesis -- when utilities recognized the emergence of
competition, they first turned to the contemporary "cookbook" management fad;
and
* The "early recognizer advantage" hypothesis -- the utilities that recognized
competition first are better positioned than those that did not.
4.5.2 Research Sample
These questions are answered and hypotheses are tested through a study of the recent
experience of seventeen utilities, which are a subset of the 25 largest IOUs in terms of
kilowatt hours sold in 1989.24 Included in the subset are:
* The ten largest;
* Four of the next 15 that are widely expected to do well in a restructured
industry: 25 Pacificorp, Dominion Resource, Northern States Power (NSP), and
Union Electric; and
* Three of the next 15 that are widely expected not to fare well: Consolidated
Edison, Niagara Mohawk, and Philadelphia Electric (PECO).
In order to answer the questions and test the validity of the hypotheses, our research
employs both qualitative and quantitative indicators. Let us first develop the former.
2 1Doughty and Rode, 24.
22 Homola et al., 1994, 56.
23 Ibid.
24 See Appendix H for a listing of the top 25.
25 See, for instance: "Another Monopoly Bites the Dust;" "Utilities Go To War;" and Salpukas, 8 August
1994.
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4.5.3 Qualitative Analysis Research Method
4.5.3.1 Evaluation Method
The qualitative analysis is performed through an examination of the annual reports of the
studied utilities over the period 1989 to 1994, inclusive. To perform this analysis, the
researcher reads the opening statements from the chairman and the general discussion
sections of the annual reports. In several cases, further reading is done to augment the
information contained in these annual reports.
There are several reasons for choosing this method of ascertaining the utilities' response to
competition. The first is that the annual report is the forum for a utility's leaders to discuss
the situation of the company and promote it to important constituencies: shareholders,
potential investors, customers, and employees.26 Therefore it is a venue for a utility's
leaders to discuss those issues that they believe are most important to the company.
Secondly, this method provides time-series data. Over time, people forget the exact dates
that events occurred, and are even more apt to forget the prevailing attitudes at any given
point in time. Reading the annual reports, then, provides for a consistent evaluation of the
development of utilities' thinking with regard to competition and adjustments to meet it.
At the same time, though, this method has several weaknesses. The first of these is that the
data is self-reported. This brings with it two problems: selectivity and inability to measure
implementation. The first and perhaps most obvious problem caused by selectivity is that a
utility uses its annual report to "sell" people on the company. Therefore, it will tend to err
on the side of a favorable discussion of its position. Beyond that self-serving motive, it
must be recognized that an electric utility is a large enterprise with many issues that effect it.
An annual report attempts to concisely capture the important issues. Therefore, a utility's
executives and public relations personnel must be selective as to what issues will be
covered and in what depth. For example, a utility might have made decisions in the late
1980s for a host of reasons, including competitive positioning. However, since a
competitive market was years from developing, an annual report may not have cited
"preparing for competition" as a decision-making rationale.
Secondly, awareness and executive philosophy does not necessarily equate to
implementation. An executive may talk about certain issues, such as "best practices," even
though they do not exist in the company. The difference between the rhetoric and reality
could be caused by at least three factors: ineffective implementation, lip service, or
2 6 Dunk, 1995.
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inspiration. In the first case, management is not able to effectively implement its ideas for
how the organization should function. In the second, an executive has no commitment to
the principles that she expounds. They are just words with little or no intent behind them --
the executive has read several management books and is parroting what she thinks will
impress the readers. In the third case, the executive is attempting to prepare constituents
for future change and to inspire and reinforce corporate goals. It is a discussion of what he
wants the company to become, not what it currently is.
Another problem with this method is that the researcher must interpret the annual reports,
which also can cause "errors." For example, concepts that should be read between the
lines might be missed, while others are found (between the lines) that were not really there.
Errors can also occur in classifying information according to the frameworks on which the
utilities are evaluated.
The bottom line is that the qualitative research, while it has some worthwhile qualities, is
imperfect. As a result, the results should be examined for general trends, not for accurate
or precise conclusions about specific utilities or representative conclusions about the larger
industry.
4.5.3.2 Evaluation Criteria
4.5.3.2.1 Recognition of competition
The first question that is asked in this research is: when did utilities recognize that
competition would lead to a fundamental change in their industry? It is important to note
that this means the recognition that competition will lead to a significant change in their core
business, not just that it will occur at the margins.27 This is observed by reading the
annual report and determining whether the utility recognizes that it will face competition in
the future. It is assumed that because of the significant changes that would result from
competition, corporate executives would appraise their shareholders of the development of
competition soon after they recognize that it will occur.28
4.5.3.2.2 Management "fad" responses to competition
With the question of recognition out of the way, the next logical question is: how did
utilities respond? The research attempts to answer this in several ways. The first is to
2 7 This distinction is important, because in several cases in the research there are utilities who had formed
affiliated IPPs who were not classified as recognizing competition. They observed opportunities at the
margins, but did not appear realize that their core business would eventually be threatened by competition.28 It is further likely that securities laws mandate that utility executives inform investors when they
recognize something as significant as the coming of competition.
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determine the validity of the "quick fix" hypothesis -- did utilities turn to the management
fad of the time to bolster their competitive position? One could imagine that when faced
with a new challenge (in this case competition) the first choice for many managers would
be to follow the contemporary wisdom of fellow managers -- which is embodied in
business fads. While this hypothesis may make intuitive sense, the research seeks to
determine if it is actually true.
The first management fad that is examined is downsizing. Since the mid-1980s, corporate
America has engaged in a long process of cutting back on their workforces, which
manifests itself in early retirement offers and lay-offs. 29 With the talk of downsizing
constantly in the press, often favorably until recent years, one could imagine that when a
utility executive recognizes the emergence of competition, he might opt to downsize. Such
an action may be appropriate for many utilities given that utility bureaucracies have been
able to grow with few checks in the comfortable existence that the industry lived during the
rate-of-return regulatory era. Therefore, some workforce reductions are likely necessary in
order for utilities to become competitive in the new era.30
The second management fad, total quality management (TQM), stemmed from the rise of
the Japanese during the 1980s. When American managers found themselves up against the
rising tide of Japanese dominance, they searched for the key to Japanese success. One
discovery was that many successful Japanese companies employed total quality control
principles. Workers are given unprecedented authority over their work3 1 and the ability to
make incremental changes in processes that would make their work more efficient and/or
lead to higher quality products in "total quality" operations. While TQM is based on
continual, incremental changes, the fad that replaced it calls for rapid, radical change.
2 9For an excellent discussion of this phenomenon and its externalities, see: "The Downsizing of America."
It should be noted that some or much of this downsizing has served the useful purpose of reducing
bureaucratic largesse, in its most pathological extreme, executives engage in these purges as an act of
bravado. Downsizing becomes an end, rather than the means to an end.
3 0This is based upon the experience in other industries that have undergone deregulation. The trend is that
overall industry employment does not change much, but this because the former monopoly cuts many jobs
and new entrants hire about the same number of employees as the old monopoly eliminated. Source:
Winston, 1993, 1281.
3 1For example, the ability to stop the assembly line to fix a problem. Such front-line authority was in
direct opposition to the mass production philosophy that underpinned much of American manufacturing at
that time. For a description of this in the automobile industry, see: Womack et al, 1990.
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The reenigineering fad was started in Cambridge by a pair of MIT graduates. 32 The basic
concept of reengineering is that work systems have evolved over time to meet specific
situations, many which no longer exist. As a result, the current organizational structure is
not designed rationally. 33 Reengineering seeks to change a company by starting with a
"blank slate" organizational chart and a list of tasks that are essential for the firm to create
value for the customer. From there, the organization is redesigned so that it most
efficiently performs those tasks.
4.5.3.2.3 Best Practice
The third set of qualitative measures is the Best Practice paradigm. 34 This series of
measurements attempts to determine which utilities have moved beyond the wonder-cure-all
management fad of the era and have made fundamental changes that will result in a long-
term competitive firm. These criteria come from the MIT Commission on Industrial
Productivity, which noted six characteristics that were common to many of the companies
that remained internationally competitive in an era where American manufacturers were
"falling behind" those from Japan and Germany. While first developed in the late 1980s,
the Best Practice paradigm continues to be relevant in the 1990s.35 The components of the
paradigm are:
* Simultaneous improvement in quality, cost and delivery;
* Staying close to the customer;
* Closer relations with suppliers;
* Using technology for strategic advantage;
* Flatter and less compartmentalized organizations; and
* Innovative human-resource policies.
Let us briefly describe each one of these, in turn.
4.5.3.2.3.1 Simultaneous improvement in quality, cost and delivery
The first best practice quality is simultaneous improvement in quality, cost, and delivery.
While at least one of these features can be found in most companies,
best practice firms put particular emphasis on simultaneous improvements in
quality, cost and speed. Other firms have made partial improvements by trading
off one dimension of performance against another; only the best companies
have made significant improvements in all three. 36
32 Initially launched in a 1990 Harvard Business Review piece, it was not until the 1993 release of the book
Reengineering the Corporation that the concept became a legitimate management fad. Sources: Hammer,
1990; and Champy and Hammer, 1993.
33 Rationally being defined here as: in a way that will most efficiently perform the organization's tasks.
34 Dertouzos et al, 1989, 117-128.
35 Bagnall, 1995.
3 6Dertouzos et al, 1989, 118.
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A further characteristic of best practice firms is "an emphasis on competitive benchmarking:
comparing the performance of their products and work processes with those of the world
leaders in order to achieve improvement and measure progress." 37
4.5.3.2.3.2 Staying close to the customer
Best practice firms make a "concerted effort" to develop and maintain close ties to their
customers. These ties allow the firms "to pick up more differentiated signals from the
market and thus to respond to different segments of demand." 38
4.5.3.2.3.3 Closer relations with suppliers
The third best practice characteristic, which was common to all of the best practice firms
studied by the Commission, is that efforts are made to improve coordination with external
suppliers in order to reduce inventories, speed up product flow, and reduce defects. 39 This
improved coordination can occur through both coercive power and cooperative negotiation.
Regardless of the mechanism, best practice firms find a way of improving their position
with suppliers.
4.5.3.2.3.4 Using technology for strategic advantage
Like many others, "best practice" firms utilize new technologies. What differentiates them
is that best practice firms do more than just buy the latest and greatest technologies, they
"have integrated technology choices into the rest of their business planning, including
strategies for manufacturing, marketing, and human resources." 40 In short, technology
innovation and use is a means to strategic improvement (however defined), rather than an
end.
4.5.3.2.3.5 Flatter and less compartmentalized organizations
The fifth best practice quality is found in the way that these companies organize
themselves. The commission found, "In virtually all successful firms ... the trend is
toward greater functional integration and fewer layers of hierarchy, both of which promote
greater speed in product development and greater responsiveness to changing markets."41
Best practice firms eliminate layers of management that stifle creativity and impair the
companies' ability to react nimbly to changes in the market. In the place of a stifling
bureaucracy, empowered cross-functional teams emerge which are charged with tasks such
3 7 Ibid., 119.
3 8Ibid.
3 9 Ibid., 121.
4 0 Ibid., 121.
4 1 Ibid., 122.
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as solving problems, developing new products, and manufacturing them. These changes
require and reinforce structural changes that lower functional barriers and decentralize
authority.
4.5.3.2.3.6 Innovative human resource policies
The sixth quality of best practice firms is that they employ innovative human resource
policies.
Best practice firms have recognized that improvements in quality and flexibility
require levels of commitment, responsibility, and knowledge on the part of the
work force that cannot be obtained by compulsion or cosmetic improvements in
human-resource policies ... The most successful firms recognize that quality is
the output of an entire production system, and not the result of an organizational
gimmick.42
In our evaluation of annual reports, it is sometimes difficult to determine whether a utility
made "best practices" a fundamental part of a new way of doing business, or whether these
were just shallow gimmicks. At the very least, though, our analysis determines whether
such practices were even attempted.
4.5.3.3 Stages of Competitive Development
Another evaluation criteria identifies the progress of the utilities based upon the framework
of Gardner and Gilson. In their research of four other industries that underwent
deregulation, 43 Timothy P. Gardner and Lawrence D. Gilson provide a framework for the
stages that occur as industries move from being dominated by protected monopolies to
becoming competitive. This framework, called "The Milestones From Protected Monopoly
to Market Competition,"44 tracks the experiences of six industry players45 through five
stages of development (see Tables 4.1 and 4.2). The players of interest in our analysis (the
utilities) would be classified as the "traditional providers." At any given point in time, the
plethora of players will be at various stages of development in a given industry. 46 Table
4.3 outlines the framework for the behavior of traditional providers during each of the
various stages.
4 2 Ibid., 124.
4 3 Airlines, Natural Gas, Railroads, and Telecommunications.
44Gardner and Gilson, 1994, 8-9.
45 Traditional providers, regulators, competitors, customers, financial markets, and employees
46 Those that are "more developed" are the leaders, and those that are "less developed," the laggards.
Table 4.1: Gardner and Gilson's Stages of Development
* Equilibrium
* Rumblings in the Provinces
* Identity Crisis
* Refocus
* Dynamic Competition
Source: Gardner and Gilson, 1994.
Table 4.2: Gardner and Gilson's Industry Players
* Traditional Providers
* Regulators
* Competitors
* Customers
* Financial Markets
* Employees
Source: Gardner and Gilson, 1994.
Based upon this framework, we place each of the utilities in one of the stages of
competitive development in each of the years studied. As a benchmark, we also
characterize the stage of progression of the industry -- based upon an estimate of where the
"average" of the six categories of industry players were in each year.
4.5.4 Quantitative Analysis Research Method
4.5.4.1 Price Changes
Because those who are leading the efforts to restructure the industry explicitly state that "we
are single-minded in [our objective] -- to lower the cost of electric service...," 47 it seems
imperative that this research examine how utilities' rates have changed between 1989 and
1994, as they have been anticipating competition. It should be noted that an inter-utility
comparison based solely upon rate levels would not be appropriate for our study because
rate levels are influenced by a wide variety of technological, regional, economic, and
regulatory factors that are influenced little by the internal workings of the utility in the
short-term.48 As a result, we do not compare the absolute rate level in this measure, but
rather, examine the relative change in the utilities' rates. Therefore, the first quantitative
measure is to examine the change in the rates of a utility over the period 1989-1994.
4 7 California Public Utilities Commission, 1994, 1.
4 8 Berndt et al, 1995, 69.
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Table 4.3: Stages of Development of Traditional Providers
Stage I: Equilibrium
* Vertically integrated full-services provider
* Engineering-driven
* Functional not process organization
* Monopoly franchise growth is objective
* Earnings driven rather than cash flow driven
* Regulator seen as key to financial performance
* Obligation to serve paramount
* Cost-based pricing
* Service reliability & rate base earnings encouraged spending
Stage II: Rumblings in the Provinces
* Continued belief in natural monopoly
* Perceived barriers to entry
- bundled services (full-service providers)
- own and build (asset driven)
* Full penetration of traditional markets in monopoly franchise
Stage III: Identity Crisis
* Across-the-board O&M cost cutting
* Defend "at risk" market segments by seeking low cost provider role
* Seek regulatory protection
* Service unbundling
* Invest heavily in technology & new systems
* Defensive pricing
* Reorganize but preserve functional lines
* Establish market function
* "Grass is greener" syndrome (unrelated diversification)
* Effort to "park" windfall cash outside regulatory purview
* Pressure on financial performance: pay out ratios deteriorate
Stage IV: Refocus
* Increasing performance variability; some fail
* Pursue market segments on basis of value
* Service line repackaging
* Process re-engineering
* Advocates fuller deregulation
* Market influenced, regulator-approved prices; prices decline
* Divest unrelated diversification
* Selective diversification in core competencies
* Redefine basic business
* Reorganization to reinforce new business definition
* Asset write downs (including stranded costs)
* Cash reinvest not distributed via dividends
* Eliminate low value activities
* Cash flow driven with reinvestment bias
* Organize by customer segment, product line or process
* New management decision tools fit new needs
Stage V: Dynamic Competition
* Reinforce; grow redefined business via reinvestment, acquisition & divestitures
* Escape commodity trap
* Maximize shareholder value
* Deploy assets dynamically to optimize creation of cash value
* Market pricing
* Consumer protection concerns
* Non-market public concerns
* More winners & losers
Source: Gardner and Gilson, 1993, 8-9.
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4.5.4.2 Regional Competitiveness
Although the absolute value of rates is not a perfect measure of how utilities are internally
changing, it is still an important. In the new competitive era, customers will not base their
decisions on how well a utility is changing its organization, but rather, on the price of the
service it provides. 49 Therefore, we also have a quantitative measure that controls for the
general price differences across the country, while still measuring the absolute value of a
utility's rates. We term this the regional competitiveness ratio (RCR). It is a rather simple
statistic: the ratio between the utility's average rate for all customers, divided by the average
rate of all customers in the state(s) in which the utility serves. This ratio is weighted to
reflect the amount of power that the utility sells in each state. The formula for this ratio is:
n__ ri 0Pi
Regional competitiveness ratio = i,4 i ai
where:
n = number of states in which utility serves
ri = the utility's revenue in state i
Pi = the utility's average price in state i
ai = the average electricity price in state i
The state-level price comparison is one (imperfect) indicator of the future competition that a
utility faces. It should be acknowledged that utilities will not just compete with the others
in the states that they currently serve. As a result, it could be argued that a more
appropriate measure for a Massachusetts utility would be a ratio of its rates compared with
those in the New England Power Pool, as opposed to only those in the State of
Massachusetts. On the other hand, it is not clear what the geographic limits of competition
will be in the new era. It might be that the Massachusetts utility competes only against
other producers in the New England Power Pool. However, it may also compete with
those in the New York Power Pool, or perhaps even with American Electric Power (from
the Midwest) or the Southern Company (from the Deep South). Therefore, due to the
uncertainties of future competitive boundaries, and the calculation simplicity of using state
numbers, we use this formula in our research.
4 9 Although they will likely pay a premium for quality service.
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4.5.4.3 Labor Productivity
The other quantitative measure that we examine is labor productivity. One might ask, why
is productivity important? The answer is that "in the long run probably nothing is as
important for economic welfare as the rate of productivity growth." 50 With this in mind,
the intent of the research is to examine how utility productivity, in terms of
MWhlemployee, changed over the six year period. Once again, this is not intended to
compare the utilities based upon absolute values, but rather to examine how their
productivity changed over time.
4.6 RESEARCH RESULTS
In the next three sections we discuss some of the major results of the research. 51
4.6.1 Qualitative Results
4.6.1.1 Recognition of Competition
There were large differences in the "recognition" of competition on the part of utilities. For
example, NSP had extensive discussions on competition in its annul reports as early as
1986,52 while other utilities, such as the Allegheny Power System, did not "recognize" the
emergence of competition until after the Energy Policy Act was passed in 1992.53 Even
then, the utility maintained that the old structure was more appropriate than a competitive
one and that the latter would lead to the deterioration of power quality, etc.
4.6.1.2 Downsizing/ TQM/ Reengineering
4.6.1.2.1 Downsizing
All but five of the utilities underwent some type of downsizing. Union Electric and
Consolidated Edison (Con. Ed.) avoided downsizing through sustained attrition programs.
Con. Ed's program started in about 1980 and by 1994 had resulted in a 20% workforce
reduction. Union Electric's program started in 1987, and by 1994, the company had
eliminated 17% of its positions. It should be noted that all of the dozen companies that
downsized did so more than once. An interesting caveat to this downsizing trend is that
many of the downsizings of the early 1990s were not caused by the emergence of
competition, but rather, by unfavorable public utility commission decisions.54
50 Baumol et al, 1989, 1.
5 1For utility-specific details, refer to the comprehensive qualitative and quantitative results in Appendix H.
52 Based upon extensive discussion in the 1989 annual report we went through older annual reports in order
to find when such discussions began.
5 3Annual reports are issued in the spring of the year following the year of the report. For example, the
1992 Allegheny report would have been published in Spring 1993.
54 At least five of the utilities had cost recovery for plants disallowed: Philadelphia Electric (Limmerick
Nuclear), Texas Utilities (Commanche Peak nuclear), Southern Company, Unicom (Byron Nuclear), and
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Figure 4.1: Recognition of Competition, Use of Downsizing, TQM, and
Reengineering vs. Time
100%
90%
80%
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
Year
4.6.1.2.2 Total Quality Management
The use of Total Quality Management by utilities peaked in 1991, when 47% of those
sampled reported TQM activities. In 1994, only one utility (Duke Power) still reported
TQM activity, and even there, TQM appears to be in decline. In its 1993 report, Duke
mentioned that it was planning to start a TQM awards process for its suppliers; but no
mention of it was made in the 1994 report, where TQM itself received .only passing
comment.
There does not appear to be a connection between early recognition of competition and the
use of TQM,55 nor between the use of TQM and preparations for competition. For
example, Unicom reported that it was engaged in TQM before it "recognized" the
emergence of competition.
American Electric Power (Zinner - coal converted from nuclear). All but the latter were partially or
primarily responsible for downsizings.
5 5This is not in keeping with the quick fix hypothesis, since TQM was the management fad during the
time period where early recognition of competition occurred.
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4.6.1.2.3 Reengineering
Reengineering did not become popular among the utilities until 1994, which is not
surprising because it was not until 1993 or 1994 that it became a mainstream management
fad. In 1994, 29% of the utilities were engaged in reengineering activities, up from 18% in
1993, and 6% (one utility - Texas Utilities) in 1992. There do not appear to be any
connections between those utilities that reengineered and those that were either early or late
recognizers of competition. There also does not appear to be any connection between
competitive positioning and reengineering. Several of the leaders, such as Duke Power and
FPL Group are engaged in reengineering efforts, but so too are PECO and Niagara
Mohawk.
4.6.1.3 Best Practice
4.6.1.3.1 General findings
None of the utilities are at the point where they can be described as "best practice" firms.
This is a significant finding, in that the set of best practice qualities are mutually reinforcing
and form a single, integrated strategy, rather than being "a list from which firms can pick
and choose."56 Therefore, the ideal situation and the synergy that accompanies it does not
appear to be present in these utilities. There is reason for hope in the findings, however (at
least for those who believe that a best practice organization can develop from a summation
of good practices that develop over time). 57 This hope stems from the apparent general
trend toward "better practice."' 58 Perhaps this trend will eventually lead to the emergence of
best practice utilities.
4.6.1.1.2 Most common and least common characteristics
When we examine where the utilities are coming the closest and falling the farthest from the
best practice ideal, we find that firms are most likely to be close to customers, and least
likely to be close to suppliers. This is not surprising in many ways. Getting close to the
customer, at least on the level that utilities would report in an annual report, may be the
easiest organizational change to make. The most common method by which utilities
reported becoming closer to their customer was for them to consolidate disperse service
operations into a centralized 24 hour telephone center,59 where customers can have any
5 6Dertouzos et al, 1989, 118.
57See, for example, Rayner, 1992. An opposite viewpoint is that a best practice firm is the result of a
deliberate, initial "proper" mindset.
58Employing more of the qualities over time.
59For the purposes of this research, actions such as opening 24 hour service centers are cause for giving the
utility credit for being close to the customer. While this undoubtedly leads to an over-reporting of "best
practice," since it is likely that some of these merely fix the specific problems without improving overall
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problem solved. One of the unfortunate limitations of this study is that we cannot
determine if utilities really get closer to the customers, listen to their needs, and make
broader service changes; or whether they are just responding to customer problems, with
no feedback loop.
On the other end of the spectrum, utilities do not seem concerned with supplier relations.60
Part of the reason for this, undoubtedly, is that the largest "supply" is fuel -- a commodity
input. 61 Utilities cannot sit down and work with fuel suppliers to get higher quality inputs
at better prices or split the responsibility for component design in the same way that an
automobile manufacturer can with its suppliers. 62 Two exceptions to the general trend are
Texas Utilities and Pacificorp, both of whom have vertically integrated much of their fuel
supply.63 Several other utilities have attempted to "solve" their nuclear supply chain
problems by starting their own enrichment plants. 64 Fuel is not the only item that is
supplied to utilities, however. It is interesting to note that few of the utilities mention that
they work with "suppliers" to develop better components for their systems. When
mentioned, technological development of processes is in the context of internal research or
demonstration projects with the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI).
In addition to interesting findings regarding the most common and least common Best
Practice characteristics, there are several interesting results with respect to the other criteria.
4.6.1.3.3 Interesting findings with respect to other Best Practice characteristics
4.6.1.3.3.1 Innovative human resource policies
In the research we found two primary strains of innovative human resource policies:
incentive pay and training. Incentive pay programs were used by a few utilities as early as
1989 (NSP, Duke Power and Entergy). At that time, these utilities claimed that only five
utilities in the nation had incentive pay schemes. 65 The intent of such programs is to tie
employee pay with the objectives of the organization.66
service; such actions represent a realization on the part of utilities that customers can no longer be taken for
granted.
60 We make this judgment because supply issues are absent from most of the companies' annual reports.
6 11t should be noted, though, that this may be an incorrect and short-sighted view of fuel supply.
6 2Although beneficial negotiations could probably occur in slightly different terms.
6 3Pacificorp owns coal mines and sites its generators on mine premises. Texas Utilities has natural gas
subsidiaries that supply several of its plants.
64 See: NSP, 1989; Entergy, 1989; Duke Power, 1989.
6 5 NSP, 1989.
6 6For an extensive discussion of this, in the context of Duke Power, see: Wilkinson, 1993.
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Several utilities have started company-wide training centers, which not only teach directly
applicable job skills, but also provide employees with education on topics not directly
related to the employees' work. Examples of these are The Southern Company College67
and Consolidated Edison's "Learning Center."68
It is interesting to note, however, that these employee programs have been generally de-
emphasized (or eliminated) as industry competition has intensified. For example, Pacific
Gas and Electric, Entergy, Duke Power, and Northern States Power -- all of whom
described these programs as being important for their competitive advantage in the early
years of the study -- made no mention of them in 1994.69 It is not clear whether these
utilities scrapped their programs or whether the programs did not make it through the
process of selecting material for the 1994 annual reports. Nevertheless, it seems significant
that none of these make reference to their human resource policies as being a strategic
advantage in the new era. Ironically, several of the competitive "laggards" -- Consolidated
Edison, Commonwealth Edison, and PECO -- started these type of programs within the
past several years -- when they recognized the threat of competition. It can be hypothesized
from these observations that utilities look to cultivate their human resources soon after they
recognize competition, but that this commitment wanes over time. Given the small set of
utilities examined here, we can only propose this hypothesis.
4.6.1.3.3.2 Using technology for strategic advantage
Another interesting finding regards the use of technology for strategic advantage. In a
confirmation of the importance of the information age, those utilities that use technology for
strategic advantage 70 most often utilize information technology. The most significant place
where this occurs is at the utility-customer interface, where distributed information
technologies can perform a range of interconnected tasks.
67The Southern Company, 1992.
68Consolidated Edison, 1992.
69when competition moved to center stage in the industry.
70As opposed to those who used it for compliance. In this latter category were many discussions of
environmental technologies that did not appear to help the sponsoring utilities' strategic goals. Examples
of these are electric cars and some remediation technologies. In the case of electric vehicles, both SCE
Corp. and Pacific Gas and Electric devoted the major theme of one of their annual reports to EVs.
However, these did not focus on how EVs would help the utility, but rather, what a great, environmental-
friendly technology they are.
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4.6.1.4 Gardner-Gilson Ratings
In 1994, the utilities in this survey had an average Gardner-Gilson rating of 2.8, with a
range from 2.0 (PECO and Unicomrn) to 3.4 (Entergy). According to their ratings, the
utilities are approaching the "identity crisis" category. The industry as a whole71 had a
rating of 2.4 (which places it about halfway between "rumblings in the provinces" and
"identity crisis"). Therefore, it would appear that this set of utilities are slightly ahead of
the larger industry in the evolutionary process of going from the old era to a new one.
Looking at the extremes; Entergy was one of the "leading" utilities on this rating scale in
1989 while both Unicomrn and PECO had ratings of 1.0 in 1989. It is also interesting to
note that all of the utilities moved at least an increment of 0.9, with the exception of NSP,
which was well in front of the pack with a 3.0 in 1989 and backslid, before returning to a
3.0 in 1994. This backslide was the result of an unfavorable rate case, which appeared to
divert the focus of management for several years.
Figure 4.2: Gardner and Gilson Ratings of Utilities vs. Time
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4.6.2 Quantitative Results
4.6.2.1 Rate Changes
The average rate increase over the period 1989-1994 was 8.9%. In comparison, rates
nationally increased 7.1% during that period. This group's figure was inflated by Niagara
Mohawk's massive 40% rate increase. In contrast, six utilities had declining rates.
4.6.2.2 Changes in Rate Competitiveness
As a whole, these utilities performed slightly better than their peers in terms of becoming
competitive in the regions they serve. Overall, the utilities went from having rates that were
100.9% of the average rates in the regions they serve to having rates of 100.5% of the
regional average. Individually, ten of the utilities improved their competitive position,
while seven of them saw it decrease.
Figure 4.3: Change in Average Electricity Price, 1989-1994
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It is interesting that the biggest winner and loser (in terms of rate competitiveness) were
from the same state -- New York. Given the method of calculating our statistic, however,
this may not be coincidental. The biggest "winner" was Con. Ed., whose change in RCR
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was a -12.2, despite the fact that it had a rate increase of 11.3% (the sixth highest of the 17
utilities). A reasonable explanation for this is that its cross-state rival, Niagara Mohawk,
raised its rates 40%. Such a massive increase by Niagara Mohawk, the second largest IOU
in New York, did much to raise the overall average state rate, therefore putting Con Ed in a
much more favorable position.72 Other than Con. Ed.'s success with its long-term work
force attrition program, there is no compelling reason to explain why the utility's
performance would have been so impressive -- except for the troubles of Niagara Mohawk
and the Long Island Lighting Company.73
Figure 4.4: Change in Regional Competitiveness Ratio, 1989-1994
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7 2Even if Con Ed did little to deserve it.
7 3 The latter is currently on the verge of being taken over by the State of New York due to significant
financial problems -- most notably, it has the highest electric rates in the Continental U.S. One of the
main contributors to these extraordinary rates is the agreement that former Governor Mario Cuomo made
with the company that kept it from opening its Shorehamn Nuclear Plant. Using the old regulatory compact
structure, Cuomo was able to advance his anti-nuclear agenda by mothballing the plant soon before it was
to open. For a more complete discussion of the utility's troubles, see: Studness, 1996.
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With an RCR increase of 10.7, Niagara Mohawk was the largest competitiveness "loser."
It was followed by Texas Utilities, which experienced a 10.3 competitive ratio rise.
Construction cost overruns from the Commanche Peak 1 and 2 nuclear power plants were
largely responsible for the poor performance of Texas Utilities.74
4.6.2.3 Employment Productivity
The original intent of this research was to also examine the changes in employee
productivity (in terms of MWh per employee) at the firm level. However, the author could
not find utility employment statistics that only included those employees engaged in the
production of electric power (as opposed to employees of natural gas or other affiliated
ventures of the utility). Therefore, these statistics are not presented in this paper.
However, industry-wide statistics on productivity are kept by the Bureau of Labor
Statistics. As can be seen in Figure 4.5, significant improvements in the productivity of
employees have been measured on the cumulative industry level over the past several years.
Figure 4.5: Relative Productivity of Electric Utility Employees
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Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics, 1985 and 1995.
74 Which had large overruns.
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4.6.3 Other Results
There are three common themes that run through many of the annual reports that were not
measured, but were interesting to observe.
4.6.3.1 Holding Company Formation
One common trend was the formation of holding companies. These structures, which fell
into disfavor during the Great Depression, are making a resurgence. Firms such as
Virginia Power (Dominion Resources) and Florida Power and Light (FPL Group) were
pioneers in this movement. They have been followed by Philadelphia Electric (PECO) and
Commonwealth Edison (Unicom). Even more holding companies, both in our sample of
utilities and in the larger industry, were created during 1995.75
4.6.3.2 Diversification
A recent EPRI Journal article76 reported a dramatic increase in utility diversification activity
in recent years. This trend was also evident in the utilities studied in this research. The
most common type of diversification was that which occurs in industries related to electric
utility core competencies. Most common of all was diversification into the non-utility
generation market.77 Many utilities explicitly stated that they would not diversify into
industries not related to their core competencies. This is in sharp contrast78 to utility
diversification efforts of the 1980s, which often proved to be unsuccessful, if not
disastrous. An example of this was FPL Corp., which had entered industries ranging from
insurance to Cable TV. For most of the period 1989-1994, FPL was looking for buyers
for these unprofitable units.
4.6.3.3 Environmental Consciousness
Perhaps the most common topic79 in the annual reports was a discussion of utilities'
commitment to a clean environment. This environmentalism was expressed in many ways,
ranging from reports dedicated to the environment, 80 to extensive discussions of
environmentally-friendly technological development, 81 to discussions of new corporate
environmental policies. 82 One exception to this environmental-friendliness was the open
75Source: "Inside Utility Mergers: Trends Within the Trend," 60.
76Lamarre, 1995.
77Those which have non-utility generation affiliates include: Southern California Edison, Pacific Gas and
Electric, The Southern Company, Northern States Power, Dominion Resources, Duke Power, and Entergy.78And is perhaps mentioned so frequently as a backlash to.
79Aside from the mandatory financial discussions.
80Pacific Gas and Electric, 1990.
81SCE Corp., 1990.
82The Southern Company.
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hostility expressed by the Allegheny Power System toward the passage of the Clean Air
Act Amendments of 1990, which required the System to install expensive scrubbers on
several of its plants.83
4.7 DISCUSSION OF RESULTS
4.7.1 The "Quick Fix" Hypothesis
One of the hypotheses of this research is the "quick fix" hypothesis. 84 The evidence in this
study does not support this hypothesis, however. In examining the data in Appendix H, it
is clear that there was no correlation whatsoever between a utility recognizing competition
and turning to TQM, reengineering, or downsizing. In fact, utilities were less likely to
employ these management practices during the year that they recognized competition.
Instead, the utilities appeared to be deliberate about how they would prepare for the
competitive environment. While this might suggest management paralysis, it also could be
explained as a continuation of the industry practice of slow, calculated, long-term decision-
making. In fact, in the year that they recognized competition, several of the utilities
mentioned that they were forming a committee to investigate the implications of competition
and would probably have a plan put together by the next annual report.
The utilities studied in this research turned to TQM and reengineering at about the same
time that the larger business community did. Among these utilities, TQM reached its peak
in 1991, when eight of the 17 utilities said that they were engaged in TQM activities. In
comparing this with the larger business community, one barometer of the overall TQM
movement would be the number of applicants for the Baldridge Award. In 1991, the
Commerce Department received 106 applications for the award, which marked its high-
water mark. 85 Among the utilities, reengineering peaked (or was still rising) in 1994,
which would be in keeping with the perceived trend in corporate America.
83While the scrubber option was expensive, the other alternative -- to buy cleaner coal -- would have been
more expensive. This is because the System gets its coal from its service territory. However, it would
have to purchase "clean coal" outside of its service territory, an action which would have significant
economic consequences on the region it serves, and in turn, on the company.
84 This hypothesis is: "when utilities recognized the emergence of competition, they first turned to the
contemporary 'cookbook' management fad."
85 Source: National Institute of Standards, 1995. In 1995, only 47 companies applied for the Baldridge.
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4.7.2 The "First Recognizer" Hypothesis
The data does not appear to strongly affirm the "first recognizer" hypothesis.86 The seven
utilities that recognized competition in 1989 did tend to do well in the Gardner-Gilson
ratings, with six of them having scores above the average of 2.8 in 1994. However, when
the focus changes to their quantitative rate competitiveness, only four saw their RCR
improve, while three saw it worsen between 1989 and 1994. Although early recognition
may not have led to overwhelming success, it also did not lead to significant deterioration
of competitiveness. The most egregious examples of worsened competitive position
occurred among those utilities that did not recognize competition early. From this
discussion it would appear that recognizing competition early can be slightly beneficial, but
does not necessarily lead to a utility having a better competitive position in the future.
4.7.3 Downsizing as the Only Consistent Response
One obvious observation is that the utilities were quite heterogeneous in their response to
competition -- in when they recognized it, how they responded to it, and how well-
positioned they find themselves now. The only clear trend in the data this is observed is
that utilities have generally turned to downsizing as they position themselves for
competition.
4.7.4 Commitment to Employees
The "old" electric utility typified the old American labor "social contract" -- lifetime
employment was not guaranteed, but companies took care of their employees and lifetime
employment had become an implicit agreement of sort. We find that most electric utilities
turned to downsizing as a partial solution to their competitiveness problem (as have many
American companies), and that downsizing activity has increased in the past several years.
It is interesting to compare this trend with the finding that a number of the utilities that were
the early recognizers of competition had innovative human resource policies in 1989 and
later de-emphasized (or jettisoned) them, while many of the laggards87 turned to innovate
human resources policies when they recognized competition. Might it be that as utilities
become more focused on cost control, they begin to lose sight of their human resources?
While this is difficult to prove based upon a small sample and limited information, it is an
interesting question that would be worthy of further research.
86This hypothesis states: "the utilities that recognized competition first are better positioned than those that
did not."87With respect to recognition of competition.
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4.7.5 Organizational Change is Not the Only Factor for Success
While this paper has focused on utilities and the internal changes that they have made in
order to become more competitive, it must be recognized that their ability to compete in the
future is only partially a function of the internal changes that they make. In this high fixed-
cost industry, regulatory decisions and past capital expenditures will play a large role in the
ability of utilities to compete.
Some firms, such as Union Electric, Pacificorp, and Dominion Resources are well-
positioned, not necessarily because they recognized or explicitly prepared for the coming
competitive environment, 88 but because they are low-cost suppliers. While this is a result
of good past decisions, it is not necessarily a reflection of preparation for competition.
On the other hand, some utilities are haunted by past decisions, and regardless of how hard
they might work to improve their internal workings, they will have a difficult time
competing. For example, Niagara Mohawk, which has recently become more
competitively focused (although it was a late recognizer) faces serious problems that could
overwhelm any internal adjustments it makes to competition. In particular, the utility has
been forced to buy power from a myriad of PURPA plants at "avoided cost" rates -- which
have proved to be very favorable to the IPPs. By the end of 1995, 2400 MW of non-utility
generated capacity was supplying Niagara Mohawk.89 The result is that in 1994, the utility
paid 28% of its revenues to IPPs (approximately $1 billion),90 which is about $400 million
above the current market value for that power.9 1 In the old era, the utility could pass these
costs along to consumers. However, in the new era, these high-cost obligations could
cripple the company (and others in similar situations).
4.8 CONCLUSIONS
During the past six years, as competitive forces have begun their invasion of the electric
power industry, the utilities studied in this research recognized and responded to this
occurrence in heterogeneous ways. In 1989, less than half of the utilities recognized that
competition would lead to fundamental changes in their industry, but by 1992, all of them
88 Note that Pacificorp and Union Electric received 1.0's for their competitive situation as recently as 1990.
Dominion Resources, on the other hand, was one of the very first to recognize and embrace the potential for
competition. Although it too appeared to lose sight of competition for a year or two around 1990. See:
Berry, 1995.
89 Niagara Mohawk, 1994.
90 Ibid..
9 1Source: "New York Utility Seeks Sweeping Changes," 39.
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recognized this. This relatively rapid change in perception is indicative of how quickly the
move to deregulation has occurred.
The one common response to competition has been downsizing, which was performed by
12 of the 17 utilities. A significant number of the utilities dabbled in other management
fads, such as TQM and reengineering, but did not do so as an immediate response to
recognizing competition. None of the utilities has thus far been able to get beyond
piecemeal solutions and transform itself into a "best practice" organization, although the
utilities are employing more of the best practice qualities over time. A number of the
utilities instituted innovative human resource programs; however, these programs appear to
be de-emphasized as utilities become more competitively focused.
Those utilities which recognized competition first have been at an advantage in terms of
being further along in their internal transformation from monopoly providers to competitors
and in being able to avoid blunders that have significant detrimental impacts on their ability
to compete. On the other hand, these "early recognizer" utilities, as a group, have not used
their farsightedness to solidify price advantages vis-a-vis their future regional competitors.
Between 1989 and 1994, the sampled utilities made meaningful progress in recognizing
and adjusting to their changing industry. With one exception, the utilities moved more than
0.9 point on the Gardner-Gilson framework, which means that they have essentially moved
through at least one stage of organizational competitive maturation.
While utilities can do much to control their destiny through internal changes, they are not in
total control of their future -- both regulators and past decisions will have a significant
impact on their fate in the new era. Decisions of the past, especially in terms of plant
construction, can leave utilities in the position of being inherently low-cost or high-cost
suppliers. Furthermore, although the restructuring of the industry is intended to reduce
regulation, it will not eliminate regulation altogether. Regulators will still play an important
role in the new competitive era, which Vietor would describe as an era of "regulated
competition." 92 In regulators' attempts to create new competitive markets without
relinquishing full control to market forces, Vietor argues that firms face asymmetries of risk
and earnings. 93 In the electric power case in particular, the rules set by regulators for the
future competitive marketplace will determine whether utilities get to "play the game" with
92 Vietor, 1994, 330.
93 Ibid.
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both hands free, or whether they will be expected to perform social functions (such as buy
power at subsidized rates) from which their competitors will be exempt, or will even
benefit. While a utility's internal functioning, as studied in this chapter, will be important
in the new era -- it will likely determine whether a utility will stay in business -- it is not the
only factor that will have a significant impact on the future viability of the enterprise. As a
result, internal reorganizations must be done in the context of the constraints of a particular
utility.
Now that we have gained an understanding of the relevant technologies and historical
developments in the industry and recent developments in it, let us explore the deregulation
proposals that are currently being developed and debated across the United States.
Chapter 5
Proposals for Deregulation
It must be remembered that there is nothing more difficult to plan, more doubtful of
success, more dangerous to manage, than the creation of a new system. For the
initiator has the enmity of alff who woutd profit by the preservation of the old
institutions and mereCy lukewarm defenders in those who wouff gain by the new ones.'
-- Niccolo Machiavetti (1506)
5.1 INTRODUCTION
The electric power industry restructuring now underway in the United States is part of a
growing international trend toward deregulating electric power systems. In other countries,
deregulation has meant subjecting a limited number of (often government-owned)
companies to new rules promulgated by a central government body. In comparison, the
American process of deregulation is awkward indeed. 2 From Massachusetts to California,
states are taking different paths as they partially deregulate their electric power industries.
These differences are attributable to a number of factors, including the particular individuals
with responsibility for the process, the motivations for deregulation, and the characteristics
of the utilities that serve each state. 3 State-level deregulation proposals must meet the
constraints of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission's (FERC)4 oversight of the
transmission system,5 whose design the FERC is currently attempting to develop. This
chapter describes the events that have been occurring in some of the states leading the
deregulation process and at the national level at FERC. This chapter will explore a number
of proposals in some detail, and from these, select five that will be evaluated for their long-
Gilbert, 1965, 26 (excerpted from Chapter 6 of The Prince); and "A Prince of a Quote."
2 Peter Navarro comments on this and proposes a national policy to mitigate what he views as harmful
effects from the situation. Source: Navarro, 1996.
3 Source: "Despite California's Lead, Many States Shy Away From Taking Competitive Plunge." A late
1994 survey of state commissioners found that 15 of the 36 commissions interviewed described their stance
as "negative" or "strongly negative" toward retail wheeling. Source: "Regulatory Outlook Toward Retail
Wheeling."
4Which has regulatory authority over transmission assets in all of the "Lower 48" states except for Texas.
5In order to rationalize this process, Sen. J. Bennett Johnston, a key crafter of the Energy Policy Act of
1992, introduced a comprehensive bill to restructure the electric power industry in early 1996. Source:
"Johnston to Offer Restructure Bill, with Retail Wheeling." For a summary of this and other legislative
actions, see: "Power Pundits make Their Pitches." By late February 1996, it appeared that these would not
be given serious consideration for passage. Source: "Senate Staff: No Restructuring Law in '96."
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term economic efficiency in Chapter 10. First, however, we briefly examine the
experiences of four countries that have already restructured their electric power industries.
5.2 OTHER COUNTRIES
Just as in Chapter 6, where we seek to learn lessons from the deregulation experiences of
other industries in the American context, here we attempt to learn from countries 6 that have
already deregulated their electric power industries. As William Hogan has pointed out,
"The United States has an enormous advantage in this process because we have the luxury
of not being the first to try such a restructuring." 7
5.2.1 Chile8
The first nation to partially deregulate its electric power industry was Chile, which began its
process in 1978, during the dictatorial rule of General Augusto Pinochet. Prior to 1978,
electricity rates were set through a politicized government process (rather than being based
upon sound economic principles). Today, generation prices are set largely through a
market mechanism, 9 while transmission and distribution prices remain regulated.
Transmission pricing is based upon nodal prices, and distribution pricing is based upon a
simple formula that includes: administrative costs, energy losses, and the price of peak-load
power. As such, distribution price regulation is a form of performance-based ratemaking
(PBR). 10 There is no prohibition on entry into the transmission market and should a new
provider build a transmission line, interconnection to the system would be required. As a
result, should insufficient transmission capacity exist, new entrants could build
transmission lines. The transmission grid operates on an open access basis, although the
transmission company is granted some discretion on terms and rates.
6 Several other countries (not mentioned in this section), including Argentina, Australia, Peru, and Sweden
have also partially deregulated their industries or are presently going through that process. For a helpful
table of activity in other countries, see: Flavin and Lenssen, 1994, 1037.
7 Hogan, November 1995, 51.
8Information for this section, unless noted otherwise, comes from: Spiller, 1993; Rudnick, 1994; and
Bernstein, 1988.
9 Wholesale rates and those for large customers (greater than 2 MW) are based upon market pricing, while
those for smaller customers are based upon long-run marginal cost pricing principles.
10 Performance-based ratemaking/regulation (PBR) mechanisms "provide utilities with a fixed price or fixed
level of revenues, as opposed to a predetermined level of profits [which occurs in rate-of-return regulation].
As a result, utilities can earn higher or lower profits depending upon how efficiently they plan for and
operate their systems. PBR is more market-based than traditional regulation because utilities' decisions are
motivated by opportunities to increase profits. At the same time, PBR can ... be designed to encourage
utilities to achieve some of the traditional regulatory objectives such as promoting safe, reliable, least-cost
electricity, and ensuring that customers are treated equitably." Source: Woolf and Michaels, 1995, 65.
Performance (financial) incentives are developed by regulators in order to promote the latter goals.
Proposalsfor Deregulation 117
Since 1978 ownership of the Chilean system has grown from two publicly-owned,
integrated companies to eleven generating, 21 distribution, and two integrated firms, many
of which are private.II This ownership diversity was achieved partially by divestment of
assets of the original two companies and partially by the creation of new ones. Today the
industry is thriving and is being flooded by foreign investment -- as many as eight new
plants may be built in the next decade by foreign investors. 12 Being the first country to
experience deregulation, Chile experienced its share of real-time learning. Lessons have
included the necessity of having: 13
* Formal rules, rather than inter-party agreements on basic transmission issues,
such as access;
* Mandatory separation of regulated functions and a clear delineation of the
limits of involvement by regulated firms in competitive markets;
* Unbundled transmission charges and comparable fair transmission access
* Clearly defined, publish transmission prices which reflect incremental
operating and upgrade costs;
* Spot markets and a parallel bilateral market based on long-term contracts; and
* Direct access by generators to at least part of the retail market.
5.2.2 New Zealand 14
The New Zealand electric power industry started down a path toward deregulation in 1987,
when the Ministry of Energy's Electricity Division was corporatized as the Electric
Corporation of New Zealand. This entity still generates the vast majority of power in New
Zealand (over 90%), even though the generation market has been deregulated. Emerging
competition is coming from small independent generating stations. The country's
transmission assets are operated by the government-owned Trans Power New Zealand
Limited. In running the grid, Trans Power must comply with three public policy
objectives:
* to provide non-discriminatory access to transmission,
* to promote efficient use of energy resources through pricing and contracting
practices, and
* to provide information that leads to efficient investment. 15
Trans Power has been regulated through rate of return regulation that has included demand
charges, transmission network charges, and energy-related charges. Attempts are being
made now to create a competitive wholesale power market. Nodal pricing and congestion
contracts are two transmission pricing mechanisms that are being considered for making
11The two integrated firms were privatized.
12 Source: "Chilean Utility Stocks Falling on Fears Rivals From U.S. Will Saturate Market."
13 These come from: Rudnick, 1994, 12; and Lalor and Garcia, 1996, 64.
14Information for this section comes from: Moy, 1994; Lambert, 1991, and Cocklin, 1993.
15 Moy, 1994, 11.
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this market efficient. Such reforms would follow on the heels of progressive deregulation
in the distribution sector, which was dominated by 52 publicly-owned electric supply
associations. Ownership of these entities has been corporatized and a financial separation
has been created between the distribution and retailing functions of these entities.
To the extent that New Zealand continues to reform its industry ahead of the United States,
lessons can be learned from its experiences with nodal pricing, congestion contracts, and
competition in distribution. While these lessons may not be learned in time for the industry
restructuring decisions that are being made in American states at the cutting edge of
deregulation, they should provide valuable experience to the next group of states.16
5.2.3 Norway 17
Norway has deregulated its electric power industry to a larger extent than any other
country. Since 1992, both the generation and the electricity sales 18 segments of the
industry have been deregulated, while a national grid company and 200 local transmission
& distribution companies operate as regulated entities. Currently, four types of market
transactions occur: bilateral agreements, futures contracts, spot market purchases, and
instant market purchases. Rates have fallen significantly since the restructuring has
occurred, but this has been in part due to excess capacity and favorable (for consumers)
weather patterns. Because of limited availability of English-language documents and the
unique character of the Norwegian industry (99%+ of generation comes from hydroelectric
plants) we will not examine the Norwegian system any further. Nevertheless, the extent to
which it has been deregulated leads to it being used as a reference point in American
deregulation debates.
5.2.4 United Kingdom
Probably the best-known electric power industry restructuring happened in the United
Kingdom when, on 1 April 1990, the government-owned power industry was broken up
into two major privatized generating companies, 19 one privatized transmission system
(National Grid Company), and twelve private regional distribution companies. Under this
16 This is important because it will not be until the year 1999 or 2000 that lessons will be able to be
learned from the actual restructuring experiences of California, Massachusetts, etc.17 This discussion is based upon: York, 1994; and Moen and Hamrin, 1996.
18Electricity sales was split from distribution service.
19 Ownership of the country's nuclear plants was retained by the government, in the form of the Nuclear
Power Company, which is scheduled to be privatized in the near future. For market power implications of
this see: Newberry, 1995, 61-65.
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new ownership structure, a pool-based model for the industry was implemented. Each
generating station submits a bid for power production for the next day (theoretically, its
marginal production cost) to the pool operator (National Grid Company), which then ranks
them from the lowest cost to highest. Based upon half-hourly demand projections, the
pool operator uses this "merit order" list to dispatch the generating plants. The result is a
de facto half-hourly auction for power supply. The bid of the highest cost generator that is
needed to fulfill demand in a given half-hour sets the system marginal cost. There are
several upward corrections then made to this system marginal cost in order to provide for
reactive power and spinning reserves, that are based in part on the system's loss of load
probability.20 In terms of Equations 2.8 and 2.9, all generators that produce power during
a given half-hour are paid:
PGi = y(t). (Equation 5.1)
Customers pay the pool a higher price:
pp = y(t) + rIQs,K(t) + yR(t), (Equation 5.2)
which corrects for transmission constraints and ancillary services.
The two private generation companies (National Power and PowerGen) have been
immensely profitable in the new market structure, 21 largely as a result of having what is
essentially a duopoly22 submitting bids, which, according to critics and the industry's chief
regulator, 23 has allowed them to game the pool price. Since the electric companies were
privatized, their stocks have risen 130% above the British all-share index,24 while
electricity prices have also risen.25 The past year has seen a rapid in crease in merger
activity, as British and American firms have bid at least £13 billion ($20.6 billion) for
seven of the 12 British distribution utilities.26 Part of the reason for the acquisition frenzy
has been the rhassive downsizings that have occurred: some companies have laid off up to
one third of their workers and are expected to continue cutting costs significantly.27
20For more specific details on the pool system see: Armstrong et al, 1994, 295-297; and Green, 1994.
21Tabors, 19 October 1995.
22At the time of privatization, together they controlled about 75% of generating capacity. Source: Chou,
1995.
23Source: "Electricity Volte-Face."
24Ibid.
25Source: "The Watchdog that Didn't Bark." One study has found that "residential electricity prices were
25% higher and industrial prices were 19% higher than would be expected based on pre-privatization trends."
Cited in Navarro, 1995, 359.
26Sources: "CSW Bids $2.53 Billion for U.K. Utility;" "In U.K. Electricity-Concern Takeovers, Up to
$31.72 Billion May Change Hands;" and "U.K. Utilities Generate Takeover Frenzy; Last Bid PowerGen's
for Midland Faces Hurdles."
27Source: "Job Cuts Fuel U.K. Profits." These cuts come on top of previous ones. Between 1991 and
1994, the industry as a whole shed 19% of its workforce. Source: "Shocking Success," 66.
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Recently, the two largest generators have agreed to divest themselves of some of their
capacity in order to allow for a more fair market.
Probably the most important lesson from the British experience is that horizontal market
power in generation is an important issue in creating a competitive industry. The
consequence of not eliminating market power has been that "investors and predators are
being drawn to Britain's electricity sector by weak regulation rather than dynamic
competition," 28 while customers have experienced little or no gain from the new industry
structure. 29
Having examined the restructuring that has occurred in other countries, let us now examine
some deregulation processes that are taking place across the United States, beginning with
the leader of the pack -- California.
5.3 PROPOSALS IN CALIFORNIA
Faced with electric power rates well above the national average and an economy reeling in
the wake of the post-Cold War trimming of the defense industry, the California Public
Utility Commission (CPUC) sought to take action to make the state more competitive by
Table 5.1: Average Electricity Rates for All Customers, By State (1993)
State Rate (C/kWh)
Washington 3.72
Wisconsin 5.52
U.S. Average 6.93
Michigan 7.21
California 9.76
Massachusetts 10.04
Rhode Island 10.39
New Hampshire 10.68
Source: Edison Electric Institute, 1993, 75.
lowering its electricity rates. 30 The CPUC's first step was to commission an extensive
study of the industry, which became the "yellow book" 31 -- California's Electric Services
Industry: Perspectives on the Past, Strategies for the Future32 -- a 200 page discussion of
2 8Source: "Shocking Success," 66.
29 Tabors, 19 October 1995.
30 Dasovich et al, 1993, 116-118.
3 1So named because of the color of its cover.
3 2Dasovich et al, 1993.
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crucial issues and the history of the industry. Armed with this information and input
gathered during a series of public hearings, the CPUC developed its radical vision for the
future of California's electric power industry, which it unveiled in April 1994 in its "Blue
Book" orders.33
5.3.1 Original "Blue Book" Proposal
The two simultaneous "Blue Book" orders (R.94-04-031 and 1.94-04-032) set in motion
the process of restructuring California's electric power industry. A particularly significant
feature was that they broke the "taboo" of retail wheeling.34 The CPUC's core objective
was to lower the State's electricity prices.
While our minds are open to modifications of our proposal, or even to the
substitution of what we could come to be convinced is a superior suggestion,
we are single-minded in its objective -- to lower the cost of electric service to
California's residential and business customers without sacrificing the utility's
financial integrity. 35
5.3.1.1 Proposal Details
In order to accomplish this objective, the Commission believed that a fundamental reform
of the utility industry and its regulation was necessary, for three reasons: 36
* Command-and-control and cost-of-service regulation, and government central
control planning, are fundamentally at odds with, and ill-suited to, the
increasingly competitive electric services industry confronting California and its
utilities;
* California's investor-owned utilities currently charge some of the highest prices
in the country; and
* This Commission has actively promoted when appropriate policies designed to
harness market forces and establish market-based regulatory structures in each
of the industries it oversees, including the electric services industry.
The commissioners felt that a long-term focus and a process marked by negotiation and
consensus, rather than litigation, would be most beneficial for creating a solid new industry
structure.37 The "Blue Book" also included a set of fundamental principles on which the
Commission's vision of the future was based:38
* California's consumers gradually enjoy direct access to generation suppliers,
marketers, brokers and other service providers in the competitive market for
energy services.
* All of California's consumers have a reasonable and fair opportunity to enjoy
the benefits of an increasingly competitive electric services industry.
* California's consumers enjoy direct access to the most efficient,
environmentally sound electric services infrastructure available.
33 California Public Utilities Commission, 20 April 1994. They are referred to as the "Blue Book" because
of the color of the cover of the publication they were issued in.
34 Source: "Retail Wheeling: The Taboo is Crumbling."
3 5California Public Utilities Commission, 20 April 1994, 1.
3 6Ibid., 6.
3 7Ibid., 7.
3 8Ibid., 12. Note: These are also listed in Appendix A of this thesis.
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* Competitive electric services make a significant contribution to growth,
productivity, competitiveness, and job creation throughout the state's economy.
* All Californians enjoy universal access to a basic and affordable package of
electric services which reflects and keeps pace with innovation taking place in
the broader, competitive market for electric services.
With these fundamentals to guide it, the Commission outlined a sketch of what a
restructured industry might look like, which included a list of 33 proposed policies.39 One
of these was a staged process by which electricity consumers would be given access to
choose their electricity generation supplier. The first set of customers to be given such a
choice would be those who take power at the transmission level -- large industrial
companies (who would receive it on 1 January 1996) -- and the last would be residential
customers (who would receive it on 1 January 2002).40 The "Blue Book" set a broad
conceptual framework for industry restructuring; at the same time, the CPUC recognized
that its work was merely beginning, and it set an ambitious plan for further hearings and
debate to flesh out the details.
5.3.1.2 Action After The "Blue Book" Proposal41
According to its timetable, in August 1994 the Commission was to have made its first set42
of final rulings, which would have determined the criteria for eligibility for direct access
and for utility participation in the direct access customer generation market. However, the
proposed rulemaking touched off an intense debate, and consequently, the timetable was
pushed back significantly. By December 1994 it was clear that a consensus would not
easily be reached, so the Commission retreated from its already delayed timeline and
charged a working group, which consisted of all interested parties, to hammer out some of
the contentious issues, such as: unbundling electric service, public policy programs,
resource procurement and diversity, and cost recovery mechanisms. 43 This group
submitted a report to the Commission on 22 February 1995 that was also shared with the
Legislature. By 24 May'1995, when the CPUC made its next ruling, the Commission had
held 16 public meetings accross the state and it had received over 10,000 pages of written
testimony, and filed comments from 140 individuals and organizations. The input also
included at least six general restructuring models,44 two of which surfaced as leading
contenders for adoption, and one eventually became the "preferred" model.
3 9For the entire list, see Appendix A of the "Blue Book."
40California Public Utilities Commission, 20 April 1994, 60.
4 1For an excellent discussion of this, see: Holden, 28 November 1995.
4 2The planned August rulings would have answered a limited number of questions, with many other sets of
rulings planned for late 1994, 1995 and beyond.
4 3 Sources: "CPUC Crafts New Utility Restructuring Schedule;" and CPUC, May 1995, A3.7-A3.8.
44Source: "Electricity Regulators Split in California,"
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5.3.2 POOLCO
In its May 1995 ruling, a 3-1 majority of the Commission supported a pool-based market
structure, 45 which would resemble the British Pool.
5.3.2.1 Functional Disaggregation
While the vertically-integrated ownership structure of electric utilities would remain under
the proposal, the utilities would be functionally disaggregated. How this would be done is
described in the following sections.
5.3.2.2 Generation
The proposal finds generation to be a competitive industry with the potential for heightened
competition in the future. As a result, an underlying goal is to establish a fully competitive
generation market, to which all classes of ratepayers would have beneficial access. In
order to ensure that a truly competitive market would develop, the CPUC would monitor
the concentration of generator ownership.46
5.3.2.3 Transmission
The proposal assumes that "transmission retains the attributes of a natural monopoly."' 47
Instead of opting for the more drastic step of ownership divestiture, the proposal attempts
to control vertical market power through a transmission system that would continue to be
owned by the utilities but would be controlled by an independent system operator (ISO).48
The ISO would be subject to regulatory oversight by the FERC. The utilities would be
allowed a stream of income from their transmission assets once the Commission is assured
that the ISO operates independently of those with beneficial interests in the system. The
CPUC delineated three major benefits of this transmission structure:49
* Permanent resolution of disputes between transmission owning and dependent
utilities;
* Efficiencies of a single state-wide system; and
* Inability of any participants to game the system through its control.
The ISO would also be responsible for maintaining system reliability by arranging back-up
and ancillary services and would manage emergency responses, reserves, and grid
4 5 CPUC, May 1995. Henceforth, this proposal will be called either the California POOLCO proposal, or
POOLCO.
46 The proposal was unclear as to how concentration would be defined or monitored. These topics were
explicitly left open for comment. Source: CPUC, May 1995, 50.
47 CPUC, May 1995, 7.
48 The exact control duties of the ISO were not specified.
49 Paraphrased from: Ibid., 8.
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congestion. Construction of new transmission lines would be signaled by congestion
pricing, with the exact mechanisms yet to be determined.
5.3.2.4 The Market
The independent system operator would also have responsibility for "making a transparent
market for generation with price signals evident to immediate users and long-term
investors." 50 The ISO would implement rules for bidding that would be common to all
generators, whether they be utility or non-utility, in-state or out-of-state. The lowest cost
bidders on a half-hourly or hourly basis would be dispatched by the ISO, and they all
would be paid a uniform price.51 Exceptions to this protocol would be the dispatch of
existing QF and wholesale contracts, which would occur in compliance with contract terms;
and utility nuclear and hydroelectric plants, which would be exempt from the bidding
process. Utility distribution companies would be required to buy their non-wholesale
requirements from the pool and other distribution entities, such as municipal pools, would
be invited to do so as well. Price information from the pool would send signals for the
need for new generating capacity. 52 The FERC would have jurisdiction over the
functioning and rates of the pool.
The pool system would allow for "bilateral contracts" through "contracts for differences" --
where parties who are risk-tolerant and risk-averse would consummate agreements that
would shield the risk-averse parties from the vagaries of the spot market; but at the same
time, the pool would maintain a transparent market price. After two years, the CPUC
would review the situation in order to ensure that the pool structure was not precluding
such virtual bilateral contracts. If the assumption is incorrect at that time, the CPUC would
allow for different mechanisms to create more direct, physical, bilateral contracts. The
Commission would also permit bilateral contracts once the pool is established and refined
and once the Commission is convinced that five logistical concerns have been alleviated. 53
Thus, the pool structure would be established with the intent of being permanent, but with
the understanding that it could be modified and evolve into a bilateral structure, or some
50Ibid., 9.
51The method for determining this price, and what would be included in it (i.e. components of Equations
2.8 and 2.9) was explicitly not defined. Source: CPUC, May 1995, 29.
5 2The volatility of the spot market could have an impact on the "reliability" of these price signals.
53The five are: "(1) establishment of a means to recover transition costs; (2) determination of the technical
feasibility of retail, physical bilateral contracts; (3) resolution of jurisdictional uncertainties; (4)
establishment of a mechanism (which we foresee requires approval by FERC) by which customers choosing
to negotiate retail, physical, bilateral contracts compensate utilities for imposition of costs on the
transmission system associated with non-pool transfers; and (5) all horizontal market power issues have
been resolved." Source: CPUC, May 1995, 47.
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combination of the two. A primary reason for establishing a pool first was a belief of the
CPUC that it would be easier to develop logistically than a bilateral structure.
5.3.2.4 Distribution
The distribution system would remain as it currently exists. The three major investor-
owned utilities (IOUs) would purchase all of their generation requirements from the pool.
Other distribution entities, such as municipal utilities, would be invited (but not required) to
purchase from the pool also.
The CPUC also considered other proposals before issuing its ruling favoring POOLCO.
5.3.3 Bilateral (Direct Access) Model
While a majority of the Commissioners supported the POOLCO model, many parties to the
debate, including Commissioner Jessie J. Knight, were critical of it.54 In his May decision
dissent, Commissioner Knight said,
A mandatory POOLCO structure offers NO advantages over direct access55
with respect to: (1) achieving the goals of decreasing electric rates for
California's consumers; (2) addressing past utility commitments fairly; (3)
providing all consumers access to the benefits of competition; (4) continuing to
deliver vital public purpose programs; (5) maintaining safe and reliable service;
and (6) avoiding current state-federal jurisdictional uncertainties. 56
Commissioner Knight then forwarded a counter-proposal that was as detailed as the
majority proposal
5.3.3.1 Generation
The proposal asserts that generation is "a fully competitive service."57 In order to take
advantage of that, the proposal would allow all customers the opportunity to contract
directly with competing generators in two years.58 The generators would receive lighter
regulatory oversight than utility generators currently face, and would compete with one
another in a fashion similar to other competing businesses in a free market economy.
5 4 In fact, during the deliberations that preceded the CPUC's decision, only SCE, SDG&E, and the
California Energy Commission were staunch supporters of the POOLCO proposal. Source: Knight, 1995,
Foreword page 4.
5 5 Direct access is Commissioner Knight's term for a bilateral system, where customers, generators, and
aggregators can consummate agreements without going through a power pool entity.
56 Source: Knight, 1995, Foreword page 4.
57 Knight, 1995, 1.
58Two years from the effective date of the Commission's decision, presumably 1 January 1998.
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Utilities would be required to separate ownership of their generation assets (including
nulcear and hydroelectric plants) from their transmission and distribution facilities in order
to: prevent market power abuse, reduce regulatory burdens, and ensure fair calculation of
stranded costs.59 This divestment could be accomplished through an auction, spin-off,60
or any other market based (non-governmental administrative) mechanism approved by the
CPUC. The result would be a generation segment of the industry that is financially
independent of the "downstream" transmission and distribution functions.
5.3.3.2 The Market
Two types of customers would exist: utility service customers and direct access customers.
Utility service customers would "continue to receive bundled service from a transmission
and distribution company" 6 1 and would be protected by CPUC performance-based
regulatory oversight with strict performance criteria. Direct access customers would
contract directly with generating companies or market intermediaries (marketers and
brokers). The exact mechanisms by which direct access customers and distribution utilities
would purchase their generation requirements would be left to the discretion and
development of the market.
5.3.3.3 Distribution
The IOUs would continue their distribution functions in the form of Electric Distribution
Companies (EDCs). An EDC would "retain its obligation to serve all customers who
choose to remain utility service customers. The EDC also has an obligation to provide
distribution services to those customers who choose direct access."' 62 Distribution service
would be subject to PBR oversight by the CPUC. Once a customer decides to surrender its
status as a utility service customer, it foregoes some of the Commission's protections. If
the customer wishes to return to utility service customer status, the EDC would be allowed
to pass along directly to the customer the true cost of the additional power needed to supply
the customer. 63
59 Knight, 1995, 59.
60 0r through a combination of auction and spin-off. The assets could be sold all together, in lots, or one-
by-one. For market power reasons, the lot or one-by-one method would be preferable. Source: Knight,
1995, 62-63.
6 1Knight, 1995, Executive Summary page 1.
6 2Ibid., 24.
6 3Ibid. Residential and non-residential customers would be treated differently. For details see: Ibid., 25-26.
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5.3.3.4 Transmission
The IOUs would retain their duty to provide transmission and ancillary services 64 and
would retain ownership of transmission assets and responsibility for their maintenance. In
the restructured industry, IOUs would bear the added duty of providing these services in a
comparable, non-discriminatory manner that is necessary to support direct access.65 In
order to facilitate this, the transmission system would be operated by an independent
system operator, termed OPCO, which would be financially independent of all distribution
and generating companies. OPCO's functions would include: "ensuring open access to all
participants; maintaining system coordination and reliability; and settling imbalances that
might occur on the system due to changes in demand or delivery." 66 OPCO would also be
responsible for system planning, emergency responses, reserves, and grid congestion
management 67 and would operate the system in compliance with Western Systems
Coordinating Council (WSCC) standards. OPCO would control the minimum amount of
resources necessary to keep the system functioning reliably 68 and would provide or
procure ancillary services. The OPCO would be indifferent to the financial dealings of the
market and would explicitly not perform a centralized bidding function. 69 "Other support
services, such as loss compensation service and spinning reserves, may be procured from a
third party provider."70
The protests of Commissioner Knight and others led to a further protraction of the debate.
In seeking a resolution, some found it desirable to lay out the differences between the
proposals.
5.3.4 Principal Differences Between the POOLCO and Bilateral Models
Three primary differences have been identified between the two models,71 which are
outlined in Table 5.2. The most significant difference involves the role of the Independent
System Operator. While both proposals call for an ISO, its role is rather different in each
case. The bilateral model provides a narrow role for the ISO -- coordinate power flows and
keep the system running through the provision of ancillary services, etc. In comparison,
64 Knight, 1995, 24.6 5Ibid., 25.
6 6 Ibid., 30.
6 7 Ibid., 32.
6 8The proposal does not indicate how this minimum threshold would be determined.
6 9 Knight, 1995, 30.
7 0 Ibid., 32.
7 1 Stalon and Woychik, February 1995, 13-14.
128 Chapter 5
the POOLCO model has the ISO conducting another function -- least cost dispatch. The
bilateral proposal would avoid the least-cost dispatch function through the creation (by
private entrepreneurs, not the state) of market intermediaries that would link customers with
generators.
Table 5.2: Differences in How Functions Are Structured
Major Functions POOLCO Model Bilateral Model
Control grid operation so as to ISO facilitates a spot market for GENCOs, users and non-
preserve reliability and power at marginal cost prices, regulated market
facilitate competitive markets. schedules power flow of intermediaries make market(s).
bilateral contracts, operates a The ISO does not operate a
clearing house for participants clearing house.
in the spot market.
Dispatch plants and operate ISO administers least cost ISO administers contract
system to serve "the market." dispatch. dispatch (PG&E model uses
as-bid price offers).
Transmission operation. ISO coordinates generation ISO manages generator use
and transmission to minimize and transmission congestion
combined generation and to facilitate bilateral trades.
transmission costs.
Source: Stalon and Woychik, July 1995, 66.72
While these differences are significant, the two models are not as fundamentally different as
they appear. Inherent in both is the question "not whether to pool, but how to organize
power pooling."' 73 POOLCO supporters maintain that their system would inherently
achieve least-cost dispatch, 74 while bilateral supporters claim that their model too would
converge to that point because traders, who would be connected to real-time electronic
systems, would swap contracts to take advantage of lower-cost supplies until the efficient
market clearing price is reached. Bilateral supporters also claim that the presence of these
intermediaries would unleash new competitive, price-lowering avenues that would not exist
when all power is traded through a monopsony/monopoly intermediary. 75 In reply, some
POOLCO proponents view market intermediaries as "the forces of evil"76 who are out to
seek a quick buck in the midst of what would be a very confusing market to consumers, at
least at first. From this discussion it should be evident that the differences separating the
two camps are as much ideological as they are functional. With such a gap it became clear
7 2 The original table had two more sets of differences: transmission pricing and contract imbalances
services. These were differences between proposals forwarded by industry players, such as ENRON, PG&E,
SCE, and SDG&E, not between the Commission majority and the Knight proposals (which were both
silent on these issues).
7 3 Stalon and Woychik, July 1995, 64.
7 4Garber et al, 1994; and Hogan, September 1994.
7 5Tabors, 13 November 1995; and Stalon and Woychik, February 1995, 21.
7 6 Hogan, 19 October 1995.
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that neither side would be persuaded by more debate or facts77 and that a compromise
needed to be developed outside of the framework of the two proposals.
5.3.5 Hybrid Model
As the debate dragged on the Commission moved toward a hybrid of the two models.78
This came about due to intervention by the staff of Governor Pete Wilson, 79 who notably
stayed out of the debate. 80 In September 1995, "formerly warring parties ... reached
important accommodations that may well shape the next steps for restructuring in
California."' 81 This negotiated agreement, between Southern California Edison (SCE)82
and formerly antagonistic groups,83 embodied in a Memorandum of Understanding
(MOU), 84 outlined a future for the industry that gained acceptance, even among its
critics.85 The MOU called for the creation of an ISO that would: schedule power
transactions, manage congestion equitably, and provide non-discriminatory and comparable
access to the transmission network; and a separate entity that is responsible for managing a
spot market power auction (the Power Exchange). The significant changes from the
Commission's May decision are the decoupling of the system control and spot market
functions of the ISO, and the more voluntary nature of the pool, i.e. direct, bilateral
contracts would be allowed immediately.86 In return for these concessions on the part of
SCE, the large power users agreed to a 100% stranded cost recovery principle.
The MOU, while a significant piece of work, was merely a compromise between the state's
second-largest utility and some opposing interest groups. Only the CPUC could turn these
ideas into state policy. Because many of the MOU's details found their way into the
Commission's final ruling, we will refrain from providing any further specifics of the
document here.
77 Stalon and Woychik, February 1995, 22.
7 8Tabors, 19 October 1995.
7 9Source: "A Nasty Shock."
8 0A scathing Wall Street Journal editorial criticized Governor Wilson for campaigning for President while
the deregulation efforts in his state were flailing. Source: Boot, 1995.
8 1Woychik, November 1995, 32.
8 2A chief proponent of the POOLCO model.
8 3Supporters of the bilateral model: The California Manufacturers Association, the California Large Energy
Consumers Association, the Independent Energy Producers, and Californians for Competitive Electricity.
8 4 Southern California Edison, 1995.
85 Source: "Almost There in California Restructuring."
8 6 Subject to a phase-in timetable. See: Southern California Edison, 1995, B-1.
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5.3.6 A Final Model?
On 20 December 1995, the CPUC issued a ruling87 that it anticipates will serve as "the
foundation for California's emerging market institutions and regulatory reforms,"' 88 barring
legislative, judicial, or FERC intervention. 89 On a 3-2 vote,90 the CPUC supported a
model that is based largely upon the MOU. The ruling is also much more forthcoming with
details than previous CPUC decisions -- as evidenced by its 240-page length -- and
represents "a much matured description of market institutions and a much clearer view of
the role of customer choice." 91 Let us now examine the pertinent details of the CPUC's
proposal.
5.3.6.1 Generation
At the heart of the Commission's decision is the creation of a competitive generation
market. Starting in 1998, IOUs would be required to bid all of the electricity they generate
into the Power Exchange 92 during the transition period.93 (Generators, currently owned
by the utilities but subsequently sold to non-affiliated parties, would be exempted from this
requirement upon transfer of ownership.) 94 At the end of the transition period, the IOUs
would be eligible to sell their power through whatever mechanism(s) they deem most
appropriate. 95 Non-IOU generators would also be welcome, but not required, to bid their
generation into the Exchange.
87CPUC, D.95-12-063. It should be noted that this was revised, for grammatical corrections, on 10
January 1996. Once again, it passed on a 3-2 vote. Thus the final decision is D.96-01-009. This thesis is
working off of D.95-12-063, with a supplementary list of the 27 changes proposed for D.96-01-009. The
text that the thesis uses was obtained from the Internet at the CPUC's World Wide Web site. There were
some pagination problems with the text obtained in this manner so the page numbers indicated in the
footnotes for citations are approximate. Henceforth, this will be referred to as the California Final model or
the Final model.
88CPUC, D.95-12-063, 23.
89The CPUC waited 100 days for legislative review before implementing the decision. The CPUC will
also have an environmental impact statement developed. Both of these processes could lead to further
changes to the proposal.
9 0The two dissenters, Jessie Knight and newcomer Josiah L. Neeper, held out in favor of a more pure
"bilateral" approach. Source: "California Regulators Approve Plan to Deregulate Market for Power by '98."
9 1CPUC, D.95-12-063, 1.
9 2 See section 5.3.6.6 for a description of the Power Exchange.
9 3 An important and controversial provision of the Commission's proposal is that the IOUs are given the
opportunity to recover 100% of their stranded investments, although at a discounted rate-of-return. The
period 1998-2003 is the transition period during which these stranded investments will accrue. A non-
bypassable competitive transition charge (CTC) will be collected until 2005 to pay for the stranded
investments. After that date, utilities would be able to recover only uneconomic QF and long-term
wholesale power contracts.
9 4 Once sold, the new owners of these generators would be eligible to sell power to whomever they desire.
However, the sale of some of its assets would not exempt the utility from the requirement for those it
retains.
9 5CPUC, D.95-12-063, 53.
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Central planning of new generation facilities would cease to exist. Instead, the
Commission believes that the creation of a transparent price in the Power Exchange would
provide potential investors with sufficient information to make investment decisions and
attract sufficient capital. 96
A lingering concern of the CPUC is that horizontal market power could undermine the
benefits of competition. Based upon extensive studies, the proposal requires Pacific Gas
and Electric (PG&E) and Southern California Edison (SCE) to develop individual plans for
the voluntary divestment of 50% of their fossil fuel generation capacity through a spin-off
or sale to a non-affiliated entity. Until these assets are divested or the transition period
ends, whichever comes first, utility generators would continue to be subject to CPUC
performance based regulation.97
5.3.6.2 The Market
By the year 2003, all customers would be presented with three broad categories of choices
for procuring their electricity service.98 Between 1998 and 2003, increasing numbers of
customers would become eligible for all three options, with option one being the default for
those who are not yet eligible for the other two.99
5.3.6.2.1 Option 1: continued service from the local utility
The first category of options would allow a customer to continue to receive service from the
same investor-owned utility distribution company (UDC) that serves him in the current
industry structure. 100 The UDC would be responsible for procuring generation and
transmission services for these customers, termed utility service customers, who would in
turn be given the option of having their rates calculated (1) using an average electricity rate
or (2) using virtual direct access (time of use) rates (provided they have appropriate
metering equipment.
9 6 Some process for developing renewable energy technologies and a diverse resource supply would likely
continue. See: CPUC, D.95-12-063, 146.
97CPUC, D.95-12-063, 85.
9 8 This is true of customers who are currently served by investor-owned utilities. Customers of municipal
utilities might be entitled to these options, but the CPUC does not have oversight over public power
agencies so it can not mandate competition for them.
99 0ne important aspect of the phase-in schedule is that as the levels of customer participation increase, a
representative group of customers will become eligible (i.e. customers from each customer class will be
eligible for access to options two and three). The original "Blue Book" phase-in schedule allowed large
industrial customers the first opportunity for direct access, then small industrial customers, etc., with
residential customers receiving the last opportunity.
100 0r retains it by default until 2003 or before.
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5.3.6.2.2 Option 2: financial hedging contracts
The second category of options would be for a customer to buy electricity at rates that
incorporate financial hedges. Essentially the customer would "lock in" a price (or a narrow
price range) with another entity that is willing to bear the vagaries of a fluctuating electricity
spot market price. The customer would continue to purchase her power through the UDC
(who would retain responsibility for acquiring the necessary generation). In addition, she
would have a hedging contract to settle with another party on a periodic basis. 101 The
Commission proposes no limits on who can be the "risk-bearer," it wishes to leave the
hedging functions open to the "genius of the marketplace and the will of market
participants." 102
5.3.6.2.3 Option 3: direct, physical bilateral contracts
The third broad category of customer choice would be the ability of a customer to negotiate
a direct, physical, bilateral contract with a generating company. According to the terms of
these contracts, sellers agree to dispatch specific generators on fixed financial terms to its
consumers. In reality, the customer receives electrons that are commingled with others on
the grid. Instead of dealing with a generation company directly, a customer could also deal
with an aggregator -- a financial intermediary who attempts to aggregate loads in order to
better match the needs of customers and generators.
5.3.6.2.4 Customer education and protection1 03
The Commission is giving consideration to two actions that would help ensure that
customers are sufficiently educated to take advantage of their new choices and are not
defrauded. The first of these is the creation of an independent trust, whose proceeds would
be used to edciucate consumers on the new electric power structure. The second action
would be the creation of a registration or licensing process for electric service providers,
including marketers, brokers, and aggregators.
10 1The Commission envisions that a hedging contract would work something like as follows: "A customer
who has formed such a contract continues to receive a bill from the local utility which reflects both the cost
of electric power and distribution services. Periodically, such a customer totals the amount of these
payments to the local utility and determines whether they exceed the price guarantee concluded in the
hedging agreement. In that event a bill is submitted to the other party who reimburses the customer so as
to bring the cost of electricity for the period to within the agreed maximum." Source: CPUC, D.95-12-063,
1995.
102CPUC, D.95-12-063, 7.
10 3 Ibid., 186-188.
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5.3.6.2.5 Requirements of UDCsfor utility service procurement
Until the completion of the transition period, the UDCs would be required to purchase the
power for their utility service customers from a newly formed entity, the Power Exchange.
At the end of the transition period, the UDCs would be able to purchase power from
whatever source(s) they finds most efficient. 104
5.3.6.2.6 The Power Exchange
The Power Exchange, which would be financially independent of all generation and
distribution companies as well as the ISO, would "foster and sustain the development of a
transparent spot market price for the generation of electricity." 105 The Power Exchange
would estimate how much power would be needed to supply non-direct access customers
during half-hourly or hourly blocks; and based upon these results, conduct an auction for
electricity generation on an half-hourly or hourly basis. This auction would occur the day
before the generation would be provided. The Power Exchange would be responsible for
implementing "nondiscriminatory rules which permit rival generators to compete on
common grounds using transparent rules for bidding into the Exchange." 106 While
individual generators would receive varying prices for their power based upon the auction
clearing price adjusted for spatial transmission costs, customers would see one single
market clearing price. Out-of-state and public power generators would be welcome to bid
into the Exchange. The Power Exchange would be regulated by the FERC.
5.3.6.3 Transmission
The Commission finds that "transmission retains the attributes of a natural monopoly and
will be consolidated, from an operational perspective, in the Independent System
Operator," 107 which would become
the essential entity to coordinate the daily scheduling and dispatch activities of
all market participants as required to meet the critical objectives of providing
open, nondiscriminatory access to the transmission grid while preserving
reliability and achieving lowest total cost for all uses of the transmission
system. The unavoidable interactions in the transmission network require the
services of a system operator to coordinate the actual use of the system and
apply a pricing structure that supports competition and avoids cost shifting. 108
10 4 Ibid., 53.
10 5 Ibid., 12.
10 6 Ibid.
10 7 Ibid., 93.
108Ibid., 14.
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Specifically, the ISO's duties would be to: 109
* Take primary responsibility for the determination of the final operation and
dispatch of the system in order to preserve reliability and achieve the lowest
total cost;
* Maintain frequency and control in compliance with North American Electric
Reliability Council (NERC) and Western Systems Coordinating Council
(WSCC) standards;
* Provide open and nondiscriminatory transmission services and access to all
users;
* Procure ancillary services from suppliers -- whenever possible this should be
done through a competitive, unbundled process;
* Coordinate day-ahead scheduling and balancing of the transmission grid;
* Coordinate the scheduled nominations from the Power Exchange and bilateral
agreements and redispatch in order to assure reliability and least-cost use of the
system;
* Calculate congestion and spatial and temporal marginal costs in advance of the
Power Exchange auction so that these costs can be used to help define the
market clearing price of the auction;
* Coordinate and implement final scheduling and last-minute redispatching of
generators;
* Collect transmission and congestion charges and administer congestion
contracts; and
* Provide a system of open communication for the scheduling market -- keeping
individual bids and nominations confidential while making public all other
reasonable information regarding power flows, market clearing prices and the
state of the transmission system.
The ISO, like the Power Exchange, would not be financially connected to any market
participant. Its role would be short-term: facilitation of day-ahead scheduling and hourly
redispatch of generators in order to balance the system and respect transmission
constraints. In order to do so, the ISO would redispatch the nominations of the Power
Exchange and bilateral contract exchanges with indifference to the source or use of power.
Thus, the time scale of ISO functions would include day-ahead scheduling, hourly
dispatch, and those actions on the order of seconds and minutes to keep the system
functioning. The ISO would also determine the "rational economic prices to apply to all
uses of the transmission grid in order to ensure that the associated incentives are consistent
with the competitive market and least cost use of the transmission system." 110 Marginal
cost-based price calculations would include temporal and spatial considerations. While an
exact pricing scheme has yet to be established, 111 the proposal states that it should include
10 9Summarized from: Ibid., 30-37.
11 0 CPUC, D.95-12-063, 16. In the May decision the Commission recognized three benefits to having an
ISO operate the system (see: Section 5.3.2.4). The December decision recognizes a fourth benefit: "there
will be a consistent pricing system for the use of the common network facilities that prevents cost shifting
and supports the competitive market." Source: D.95-12-063, 29.
11 1This will likely be an issue of significant controversy. While there is no fundamental reason to do so,
those supporting bilateral contracts have generally supported zonal pricing, while those supporting the
POOLCO model have advocated nodal pricing.
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a system of transmission congestion contracts that would be administered by the ISO. The
FERC would have regulatory oversight over the policies of the ISO and the transmission
rates it charges.
Although transmission assets would be operated by the ISO, the utilities would retain
ownership of them. The proposal directs the utilities to develop mechanisms for recovering
the fixed costs of transmission and for prospective investments in transmission
upgrades.112 The CPUC would like to have new transmission investments signaled by the
market, as opposed to being requested through contentious administrative processes. 113 In
order to prevent utilities from delaying transmission line construction so that they can take
advantage of "strategically placed" generators (in terms of transmission line congestion),
the ISO could be allowed to collect congestion rents which it could use to construct new
transmission facilities. 114
5.3.6.4 Distribution
Investor-owned utilities would retain their distribution function by providing service for all
customers, not just those who choose to remain utility service customers. 115 The
obligation to provide full service (utility service customer service) would extend even to
those customers who have left utility service in favor of bilateral contracts and wish to
return to utility service customer status. 116 The UDC also retains its obligation for least-
cost service to utility service customers. Even if this distribution service is minimal, it is
important that every electric transaction that is currently deemed retail be considered to have
a distribution component for jurisdictional reasons.117 Implicit in the previous sentence is
the continued regulation of distribution rates, terms and conditions by the CPUC. It is the
intent of the Commission to switch from rate-of-return regulation to PBR mechanisms.
112CPUC, D.95-12-063, 40.
113ibid., 41. Perhaps a longer-term (than the sport market) view will be necessary for this to occur. For
example, long-run marginal cost pricing and/or a mechanism that accounts for cumulative savings over the
life of new equipment that result from the upgrade (compared with the base physical case).
114This too has yet to b6 resolved. The CPUC's statement on this is only a suggestion on ways to
prevent market power abuse, not a final decision. Source: CPUC, D.95-12-063, 95. Some analysts, such
as William Hogan, believe that this would create perverse incentives for the Independent System Operator.
Source: Hogan, 19 October 1995.
115These are the customers who choose "option 1." (See: Section 5.3.6.2.1)
1161n fact, the UDC is not allowed to delay or tariff utility service resumptions.
117A primary reason for this is that maintaining a distribution component would allow the CPUC to
collect money for the CTC and other public purpose programs. Source: CPUC, D.95-12-063, 46.
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5.3.7 Other Models
While the POOLCO, bilateral, and hybrid models rose to the top of the agenda in the
California debate, there were several other restructuring models that received consideration.
Although they were not adopted in California, that does not mean that they will be forgotten
-- since it is expected that different states will adopt different models. Therefore, let us
briefly examine them.
5.3.7.1 Regional Transmission Company Model' 18
The principal feature of this model would be that an entity (a public agency or private firm)
would purchase all of the transmission assets in the state and create a state-wide regulated
transmission monopoly. The new transmission monopoly would operate the system. Its
duties would include the provision of economic dispatch and grid support. Generation
would become a fully competitive business and distribution would stay as it is, with
jurisdictional utilities providing service. The revenues from the sale of the transmission
assets would be used to pay for stranded investments and to pay off the bonds of
municipally-owned generators.
5.3.7.2 Municipal Choice Model (McPool)119
Another proposal, generally supported by municipal power agencies, would focus on
enhancing wholesale power competition. It would develop transparent pricing and open
access transmission tariffs and electricity pricing bulletin boards. The pool would only be
open to distribution entities, unless the distribution company in an area specifically allows
its customers direct access to the pool. Transmission congestion rents would be used
specifically to pay for additional transmission capacity. The ownership of the transmission
system would be consolidated into a Grid Company, whose shareholders would be the
distribution companies in its service territory who wish to have an ownership stake in it.
5.3.7.3 Community Access Model120
Slightly different than the McPool option is one that would allow community entities to
form and to purchase electricity on the wholesale market on behalf of their customers.
These community groups would aggregate the electricity demand within their geographic
area, but would differ from municipal utilities in that they would not acquire distribution
assets. Instead they would purchase distribution service from the IOUs at CPUC regulated
118CPUC, May 1995, A3.21.
1 19 Southern California Public Power Authority, 1995; Stalon and Woychik, July 1995, 65-66; and
CPUC, May 1995, A3.19.12 0 CPUC, February 1995, 7-8; and CPUC, May 1995, A3.20.
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rates. The community entities would become responsible for load forecasting and
purchasing energy on behalf of all customers -- residential, commercial, and industrial -- in
their geographical area.
5.3.7.4 Tehachapi Compromisel 21
The last California proposal that will be discussed is the Tehachapi Compromise. It is
rather simple -- the northern part of the state would proceed under a bilateral market
structure and the southern part of the state would be based upon a pool model. 122 These
would be established on parallel schedules.
5.3.8 The Future
With its final order in place, the CPUC must now garner political support for its decision
and enter into its implementation stages. On 31 August 1994 the State Legislature passed
Assembly Concurrent Resolution 143, which established a joint committee for oversight of
the restructuring process, required the CPUC to meet certain standards, and sought to
ensure that the legislature would be properly consulted and involved in the Commission's
proposal development process. 123 As a result, the Commission plans to allow 100 days
for Legislative review before implementation of its proposal begins. 124 In order to be fully
implemented, the proposal will also require several explicit Legislative actions, such as
changing the Public Utilities Code and creating new collection mechanisms for public
purpose programs. 125 The proposal will further require external review of its
environmental impacts. 126 Politically, the proposal will face challenges from both sides of
the spectrum: from those who believe, along with Commissioners Knight and Neeper, that
the decision does not go far enough; to those who are concerned that it goes too far, such
as a vocal Legislative committee chair who is concerned about its impact on small
customers. 127
121CPUC, May 1995, A3.22.
122Conveniently, Pacific Gas and Electric, a bilateral proponent, serves the northern part of the state and
Southern California Edison and San Diego Gas and Electric, POOLCO supporters, serve the southern
portion of the state.
123CPUC, D.95-12-063, 219.
124CPUC, "Electric Restructuring Fact Sheet."
125CPUC, D.95-12-063, Appendix E.
126The Commission explicitly mentioned that the order does not become final until the findings of the
environmental impact statement are considered. Source: CPUC, D.95-12-063, 217.127 Sources: "California Legislators Sing Restructuring Blues;" "Could Service Issues Unravel Cal.
Restructuring?;" and "1Ist Calif. Restructuring Bill of '96 Would Protect Small Users."
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If the proposal clears these "external" hurdles and does in fact serve as the basis for
California's electric power industry, the Commission and other interested parties must take
many more actions and make numerous decisions in order for a workable industry structure
to develop. The Commission has listed 14 "activities" that must occur within the 175 days
following the decision alone, with many more anticipated to occur later. Therefore, while
the debate may appear over, it is actually just moving into a new phase.
It should be clear from this section that the debate in California has been complicated and
involved, but it has been just one piece in the larger puzzle of American electric power
deregulation.
5.4 PROPOSALS IN OTHER STATES
At the time this thesis is being written, California is only one of approximately a dozen
states that are examining the issue of deregulation. 128 The process and motivations in each
varies. Some, like Massachusetts and California, are serving as the trailblazers. Others,
such as Rhode Island, are following closely but cautiously behind. The motivations in
some cases are obvious -- lower rates. California's prolonged economic slump and
Massachusetts' manufacturing woes, 129 when combined with both states' high electricity
rates and free market-oriented governors served as effective catalysts for change. In other
cases, the motives are less self-evident. For example, Wisconsin, which has some of the
lowest electric rates in the nation, is moving to deregulate almost as quickly as
California.so This is the result of an interesting combination of restructuring proponents:
electric utilities who are unusually supportive of deregulation,' 31 industry leaders seeking
lower electric rates, and a group of leaders in the state government who are strong
ideological advocates of deregulation. 132 From such an amalgamation of rationales for
deregulation it should not be surprising that a number of widely-varying restructuring
models have emerged and that more than one will likely gain wide acceptance. With this in
12 8States that entered the fray early include: Connecticut, Illinois, Maine, Maryland, New Hampshire, New
Jersey, New York, Ohio, Rhode Island, Vermont, and Wisconsin. Source: Massachusetts Department of
Public Utilities, 16 August 1995, 3.
129 Lester et al., 1995.
130Energy Daily noted thaf Wisconsin is the first state to undertake such proceedings in a situation "that is
not marked by a sense of economic and ratepayer urgency." Source: "Wisconsin PSC Launches
Restructuring Investigation," 1.
13 1Source: "Total Deregulation in Electricity Sector Would Hurt Customers, a Report Says."
13 2 Healy, 30 August 1995. Cheryl L. Parrino, Chair of the Public Service Commission, answers the
question -- "With our low electric rates, why should we be doing anything?" -- with "No matter how far
ahead you are in the race, if you stand still and refuse to move 'Forward' you will eventually lose." Source:
Wisconsin Public Service Commission, October 1995, ii.
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mind, let us examine the restructuring efforts that are currently underway in several
vanguard states.
5.4.1 Massachusetts
During the Fall of 1995, as the California process languished, 133 the focal point of the
national debate arguably shifted to Boston and the Massachusetts Department of Public
Utilities (DPU).134
5.4.1.1 Initial Steps
In February 1995 the DPU launched an inquiry into restructuring the industry to investigate
and determine: 135
* How a restructuring of the electric industry in Massachusetts would promote
competition and economic efficiency and expand opportunities that would
benefit customers;
* Whether and how to extend to some or all customers the option of choosing
their own electricity suppliers;
* How such a restructuring could be implemented; and
* The appropriate regulatory mechanisms to apply to a restructured electric
industry.
While the Commission was investigating, a coalition of utility, business, and
environmental groups, the Massachusetts Electric Industry Restructuring Roundtable,
developed a set of 18 interdependent principles which it hoped would guide the process in
Massachusetts. 136
5.4.1.2 The DPU's Ruling
In an August. 1995 order, the DPU established its own set of principles that would serve as
the basis for a relatively rapid move to restructure the industry. 137 The Commonwealth's
three largest investor-owned utilities (Boston Edison, Massachusetts Electric Company,
and Western Massachusetts Electric Company) were given 6 months to come up with:138
* A plan for moving from the current structure to one that has a competitive
generation market and increased consumer choice;
* Illustrative rates and supporting information that, at a minimum, demonstrate
unbundled charges for transmission, ancillary services, distribution and
generation;
13 3For a good discussion of the political forces that shaped and delayed the debate see: Holden, 29
November 1995.
134 Ackerman, November 1995, 87.
135 Massachusetts Department of Public Utilities, August 1995, 1.
136 Electric Industry Restructuring Roundtable, 1995. See Appendix A for a listing of these principles.
137 For a description of the history leading up to the DPU's ruling see: Ackerman, 15 August 1995.
138 Condensed from: Massachusetts Department of Public Utilities, 1995, 47.
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* A stranded cost charge which approximates its magnitude with supporting
information; and
* An incentive regulation plan (for transmission and distribution).
The five smaller regulated utilities in the Commonwealth would then be given 6 months
from the DPU's ruling on the larger utilities' plans to develop their own. All eight
proposals should be based upon the following seven transition principles: 139
* Provide the broadest possible customer choice;
* Provide all customers with an opportunity to share in the benefits of increased
competition;
* Ensure full and fair competition in generation markets;
* Functionally separate generation, transmission, and distribution services;
* Provide universal service (i.e. all residents have access to electricity service);
* Support and further the goals of environmental regulation; and
* Rely on incentive regulation where a fully competitive market cannot exist or
does not yet exist.
The DPU's document raised several important issues with regard to transmission:
* In a competitive electric industry, constraints on the transmission system can be
constraints on the efficient function of the market itself. Therefore, as the
industry makes the transition toward a competitive generation sector, adequate
long-term investment in the transmission system is necessary to maintain
acceptable levels of capacity, safety and reliability, and to enable the
transmission system to support market function. Careful attention must also be
focused on issues related to the sitting of new transmission facilities in order to
ensure adequate transmission. 140
* In addition, cross-subsidization is of particular concern in the electric industry,
where companies operating simultaneously in competitive and monopoly
markets could subsidize competitive services by recovering a portion of the
costs of those services through monopoly services. Transactions in a
competitive market should occur in an economically efficient manner without
undue, and therefore anti-competitive, advantage from affiliations,
relationships, or exclusive agreements.141
The Department anticipates that the transmission and distribution of electricity will remain
monopoly services, and as such, will continue to require regulatory oversight.142
Regulation of transmission services, regardless of jurisdiction, should ensure
open access to the transmission grid, comparable pricing of transmission
services to all users including the owner, and adequate levels of investment to
ensure that the transmission system remains reliable and is expanded as
appropriate. Any incentive proposal pertaining to transmission should promote
simplified procurement of transmission services and the efficient use of
transmission assets. Prices for transmission services should, to the extent
possible, promote efficient use of the transmission system so that the system
constraints are minimized and transmission capacity is well-utilized.143
13 9Excerpted from: Massachusetts Department of Public Utilities, 1995, 15-17.
14 0Massachusetts Department of Public Utilities, 1995, 21.
14 1 Ibid., 22.
14 2 Ibid., 28.
14 3 Ibid., 29.
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5.4.1.3 NEES Proposal
In early October 1995, the New England Electric System (NEES) unveiled a tentative
proposal that it intends to present to the DPU for consideration. 144 According to the
proposal, retail wheeling would commence for all customers down to the residential level
on 1 January 1998. Customers would be given the opportunity to choose their suppliers
on a periodic basis and the existing utilities would have the "obligation to offer" service to
their current customers. Structurally, NEES would functionally unbundle its generation
company and would create a new, separate transmission company. Transmission and
distribution rates would be set through performance based ratemaking while generation
rates would be deregulated. All parties would be subject to a uniform charge for stranded
investment and social programs.
5.4.1.4 Utilities Report Back145
On 16 February 1996, the three large utilities plus two of the smaller ones reported back
with their reports which varied significantly, ranging from radical restructuring by 1998 to
a transition to deregulation with no firm start date. Governor Weld's office also submitted
a restructuring proposal.
5.4.1.5 The Future
The State Senate Committee on Post Audit and Oversight issued a report in December 1995
that calls for deregulation. 146 According to the "Senate Post Audit & Oversight Staff
Model"147 that the report proposes, customers would be able to purchase power from an
aggregator of choice or directly from generators. The model would also create a pool,148
which would be responsible for maintaining system reliability and would be the default
supplier for customers who do not purchase power from an aggregator. This proposal has
been described as "one of the purest approaches to retail competition of the various
schemes before state governments." 149
144Source: "NEES Plans Residential Wheeling."
14 5 Material for this section comes from: Ackerman, 16 February 1996, and "Massachusetts Utilities
Propose Rate Cuts."
14 6Massachusetts State Senate Committee on Post Audit and Oversight, 1995.
14 7Ibid, 31-33.
14 8 The geographic reach of this pool is unclear. In general, the report discusses issues in terms of New
England. However, the specific discussion of the pool seemed to imply (although did not explicitly state)
that the pool would be limited to Massachusetts.
14 9 Source: "Mass. Senate Report Backs Pure Retail Competition."
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With the reports of the utilities now in hand, it is expected that the DPU will conduct
hearings over the ensuing months and issue a master plan by the end of the year, at the
latest. With gubernatorial and legislative support for deregulation, and a stated desire by
the DPU to begin deregulation in 1998 (the same target date as California), many eyes
across the country will be focused upon Massachusetts during the next two years as it goes
through the process of defining, refining, and ultimately adopting its deregulation
proposal(s).
5.4.2 Wisconsin
5.4.2.1 The Context
Another state at the cutting edge of the deregulation movement is Wisconsin. Despite
having some of the lowest electricity rates in the nation,150 electric power deregulation will
come to "America's Dairyland" in the near future. This rapid embrace of deregulation has
arisen from a combination of political entrepreneurship on the part of the state's large
utilities, 151 which are well-positioned for deregulation, 152 and those in state
government.153
In February 1995, a 22-member advisory committee 154 was established by the Public
Service Commission (PSC) to develop and recommend actions for the future of
Wisconsin's electric industry. The committee examined transmission, generation, and
distribution individually, and developed goals & objectives, and restructuring alternatives
for each segment. After examining the industry segments individually, the committee
developed five options for a consolidated industry structure. In October the committee
presented its pyroposals to the Commission. 155 A majority of the committee's membership
favored an "incremental change" approach, which included the creation of an independent
system operator for the transmission system in the state and unbundled rate and service
options. 156
15 0Wisconsin Public Service Commission, July 1995, ix.
15 1Wisconsin Energy, Northern States Power, and Wisconsin Power & Light.
152 Abdoo, 1995; and "'Merger of Equals' Primes NSP, WEPCO for Competition."
15 3Healy, 1995.
154 Wisconsin Public Service Commission, July 1995, A10.
15 5Advisory Committee on Electric Utility Restructuring, 1995.
15 6Source: "Camps Vie over Restructuring, As Wisc. PSC Process Advances."
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Working in parallel with the advisory committee was the PSC's staff, which prepared an
environmental impact statement (EIS). The draft reports57 was issued in July 1995, with a
final report158 issued in October. The EIS examined two market structures: the "status
quo" and the "plausible extreme" models. 159 These were chosen as the extreme points on
the restructuring spectrum, between which the final ruling of the Commission would likely
fall. Let us now take a closer look at the plausible extreme model.160
5.4.2.2 The "Plausible Extreme Model"
5.4.2.2.1 Generation
Utilities would be forced to sell their generation assets through an auction or sealed bid
process, which would allow for more competition and for a market-based mechanism of
calculating stranded costs and benefits. Following divestiture, the only requirements for
owning generation assets would be the ability to gain sufficient capital and siting clearance
to build a new plant and a belief that one can operate it efficiently enough to survive in a
competitive market. Plants would be built and purchased in an uncoordinated manner, with
the business judgment of investors, rather than regulators, driving decisions. Government
intervention161 in the financial considerations and market structure of the generation market
would be limited to securities laws and anti-trust enforcement. Correspondingly, the
government would not assist the siting of competitive generating facilities through the
power of condemnation or eminent domain.
5.4.2.2.2 The market
The market for power would be based upon a Pool-based model, by which the pool would
determine the spot price and would dispatch the generators. The Pool operator (Poolco)162
would be totally independent, having no ownership relations with any generation,
transmission, or distribution company. In order to manage risks and perhaps facilitate
financing, bilateral contracts and forward markets would likely develop both around and on
top of the Poolco foundation.
157Wisconsin Public Service Commission, July 1995.
15 8Wisconsin Public Service Commission, October 1995.
15 9 So titled because "it bounds the range of options that the Commission and the Wisconsin legislature
might realistically decide to implement. It is termed 'extreme' because it envisions eliminating regulation
and employing competitive market forces to the maximum degree that the staff believes is possible."
Source: Wisconsin Public Service Commission, July 1995, x.
160 Wisconsin Public Service Commission, July 1995, 4-10.
16 1Aside from typical interventions such as siting and environmental regulation.
162 Note that "POOLCO" is an industry structure proposal in California, while "Poolco" is the entity that
would operates a pool, in this case in Wisconsin.
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On an operational level, the Poolco would take bids once a day for generation capacity for
the next day. Based upon the demand during the day and the prices that were bid, the
system operator would dispatch and curtail generation supply. Also included in the unit-
loading order would be transmission and distribution costs and constraints. Not all
generators would need to bid into the pool. Others could be "dispatched" based upon
bilateral or multilateral contracts which have fixed levels of generation and price. Those
that choose this route would still submit their operating profiles to the Poolco so that they
could be coordinated with the other system flows. Additionally, the Poolco would provide
balancing services for the bilateral contract power exchanges when the specified amount
that is generated either exceeds or falls below the actual demand. In short, the Poolco
would have responsibility for keeping the system functioning reliably while meeting the
contractual agreements of bilateral customers and properly dispatching those who sell and
take power from the pool. To do so, the Poolco would have the authority to break the
contractual delivery requirements in order to keep the system together when emergencies
arise.
5.4.2.2.3 Transmission
Transmission system operating standards would need to be developed by a combination of
the Public Service Commission, NERC, the appropriate Regional Transmission Group,
and the Poolco. The latter would ensure that these were met, as part of its responsibility
for maintaining system stability and reliability. The Poolco would be responsible for
obtaining the ancillary services necessary to keep the system functioning, many of which
would be purchased through competitive solicitation. 163 These would be paid for either by
adding an even, specific amount to the spot price (for power purchased from the pool) or
through a specific charge levied to those who purchase power through bilateral contract
mechanisms.
The transmission facilities would be owned and maintained by a private transmission
company (Transco), which would be a state-wide or regional company. The Transco
would not have any ownership affiliation with generation companies. All facilities would
be owned and built by the Transco, which would receive a return on its investment through
status as a price-regulated statewide monopoly. The Transco would be responsible for
providing transmission service in a reliable manner with maximum power throughput.
16 3 Competitively-obtained services would include: spinning and non-spinning reserves, load-following,
VAR (volt-ampere reactive) support, provision of reactive power, and local area support (in cases that
market power would not preclude a competitive solicitation).
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The price structure would be designed so that the Transco would recover all of its costs in a
manner that would enable expansion of the grid; yet low enough to prevent the taking of
monopoly rents. Prices would be simple, with only one charge for service, and would be
temporally and spatially insensitive. Those who require special transmission services
would be financially accountable for their provision.
Long-term planning should be done in a manner that eliminates any possibility that physical
barriers block economically efficient transactions. When additional transmission service is
needed, whether it has been anticipated for a long period of time or requested
spontaneously by potential economically efficient transactors, it should be built in a timely
manner. This timeliness can be assisted by the power of eminent domain. However, the
extent to which eminent domain can be used is directly proportional to the role that the State
plays in siting decisions.
5.4.2.2.4 Distribution
Distribution systems (investor-owned, cooperatively-owned, and municipally-owned
distribution companies) would be broken into two components: Linecos and Retailcos.
The Linecos, which would operate as regulated monopolies in defined service territories,
would own the distribution facilities that originate at the transmission system and extend to
the customer meter. 164 They would be responsible for the construction, operation, and
maintenance of distribution facilities at prescribed levels of reliability.
Multiple Retailcos would compete in an unregulated market to serve customers. They
would aggregate power purchases from the spot market, generators and other power
merchants and would sell power to customers, presumably in a fashion that is tailored to
their needs. In this competitive market, Retailcos would need to focus on customer
attraction, retention, and satisfaction. No ownership restrictions would be in place and
Retailcos would not need licenses to participate in the market. The same company may
own a Retailco and a Lineco, although close Commission scrutiny would be necessary in
such a case to ensure that no customer information gathered by the Lineco that is not
available to all Retailcos would be used by the affiliated Retailco.
The Retailco would charge a distribution access fee to all customers, which would then be
paid to the Lineco, based upon rates set by the Commission. In addition to paying the
164 Rate base regulation would be replaced by price caps and performance-based regulation.
146 Chapter 5
Lineco for service, the access fee would include several other components. These would
include:
* A stranded investment fee (or alternatively, a stranded benefit payment); and
* A low Income Assistance fee.
Linecos would have an obligation to serve, but Retailcos would not.
5.4.2.3 The Future in Wisconsin
On 19 December 1995,165 the Public Service Commission voted to implement a 32-step,
phased-in approach to deregulation. 166 The target date for retail competition would be the
year 2000.167 Public utilities would be required to functionally unbundle their generation,
transmission, distribution, and energy services businesses, and establish unbundled tariffs
and transfer prices for "sales" between existing business units. In the near term, generation
would continue to operate rather similarly to how it has in the past, although the PSC
would conduct studies on issues such as market power as it looks ahead to a competitive
generation market in the year 2000. The transmission system would continue to be owned
by the utilities. However, starting in 1997, it would be operated by an ISO, whose
functions would be "to achieve nonpreferential operation and coordination of the
transmission system, on a statewide or regional common carrier basis, grid-wide pricing,
and a specific means of relieving transmission constraints." 168 Should the ISO
arrangement fail to mitigate market power concerns, utilities would be forced to divest their
assets and a state-wide Transco would be formed. 169 Little would change in the near-term
for distribution, although studies of how new regulatory procedures could improve
efficiency would be undertaken. The Commission would also take steps to strengthen
service territory definitions. Research would be conducted on how to develop the energy
services segment of the industry and how to maintain public benefits programs.
Wisconsin is not the only Midwestern state to consider electric power deregulation, its
neighbor to the north and east has also been a leader in the issue.
16 5Beating California to the punch by one day.
16 6 Wisconsin Public Service Commission, December 1995. Unless otherwise noted, details of the
Wisconsin final proposal come from this document.
167 Source: "Wisc. PSC OK's New Restructuring Plan."
168Wisconsin Public Service Commission, December 1995, 4.
169 Newman, 1996.
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5.4.3 Michigan
While it has somewhat slid into the background, Michigan was the first state in recent years
to propose some, albeit limited, form of electric power competition. 170 In April 1994171
the Michigan Public Service Commission launched the retail wheeling movement by
ordering a limited retail wheeling experiment. According to the order, large retail
customers -- those who consume 5 MW or more of power -- would be eligible for the retail
wheeling trial program. The plan would go into effect when each utility solicits for new
capacity, 172 would have a five-year time limit, and only 60 MW of Consumers Power's
load and 90 MW of Detroit Edison's would be placed at risk. 173 Each customer could
wheel between 2 and 10 MW and they would have to take the wheeled power from certified
wheelers at transmission or sub-transmission voltage levels.
Implementation of the proposal faced stiff resistance from Detroit Edison in particular,
although the Commission ultimately prevailed in the courts. This plan would go out the
window if the State's governor, John Engler, has his way. In a January 1996
development, Governor Engler called for an aggressive plan of retail wheeling for large
customers, an ISO-controlled transmission system by 1998, and a dissolution of franchise
service territories by the turn of the millennium. 174
Another recent significant event in Michigan was that the utilities worked hard to keep their
best customers, the auto companies, locked into their systems through a series of long-term
contracts (5 to 10 years) that give the Big 3 lower prices, reliability guarantees, and free
DSM advice, in return. 175
5.4.4 New Hampshire
A revolutionary set of events is unfolding in New Hampshire, where a company called
Freedom Energy is proposing to run a retail wheeling franchise. In June, New
Hampshire's Public Utilities Commission (PUC) ruled that the State's franchise agreement
170The "in recent years" clause exists for two reasons. First of all, the early industry was competitive (See
Appendix B.2). Secondly, since 1973, large industrial users moving to Georgia have had the ability to
secure their power through a competitive bidding process. Source: Southern Company, 1994, 11.17 1Just 9 days before the landmark California decision.
17 2 Gish, 1995, 53.
17 3 Sources: "Detroit Edison, AG Challenge Michigan Retail Wheeling Plan;" "Michigan Commission
Tries Again, Backs Retail Wheeling Experiment;" "Michigan PSC Approves Retail Wheeling Rates;"
Strand, 1994; and Brown, 1995.
174 Source: "Retail Wheeling Comes Alive in Michigan, Oklahoma."
17 5Source: "Consumers, GM Sign Deal;"
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with Public Service of New Hampshire was not an exclusive one and that Freedom Energy
could potentially be considered a public utility, if it was found to be in the public
interest. 176 In October the PUC set preliminary guidelines for a retail wheeling experiment
that is planned to commence in May 1996. Under the proposal, competitive suppliers
would have access to 3% of the State's six utilities' demand, which amounts to about 60
MW. All customers would be eligible to participate, and actual participation would be
based a random selection of interested customers. 177 The utilities would be able to recover
50% of the stranded investment lost in the process. 178 While Freedom Energy hails the
proposal as "a good first effort," the State's utilities are less enthusiastic. 179
5.4.5 Other States
These five states are a subset of 42 that are actively considering changes in their electric
power industry structures.1 80 The following is a brief, noncomprehensive sampling of
deregulation activities in other states: 181
* Rhode Island, realizing that as a small state in the large, interconnected New
England Power Pool it cannot determine the destiny of its electric industry
alone, has worked to forward principles for restructuring in the region 182 and
then stand back as the larger Commonwealth of Massachusetts takes the
lead. 183 The Massachusetts Interdependent Principles are based upon a set that
had been developed several months earlier in Rhode Island. 184 This strategy of
the regulators may be upended by a Legislature that is strongly in support of
deregulation. 185
* The New York State Public Service Commission is currently undertaking an
extensive proceeding on competition. In response to this, the New York Power
Authority has proposed an industry structure somewhat similar to the
Wisconsin extreme model, where a combination retail/bilateral market would be
developed from which all customers would have access to a competitive market.
Generation would be competitive and deregulated, transmission would be
owned and operated by the New York Power Authority and subject to FERC
regulation, distribution would be a regulated activity (by the Public Service
176 Source: "A Franchise By Any Other Name?;" and "Electric Controversy Burns in N.H."
177 Source: "State Experiments with Retail Wheeling."
17 8Source: "N.H. Commission Sets Retail Wheeling Trial."
179 Source: "Marketer Cheers Wheeling Trial."
180 Source: "Will Power Reform Burn Customers," 7B.
18 1A more comprehensive discussion of the state-by-state status in mid-1995 can be found in: "Report of
the Committee on Electric Utility Regulation," 1995, 557-564.
18 2Electric Industry Restructuring Collaborative, 1995, 5.
1 83 This is the position of the Rhode Island Commission. The Legislature has had other ideas and is
actively pursuing deregulation. See, for example: "Rhode Island's Utility-Deregulation Bill Would Set
Precedent in Electric Industry."
18 4 See Appendix A for the list.
18 5Source: "Rhode Island's Utility-Deregulation Bill Would Set Precedent in Electric Industry."
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Commission), and energy service companies would arrange with distribution
companies for the delivery of power. 186
* In Illinois, a proposal for a limited retail wheeling experiment: "Power Quest,"
proposed by Central Illinois Light Co., is being reviewed by the Illinois
Commerce Commission. 187
* In Pennsylvania, utilities are beginning to push the envelope on deregulation in
spite of skepticism by the Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission and its staff.
A proposal for a retail limited wheeling experiment has been made in the
Pittsburgh suburb of Pleasant Hills. 188 On a larger scale, General Public
Utilities and Pennsylvania Power and Light are advocating the creation of a
pool-based customer choice deregulation plan. 189
* In Ohio, retail wheeling has been a hot topic for more than a year. In 1994 a
retail wheeling bill was proposed in the Legislature. In October 1995 the state's
Public Utilities Commission unveiled a proposal that would allow large
industrial customers to buy power from suppliers other than their service utility
during a two year pilot program. 190
* In Connecticut, the state commission, after an extensive process, determined
that it is not in the public's interest to commence retail wheeling at this point in
time. However, it did recommend that generation be unbundled (although not
divested) and that the generation market become competitive.191
Having now examined events at the state level, let us now turn to the other forum of electric
power regulation, the federal government. While states were working on their proposals,
the FERC was attempting to implement the open access requirements of the Energy Policy
Act of 1992 (EPAct) by guiding the industry through a series of case rulings.
5.5 FERC "MEGA-NOPR"
Realizing that a more comprehensive framework was necessary, the FERC weighed in with
a massive Notice of Proposed Rule-Making (Mega-NOPR) on 29 March 1995. This
Mega-NOPR, which consumes 69 pages of the Federal Register, has stirred much
controversy. It focuses*on three major issues: open access to transmission systems, real-
time information networks, and stranded cost recovery. Let us examine each of these in
turn.
186 Source: (Not a direct quotation). "NYPA Staff for Direct Access, Statewide Grid and Exchange."
187 Source: "Retail Access Comes to Illinois."
188 Source: "Head-to-Head Energy Competition in Pa."
189Source: "Competition, Cost Recovery Urged in Pa."
190 Source: "Ohio Commission's Timid Test."
19 1Source: "Connecticut DPUC Issues Restructuring Recommendations."
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5.5.1 Open Access
The FERC believes that "the key to competitive bulk power markets is opening up
transmission services" 192 and that "market power through control of transmission is the
single greatest impediment to competition." 193 These two beliefs, combined with an intent
"to encourage lower electricity rates by structuring an orderly transition to competitive bulk
power markets," 194 led the FERC to issue the proposed rulemaking. In the Mega-NOPR
the Commission proposes three broad open access provisions:
* to require all public utilities owning or controlling facilities used for transmitting
electric energy in interstate commerce to file open access transmission tariffs;
* to require the utilities to take transmission service (including ancillary services)
for their own wholesale sales and purchases of electric energy under the open
access tariffs; and
* to create regulations to implement the filing of open access tariffs and the initial
rates under these tariffs.
In short, the FERC believes that "transmission service continues to be a natural
monopoly," 195 and that the creation of a competitive wholesale market requires common
carrier service on this system.
5.5.1.1 Nondiscriminatory Open Access
In order to prevent market power abuse by transmission-owning utilities (TOUs), the
Commission proposes that the national grid be characterized by nondiscriminatory open
access rules. According to the proposed rulemaking,
transmission owners must offer non-discriminatory open access transmission
and ancillary services to wholesale sellers and purchasers of electric energy.
This will require tariffs that offer point-to-point and network transmission
services, including ancillary services. All of these services must be non-
discriminatory as to price as well as to non-price terms and conditions.196
In developing its non-discriminatory principles, the FERC enumerated the discriminatory
actions of TOUs which it seeks to prevent:
* Refusal to provide network service;
* Use of pricing mechanisms that lead to higher prices for those wheeling than for
the utility's native load;
* Service prioritization that places wholesale wheeling contracts subordinate to
native load uses;
* Difficult scheduling and balancing contractual provisions;
* Restrictions on firm capacity agreements;
* Inferior provision of ancillary services;
* Unreasonable requirements of creditworthiness or security deposits;
* Requirements for reciprocity double payments; and
* Granting of superior provisions to other transmission owning utilities, vis-a-vis
non-transmission owners.
192 FERC, April 1995, 17663.
193 Ibid., 17664.
194 Ibid., 17663.
195 Ibid., 17675.
196 Ibid., 17680.
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Open access would occur through the posting of tariffs for transmission services. The
terms and conditions of these tariffs should be: 197
* Clear and specific; and
* Free of restrictions or limitations on service, except for cases when verifiable
technical or operational needs mandate the limitations.
These tariffs would be available to any entity that can request service under Section 211 of
the Federal Power Act. They should be made available for a wide range of time periods,
from the transmission provider's minimum scheduling period to several decades (long
enough to cover a contract's or plant's lifetime). 198 In the event of insufficient
transmission or ancillary service capacity, a transmission utility would be required to make
a good faith effort to expand its facilities upon request. 199
5.5.1.2 Point-to-Point and Network Services
Two broad types of transmission services -- network and point-to-point -- would be
available to all system users under the same tariffs (i.e. same rates and terms) that the
transmission owner offers itself for its wholesale power sales.200
The Mega-NOPR defines flexible point-to-point service as: "deliveries of power from
designated points of receipt to designated points of delivery." 201 Such service could be
taken or reserved on a firm or non-firm basis. A firm reservation would entitle a customer
to a certain amount of transmission capacity during a specified time period, while a non-
firm reservation would be subject to interruption (in return for a lower transmission
rate). 202 New firm service requests would have priority over new non-firm requests, and
would have the same status as new transmission service to the utility's native load.203
More extensive than point-to-point service is network transmission service, which the
Mega-NOPR defines as follows:
Network transmission service allows a transmission customer to use the entire
transmission network to provide generation service for specified resources and
19 7Summarized from: FERC, April 1995, 17682.
19 8 FERC, April 1995, 17685.
19 9It should be noted that "the (requesting) customer must agree to reasonable terms, conditions and prices,
including the financial responsibility for its share of the incremental expansion costs." Source: FERC,
April 1995, 17682.
2 0 0This would be a major change of policy. Currently, TOUs do not charge themselves, nor are they
limited to specific terms with regard to their wholesale sales.
2 0 1FERC, April 1995, 17683.
2 02 Firm transmission service could also be interrupted, but this would be the result of technical problems.
In the prioritizations that occur during emergency conditions, the firm user would have the same standing as
the transmission-provider's own capacity. Source: FERC, April 1995, 17687.2 0 3 FERC, April 1995, 17687.
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specified loads without having to pay a separate charge for each resource-load
pairing. Such service allows a transmission customer to integrate, plan,
commit, economically dispatch, and regulate its resources to serve its
consolidated load. Network service provides the customer with the same
flexible network usage needed to optimize its resources to meet its customers'
needs that transmission owners have to optimize their resources to meet their
customers' needs. Network service includes the ability to import power from
other control areas to economically and reliably service the customers' load.204
Network services would also be offered to customers on a firm and non-firm basis.
5.5.1.3 Reassignment of Firm Services
The inclusion of explicit reassignment rights20 5 -- the ability of a transmission customer to
sell its firm capacity reservation to another party -- would be required in firm transmission
tariffs. There would be several benefits to requiring reassignment rights. First of all, such
rights would help transmission customers with long-term contracts manage financial risk.
For example, if a potential customer did not need transmission capacity immediately, but
knew it would need it in the future and would not be able to obtain it at that time, the
customer could purchase it immediately and sell it on the secondary market until the
customer needed the capacity for its own purposes. Secondly, transmission rights
reassignment -- through the assumed creation of a secondary market for transmission
service -- would reduce the market power of transmission providers. Thirdly,
reassignment rights would lead to more efficient allocation of transmission capacity, since
those who value transmission in a given situation more than the rights-holder would be
willing to pay a premium for service.206
5.5.1.4 Tariff Development (Implementation)
The new tariffs would be developed in a two stage process.207 In stage one, the FERC
would issue generic tariffs, with the exact transmission prices to be set based upon each
utility's FERC Form 1 data. The Commission would use postage stamp, embedded-cost
based ratemaking in constructing the generic tariffs.208 Point-to-point rates would be
calculated by (1) dividing the total value of the transmission plant in service by the system
peak, (2) multiplying by a return on equity factor, and (3) dividing by the total number of
hours in a year. The cost for network service would be calculated by (1) averaging the
20 4Ibid., 17683.
20 5 At least for point-to-point services. The Commission is not clear as to whether network or ancillary
services would be reassignable. Source: FERC, April 1995, 17685-17686.
20 6FERC's discussion of reassignment rights is found in: FERC, April 1995, 17685-17686.
20 7 The Commission is using this two stage approach because it estimates that 137 utilities would be
forced to file new tariffs and it wishes to bring the benefits of increased wholesale competition to customers
as quickly as possible. Source: FERC, April 1995, 17718.
20 8 These are discussed in: FERC, April 1995, 17720-17721.
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transmission customer's monthly peaks, (2) dividing by the average of the transmission
provider's monthly system peaks, (3) multiplying by the value of the transmission plant in
service, (4) multiplying by a return on equity factor, and (5) dividing by the total number of
hours in a year. These tariffs would go into effect at midnight, sixty days after the
Commission's final order. All contracts consummated under these tariffs would be
permanently binding for their duration, unless explicitly stated otherwise.
The second stage would begin on day sixty-one. "On and after that date, public utilities
may propose changes to the rates, terms, and conditions in the generic tariffs... In addition,
customers and others may file complaints ... seeking changes in the rates, terms and
conditions... "209
5.5.1.5 Other Tariff Requirements
The transmission provider would be required to post its available transmission capacity,
which is the capacity not already committed to other firm uses during a scheduling period.
Acceptable commitments to other uses would include capacity reserved to meet:210
* Generally acceptable reliability criteria;
* Current and reasonably forecasted load on the transmission provider's system;
* Current firm power and transmission contracts; and
* Pending firm transmission service requests.
The tariffs would also include minimum notice periods for obtaining service. These should
be as short as technically feasible so that users can take advantage of short-term fluctuations
in the market.
When purchasing point-to-point service, transmission customers would undoubtedly be
required by a tariff to reveal the power receipt and delivery points and energy flows of a
transaction. However, a tariff could not require a customer to reveal contractual
information or even proof of a contract. While not requiring contractual proof would open
the possibility of users reserving capacity and then not using it, the detrimental effects of
such actions could be mitigated by either creating a secondary spot market for unused
capacity or by including a "use it or lose it" provision in tariffs.211 Because of the nature
of network services, the FERC may allow a transmission provider to garner contractual
proof that a prospective customer will use the service. 212
20 9 FERC, April 1995, 17719.
2 10 Ibid., 17686.
2 11 The Commission sought comments on the relative benefits/difficulties of these two approaches in the
Mega-NOPR.2 12 FERC, April 1995, 17686.
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The provisions of the Mega-NOPR would only affect new wholesale contracts; the terms of
existing ones would not be abrogated, except possibly with respect to stranded
investments. 2 13
In the long-term, the FERC believes that the open access Mega-NOPR would alleviate
market power in wholesale transactions to the extent that it can reduce its oversight
functions. In the industry it envisions, wholesale rates would be market-based, subject to
lighthanded FERC regulation.2 14
5.5.1.6 Ancillary Services
In order to support the transmission of electric power and maintain system integrity, there
are a number of services that a transmission utility must provide, which are termed ancillary
services.
5.5.1.6.1 Definition
The Mega-NOPR defines six ancillary services that should be offered in a utility's
transmission tariff:2 15
* Reactive power/Voltage control;
* Loss compensation;
* Scheduling and dispatching;
* Load following;
* System protection; and
* Energy imbalance.
While some ancillary services are best provided by a transmission utility216 for technical
reasons, others could be provided by either a transmission provider or customer. In the
case of the latter, customers should be given the option to provide their own ancillary
service, purchase it from the transmission utility, or procure it from a third party.217
5.5.1.6.2 Ancillary Services Pricing
The Mega-NOPR also defines a rate structure for ancillary service provision during stage
one of the rate-making process.2 18 The details of this rate structure will be discussed in
this thesis in the context of its evaluation. 219
2 13 See Section 5.5.3.2.
2 14 FERC, April 1995, 17688-17689.
2 15 Extensive descriptions of these can be found: FERC, April 1995, 17684-17685.
2 16 It should be recalled that the Mega-NOPR assumes that transmission would be provided by vertically-
integrated utilities, which would retain the capability to produce all ancillary services.
2 1 7The technical ability of a customer to self-provide/contract out is listed in the more comprehensive
discussion of the services. See: FERC, April 1995, 17684-17685.
2 1 8This pricing structure is established in: FERC, April 1995, 17721.
2 19 See Section 10.6.2.
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5.5.2 Real-Time Information Networks (RINs)
In order to facilitate the creation of a non-discriminatory transmission network, the FERC
issued a Notice of Technical Conference and Request for Comments simultaneous to its
promulgation of the Mega-NOPR. 220 The Commission did this because,
non-discriminatory open access transmission service requires transmission
customers to be able to compete effectively with the public utility that owns or
controls the transmission. Customers must have simultaneous access to the
same information available to the transmission owner. Thus, in this
proceeding, the Commission expects to require RINs or other options to ensure
that potential and actual transmission service customers receive access to
information so that they can obtain service comparable to that provided by
transmission owners (or controllers) to themselves. 221
In its notice, the FERC sought comment on a number of specific questions as well as three
broad questions:222
* What information should be available on a RIN?;
* What standard formats would be appropriate to use?; and
* What types of information systems are most appropriate to use?
Based upon the Commission's experience in the natural gas industry, it concluded that
industry-wide standards for real-time information systems set at the beginning of the
process would be the most efficient mechanism for compliance with the Mega-NOPR's
open access principles.
5.5.3 Stranded Cost Recovery
5.5.3.1 Basic Principle
When dealing with the issue of open access and the changes it would bring to the wholesale
power system, the FERC believes "it is essential to address the transition issues associated
with the move toward competition responsibly. The most significant of these issues is
stranded cost recovery." 223 The basic principle forwarded by the FERC is that utilities
should be permitted to recover "legitimate and verifiable stranded costs associated with
requiring open access tariffs." 224
5.5.3.2 Wholesale Stranded Costs
When stranded costs occur as a result of wholesale requirements contracts being stranded,
the FERC maintains that it has authority over their recovery. The FERC would allow the
2 20See FERC, April 1995, 17726-17731.
2 2 1FERC, April 1995, 17727.
2 22 Ibid., 17729.
2 23 Ibid., 17669.
2 24 Ibid., 17664.
156 Chapter 5
recovery of a utility's "stranded wholesale costs"' 225 directly from an exiting customer
under a limited set of circumstances. 226
5.5.3.3 Retail Stranded Costs
The FERC further states that retail wheeling stranded cost recovery is best left in the hands
of state authorities. Therefore, the FERC would not entertain requests for stranded cost
recovery due to retail wheeling unless "the state regulatory authority does not have
authority under state law to address stranded costs at the time the retail wheeling is
required." 227 The other situation when the FERC would intervene is when a retail
customer becomes a wholesale customer (i.e. municipalization). While it would grant to
the states the authority to collect retail wheeling stranded costs, the FERC would "not allow
states to use the interstate transmission grid as a vehicle for passing through any retail
stranded costs."228
5.5.4 Separation of Generation, Transmission, and Distribution
5.5.4.1 Ownership
The Mega-NOPR would not require the corporate separation of generation, transmission
and distribution functions, but it would require utilities to functionally unbundle
transmission from their other activities. In particular, functional unbundling means:229
* A public utility must take transmission services (including ancillary services) for
all of its new wholesale sales and purchases of energy under the same tariff of
general applicability under which others take service;
* A transmission owner must include in its open access tariffs separately stated
rates for the transmission and ancillary service components of each transmission
service it provides; and
* A public utility must rely upon the same electronic network that its transmission
customers rely upon to obtain transmission information about its system when
buying or selling power.
2 2 5
"Wholesale stranded costs" are: "any legitimate, prudent and verifiable cost incurred by a public utility
or a transmitting utility to provide service to: (i) a wholesale requirements customer that subsequently
becomes, in whole or in part, an unbundled wholesale transmission services customer of such public utility
or transmitting utility, or (ii) a retail customer, or a newly created wholesale power sales customer, that
subsequently becomes, in whole or in part, an unbundled wholesale transmission services customer of such
public utility or transmitting utility." Source: FERC, April 1995, 17701.
2 26 These circumstances include contracts consummated before 11 July 1994 that: (i) contain explicit
provisions for stranded cost recovery, (ii) do not include explicit restrictions for stranded cost recovery, (iii)
are silent on stranded cost recovery and the parties agree to modify the contract or one party files with the
FERC for modification, or (iv) include a non-public, transmission utility and the contract is silent with
respect to stranded costs. Summarized from: FERC, April 1995, 17701.2 27 FERC, April 1995, 17708. Despite its decision to relinquish jurisdiction, "the Commission holds the
strong expectation that states will provide procedures for, and the full recovery of, legitimate and verifiable
stranded costs." Source: Ibid., 17691.
2 2 8FERC, April 1995, 17708.
2 29 Summarized from: FERC, April 1995, 17681.
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While the FERC would not require corporate unbundling as a result of the Mega-NOPR, it
believes that the latter would be accommodated by its functional unbundling decision. 230
Furthermore, the FERC would consider stranded cost cases where a utility chose a
corporate unbundling strategy on its own initiative.231
5.5.4.2 Jurisdiction
The FERC maintains that it retains jurisdiction over the transmission grid -- "as long as
electric energy is being sold to a legitimate wholesale purchaser, we believe the
Commission has jurisdiction..."' 232 -- even in the case of unbundled transmission sales to
retail users. 233 In distinguishing between transmission and distribution functions, the
FERC proposal rejects "an absolute bright line" test (although that would be preferable),
but rather proposes a "functional line test" with two variants -- one for unbundled
wholesale wheeling,234 and one for unbundled retail wheeling.235 According to these
tests, in almost all cases, electricity flowing to a customer in a restructured industry would
pass through both state and federal jurisdiction because the power would cross the FERC
regulated transmission system and "in most cases the last public utility in the chain will use
facilities that historically were considered local distribution facilities."' 236
230FERC, April 1995, 17681.
231 Ibid., 17711.
232Ibid., 17717.
233The Mega-NOPR discusses this at length, see: FERC, April 1995, 17711-17712. This is an
interesting situation, given the current political climate. Paul Kemezis comments on the current debate
between state commissions and the FERC. "If it did anything, the debate underscored the contradictory and
almost bizarre situation facing state regulators. As political power shifts away from Washington to the
states, state commissions should be exercising the power they retain under federal law to regulate local
utilities with less federal interference -- not more. But the dynamics of electric power industry restructuring,
and the physics of electricity, seem to be working against this." Source: Kemezis, 1996, 26.
234The test would be: "whether the entity to whom the power is delivered is a lawful wholesaler." All
facilities up until the entity receives the power are subject to FERC regulation; while all facilities after
reception by the wholesaler are considered state-regulated distribution assets. Source: FERC, April 1995,
17717-17718.
235Indicators for determining whether a facility is a wholesale or retail one include:
* Local distribution facilities are normally in close proximity to retail customers;
* Local distribution facilities are primarily radial in character;
* Power flows into local distribution systems, it rarely, if ever, flows out;
* When power enters a local distribution system it is not reconsigned or transported on to some other
market.
* Power entering a local distribution system is consumed in a comparatively restricted geographical area;
* Meters are based at the transmission/local distribution interface to measure flows into the local
distribution system; and
* Local distribution systems will be of reduced voltage. Source: FERC, April 1995, 17718.236FERC, April 1995, 17717.
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5.5.5 Action Since the Mega-NOPR
Just as the California "Blue Book" served as a catalyst for discussion of retail wheeling
issues that had been slowly increasing with time, the same has been true for the Mega-
NOPR and transmission issues. The Commission has held a number of hearings on
transmission related-issues since the Mega-NOPR was issued and it (the Mega-NOPR) has
been the subject of lively debate within the industry. Since opening the debate with the
Mega-NOPR, the FERC has chosen a deliberative approach, which is in keeping with both
the incremental nature of American policy-making and the significant "unknowns" with
regard to the best way to handle the deregulation of the electric power system. This
strategy and the challenges faced by the FERC were articulated by Commissioner Don
Santa,
Quite candidly, the industry is fooling itself if it expects FERC to play the role
of Moses and all at once come down from the mountain with a tablet that
contains the 10 commandments that will define the structure of the new power
industry. Just as the industry's restructuring is an evolutionary process, so too
is the development of the regulation that will be the 'rules of the road' for the
restructured industry. The electric power issues facing the FERC and the
industry are a moving target in the truest sense.237
5.5.5.1 California and Other States
While the FERC takes its time deliberating, California and the other states continue to press
ahead. In order to accommodate these states the FERC will soon need to make some
decisions. In fact, one of the first tests of the effectiveness of a new FERC policy will be
how it is able to handle the issues related to California's restructuring. The CPUC
recognizes that a productive state-federal dialogue is important for its ability to restructure
the industry and has called for a process market by "cooperative federalism." Let us briefly
examine how the CPUC proposals (the May and December preferred decisions) compare
with the FERC Mega-NOPR on several significant issues, which can be seen in Table 5.3.
Based upon Table 5.3 it would appear that there is a great deal of congruence between the
proposals, and certainly no insurmountable obstacles. The differences that do arise appear
to occur because of the difference in nature of the two proposals (the FERC's being
wholesale competition and the CPUC's being retail competition).
2 37 Source: "Quotable," 20 January 1995.
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Table 5.3: The Confluence and Divergence of the CPUC and FERC Models
CPUC POOLCO CPUC Final FERCIndustryStructure
Disaggregate vertical Disaggregate vertical Disaggregate vertical
integration integration operationally integration
Functional disaggregation Functional disaggregation Functional unbundling
Transmission system Transmission system Transmission system
independently operated independently operated operated on an open-access
basis
Independent system operator Independent system operator Transmission owner
with authority over with authority over accommodates wholesale
wholesale dispatch; financial wholesale dispatch; Power bilateral power transactions
bilateral transactions exchange handles
permitted for retail competitive auctions; direct
customers retail contracts permitted
System operator for Pool provides transparent Generation finds its own
wholesale pool to provide prices for generators who wholesale market
transparent prices for retail participate; other generators
generation can deal directly with
customers or aggregators
Non-discriminatory Non-discriminatory Non-discriminatory
generator access generator access (regardless transmission access
of pool/bilateral standing)
Bundled service from Bundled service for those Nominally complete
wholesale pool; contracts for who so choose unbundling of transmission
differences at retail services
Transparent time-of-day Transparent time-of-day Power prices set through
price signaling price signaling available for private bilateral contract
all but not mandatory
"Contracts for differences" Contracts for differences Direct physical wholesale
as a surrogate for direct and direct access retail transactions
retail contracts -- all financial contracts are possible
transactions
Potential to permit direct Retail access in two years No provision for retail
retail transactions in two for some customers access
years .
Sources: Hollis and Teichler, 1995, 24; and author.
5.5.5.2 Real Time Information Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
In December 1995 the FERC issued a notice of proposed rulemaking which selected the
Internet's World-Wide Web graphical interface as the vehicle over which RINs would be
developed. 238 This NOPR was the culmination of significant effort on the part of the
industry and the Commission. Following a number of technical conferences, two
committees with inclusive membership were established: one to answer the "what"
2 3 8 Source: "'Web' Is Choice in FERC's RIN."
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questions (what information should be available) and other to answer the "how" questions
(technical specifications for RIN hardware and information presentation). The issues and
discussion are interesting, however, they are marginally relevant to this thesis so they will
not be discussed in further detail here. 239 Although a proposed rulemaking, based largely
upon the findings of these committees, is now in place, the FERC has a long list of
questions that must still be answered. It is expected that the FERC will make its final
rulemaking on both RINs and Open Access sometime this spring.240
5.5.6 The Future
In attempting to create an open access transmission system, the FERC is looking at the
creation several types of organizations to help further its goal.
5.5.6.1 Independent System Operators
The FERC is intrigued with independent system operators as vehicles for ensuring
compliance with its open access requirements. In particular, "the Commission is interested
in whether ISOs are necessary to ensure comparability for public utilities that are not
members of power pools."24 1 In announcing a January 1996 technical conference on the
topic, the FERC cited three reasons (for the conference): 242
* To help define the essential elements and operational characteristics of an ISO;
* To examine the principles of power pools; and
* To develop criteria for evaluating the ISO proposals that are currently being
developed.
Clearly, the FERC's ultimate decision on the ISO issue will have large implications for
state-level decisions. On one hand, if it were to determine that ISOs do not meet Federal
Power Act standards for not being unduly discriminatory, the FERC would essentially
unravel all of the work in California and Wisconsin. On the other hand, if the FERC were
to determine that all transmission systems must be run by an ISO, it would probably speed
the deregulation process in other states.
5.5.6.2 Regional Transmission Groups
Regional Transmission Groups (RTGs) are another concept that the FERC is dedicated to
in the process of restructuring the electric power industry. The purposes of RTGs are to:
* Speed the development of competitive markets;
* Increase the efficiency of the operation of transmission systems;
* Provide a framework for coordination of regional planning of the system; and
* Reduce the administrative burden on the Commission and members of RTGs
through voluntary dispute resolution.
23 9 To read this NOPR, see: FERC, December 1995.
24 0 Source: "'Web' Is Choice in FERC's RIN."
24 1FERC, January 1996, 706.
2 42 Source: "FERC Goes to Work on ISOs."
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While RTGs are given brief mention in this thesis, they are an important part of FERC's
efforts. Three such entities have been formed and several others in the wings. In an open
access era, the FERC views RTGs as important for regional capacity planning (as opposed
to system-by system planning), dispute resolution, and for serving as "regional
laboratories" for experimenting with innovative transmission policies. 243
5.6 THE PROPOSALS THAT WILL BE EVALUATED
Having discussed many proposals in varying degrees of depth, we will now choose five to
evaluate in Chapter 9. Two criteria will be used in selecting the five. The first is relevance:
what is the likelihood that the proposal will be adopted? Is it under serious consideration
anywhere? If not, might it be at some point in time? The second criterion is uniqueness: is
the proposal sufficiently different from the others that it might illustrate differences or lead
to different implications for the transmission system?
With these two criteria in mind, the first three come from the California debate: POOLCO,
Bilateral and the "final" models. The over-riding reason for their selection is that these
were the three proposals being considered by the largest state in the country for
restructuring its electric power industry. Not only is California the largest state, but with
its ultimate selection of a hybrid model, it was the first state to take such a radical step in
restructuring its industry.
The fourth proposal comes from Wisconsin: the "plausible extreme" model. This is chosen
because it represents an extreme that may become reality at some point in time.
Furthermore, it is quite different than the three under consideration in California. Thus, the
evaluation of it holds the potential for finding significantly different results than the
relatively more similar California proposals.
The final "model" that will be examined is the FERC Mega-NOPR. 244 This proposal is
different in character from the others, as it is not a comprehensive model for industry
restructuring, but rather a template for the nation-wide debate. It is in many ways the most
24 3 FERC, April 1995, 17689.
24 4 This is not a comprehensive industry model; but rather, it is a significant policy that will impact all
comprehensive models. Because this policy will be significant (and will have implications for the future
efficiency of the grid and for the prospects of non-utility transmission systems) this will be evaluated along
with the other four models.
162 Chapter 5
important of all the models for the purposes of this thesis, as it will determine the basic
transmission structure that will have to be used in all of the state restructuring proposals.
We will return to these proposals in Chapter 10, where they are evaluated for their
economic efficiency in transmission. Having now discussed the basics of some
restructuring proposals, let us change our focus and develop criteria for evaluating them.
We begin the discussion in Part II of the thesis by attempting to learn efficiency lessons
from the deregulation of the natural gas and telephone industries.
PART II:
ESTABLISHING
EVAULATION CRITERA

Chapter 6
Deregulation in Related Industries
The post-636 world wif provide us and our customers with more options. But it is
somewhat akin to a situation if the automobife manufacturers were to tef us they are
providing us with more options by sending us all the parts for a car in a box. We then
can '6undfe' the parts any way we want. And, indeed, we can. The key is how to
make it work It wif be a cha(enge.I
-- DaniefA. BotfTom, President andCEO of Wisconsin Pu6tic Service Corp. (1992)
6.1 INTRODUCTION
6.1.1 Deregulation in Other Industries
While they are new to the electric power industry, the deregulatory2 forces being unleashed
in the industry have been changing the structures of relatively stable American industries
for nearly two decades. Since 1978, when the airline industry was the first to experience
the process, nine industries, accounting for more than $600 billion in annual output,3 have
been freed, to varying degrees, from government control over firm entry and exit and price
setting. During this period, Presidential Administrations from both parties have advocated
that markets are better equipped than bureaucrats to set the entry conditions for firms and
the prices they charge in an efficient manner.4 The result of deregulation has been
increased economic efficiency through a process of significant economic tumult.5
Seemingly-invincible companies, such as Pan-American Airlines6, have gone bankrupt,
others have greatly cut back -- once-secure jobs have been lost forever -- while
entrepreneurial firms have arisen, creating new jobs.7 While this has been disruptive to the
industries affected, deregulation has repeatedly given consumers a greater range of choice
in products and services that are typically less expensive. 8
I Source: "1992 Gas Utility Executive's Forum", 68.
2 For the purposes of this discussion, deregulation will be interpreted as: "the state's withdrawal of its legal
powers to direct the economic conduct (pricing, entry, and exit) of nongovernmental bodies. See: Winston,
1993, 1263; and Stigler, 1981.
3 Winston, 1993, 1263, 1265.
4 For example see an editorial which ends with: "there is really nobody left who believes that the [integrated
and regulated telephone] system is the answer." Source: Warsh, 1995.
5 For economic data, see: Winston, 1993.
6 For an detailed account of Pan-Am's failure, see: Gandt, 1995.
'7 Overall, there have been small to significant losses in total jobs and employment. Source: Winston,
1993, 1282.
I See: Winston, 1993; and Gardner and Gilson, 1994.
166 Chapter 6
6.1.2 Electric Power Deregulation
The expectation that deregulation would bring less expensive rates to the electric power
industry is the main impetus for the deregulation movement. This motivation has been
made explicit by the regulatory bodies in the two states leading the deregulation charge --
California and Massachusetts. The latter's Department of Public Utilities stated, "reducing
costs, over time, for all consumers of electricity is the primary objective of the
Department's efforts in restructuring the electric industry." 9
6.1.3 Ability to Learn From Others
While from a technical standpoint the deregulation of the electric power industry is
probably more complicated than any of the industries that have undergone deregulation to
date, it does have the benefit of being able to learn from its predecessors' successes and
mistakes. Economic historian Peter Temin argues that while the path to deregulation cannot
be predicted based upon what has happened in other industries, lessons nevertheless can be
learned -- "history does not repeat itself. But history does have echoes."10 With that in
mind, this chapter will be devoted to an examination of deregulation in the telephone
industry (specifically the events leading up to the break-up of AT&T) and in the natural gas
industry1 . The stories recounted in this chapter are not intended to be authoritative
historical accounts; 12 rather they will focus upon particular lessons that are applicable to
electric power industry deregulation.
6.2 DEREGULATION AND BREAK-UP OF THE AT&T TELEPHONE SYSTEM
6.2.1 The Context
One of the most visible manifestations of deregulation, which directly touched the life of
nearly every American, was that which transformed the telephone industry in the 1980s.
Under the terms of the Modified Final Judgment (MFJ) negotiated between AT&T and the
U.S. Department of Justice, under the jurisdiction of Judge Harold Greene, the telephone
company was broken up into a new AT&T and seven regional Bell operating companies
(RBOCs or "Baby Bells.") The events that led to the break-up of what was then the
world's largest corporation (and that in the previous year had recorded the largest profits of
9' Massachusetts Department of Public Utilities, 16 August 1995, 1.
10 Temin, 1994, 10.
" These two industries were chosen for several reasons, which will be made clear in their respective
sections.
12 The former has been the source of many excellent books, while the latter has attracted less attention, but
has been the topic of several recent Ph.D. theses.
any company ever) 13 is fascinating and has been the subject of much debate. In the
literature on the causes of the break-up, two primary schools of thought have emerged One
holds that technological change was the driving force for the break-up' 4. Vietor argues, for
example, that:
By comparison to any other national [telephone] network, there is no question
that this American [regulated] system worked best -- measured by penetration,
technical quality, or price. But of course this regulatory structure was rooted in
analog electronics. By the mid-1970s the digital revolution, triggered by
AT&T's own invention of the transistor, was radically changing the product
and operating economics of the telecommunications business. And as these
economics changed, the existing regulation became less and less appropriate.' 5
The second school of thought holds that the break-up was the result of "pricing and
politics" 16 -- incremental decisions that, when taken together, undermined the old system
and made it ripe for newcomers. One example is the Federal Communications Commission
(FCC) decision that allowed MCI into the industry. The intent of the original decision was
to allow off-system alternatives to AT&T's service, to have the giant monopoly feel the
discipline of the market in a niche market or two. Instead, the original and subsequent
decisions allowed MCI to serve the most desirable customers ("cream-skim"), while
leaving system responsibility and the less desirable customers to AT&T. The FCC also
essentially prohibited AT&T from being able to compete with MCI, by forcing it to charge
embedded, local service-subsidizing rates to the same customers that MCI was allowed to
charge marginal cost-based rates. Those in the second school of thought would argue that
while technological change was an enabler of more competition, it did not predestine
competition. Rather, regulatory decisions that ignored and thus furthered the inefficiencies
of the existing regulatory structure (especially the cross-subsidies), and which ignored the
systemic nature of the telephone industry, drove the industry deregulation. Instead of
turning to deregulation, a continued reliance on the monopoly system could have
incorporated these new technologies while retaining the benefits of a national system,
benefits that were partially lost when the Bell System was splintered.
Both schools of thought believe that the break-up was at least partially motivated by a
desire to speed technological development. Some analysts in the 1970s and early 1980s
felt that through its monopoly status, AT&T was hindering the adoption of new
13 Source: "AT&T Move is a Reversal of Course Set in 1980s."
14 See Piepmeier et al.
"5 Vietor, 1994, 233.
16 See Temin, 1987.
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technologies -- from consumer gadgets such as answering machines to revolutionary
advances such as satellite systems. Therefore, in order to let the satellite era begin, and to
allow for more services to consumers, the monopoly needed to be broken up.
With this as a background, we next examine the history of the telephone industry.
6.2.2 The Early Bell System
The modern telephone system has its roots in the work of Alexander Graham Bell, who
invented the telephone in 1876. When Bell's patents (which in the mid-1880s became the
property of AT&T) expired, competition in the industry quickly emerged both in
equipment and phone service. This competitive environment did not last long, however, as
AT&T began to acquire many of its competitors, including the leader in the telegraph
communications era, Western Union. This anticompetitive behavior was much to the
chagrin of the Justice Department, which began an anti-trust investigation. Many of
AT&T'S acquisitions occurred during the leadership of Theodore Vail, who became
chairman in 1907. Vail's vision for the telephone industry was universal service (provided
by AT&T). In 1913 AT&T reached an agreement with the Justice Department which
required it to sell Western Union (and agree to stay out of the telegraph business) in return
for the fulfillment of Vail's aspiration -- status as a regulated monopoly. AT&T's
philosophy with regard to the benefits of universal service and its belief in the need for a
regulated private monopoly to provide it was laid out in its 1910 Annual report.
It is believed that the telephone system should be universal, interdependent and
intercommunicating, affording opportunity for any subscriber of any exchange
to communicate with any other subscriber of any other exchange within the
limits of speaking distance, giving to every subscriber possible additional
facility for annihilating time or distance by use of electrical transmission of
intelligence or personal communication. It is believed that some sort of a
connection with the telephone system should be within the reach of all... It is
believed further, that the idea of universality can be broadened and applied to a
universal wire system for the electric transmission of intelligence (written or
personal communication), from every one in every place to every one in every
other place, a system as universal and extensive as the highway system of the
country which extends from every man's door to every other man's door...
.. It is believed that all this can be accomplished to the reasonable satisfaction
of the public with its acquiescence, under such control and regulation as will
afford the public much better service at less cost than any competition or
government-owned monopoly could permanently afford and at the same time be
self-sustaining. 17 (emphasis original)
17 American Telephone and Telegraph, 1910, 22-23.
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This set of beliefs would guide AT&T for the next 70 years, and from 1913 on, the
company embraced government regulation as the mechanism through which it could
provide its goal of universal service and end-to-end responsibility for the network.
Following a wave of purchases of small phone companies, by the late 1920s AT&T held
79% of the local exchange market. 8 During the Great Depression, when the oil, steel, and
electric power trusts were broken up, AT&T was successfully able to argue its case as a
public servant, and for the next 50 years it largely retained its "motherly" stature as a quasi-
public servant. That is not to say that problems did not arise on occasion. One of these
occurred in 1949, when the U.S. Justice Department filed an anti-trust suit against AT&T.
The suit sought the divestiture of Western Electric (AT&T's manufacturing subsidiary)
from Ma Bell. The case was dropped in 1956 when AT&T signed a consent decree by
which Western Electric remained part of AT&T, in return for which, AT&T and Western
Electric agreed not to enter other industries, such as the computer industry.' 9 This
agreement cemented the integrated structure of the phone system. AT&T had exclusive
control over the long distance "long lines," and was dominant in local phone service,
through its local Bell operating companies, and in the equipment manufacturing market,
through its Western Electric subsidiary.
6.2.3 The Monopoly is Challenged
Though AT&T's future seemed secure in the mid-1960s, a combination of events over the
next decade and a half would lead to the break up of the Bell System.
6.2.3.1 The Challengers and the FCC
In the late 1960s and early 1970s, a series of Federal Communications Commission (FCC)
rulings20 would begin to transform the telephone industry.21 During this period, the chief
of the FCC's Common Carrier Bureau was Bernard Strassburg. While his goal was not to
create a fully competitive industry, Strassburg saw benefits in forcing limited competition
on the Bell System.22
6.2.3.1.1 The Carterphone
The first set of FCC rulings had to do with equipment on the telephone system. Prior to
1969, only devices provided by the telephone company could be attached to the phone
18 Vietor, 1994, 173.
19 Shepard, 1971, 100.
20 Which were decided by close FCC votes.
21 Temin, 1987, 68.
22 Ibid., 1987, 78.
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system.23 Whenever others proposed a device for use on the system, they were opposed
by AT&T. The basis for the opposition was a claim that the system would face a serious
24technical threat if non-Western Electric equipment were used. 24 While this reaction was
often interpreted outside of the company as a monopolist's attempt to protect its turf -- and
to some extent it probably was -- it also reflected a deeply held conviction by many
engineers within the company regarding the importance of protecting the integrity of the
network.25 It was an extension of Bell's long-established cultural value of responsibility
for the provision of end-to-end service.
The first of the equipment rulings was the Carterphone decision. This device was a
primitive mobile phone developed by a Texas entrepreneur, Tom Carter. Despite AT&T's
strenuous objections, the FCC voted 4-3 to allow Carterphones to be connected to the
network. While as a product the Carterphone itself was not significant, the result of the
case it spawned was to set a precedent for non-Western Electric equipment to enter the
system. Although Strassburg maintains that the intent of the decision was to allow for
additional equipment rather than replacement of existing Western Electric equipment, it did
in fact have the latter effect. 26
AT&T's response to this decision was to require a "protective coupling arrangement"
(PCA) to be placed on any non-Western Electric equipment. This irritated many people
because AT&T charged a $2 monthly fee for PCAs.27 To those skeptical of AT&T's
motives, this was further proof that the company did not have system reliability on its
mind, only protection of its monopoly. Several years later, in 1972, the PCAs gave way to
certificates of compliance, which were given to equipment that met detailed technical
standards.
6.2.3.1.2 MCI
With competition having breached the equipment part of the system, the next beach head
was telephone service itself. In Temin's view, the markets for long distance service were
opened as a consequence of the industry's pricing structure. Long distance phone calls can
23 Martin, 1977, 362.
24 A similar argument was made by the natural gas industry, with respect to "alien" gas, and by the electric
power industry, with regard to IPPs, in the early 1980s. Sources: O'Neill and Whitmore, 1995, 72; Fyock,
1988, 78-79.
25 Bambenek, 1995.
26 Henck and Strassburg, 1988, 127.
27 Ibid., 1988, 130.
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be charged in many ways.28 Two alternatives are station-to-station and board-to-board
rates. When charging on a station-to-station basis, the long distance call (for billing
purposes) consists of the use of the phone system from the originator's station (telephone)
to the other person's station (his/her telephone). Therefore, the toll charge includes not
only the transmission between the city central stations, but also the connection to the city's
central station on both ends. During a local call, this latter service is provided free-of-
charge to the customer. The result is that station-to-station rate structures subsidize local
service. 29 A second option is board-to-board rates. By this rate system, the "local" part of
the call is free, all that the caller pays for is the "long distance" segment of the call, the
transmission from one central station to the other. In a series of decisions which began
during World War II with the establishment of station-to-station rates, and which ended in
the 1970s, the subsidization of local service by long distance service gradually increased.
Especially during the 1940s and 1950s, these cross-subsidies probably seemed innocuous
since the telephone system operated as one system. While these decisions were intentional,
they caused economic distortions and their purpose was not understood by all participants
at key junctures in the deregulation process.
The rising subsidies caused a significant (and increasing) gap between the marginal cost of
a long distance call and the price that was charged for it. This gap allowed start-up
companies, such as Microwave Communications Inc. (MCI), to enter into the long distance
business. Permission was granted by the FCC, which was seeking "limited" competition
in the telephone industry. MCI could profitably connect high service density city-pairs,
such as the Chicago-St. Louis corridor, at prices 65% below those of AT&T. 30 When
AT&T sought to match or beat these prices (which on a marginal cost basis it could do), it
was sharply criticized for monopolistic practices. Initially, the FCC granted MCI
permission for private line service between St. Louis and Chicago on an experimental
basis. However, this decision opened the floodgates and after numerous requests for
private line service (many of them from MCI and its affiliates) were granted in the ensuing
several years, the FCC granted blanket permission for specialized services. A later
decision, in 1974, mandated that these "private line" services be connected to the Bell
System's switching network. With that decision, AT&T essentially faced true competition
2 In economics there is no "correct" way to allocate the joint costs of local plant to different uses,
especially since a major part of the expenses is not traffic sensitive. Source: Temin, 1987, 24.
29 Subsidization occurs because the "extra" revenue from long distance calls is used to pay for the operation
of the local phone system, which, in turn, reduces the total amount that must be collected from local
ratepayers. This is especially helpful (in terms of subsidization) since much of the cost of a telephone call
goes toward fixed costs.
Vietor, 1994, 201.
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in long distance service. In 1978 the so-called EFINA tariffs were developed by which the
new long distance companies would pay 35% of what AT&T would pay to the local
telephone companies for their long distance connections to the switching stations.31
Because of these decisions, AT&T's competition in long distance, though small in relative
volume, had gained a firm footing.
6.2.3.1.3 The people
In McGowan, MCI's CEO, AT&T had encountered an entrepreneurial pit-bull. As Temin
describes him, "McGowan was a street fighter, a man who took advantages when they
appeared and seldom worried about the rules of combat."32 McGowan's personality and
tenacity did much to expand the envelope of competition in the industry. McGowan was
not alone in his attack on AT&T's monopoly, however. He was joined by a group of
"policy entrepreneurs." As was mentioned previously, in the late 1960s and early 1970s
McGowan had benefited from Bernard Strassburg's tenure as chairman of the FCC
committee that regulated AT&T. Yet another key figure was Attorney General William
Saxbe, who initiated the fateful antitrust case, apparently without the support of the Ford
Administration. As will be seen later, the assignment of Judge Harold Greene to the anti-
trust case in mid-stream was also important. His rapid handling of the case and the
perception that he would be willing to take drastic actions if he found them appropriate put
pressure on AT&T to settle.33 The man who would eventually break the monopoly,
Assistant Attorney General William Baxter, also played a key role. Baxter overcame
objections from the Reagan Cabinet, and even the President himself, and managed to
continue with the case. President Reagan reportedly commented that when he was a boy, it
cost $.02 to send a letter across the country and $2 to make such a phone call. Today, it
costs $.20 for each. If the phone company can deliver such efficiency, why fix something
that is not broke? However, neither the President nor anyone else above Baxter explicitly
forbade him from pursuing the case, and he persevered. 34 AT&T's position was also not
helped by the abrasive style of Chairman John deButts, who challenge to the regulators in
the early 1970s helped to bring on the antitrust case. His style also helped create a
perception of recalcitrance on the part of AT&T that contributed to the decline in support for
the company during the 1970s.
31 Henck and Strassburg, 1988, 181.
32 Temin, 1987, 47-49.
33 For a retrospective look at Judge Green's contributions, see: "Telecom Czar Frets Over New Industry
Rules."
34 Temin, 1987, 229-230.
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6.2.3.2 AT&T and Its "Drag" on Technology Adoption
At the time that the antitrust case was being formulated, there was a widespread belief that
microwave technology would be the technology of the future. Many in the
communications field were concerned that AT&T was dragging its feet in installing the new
technology, thus causing economic inefficiency. James Martin argued, for example, that
"the worst aspect of the rate-of-return regulation is that it tends to discourage projects
which could bring a massive saving in capital equipment costs, as could the use of large
telephone company satellites today." 35 Many felt that while the wire cable telephone system
of the past had clear network properties, satellite technology, which was not constrained by
immobile conduits, would diminish the network nature of the system, and with it, the
efficiency advantages of a single national telephone system.
More generally, critics of AT&T were concerned about its slow adoption of new
technology. In some respects, this was a natural product of the Bell System culture, which
viewed telephone service quality, and the technical integrity of its system, as its highest
priorities. For example, soon after he became chairman, John deButts announced that the
quality of POTS (plain old telephone service) was the System's most important objective. 36
Predictably, the result of this focus was that "customer demand assumed a relatively minor
role in service development or introduction." 37 Bell System engineers were disposed to
standardize technological improvements and slowly make them available throughout the
system in order to guarantee reliability. 38 The same mind-set pervaded AT&T's equipment
manufacturing unit, Western Electric.
Many outside the system concluded39 that new technologies were being stymied in the
domestic equipment business. 4 One important example was an influential 1971 article by
William G. Shepard that contained seven hypotheses about the negative impact of the Bell
3s Martin, 1977, 360.
36 Coll, 1986, 7.
37 Bolter and McConnaughey, 1991, 285.
38 Nevertheless, as Temin notes: "The Bell System worked spectacularly well. Telephone service became
progressively cheaper, more available, and more automatic... Much of the solid state electronic technology
that transformed telephony into telecommunications came out of Bell Labs and was implemented first by
the Bell System. This record of relentless technological improvement was the glue that held together
AT&T's various accommodations with the state and federal governments." Source: Temin, 1987, 19.
39 For example, see: Shepard, 108.
4 Although competitors did have non-Bell outlets in the 20% of local service which was provided by the
likes of GTE and United Telephone.
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System's monopoly on performance and innovation. These were: 41
* Classical monopoly restraint;
* X-Efficiency;
* Rate-base preference and capital intensity;
* Innovation stopped by market closure;
* Exclusivity of technology;
* Preemptive innovation in response to competition; and
* Entry into unprofitable markets.
While these hypotheses were unproven, Shepard's case was persuasive to many.
6.2.3.3 The Anti-Trust Suit
The Justice Department staff, which had long been concerned with the AT&T situation, 42
saw an opportunity for action amidst the disarray of the post-Watergate Ford White House.
In November 1974, only 3 months after Richard Nixon's resignation, the Justice
Department announced that it was bringing an antitrust suit against AT&T. This suit was
widely unanticipated and does not appear to have had the support of the Ford
Administration. 43 During the Carter years the suit slowly dragged on, although the
Administration gave it little attention. Several attempts by AT&T to have the case
dismissed were unsuccessful. One of the most significant developments in the case was
the change of judges in 1978. The first judge assigned to the case, Joseph Waddy,
developed a terminal illness. The case was then placed on the docket of Judge Harold
Greene, who had drafted the 1964 Civil Rights Act and the 1965 Voting Rights Act. Once
the case was in Greene's court, the suit picked up speed." Five days after the trial began
in January 1981, the Reagan Administration took office, and responsibility for the Justice
Department's case was given to the tenacious William Baxter. Although Baxter was a
third-tier administration official, his two superiors had conflicts of interest in the case, so
he was able to act with the full authority of the Justice Department, even though many high
Administration officials opposed the case. Despite this sentiment, having never been
formally enjoined from continuing the case, he litigated it, in his words, "to its eyeballs"45
until AT&T's signed the decree.
41 Shepard, 1971, 101-117.
42 Temin, 1987, 101.
43 Temin, 1987, 110.
44 In comparison, while the IBM court case took 7 years to settle, the much more complicated AT&T case
took only 1 1/2 years of court time, largely due to Judge Greene's expediency. Source: "What a Difference
a Judge Makes."
45 Cited in: Vietor, 1994, 210.
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6.2.3.4 AT&T's Response
By the 1970s, AT&T had developed a special place in American society, as "a private
enterprise with a public trust."46 As its position was beginning to be undermined in 1973,
John deButts, the new chairman of AT&T, gave a bold speech at a meeting of the National
Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners (NARUC), entitled "An Unusual
Commitment." The speech's purpose was, in deButts' words, "to take to the public the
case for the common carrier principle."4 7 While the speech clearly signaled AT&T's
commitment to Vail's ethos, it was taken by some in the Justice Department and at the FCC
as a clear challenge.
Following the filing of the anti-trust suit, AT&T attempted an end-run around the Justice
Department and the FCC. It gathered wide Congressional support for the Consumer
Communications Act of 1976, commonly referred to as the "Bell Bill," which would have
solidified the existing regulatory structure. But despite having nearly 200 co-sponsors the
bill never made it out of the House Subcommittee on Communications. Attempts in 1977
and 1978 to resuscitate it failed as well, and by that point in time the momentum for
deregulation was beginning to build in Congress.
In 1979 Charles L. Brown took over as chairman of AT&T. Under the leadership of
Chairman Brown the company moved gradually toward a more conciliatory position with
regard to competition. deButts' contentious style had not helped, and perhaps even hurt,
and by 1979 AT&T found itself in a precarious position: its hopes for legislation in
Congress were virtually dead, the anti-trust suit was progressing, and a full-scale
certification process for non-Western Electric Equipment became operational in 1978.
Faced with these obstacles, Brown saw little choice but to become more conciliatory. His
stance was called "a new realism." In January 1982, less than three years into his
chairmanship, Brown agreed to the Modified Final Judgment (MFJ) of the 1956 Consent
Decree with the Justice Department.48
46 Tunstall, 1985, 2.
47 deButts' speech cited in Temin, 1987, 96.
48 On the same day, 8 January 1982, the Justice Department dropped its long-standing anti-trust suit against
IBM.
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6.2.4 The Monopoly is Broken Up
6.2.4.1 The Deal is Made
The MFJ mandated the divestiture of AT&T's local phone companies, which accounted for
80% of its assets.49 AT&T's agreement to the MFJ was motivated by legal and economic
considerations. In the legal realm, Judge Green had consistently been ruling against AT&T
on procedural issues. There was no way to predict how he would decide the case and
signing the decree eliminated the risk of an even more damaging judicial decision. The
MFJ also unshackled AT&T from the restraints of its 1956 agreement. allowing it to
become an active participant in the electronics revolution. 5o It also allowed the company to
fight off competitors on its own turf with less fear of government reprisal. As Brown
stated, "we were surrounded by a fence with a one-way hole in it. Competitors could come
in, but we could not get out into their unregulated markets." 51
6.2.4.2 Unanticipated Technology Used
Following the break-up, a number of new competitors entered the long-distance market,
with MCI and U.S. Sprint emerging as AT&T's two leading competitors. Against
expectations that telecommunications satellites would make long distance provision less
systemic and more distributed, MCI and Sprint, in fact, poured billions of dollars into fiber
optic cable systems. Between 1985 and 1989, nearly 60,000 route miles of fiber optic
cable were laid by Sprint, MCI and AT&T.52 Instead of creating a number of dispersed
long-distance "systems," the result of divestiture was the creation of three competing
systems that were much more systemic in nature than expected.
6.2.4.3 Mixed Public Reaction to the Divestiture
While consurmers have enjoyed the benefits of a 60% decline in long-distance rates53 since
1984, they have also experienced increased responsibilities with regard to telephone
service. What once was simple -- receiving telephone service from one company, using a
phone provided by Ma Bell, and paying one monthly bill -- had become more complicated.
Choices abounded, from the selection of telephone equipment to the selection of a long
distance provider. The new long distance companies brought with them marketing
gimmicks, massive advertising, and telemarketers peddling telephone service. Customers
had to pay more than one monthly bill, and the new choices brought new obligations. As a
49 Source: "Life After Litigation at IBM and AT&T," 61.
50so At the time, in particular, AT&T was interested in entering the computer business.
" Source: "Life After Litigation at IBM and AT&T," 59.
52 Sirbu, 1991, 336.
53 Source: "Ready, Willing, Cable."
Deregulation in Related Industries 177
result, for many years American public opinion remained mixed with regard to the break-
up. For example, in a 1986 poll, only 52% of Americans said that they supported it.54
6.2.4.4 The Decline of Bell Labs
A casualty in the deregulation process has been Bell Labs. When the MFJ was signed in
1982, Bell Labs was the largest research organization in the U.S., having 25,000
employees and a budget of $2 billion.55 The comfortable profits AT&T made through its
regulated monopoly position were poured into Bell Labs56 to build a better system. As a
result of this effort, "it [AT&T] was regarded, domestically and abroad, as operating a
model telephone system. '" 57 Bell Labs also made many discoveries that had broad
applications outside of the telecommunications industry, such as the laser and transistor.
Because of the 1956 consent decree, there was relatively open diffusion of Bell Labs'
inventions, which made it a quasi-public research facility. The 1982 MFJ made Bell Labs
more inward-looking, with more emphasis on shorter-term and more focused research 58 (as
opposed to basic scientific research).59 The recent announcement of AT&T's second
break-up threatens to weaken Bell Labs further, as the Labs too will be split -- between the
"new" AT&T telecommunications company and Lucent, the manufacturing spin-off (which
will receive most of Bell Labs' facilities and employees). It is expected that the trend away
from scientific research will continue, and perhaps be accelerated by the second break-
up. 60
Another casualty of the increasingly competitive environment is Bellcore, the $1 billion per
year research consortium of the "Baby Bells" that was established after the divestiture for
engineering, research and administrative purposes61 such as standards creation. In April
1995 the Baby Bells decided that they would sell this enterprise. The underlying cause of
the sale is the growth in competition in the industry.62 Immediately after divestiture the
Baby Bells had similar needs, but the strategic paths of the companies have diverged with
time,63 and as they approach head-to-head competition, they have been less willing to share
technological advances. 64 As a Bellcore spokesman observed, "collaborative research and
54 1986 Roper poll cited in: Winston, 1993, 1284.
5 Mowery, 1988, 355.
56 Vietor, 1994, 319.
7 Henck, 1988, x.
58 Source: "Most Employees of Bell Labs Will Join Equipment Business."
59 Source: "Prized Labs Shifts to More Mundane Tasks."
60 Sources: "Bell Labs Faces Mundane Future Under Breakup Plan;" and Chapman, October 1995.
6 Source: "Sale May Break Up Bellcore," 19.
62 Source: "Breaking from Tradition."
63 Source: "Psst! Want to Buy a Research Lab? The Baby Bells Want Out."
4 Source: "Baby Bells Expected to Announce Plans for Sale of Their Bellcore Research Lab."
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development does not blend well into a landscape of companies that are preparing to do
battle with one another as long-distance markets open up."65 But it remains unclear who
will buy Bellcore, and what purpose it will serve. The expectation is that the Baby Bells
will continue to rely on Bellcore for R&D,66 but a similar dependence on Bell Labs was
expected following divestiture 67 and it was because such a cooperative reliance did not
develop that Bellcore expanded its research and development functions.
6.2.4.5 Recent Developments
During the dozen years that have now ensued since the break up, the telephone and the
larger telecommunications industry, have become one of the most exciting and expanding
industries (see Table 6.1). Recently, the "information superhighway" and the Internet have
captured the imagination of scientists, citizens, and businesses alike. Cellular phones and
fax machines have changed the way business is done. Cellular phones, like
communications satellites in the 1970s, hold promise for fundamentally changing the nature
of the telephone industry, this time in the local service segment.
Table 6.1: The Telecom World: Then and Now
Year 1984 1994
Millions of calls handled by AT&T during a typical 37.5 185
business day
Number of AT&T employees 373,000 304,500
AT&T's share of long-distance market 88.3% 57.6%
Number of long-distance carriers 1 + several 00
minor rivals
Number of phone numbers (in millions) 111.4 155.8
Cost of 5-minute call between New York and Los Angeles . $1.40 $2.70
Wholesale cellular phone sales (in millions of $) Negligible 1,975
Wholesale fax machine sales (in millions of $) Negligible 964
Source: "AT&T Move is a Reversal of Course Set in 1980s."
The past year has been especially interesting. In September 1995 the business world was
surprised by the announcement of the "second" break-up of AT&T.68 The company
decided that in order to stay a leading player in the new world order of the
telecommunications industry it would be desirable to split into three separate parts:
65 Source: "Sale May Break Up Bellcore", 19.
66 Source: "Breaking from Tradition," 16.
67 Mowery, 1983, 37.
68 For example, see: "AT&T Will Split into 3 Companies;" "AT&T, Reversing Strategy, Announces a
Plan to Split into 3 Separate Companies;" Defying Merger Trend, AT&T Plans to Split Into Three
Companies;" and related stories.
Deregulation in Related Industries 179
telecommunications, telecommunications equipment, and computers. During 1995 and
early 1996, the Congress continued its decade-long attempt69 to reform the nation's
communications laws, and in the process, radically alter the competitive landscape of the
industry.70 Finally, on 8 February 1996, the telecommunications industry entered a new
era when President Clinton signed into law a bill which essentially rewrote the
Communications Act of 1934, which has shaped the industry since the Great Depression.
Of particular interest to the telephone industry are provisions which would allow long-
distance companies to provide local service and local companies to provide long-distance
service once they prove their local phone markets have been opened to rivals. The law
would also allow cable and telephone companies to compete in each other's markets and
would allow for mergers between cable companies and the Baby Bells.71
6.2.5 Lessons
Many lessons can be learned from such a complicated and fascinating story. However,
given the focus of the thesis, five lessons will be taken from the telephone case.
6.2.5.1 Technological Advance is Both Important and Unpredictable
Neither of the two "sides" in the historians' debate on the cause of the fall of the Bell
System dispute the fact that changing technology played a role. It is only the relative
importance of this role that is contested. A clear lesson from the events is that technological
advance is unpredictable. It was believed that communication satellites would be the next
important technology in long-distance telephone transmission, and the decision to break up
the Bell System was partly based on that premise. Yet, as Temin observes,
to the extent the Bell System was broken up to usher in the age of microwave
radio, the government forced a permanent shift in the industry's structure to
take advantage of a temporary technical opportunity -- which has already been
superseded for high-density uses.72
Rosenberg concludes from his study of the telecommunications industry that, "regulators
should not pretend to be able to predict the future level of systemness or the viability of a
specific technology in something as complex as the telephone network." 73 Therefore, any
69 For example, see: "A 'Camelot Moment' on Communications;" and "An Accord Struck on
Communication Faces House Snag."
70 For example, see: "Senate Approves Far-Reaching Bill on Media Industry;" "Senate, in 81-18 Vote,
Clears Overhaul of the Nation's Communications Laws;" and "Ready, Willing, Cable."
71 Baby Bells could also merge with each other. Sources: "Telecom Vote Signals Competitive Free-for-
All;" "Communications Bill Signed, And the Battles Begin Anew;" "Congress Votes to Reshape
Communications Industry, Ending a 4-Year Struggle;" and "Washington's Wake-Up Call."
72 Temin, 1987, 347.
73 Rosenberg, 1994, 228.
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regulatory system should be somewhat robust to technological change and not be designed
solely with reference to specific technological predictions.
6.2.5.2 The Pricing Structure Matters
The second lesson is that pricing structures and seemingly insignificant regulatory actions
can make a big difference. As Temin notes, "arcane as these theories [board-to-board vs.
station-to-station] may seem to be, they were at the heart of the telecommunications policy
debates in the 1970s and 1980s." 74 Similar phenomena have been noted in other
industries. "Yawn-inducing federal decisions about standards for electronic devices and the
availability of the broadcast spectrum for commercial use indirectly dictate the rate and
results of electronic device development."75 In the case of the telephone system, the
decision to subsidize local service by long distance service, through station-to-station
billing, created an incentive for companies such as MCI to steal away high volume
customers by charging them the marginal cost of service. These low prices, in turn, made
AT&T look like a bloated monopolist. What was not realized by many was that the
subsidizing system-wide averaging process was the cause of AT&T's high tariffs.
6.2.5.3 People and Politics Matter
Especially if one espouses Temin's view on the causes of divestiture, there are many "what
ifs?" in this story -- revolving mostly around the actions of individuals. Had John deButts
taken a more conciliatory strategy, had William McGowan not been as dogged, and had
regulators like Bernard Strassburg and William Baxter not been "policy entrepreneurs," the
anti-trust suit may never have been filed and/or may have never pushed AT&T to a point
where it had little choice but to settle. While this lesson may not be directly applicable to
the core of this thesis -- an examination of economic efficiency -- it is important to bear in
mind that policy-making decisions are frequently made with more weight placed on politics
than on technical analysis. In such a context, engineers should be cognizant of the
perceived value of their conclusions and actively work to inform those who make the policy
decisions from that standpoint. While such a process makes many an expert cringe, it is a
fundamental part of democratic governance.
6.2.5.4 Understandability of a New System
In order for a competitive marketplace to exist, the participants in the market theoretically
should have symmetric access to information. In a confusing environment, although
information may be available, it is still "imperfect" in the economic sense if there are
74 Temin, 1987, 20.
75 Rennie, 1995.
differentials in the ability of people to use it in a meaningful manner. Many "ordinary"
people are confused by the complexity of their choices in the deregulated telephone system
and therefore do not make economically efficient choices. With electric power provision
being even more complicated than telephone service, Navarro notes that "choosing from a
menu of electricity services will be much more complex than, say, choosing a phone plan,
and the evidence suggests that this is already too confusing."''6 Thus, a structure that
presents customers with choices that are as straightforward as possible is desirable for
efficiency reasons.
6.2.5.5 Impact on Technological Innovation
The divestiture has resulted in a in technological innovation paradox. On one hand, the
divestiture clearly had a positive impact on the development specific technologies, such as
fiber optic cable.77 Fiber optic technology was aided by the divestiture because it happened
to be a maturing technology at the time that two national networks were being built (and a
third was being rebuilt to match them.) Had those networks already been in place with a
more mature technology when the breakthroughs in fiber optics occurred, the MFJ's
positive impact on technological improvement of the transmission network may have been
much smaller. The divestiture also likely had positive impact on the rate of technology
adoption of other specific technologies. Prior to 1984, AT&T focused on Plain Old
Telephone Service (POTS) and the equipment it used was largely developed through its
captive producer Western Electric. The divestiture opened up the equipment market to new
producers and allowed for a divergence of demands -- from service customers;78 to the
new long distance companies, to the seven "Baby Bells" -- who could then seek
altervatives to Western Electric equipment. These circumstances allowed for a blossoming
of new firms.and a divergence of development focus that allowed for the creation of
entirely new technologies.
On the other hand, the divestiture has slowly eroded one of the crown jewels of the
American research establishment, Bell Labs. As Rosenberg recently noted, "the diminished
role of Bell Labs as a national resource for basic research reflects an insufficient
appreciation for the role played by such private-sector research as a determinant of long-run
economic growth."' 79 Therefore, if one examines total social welfare, it is hard to make a
76 Navarro, 1995, 409.
77 Sirbu, 1991, 336.
78 Until the late 1970s, the telephone company owned almost all of the telephones that customers used, and
even in 1984, it still owned most of them. Services such as call waiting and equipment such as answering
machines were rare if non-existent prior to 1984.
79 Rosenberg, 1994, 229.
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definitive determination of the impact of the divestiture on technological development. The
trade-off of modest technological improvements in telephone technology, with the
deleterious impact on the basic research base of the nation, is difficult to evaluate
quantitatively.
It should be noted that there is a danger in relying too heavily on any one particular case to
make general conclusions. Bell Labs was an extraordinary organization. The electric
power industry does not have the tradition of successful, massive industry-sponsored
research and development. Instead, electric utilities have tended to be the consumers of
innovations as opposed to the developers of them.80 Therefore, one would expect that
deregulation would not have the deleterious impact on technological development that it had
in the telephone industry. In fact, deregulation should have a neutral,81 if not positive
impact on technological innovation. This has already been seen, at least to some extent, in
the rise of the independent power producers (IPPs). These new entrants have helped to
spur on, and provided a market for, new generation technologies.
With these lessons from the telephone industry now in hand, let us next examine the
experience in natural gas deregulation.
6.3 NATURAL GAS DEREGULATION
6.3.1 Similarities Between the Gas and Electric Power Industries
There are numerous similarities between the gas and electric power industry in their
physical structure, history, and regulation. For example: the same federal regulatory body
(the FERC) is responsible for both natural gas and electricity, a number of large utilities
have both gas and electric divisions, and the technology of both industries is broken into
three parts: production, transmission and distribution. Furthermore, just like the electric
power industry, regulatory power is shared between the federal government and the states.
In the case of natural gas, state commissions (often the same body that regulates electricity)
have domain over the local distribution companies (LDCs).82 Despite these obvious
similarities, the most important one for the purpose of this thesis is that both industries
80 Joskow and Schmalensee, 1983, 87.
8 One could anticipate that the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI), a research consortium of electric
utilities that was started in 1973, will have similar problems to those of Bellcore, as its members have
increasingly divergent interests, if not become direct competitors. EPRI has been responsible for some
technological development in generation and transmission so there will be some negative impact to cancel
out the anticipated positive impact.
82 Boswell, 1992, 27.
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have been undergoing a process of deregulation. Since the natural gas industry has been
experiencing increased competition before the electric power industry, there are lessons that
can be learned from the former to help the process of the latter. With that in mind, let us
examine the experience of the gas industry.
6.3.2 History of Gas Industry83
6.3.2.1 Early History
Early in its history, the gas industry was cited as a classic natural monopoly by a host of
economics theorists,84 a fact which ultimately led to the establishment of gas distribution
franchises and government regulation of them (at either the city or state level). Until
technological advances in steel and welding allowed for the interstate transport of natural
gas, the industry relied upon gas manufactured from coal. However, natural gas had a
higher BTU content and was being discovered (and discarded) along with oil. Therefore,
when technology made it possible, interstate natural gas pipelines were built, starting in the
late 1910s. For more than a decade a regulatory gap existed, since only state regulation
existed but the blossoming natural gas system spread across multiple states. Furthermore,
the Supreme Court disallowed state regulatory action over interstate pipelines. The result
was that, much like electric utilities, gas companies ran circles around state regulators until
the depths of the Great Depression.
6.3.2.2 Regulation Comes to the Industry
The natural gas industry experienced its first taste of federal intervention in the mid-1930s,
with the passage of the Public Utility Holding Companies Act of 1935 (PUHCA). This
law was the first of twelve significant federal forays into the gas industry that would occur
over the next six decades. 85 As with the electric power industry, PUHCA was applied to
86
the gas industry to correct the abuses of the holding companies. Between 1940 and
1954, the Securities and Exchange Commission broke up 158 gas utilities with an asset
value of $874 million. 7 This largely destroyed the vertical and horizontal integration that
had been prevalent in the industry before PUHCA.
In 1938, soon after the passage of PUHCA, the Natural Gas Act became law. The law
was formulated because Congress concluded that:
83 The information contained in this section comes from narratives by Vietor, 1994; and Pierce, 1988.
84 For a discussion of this, see: Pierce, 1988, 2-3.
8s Vietor, 1994, 163.86 Vietor vividly describes a holding company as "a financial octopus that ignored regulators and preyed on
consumers." Source: Vietor, 1994, 96.
87 Ibid., 100.
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the business of transporting and selling natural gas for ultimate distribution to
the public is affected with a public interest, and that Federal regulation in
matters relating to the transportation of natural gas and the sale thereof in
interstate and foreign commerce is necessary in the public interest. 88
The Act required the Federal Power Commission (FPC) to establish "just and reasonable
rates" in three areas: sales for resale in interstate commerce, transportation in interstate
commerce, and facilities used for such sales and transportation. 89 The wording of the law
was vague and, as a result, its interpretation by the FPC for the next 30 years would be a
source of great contention. While the story is an interesting one, for the purpose of this
thesis, we will skip many of the details.
6.3.2.2.1 Regulation of pipelines
After 1938 pipelines were regulated by the public utility model. Pipelines would buy gas
from producers, transport it through their pipelines (over which they had control), and sell
it to distribution companies. As a public utility, they were entitled to earn a fair return on
their investment, based upon a commodity charge (for the volume transported) and a
demand charge (to pay for the capital costs of capacity).
6.3.2.2.2 Regulation of producers
As a result of FPC and court decisions, by 1954 the rates of well-head gas were tightly
regulated through the utility model. As time passed, this method was replaced by price
ceiling regulation, which was intended to make the FPC's workload more reasonable. In
the process of creating the price ceilings, the FPC realized that higher prices would
stimulate more production (and discovery) of gas. Therefore, in order to avoid shortages
while preventing gas companies from making windfall profits on previously operating
facilities, the FPC started a two-tier price schedule, where a higher price would be allowed
for new gas. Unfortunately, there were several fundamental problems with the production
price regulation that had gradually developed. The first was that the price adjustment
process was slow. Secondly, the price structure ignored the fact that gas is a depletable
resource, and as such, it would become more valuable in the economic sense and more
expensive to discover and produce with time. These flaws were not easily spotted during
the 1950s and early 1960s, when the cost of gas was relatively steady and the commodity
was in plentiful supply. As the 1960s wore on, though, the rising costs of exploration and
the low economic incentives for such activity were causing a marked decrease in the drilling
of new wells,90 setting the stage for problems in the coming decade.
88 PL75-556, 821.
89 Pierce, 1988, 6.
90 Vietor, 1994, 114.
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6.3.3 Shortage in the 1970s
The slowly building problem that resulted from these inappropriate incentives, when
combined with the extreme economic conditions of the 1970s, was a recipe for disaster.
Although the FPC realized in the late 1960s that a problem was brewing, it was hampered
in its attempts to solve it due to the slow process of bureaucracy and liberal intervention in
the regulatory process and by the courts. Even as energy prices began to escalate rapidly,
the slow pace of regulatory change meant lags of four years between price increases. The
result was predictable: supply was curtailed. However, the curtailment was not evenly
spread, because while interstate transactions were regulated and subject to price caps,
intrastate transactions were beyond the purview of the FPC and thus followed the "market"
price level. As the disparity between the market and regulated prices continued to widen,
intrastate customers had access to plentiful (and expensive) supplies of gas, while the
interstate customers, who were being "protected" by regulation, were facing massive
shortages.91 These shortages resulted in widespread school and plant closings as well as
service cut-offs to residential users during the severe winter of 1976-77.92
In the mid-1970s the FPC speeded up its rate-making process by establishing national rates
(as opposed to "area rates," which were implemented in the early 1960s), but it still could
not adjust the price ceilings quickly enough and met with stiff resistance when doing so.
While in hindsight, and in the minds of contemporary economists, the supply-demand-
price problem was evident, many at the time did not understand it. In a comment that
typifies the mentality of many intervenors during the era, Lee White, a former FPC
chairman, stated, "we believe price to be one of the most regressive techniques for rations
and allocation that there is." 93 While the intent of intervenors such as White was to protect
consumers, they ignored the fact that the artificially low prices were costing the economy
between $2.5 and $5.0 billion per year.94 With economic losses and personal suffering
(i.e. winter heating cut-offs) mounting, and a system that was unable to ameliorate the
situation, the construction of a new framework was clearly needed.
9' Sawhill, 1987,16.
92 Quirk, 1991, 420.
93 Cited in Vietor, 1994, 123.
94 Pierce, 1988, 10.
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6.3.4 NGPA: A Misguided Solution
6.3.4.1 The Bill and Its Formulation
The solution to this problem -- natural gas deregulation -- was one of the most contentious
issues of President Carter's National Energy Policy. After much wrangling, Congress
passed (as a sister bill of PURPA) the Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978 (NGPA).95 At the
Bill's signing, Senate Majority Leader Robert Byrd commented, "this [natural gas
deregulation] has been the toughest of all the issues as far as I'm concerned that I have ever
seen come before the Senate." 96 The Act was a "marvel of complexity" that had two
principal features: (1) a separation between old and new gas (for the purposes mentioned
previously) and (2) a partial unification of the interstate and intrastate markets. 97 To
achieve these goals, the Act created eight separate gas classifications and carefully defined
price ceilings and escalators for each. The Act permanently retained price ceilings on "old
gas" (with adjustments) while it steadily raised the ceilings on "new gas" so that the 1985
ceiling price would be equivalent to 1985 oil prices, at which time the well-head price of
new gas would be deregulated. 98 The law also defined pass-through requirements and
rationing procedures, should the latter become necessary. 99 In analyzing NGPA and its
process Quirk states, "the final bill ... was an incoherent, lowest-common-denominator
solution that an exhausted Congress preferred to the alternative of failing to act."' With
the legislation having been forged in such a manner, it should not come as a surprise that its
impact was not what had been anticipated.
6.3.4.2 The Aftermath
6.3.4.2.1 Incorrect assumptions
Unfortunately, the NGPA caused more problems than it solved. In hindsight, President
Carter's unprophetic words -- "[the Act] will end 30 years of debate over how natural gas
should be regulated, how it should be priced" 10 1 -- appear ludicrous, even humorous, given
the havoc and inefficiency that it wrought on the industry during the 1980s. The heart of
the problem with the legislation was that it was based upon several assumptions that were
incorrect. The errant assumptions were: there would be a permanent shortage of gas,
demand would continue to rise, and energy prices would continue to rise.
9 For an interesting account of the political process, see: "Energy Bill: The End of an Odyssey," 647-663.
96 Carter, 1978, 1983.
97 Carpenter et al, 1987, 70.
98 Although the President and Congress were given the authority to reinstate price ceilings at that time (and
until 1987) should such action be warranted.
99 PL95-621.
ux Quirk, 1991, 422.
10 Carter, 1979,
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Why were these assumptions wrong? The first assumption, about the permanence of gas
shortages, was incorrect because the artificially low gas prices of the 1970s had deterred
both the production and discovery of gas to below the natural market clearing quantity (and
price). Given the sub-market prices for gas, there was little incentive to find (and prove)
reserves.
The second assumption, regarding the demand for gas, was incorrect for several reasons.
For one, the shortages during the 1970s diminished consumer (and in particular, industrial)
confidence in the gas supply, which led some to either change supplies outright, or at least
make facilities able to run on multiple fuels. A second cause of lower demand was
mandated by law, the Power Plant and Industrial Fuel Use Act (PIFUA), which placed
outright bans on the use of gas for some uses - such as electric power generation. Thirdly,
as gas prices rose while the prices for other energy sources declined, gas lost its
competitive advantage. And finally, the energy crisis of the 1970s sparked interest in
conservation. The result of these factors was predictable, gas demand did not rise at the
expected rate, and in fact, gas deliveries fell by 14% between 1981 and 1983.102
The cause of incorrect assumption about energy prices is much more complicated. The
price increases in the 1970s were driven by instability in the Middle East. Energy prices
did rapidly escalate again soon after the passage of NGPA, as a result of the 1979 Iranian
Revolution. When the political situation stabilized (or at least became relatively stable) and
when the oil cartel (OPEC) lost its tight grip over its members, oil prices began a protracted
decline. Between 1980 and 1982, the cost of a barrel of oil fell from $40 to $25.103
However, the price of natural gas continued to escalate by law on its way to the 1985 target
price. By 1985, the ceiling price of natural gas had risen 67% since 1981 while the price of
oil had dropped by more than half in the same period. 1 4
6.3.4.2.2 Minimum bills and take-or-pay
Compounding the impact of these incorrect assumptions was that period's standard practice
of purchasing gas under 15 to 20 year contracts. Two typical features of these long-term
contracts were minimum bills and take-or-pay provisions. The latter meant that a pipeline
was obligated to pay for a fraction of the gas that it contracted for, I° 5 even if it did not
102 Carpenter et al, 1987, 12.
103 Kalt and Schuller, 1987, 4.
104 Pierce, 1987, 23.
105 The average take requirement in the period 1979-1982 was 79%. Source: Vietor, 1994, 127.
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"take"'10 6 (delivery of) it. A minimum bill was an analogous arrangement, where a
distribution company would commit to purchasing (or at least paying for) a minimum
amount of gas, regardless of whether or not is was actually sold or needed. These were the
"insurance clauses" of long-term contract to prevent opportunistic behavior, but they also
limited efficient behavior. 107
In 1979 and the early 1980s, as natural gas prices rapidly rose, pipelines and distribution
companies were eager to guarantee their capacity quickly, and as a result, producers could
extract top dollar from each new contract. Since gas demand had always risen, these
contracts assumed a continuing increase in demand. However, as has already been noted,
the demand for gas not only stopped rising, it dropped significantly. Furthermore, instead
of contracts that purchased gas at or below the market rate for energy (as had been
historically true), these contracts locked in the LDCs and pipelines at prices which were
quickly rising above the equivalent cost of alternatives, such as oil. Therefore, within
several years, the pipelines and the LDCs found themselves with contracts that no longer
made economic sense. Furthermore, the incentives to alleviate the consequences of these
contracts were not efficient. In order to minimize losses, a pipeline that both a low-priced
and a high-priced take-or-pay agreement would "take" the high cost gas, which then would
be sold to its customers (the LDCs) at the high price, while "paying" for (but not taking
delivery of) the lower cost gas. Likewise, minimum bills prevented prices from
transmitting appropriate market signals to distributors and end-users. Consequently, LDCs
and end-users did not switch from higher-priced contracts to the lowest-cost pipeline
supplier.108 In the early 1980s the situation had become very confusing: while demand was
falling, prices were rising. Vietor comments on this situation,
By 1983, as the pressures against rising end-user prices intensified and as the
take-or-pay liabilities of pipelines mounted, criticism of the Natural Gas Policy
Act was universal ... no one understood clearly whether it was regulation or
deregulation that was causing gas prices to rise while demand fell. And not
knowing the future, none of the participants realized that oil prices had just
begun to fall. Since it was too early to assess the effects of the Natural Gas
Policy Act, it was hard to see that industry structure and perverse contracts
could not coexist with competitive gas supply markets and substitution by large
109
users.
Although confusion reigned, what was clear was that something needed to be done.
106 Kalt and Schuller, 1987, 4.
107 Kalt, 1987, 104.
108 Vietor, 1994, 145.
109 Ibid., 1994, 140.
Deregulation in Related Industries 189
6.3.5 The "Clean Up" of NGPA
6.3.5.1 Order 380
In order to alleviate the distortions that the NGPA had created, the Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission (FERC) issued Order 380 in 1984. This Order invalidated the
variable cost component of minimum bill provisions, citing them as anti-competitive. 110
This essentially freed the LDCs of their minimum bill obligations that in some cases were
forcing them to purchase gas at a much higher price than could be obtained from another
111
source.
While the order was a start, it was not sufficient to "fix" the problems caused by the
NGPA. In fact, it exacerbated them. Suddenly, the pipelines were facing asymmetric
risks. Prior to Order 380, there was a symmetric risk since the pipeline could hold LDCs
accountable for the gas they contracted for, just as the producers could hold the pipelines
accountable through take-or-pay provisions. Now, the LDCs could escape their contractual
agreements with the pipelines being stuck holding the bag.
6.3.5.2 Order 436
On 9 October 1985, FERC issued Order 436, which promoted (but did not mandate) the
concept of pipelines as common carriers. The FERC issued this Order because it was
confronted with a situation where: there was a generally competitive market in the
commodity of natural gas and a highly integrated transportation network that was highly
monopolistic in some markets but fairly competitive in others. 112 The FERC established
six objectives to handle this situation: 113
* to flow economic rents through to consumers as Congress originally intended;
* to give producers correct price signals;
* to give consumers correct price signals;
* to eliminate the pipelines' incentive to make imprudent purchasing decisions;
* to produce a "level playing field" between competing gas sellers, particularly
between pipelines with access to large supplies of under priced gas and all other
competitors; and
* to avoid the inequity of having new customers benefit from old gas rents.
These principles were embodied in the three major provisions of the Order:114
* Transportation: Pipelines would be given the option of providing
nondiscriminatory transportation service. This allowed third parties to send gas
along the pipeline on nondiscriminatory terms. This unbundled the pipelines'
'0 Pierce, 1987, 23.
.. Vietor, 1994, 141.112 FERC, 1985, 42413.
113 These are taken from the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking for Order 436, issued 30 May 1985; cited in:
Williams, 1985, 30-34.
114 FERC, 1985, 42409-42410.
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transportation function from their sales functions. For those pipelines who
chose not to avail themselves of this option, traditional sales and transportation
options would remain available (and bundled) under the Commission's existing
certificate authority (which meant that pipelines could not serve or charge
selectively). 115
* Take-or Pay: Those pipelines that did choose to offer nondiscriminatory
transportation would receive favorable and expedited consideration in their
attempts to ameliorate their take-or-pay liabilities. (Nothing was guaranteed, and
a more comprehensive sheltering of pipelines was taken out of the original
proposal.)
* Optional Expedited Certificates: Pipelines that agreed to offer nondiscriminatory
transportation service would be given expedited certification of any competitive
services that they might propose to undertake. (Provided that such services met
requirements with regard to the prevention of cost-shifting.)
There was a fourth major provision of the proposed rule-making that was largely disposed
of in the final Order. This would have created three blocks of pricing for gas, old gas (still
subject to price regulation), new gas (prices set by market rates), and non gas-purchasing
costs (which would be divided among the first two blocks.) Existing firm sales customers
would have top priority for the cheapest (old) gas.116 Prior to this, pricing had been done
on a "rolled-in" basis where the price was determined by the weighted average cost of
gas. 117 However, this provision was abandoned as a result of the contentious discussions
that revolved around the proposed rule-making. 118
A serious error in Order 436 was that it did not satisfactorily address the mounting "take-
or-pay" burden faced by the pipelines. In fact, Order 436 worsened it. While the Order
further relieved the purchase obligations of the pipelines' resale customers, it held the
pipelines accountable for their upstream purchase requirements. 119 This resulted in
pipelines incurring $6.1 billion of added exposure in 1986 alone. 120 By 1988, the return
on equity of gas pipelines dipped to approximately 3%.121 As the pipelines suffered, so too
did the shift to a more competitive market. Since Order 436 required the "voluntary" action
of pipelines in order to achieve its goals, pipelines had the ability to slow the emergence of
a more competitive market by foot-dragging and lawsuits.
115 Pierce, 1987, 25.
116 FERC, 1985, 42410.
117 Ibid., 42414.
us8 This is described as the "Natural Gas Revolution of 1985." Source: Williams, 1985.
119 Santa, 1994.
120 Source: "Pipelines' Take or Pay Costs Continue to Mount."
121 Kolbe et al, 1993, 175.
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6.3.5.3 Order 500
With staggering losses mounting in the bottleneck segment of the industry, further action
was necessary. In 1987, relief (for the pipelines) came about as a result of the (judicial)
ruling in the case of Associated Gas v. FERC. A federal court overturned Order 436 on the
grounds that it did not adequately address the take-or-pay issue. The FERC's response
was Order 500, which allowed for 100 percent recovery of take-or-pay commitments
through a commodity-based rate.
6.3.5.4 The Rise of Competition
The ensuing years saw a continued rise in competition in the market. Between 1985 and
1988, the percentage of gas flowing through the pipelines on a carriage basis 122 jumped
from approximately 10% to over 50%.123 In early 1992, the Interstate Natural Gas
Association of America (INGAA) issued a report that stated, "While the pipeline industry
sees competition as a spur to efficiency and vigor, the industry is reeling from the burden
of regulation that does not reward efficiency." 124 Such a finding is not surprising, given
the function of regulation. As Vietor notes, "By its very design, economic regulation was
meant to neutralize surplus earnings that might result from efficiency gains or marketing
success. Thus, it conflicted squarely with the organization incentives needed for
competitive effectiveness. '" 125 Thus, while many strides had been made in moving toward
a competitive gas market, the continued market power of the pipelines126 still stood in the
way of true competition.
6.3.6 Order 636: A New Era Begins
6.3.6.1 The Order
On 8 April 1992, the FERC took definitive action by issuing Order 636.127 The intent of
the order was:
to ensure that transportation service is equal in quality for all gas supplies,
whether the customer purchases the gas from the pipeline or from another
supplier. This should maximize the consumer benefits of the competitive
122 Carriage means transportation for another company. In electric power jargon, carriage is wheeling. The
alternative to carriage was transportation on a sales basis. This was gas that pipeline companies would
themselves sell to LDCs.
123 Vietor, 1994, 152.
124 Source: Financial Health of the Pipeline Industry, cited in "INGAA: Regulatory Uncertainty To Blame
for Pipelines' Fiscal Woes."
125 Vietor, 1995, 165.
26 Van Sandt and Mespelli, 1995, 67.
127 The final version, Order 636-B, was issued on 27 November 1992. It offered few substantive changes
from the original order. Source: "FERC Approves 'Final' Version of Order 636."
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wellhead gas market by allowing buyers of natural gas to reach as many sellers
as possible, thereby ensuring that the most efficient and beneficial transactions
take place. 128
The effect of this order was to change gas pipeline companies from full-service gas
providers into common carriers. Included in Order 636 were the following provisions. 129
* Interstate pipelines must provide transportation unbundled from their sale of
gas;
* Customers must have unbundled access to storage services at storage facilities;
* Pipelines must sell gas on a basis similar to unregulated sellers;
* Pipelines must use a straight-fixed variable rate structure; 130
* Pipelines must make all necessary information available to all potential market
participants in a timely and equal manner through the use of an electronic
bulletin board (EBB); and
* Pipelines will receive 100% of costs stranded by the Order.
The underlying result of the order is that the pipelines would have no advantage over any
other market player in the gas merchant business.131
6.3.6.2 The Industry Since Order 636
In the three years since Order 636, the gas industry has rapidly emerged as an active
commodity market. Sophisticated financial instruments have been developed in order to
meet the new challenges posed by unbundling. Significant amounts of money have been
invested in creating new facilities to handle the new marketplace.
One of the first challenges of implementing Order 636 was that of standardizing Electronic
Bulletin Boards (EBBs). Given the state of technology at that time, the EBB mechanism
was arguably the best for achieving the FERC's mandate of equal access to all information
necessary for unbundled service for all potential traders. 132 However, if effective use of
each EBB required detailed knowledge, unique to the specific EBB, there would still be
information asymmetries. Creating a standard, though, was not a simple task: It was not
until 24 March 1994 (Order 636 took effect on 1 November 1993) 133 that the industry came
to agreement on a standard. Upon announcing it, the four natural gas trade groups said, in
a joint statement,
12 FERC, 16 April 1992, 13267.
129 These are summarized from: "Quotable," 10 April 1992 and Trabandt, 1993, 30; except where noted.
130 In this rate scheme, all fixed pipeline costs are in the demand charges, which are paid regardless of how
much capacity a customer actually uses. Source: "FERC Approves Final Gas Pipeline Rule," 1.
131 Kolbe et al, 1993, 228.
132 Parker, 1994, 31.
133 Source: "New Competitive Era Dawning for U.S. Natural Gas Industry," 4.
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Electronic gas standards are key to increasing demand for natural gas because
they make it easier to buy and sell, reduce costs associated with buying gas and
planning for its movement and increase the speed and accuracy of the industry's
business transactions. 134
In the past two years, EBBs have not only served as sources of information (price
discovery, market reporting, and operation), they have also become catalysts and places of
consummation for new types of transactions.
In what may foreshadow the future of the electric power industry, during the past two
years gas marketing centers have begun to emerge' 35 and gas marketers have thrived in the
new competitive environment.136 Many of these centers have developed at physical hubs
on the gas pipeline system. 137 Three key elements of an effective hub and center have been
identified as: (1) use as a pricing and physical transfer point, (2) liquidity (there are a
138
number of buyers and sellers) and (3) storage.s The last, which will be technically
difficult to replicate in the electric power industry139 has been the subject of significant
investment interest in the natural gas industry. 14 Some predict that similar market centers
will develop in the restructured electric power industry, 141 perhaps also at key physical
interconnections on the grid. While future electric power market mechanisms are difficult
to predict, the "electricity market" may very well resemble the thriving commodity market
that has been developed in the gas industry.142
6.3.7 Lessons from the Gas Industry
Having discussed some of the highlights of the industry's history, let us now examine
some of the efficiency lessons that can be learned from this case.
6.3.7.1 Equitable Handling of Transition Costs
The first lesson is that in the process of moving from one regulatory regime to another,
there must be an equitable distribution of the transition costs. Coming to such a state in the
gas industry was a long and painful process. To some extent, at least, the switch from a
highly controlled utility industry to a blossoming commodity market was delayed for nearly
134 Source: "Gas Industry, Eyeing Electric Power Mart, Moves to Make Buying, Selling Easier," 1.
135 Source: "Gas Companies Plan Marketing Center."
136 Source: "Natural-Gas Industry Expands into a Marketing Business."
137 Although given the electronic nature of trades, they are both "real" and "virtual" centers.
138 Vallen and Sharp, 1995, 27..
139Although storage might be possible to emulate through power swaps. Source: Vallen and Sharp, 1995,
34.
140 For example, there were nearly 100 storage projects being planned at one point in mid-1994. Source:
"What's In Store for Gas"
141 Vallen and Sharp, 1995.
'42 Source: "Electricity Contracts Generate a Buzz Among Firms."
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a decade due to the inequitable treatment of gas pipelines with respect to the take-or-pay
contracts, which would be analogous to stranded investments in today's electric power
industry. For example, Order 436, which resulted in a major change in the industry, was
delayed due to court intervention and slow pipeline response as a result of the stranded cost
issue. These delays protracted the highly-inefficient state that the industry was in during
the 1980s. Had the court not stepped in when billions of dollars continued to be lost, the
industry could have become crippled when pipelines, which are now viewed as common
carriers, went bankrupt.
6.3.7.2 Regulation in a "Partially" Regulated Industry
A second lesson is that when an industry is partially regulated, i.e. some parts are regulated
while others are not, there must be correspondence between market imperfections and those
parts which are regulated. As Pierce notes, it was in the transmission (the gas pipelines)
and distribution of natural gas where the market power1 43 had existed. The production
process, with many producers and low barriers to entry and exit, met the conditions of a
competitive market. Yet, the federal government, which has domain over production and
transmission, during the period 1938 to 1985 focused its efforts on utility regulation of the
production segment of the industry. Furthermore, instead of treating pipelines as common
carriers, the FPC (and later FERC) increased their market power by allowing them to be
transportation and sales companies. 144" Thus, instead of alleviating market imperfections,
the Natural Gas Act (and subsequent interpretations by the courts) caused great market
distortions through its regulation of a competitive segment of the industry while shielding
the pipeline industry. During the past decade, when the regulatory scheme has been
"reconstituted" 14 5 to fit the economic and technical characteristics of the industry, the
industry has become more efficient and is beginning to flourish as a commodity market.
6.3.7.3 Pricing Must Send Correct Signals
One of the clearest lessons of this story is that pricing really does impact the behavior of
buyers and sellers, even in a regulated market. While this is an intuitive concept to
economists, it is often forgotten in the heat of the policy-making process by people who
143 With respect to pipelines, in some places this is merely significant market power, in regions of lower
demand, it is natural monopoly power. Source: Pierce, 1988. In 1987, only 46% of markets in a study by
DeVany and Walls were co-integrated. Thus, in 54% of the cases, the pipeline held a monopoly position.
Source: DeVany and Walls, 1993.
144 Pierce credits this to effective lobbying by the pipeline industry. Source: Pierce, 1988, 6.
145 Reconstitutive law is the adoption of "new strategies for achieving national goals in lieu of the
centralizing command and control techniques relied upon so heavily in recent decades." Source: Stewart,
1990, 352. For a more detailed description of the theory, Stewart suggests: Richard B. Stewart,
"Reconstitutive Law," Maryland Law Review 86 (1986).
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should know better. This case illustrates how prices affect both the quantity demanded and
the quantity supplied -- during the 1970s when shortages occurred because of low prices,
and in the 1980s, when surpluses occurred due to high prices.
One particular lesson here is that in regulatory environments where customers are given
different degrees of protection, market distortions and inefficiencies can occur. In this
case, interstate customers paid significantly lower rates than those in the gas-producing
states, but they were also subjected to shortages during an especially cold winter. To
conclude that special protections are never warranted would be an extreme interpretation of
this case; however, before they are enacted, careful consideration should be given to the
likely consequences, since those who are intended to be helped may be actually hurt in the
process, and at a cost to social efficiency.
6.3.7.4 Robustness of Market Structure
The NGPA clearly demonstrated that market structures, especially when they are developed
by legislative action (which is more difficult to amend than regulatory decisions), must be
insensitive to assumptions about the conditions of supply, demand, and price. The Act had,
as fundamental principles, predictions that turned out to be opposite of what occurred.
When the market conditions changed, instead of being useful, the NGPA caused more
problems than it solved. Rather than focusing on a particular situation, effective regulation
offers incentives that encourage all parties to behave efficiently, no matter what the future
holds.146
6.3.7.5 Marketplace Development
The final lesson (for the purposes of this thesis) from the gas industry case is that the
marketplace must be allowed to develop in a non-prescripted, fair, and open manner. One
of the surprises of the Order 436 experience was the rapid rise of gas marketers. Very few
of these agents existed in the mid-1980s. 147 While in Order 436 the FERC did recognize
the emerging importance of marketers in an industry where gas was becoming a "separate
and distinct economic commodity,"'148 the speed at which firms from within and outside the
industry entered the marketing business was not anticipated.
As the markets opened up, firms from within and outside of the industry arose to play a
prominent position in the marketplace. With them came new financial tools which were
146 O'Neill and Whitmore, 1995, 71.
147 Legato, 1987, 220.
148 FERC, 1985, 42412.
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developed for the industry (often adapted from other commodity markets) for the trading of
gas. The success of Order 636 has demonstrated that this happens most efficiently when
information on pipeline capacity is available to all players and in a format that is readily
usable by all. Prior to Order 636, when the information was not made available to all, the
market was not efficient due to information advantages on the part of the pipeline
companies. While this situation was a hold-over from the days of vertical integration
where pipelines, as individual entities, could operate more efficiently with free intra-firm
information flows. However, this situation represented was a local optimum point (for the
pipelines) not a global one, and was a barrier to a more efficient overall market. Even
when the pipelines were forced to make the information available to all in Order 636, there
were still imperfections of information until the formats became standardized.
Interestingly, the open information not only created a level playing field, but also prepared
the ground for new forms of market transactions. EBBs have rapidly advanced from being
mere providers of information to catalysts for market exchanges. Clearly, when allowed to
do so, the opening of a market to competition that is freed from information asymmetries
leads to the development of previously unimagined efficient structures. From this we can
see that a goal of regulation should be to ensure that asymmetries of information and market
power are eliminated, but at the same time, regulation should do so in a manner that allows
for the creation of efficient new market structures.
6.4 SYNTHESIZED LESSONS FROM THE CHAPTER
Although they have been already stated on a case-by-case basis, let us now review and
make more concise the applicable lessons from the telephone and natural gas industry
cases. In doing so, we should recall that although there are many common characteristics
of telephone; natural gas, and electric power systems, there are also important
differences. 149 With this caveat in mind, let us reexamine the lessons and attempt to make
them relevant for the electric transmission industry.
6.4.1 Market Structure Should be Robust to Changes
A lesson that was learned in both industries, but in different ways -- technology in
telephone service and pricing in natural gas -- is that when a new market structure is
formulated, it should be robust to a reasonable degree of change. At the same time,
however, while some flexibility should exist, there is also a limit to the degree of
robustness that is desirable. If a regulatory structure were to become so general that it no
149 Pierce, 1988, 55.
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longer was able to effectively handle the technical characteristics of an industry, then it too
would lead to efficiency losses. Rosenberg offers a conceptual way out of this paradox,
Policy should be constructed to ensure that the technological path is asflexible
as possible, that resources are channeled toward those institutions which
consistently provide large social benefits, and that viable economic
opportunities are available to those who push out the technological frontier.' 50
(emphasis original)
Thus, regulatory models should be dependent on a minimal number of fundamental
assumptions about the technical structure of the industry while being able to adapt in the
event that fundamental change does occur. Great care should be taken to ensure that these
fundamental assumptions are built upon a reasonable long-term view rather than just a
snap-shot, faddish view of the future.
6.4.2 Price Setting Matters
The process of establishing pricing mechanisms (whenever this is not done by the market)
should be done based upon careful economic analysis. Regulatory price schemes should
offer incentives that encourage all parties to behave efficiently, no matter what the future
holds. Non-market price-setting can establish perverse incentives that can undermine social
economic efficiency. This lesson is of particular importance to this thesis. As we saw
previously, "there is no uniquely correct way to allocate fixed costs to units of production.
There is also no uniquely correct way to allocate joint costs to disparate activities."' 151 This
economic principle is clearly relevant to transmission system pricing. In the AT&T case it
was shown that "incorrect" pricing can lead to opportunities for companies to enter into a
regulated situation as cream-skimmers that are not necessarily serving the best interests of
overall system efficiency.
6.4.3 Available and Understandable Information
In order for a market to function efficiently, market participants must have equal access to a
sufficient amount of understandable information. This allows for rational choices and
prevents participants from having uneconomic, unfair advantages in the market. The need
for understandable information is true on several levels - both with "average" customers
who are currently confused with their telephone bills, and with sophisticated traders, who
face information asymmetries when marketplace mechanisms are not standardized.
Iso Rosenberg, 1994, 228.
151 Temin, 1994, 11.
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6.4.4 Freedom For New Market Mechanisms
As both the telephone and natural gas cases make clear, the marketplace has changed
markedly in the past decade, well beyond what could have been imagined at the time of
divestiture and of the issuance of Order 436. Firms have found entrepreneurial ways to
buy and sell natural gas and telephone calls that have increased the efficiency of the market.
This being the case, highly structured market mechanisms that allow little leeway for
development will likely impede long-term economic efficiency.
6.4.5 Equitable Sharing of Transition Costs
While this thesis argues that the long-term picture is important to bear in mind, and that the
restructuring process should not be driven by transitional issues, that does not mean that
transition issues are irrelevant. Even in the most revolutionary changes, such as the break-
up of AT&T, the market develops in an evolutionary manner. If, in order to survive, firms
must engage in behavior that is not optimal from the perspective of overall social efficiency
(due to inequitable compensation for transition costs), both the short-term economic
efficiency and the long-term direction of the industry are deleteriously impacted. This is
especially true for the owners of bottleneck facilities, such as pipelines in natural gas and
transmission lines in electric power. While some economists may assume, as an article of
faith, that the market will move to its most efficient configuration over time, recent research
on technology development shows that technological innovation is path-dependent. 15 2
6.4.6 In Mixed Regimes Regulation Should Match Structure
In the two preceding cases there are segments of the integrated system that are
technologically and economically ripe for competition and there are some that retain natural
monopoly characteristics. In order to avoid distortions -- either from granting a regulated
monopoly to a competitive function of the industry, or from making "competitive" a
segment that is a natural monopoly -- it is important that regulatory structures properly
match the characteristics of the segments of the industry. Yet, as was discussed in 6.4.1,
these structures must be created with sufficient flexibility so that when technology changes,
the structure can change with it.
6.4.7 People and Politics Matter
People and politics had an important impact on the efficiency and structure of the two
industries. These factors have already been highlighted in the telephone story, but they
152 For more on this topic, see: Section 9.5.1.
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also played an important role in shaping the gas industry at three critical junctures. Despite
the findings of the 1935 Federal Trade Commission reports, wellhead gas was regulated
and pipelines were not treated as common carriers until 1985 due to successful lobbying by
the former group. In the 1970s, as the gas shortages were breaking out and price ceilings
appeared to provide part of the answer, the NGPA was formulated to let market forces play
a greater role in matching supply with demand. As Kalt and Schuller note, "although this
may appear to be an incontestably positive, if not innocuous, direction for natural gas
policy to take, the NGPA was passed only after protracted and contentious congressional
debate."' 153 Later, in the 1980s, the resolution of the "take or pay" problem was delayed
several years because LDCs and state commissions successfully eliminated from the final
order the pipeline recovery mechanisms present in FERC's Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking that preceded Order 436. From these examples it should be clear that market
structures, and their efficiency, are not merely driven by technology or the "invisible
hand." People and political situations do matter.
6.4.8 What These Lessons Will be Used For
These lessons will be used in order to develop criteria for long-term economic efficiency in
electric power transmission. This criteria development will take place in Chapter 9,
following the next two chapters, which also seek to bring concepts to the criteria
development process. With that in mind, let us turn to an examination of some potential
new transmission technologies.
153 Kalt and Schuller, 1987, 1.
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Forthcoming Transmission Technologies
The permanent social welfare gains potentially availab6le from a transition to a fufty
competitive electricity market dwarf even the highest estimates of the one-time,
already sunk costs of the transition.1
-- Richard J. Pierce Jr. (1994)
7.1 INTRODUCTION
Technological innovation has played an important role in the development of the
electric power industry and is an important force in the industry restructuring that is
currently underway.2 Given the industry's history, the adoption of new technologies
by IPPs (the industry's new entrants), and the experience of increased technological
innovation in other deregulated industries, it is highly probable that technological
innovation will continue. In fact, there are many electric power technologies
currently being developed. 3 This chapter examines three transmission technologies
that may have a significant impact on transmission systems in the future. We
describe their basic technical functions and history of development, and we predict
the economic and operational impact that they would have on transmission
systems. One intent of the chapter is to demonstrate, using real technologies, how
transmission systems might evolve over time so that allowances for efficiency-
enhancing innovations can be considered in the development of deregulation
proposals. This evaluation is done with the understanding that technological
progress is difficult to predict. Consequently, it is imperative that deregulation
proposals not be tailored to meet specific technologies -- be they the current ones or
those under development. Rather, some degree of technological robustness should
be built into new industry structures. A second intent of this chapter is to serve as an
important background for the discussion of non-utility transmission systems. 4
1Pierce, 1994, 323.
2 Source: "Holy Bypass! Technology is Destructive."
3Yeager, 1995.
4 See Chapter 11.
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7.2 POTENTIAL NEW TECHNOLOGIES
In this chapter we examine three transmission technologies, each with a different
development lead time. The first, Flexible Alternating Current Transmission
Systems (FACTS), are just starting to be used on the system. The second,
superconductive transmission lines, will probably not be ready for commercial use
for at least a decade. The development of the third technology, wireless
transmission, is still in a nascent stage.
7.2.1 Near-Term Technological Advance: FACTS
FACTS are expected to be introduced into the industry on a large scale 5 within the
next five years. FACTS are being "heralded as both the engineers' and accountants'
salvation."6 With such a billing, these technologies are undoubtedly worth a closer
look.
7.2.2.1 The Basic Technologies
Rather than one technology, FACTS are actually a series of technologies, 7 all
utilizing semiconductors. The basic building block of FACTS is the thyristor, a
counterpart to the transistor that can control large power flows. 8 Its function is akin
to the semiconductors that turn off and on (as the silicon goes from being an
insulator to a conductor) on a micro scale in order to process the information that is
being typed into this thesis. Instead of controlling milliamps; however, thyristors
harness the same principle to regulate transmission line power flows. In keeping
with semiconductor development in general, the thyristor is being improved at a
rapid rate.9
FACTS allow utilities to increase or decrease power flows on specific lines, damp
disturbances almost instantaneously, and increase the capacity of some lines.10
These benefits come from the two fundamental advantages that FACTS have over
traditional switching: they can redirect power in fractions of a cycle, compared to
multiple seconds, if not minutes; and they do not wear out from use, whereas a
5Some FACTS devices have been used "experimentally" for several years already.
6Bickers, 1994, 95.
7Approximately a dozen are being developed. Source: Douglas, 1992, 5.
8Douglas, 1992, 9.
9Temple, 1995, 38. There are three generations of thyristors: silicon-controlled rectifiers (SCR), gate turn-
off thyristors (GTO), and MOS-controlled thyristors (MCT). Source: Hingorani and Stahlkopf, 1993.
10 Source: "Electric Utilities Are Looking for FACTS on Transmission."
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traditional transformer is switched a maximum of a dozen times per day to prevent
wear.11
The Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) has supported research on these
technologies for more than a decade 12 and the results of that effort are beginning to
be witnessed in several successful demonstration projects. Thus far, about 5 FACTS
devices have been developed, which include:
* Thyristor controlled series compensators (otherwise known as ASC),
which allow for impedance modification;
* Static VAR compensators, which provide reactive power modulation;
* Thyristor-controlled phase angle regulators, which permit modulation of
power phase angles;
* Gate turn off thyristors, which can keep voltages within acceptable limits
and may also be used as "gates" that someday may allow for redundant
electricity service on the distribution level; 13 and
* Unified Power Flow Controllers (UPFC), 14 which control power flow and
provide voltage support. 15
As many as a dozen FACTS devices may be in use within a decade. 16
7.2.2.2 Projected Use of FACTS on the Transmission System
FACTS are expected to be added to both existing lines and new ones. They would
replace devices such as electromechanical switches and static reactive power
equipment. Due to their ability to stabilize the system rapidly, FACTS might also
allow for a reduction in spinning reserves and reactive power support. In particular,
FACTS would serve two useful purposes on the grid.
The first is that FACTS would allow for a more reliable, smoother power flow. High
voltage FACTS "switches" can replace the electromagnetic switches that are currently
used with generating equipment. Drawbacks of the old switches include the
introduction of electromagnetic noise and instabilities into the system, and their
slowness -- it takes several cycles to turn them on. 17 Because of faster switching
times and clean (no noise) switches, FACTS are able to smoothen out power flow
IIDouglas, 1992, 6.
12Source: "Electric Utilities Are Looking for FACTS on Transmission."
13Hingorani and Stahlkopf, 1993, 84.
14The newest and most advanced types of FACTS devices -- which are scheduled to begin service by the end
of 1996 in a demonstration project at American Electric Power's Inez substation. Source: "AEP Puts
Transmission Technology into Practice.".
15Source: "AEP Puts Transmission Technology into Practice," 7.
16Douglas, 1992, 6.
17Hingorani and Stahlkopf, 1993, 78.
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disturbances before sensitive equipment experiences them. Doing so with
electromechanical devices is difficult, if not impossible. As the economy becomes
increasingly dependent on electricity quality-sensitive semiconductor-based
technologies, electricity reliability and stability become ever more important.18 The
transmission system could also become "self-healing," since thyristors can control
impedance, voltage, current and phase angles in ways that cannot be regulated by
mechanical switches.19
The second is that FACTS would allow for substantial increases, perhaps as much as
50% on some lines, 20 in the amount of power that transmission lines can carry
because of their ability to "fix" otherwise potentially catastrophic instability
problems. This would occur because FACTS would enable lines to operate at their
thermal limits, rather than at lower limits that are often established to ensure
transmission reliability in the event of unexpected occurrences. This capacity
increase would be especially valuable in light of the changing nature of the grid.
While the primary use of transmission systems was once to serve a utility's native
load, they are increasingly becoming the primary thoroughfares for electric power
sales. Today, almost 45% of all power consumed in the United States is sold through
the wholesale market;2 1 and with the move toward increased competition, the
dependence on the transmission grid to facilitate electricity commerce will only
increase. Thus, it will be necessary to increase the capacity of the transmission
system, at least along some primary corridors. When compared with traditional
network reinforcement (adding another conductor to a line or building an entirely
new one) FACTS have several benefits:22
* Less environmental impact;
* Greater utilization of transmission lines and systems;
* Potentially relocatable; and
* Encouraging cost/benefit ratios.
For example, the first advanced services compensator (ASC) was installed on the
Shiprock-Glen Falls transmission line in Arizona in 1992. Prior to the installation of
the ASC bank, the line had been a bottleneck in the western power grid. The ASC
18One estimate indicates that as much as 40% of all electricity is being processed by silicon. Source:
Evans, 1994, 3.
19Ibid., 82.
20Ibid., 79.
21This number is calculated from data found in: Energy Information Administration, November 1995a, 59.
22 Bickers, 1994, 95.Bickers, 1994, 95.
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reduced the line's impedance by 72%, allowing the line to carry 33% power than it
previously could.2 3 The estimated pay-back period for this project is 4 years.24
7.2.2 Medium-Term Technological Advance: Superconductive Transmission Lines
Superconductive transmission lines are probably the best-known of the three
transmission technologies we examine. During the late-1980s, superconductivity
was a "hot" research area -- both figuratively and literally. This interest was spurred
by the 1986 discovery of "high temperature" [57K(-4060 F)] superconductors by two
researchers at IBM Zurich. What ensued quickly captured the public's imagination.
At the time, predictions were made of the imminent use of superconductors for a
variety of purposes. The scene was described as follows:
While thousands of scientists all over the world are competing on the
possibilities to beat the latest temperature records, the man in the street is
fed by the mass media with levitation trains, no loss energy conversion,
no loss transmission systems and many other things that stimulate one's
imagination. 25
Since then, interest in the field has cooled, although progress is still slowly being
made.
7.2.1.1 The Basic Technologies
In 1911, Dutch physicist Heike Kamerlingh Onnes discovered superconductors 26 --
materials with special physical properties that until recently have remained largely
in the realm of esoteric physics. Their most important property is their ability to
conduct electricity. When superconductors are at a temperature above their "critical
temperature," they do not conduct any meaningful amount of electricity. However,
when coolej below their critical temperature, they conduct electricity with no
resistance. 27
When he discovered superconductivity, Onnes was cooling Mercury to a
temperature of 4K. For many years, pure metals and alloys were the primary
superconductors. These materials made practical applications difficult, as their
critical temperatures are approximately 20K. 28 In the 1960s, scientists discovered that
intermetallic, ceramic compounds such as NbTi are also superconductors. Major
2 3Pereira et al, 35.
2 4 Ibid., 37.
25Bergsjo and Gertmar, 1989, 389.
26Chu, 1995, 162.
27Wiegner, 1995, 26.28Chu, 1995, 162.
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breakthroughs occurred in 1986 and 1987, when the warmest known
superconductors went from having critical temperatures of 23K to 35K, then to 93K
and finally to over 100K. The late 1980s was a period marked by a frenzy of scientific
activity that has since slowed, but nevertheless continues. Today, the warmest
superconductors have critical temperatures of 164K, and the critical temperature is
gradually moving higher.29
Applications of these new materials are also being developed, although not without
difficulty. One of the challenges of using today's superconductors is that they are
ceramics rather than metals. Ceramic wires, for instance, are much more brittle than
the traditional conduits. 30 Another difficulty is that superconductors must be kept
so cold. Maintaining an environment of 150K is an expensive proposition (although
it is much easier and less expensive than at 23K). 3 1 Before superconductors can be
widely used in commercial applications, it will be necessary to increase their critical
temperatures and to find ways of making them physically stronger. Advances in the
latter area are now being made, and it is now possible to produce kilometer-long
wires.32
Another problem which has already been greatly mitigated is the tendency for
superconductors to lose their properties in the presence of strong electric and/or
magnetic fields. In mid-1995 the record for current capacity was set by a team of
researchers at the Los Alamos National Lab when a current density of 1 million
amperes per square centimeter was passed through a yttrium-barium-cooper oxide
wire (which loses its resistance to electricity at -292* F). 33 In contrast, a copper wire
carries less than 800 A/cm2.
7.2.1.2 Projected Uses of Superconductors on the Transmission System
Given their special properties, superconductors appear in principle to be perfectly
suited materials for electric transmission line conductors. Various research
programs have studied the feasibility of superconductive transmission lines since
the 1960s. In 1986, a transmission system built at Brookhaven National Lab
demonstrated that superconductive lines are technically possible to build and
29 Chu, 1995, 165.
30Source: "Taped."
3 1Chu, 1995, 163; Wiegner, 1995, 28.
32 Chu, 1995, 164.
33Source: "New Record Set for Superconducting Wire."
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successfully operate on a small scale. 34 That is not to say, however, that these
technologies were then (or are now) ready for commercial use.3 5
If the critical temperatures of superconductive transmission line conductors are sub-
zero, their use would change the complexion of transmission systems. Instead of the
dominating overhead towers and wires, new transmission lines would be built in
cold, underground trenches. The potential benefits of superconductive transmission
lines (compared to traditional conductors) include:36
* Resistance loss-free transmission;
* More compact space requirements; 37
* Ability to operate at lower voltage;
* Less environmental impact; and
* Ability to send power over much longer distances.
One implication of the last point is that superconductive transmission lines could
potentially transport power across the country, which would then create a truly
national power system. At least one author has even suggested that a large number
of natural gas generating stations could be built in Alaska, where gas is plentiful,
with superconductors transporting the power to California 38 (and the rest of the
Lower 48). An extension of this prediction is that superconductors could lead to an
all-electric economy. 39 An even more far-reaching scenario is that all of the world's
electric power needs could be fulfilled by building huge photovoltaic power solar
cells in the middle of deserts and connecting these complexes to the grid through
superconductive transmission lines.40 These predictions do not take into account
important factors, however. Resistive losses only dissipate 3%-6% of the power sent
over a transmission line, so from a technical standpoint, superconductive lines
would not lead to revolutionary decreases in losses.4 1 Superconductive lines would
also not solve reactive power problems, which in some cases can cause losses an
order of magnitude higher than resistive losses.42
34Forsyth and Thomas, 1986.
35This is especially true because it was just about the time that the testing was completed that the
aforementioned revolution occurred in the superconducting world.
36Hosny and Dodds, 1993, 170-171; and the author.
37Due to their higher current/cross sectional area ratio.
38Greenberger, 1991, 38.
3 9Ibid.
40Johnson, 1993, 2.
4 1Furthermore, "if superconductive lines are built with non-room temperature superconductors, substantial
"cooling" costs would be incurred." Source: U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, 1989, 121.
On the other hand, 3%-6% of a $200 billion per year industry is a substantial amount of money.
42Ilic', 18 September 1995.
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In summary, superconductive transmission lines would allow for power flows over
longer distances than at present, perhaps even allowing the creation of a national or
international grid; but their resistance-free characteristics are not the panacea that
some believe them to be.
It should be noted that wires are not the only area of superconductor development
relevant to transmission systems. There is already. a commercially viable electric
storage product and several more are on the way.4 3 More recent technological
developments have come with respect to superconducting current limiters and
converters. 44 These other uses may become even more significant than the
adoption of superconductive transmission lines in their impact on the transmission
system. A fundamental property of electric power systems, which differentiates
them from almost any other, is the necessity to instantaneously balance load and
generation without storage. Profound implications would result from the
development of economical, large scale superconductive storage.
7.2.3 Long-Term Technological Advance: Wireless Power Transmission
The most long-term development in this evaluation is wireless power transmission
(WPT), which would probably not be used on the system for at least 15 years.45
7.2.3.1 The Basic Technologies
Since the mid-1960s researchers have been exploring the possibility of WPT -- i.e.,
transmitting power from one point to another without the use of a conductor. 46
Several research routes for WPT have been explored.
The first employs microwave and millimeter-wave technologies. When this type of
technology is used, electric power is converted to microwave radiation by a
magnetron - the primary device in a microwave oven.47 The microwave radiation
is then transmitted by an "antenna" -- typically a set of parabolic dishes. It is then
received by a "rectenna," whose conversion efficiencies are in the range of 70% to
80%. Systems employing this technology have already been developed.
43Source: "Using Superconductivity in Electric Power Systems."
44Source: "Gains Seen in Superconducting Current Limiter and Converter."
45Yeager, 1995; Johnson, 1993.
46Schupp and Brown, 1992.
47Although slightly altered. The conversion efficiency on these devices currently run at about 70%.
Source: Schupp and Brown, 1992, 2.273.
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Other researchers have been employing laser-photovoltaic systems. In these
experiments, a laser emits a beam of energy which is received by a photovoltaic
semiconductor. Three types of semiconductors are being used as receivers, the most
48
advanced of which are GaAs-based 4 8 photovoltaics. The energy conversion
efficiency of GaAs photovoltaics is upwards of 52%, 4 9 with a theoretical limit of
approximately 70% under certain conditions. 5 0 The power received by the
photovoltaic devices in these experiments is on the order of 100 mW/cm 2 . Silicon-
based photovoltaics are also being studied, although their energy conversion
efficiency of 46% to 50%51 is lower than for GaAs. The power of the light being
transmitted in the most advanced research is on the order of 52 mW/cm 2.52 The
third type of photovoltaics being studied are InP (Indium Phosphide) cells. The chief
advantage of these materials is that they offer better radiation protection than the
other two types. 53 The highest measured efficiency for InP cells is upwards of 44%,
with predictions of 50% in the near future. 54 This research is being done using
powers on the order of 500 mW/cm 2.5 5
There are two general types of efficiency loss in photovoltaics, electrical and optical;
both of which result from the crystal structures of photovoltaics. 56 Up to 95% of a
light beam is reflected at the base of a photovoltaic, 57 which makes the ability to
capture this reflection a critical engineering challenge in improving the efficiency of
photovoltaics.
The advantage of laser technologies (over microwave ones) is their ability to
transmit power over long distances. At the same time, though, they are more
subject to atmospheric disturbances and are an earlier stage of development than the
microwave technologies. At this point in time, laser-photovoltaic systems are only
4 8 Landry et al, 1989; and Olsen et al, 1991.
4901sen et al, 1991, 419.
50Ibid.
51Jain, 1993; and Zhao et al, 1995.
52Zhao et al, 1995, 3636.
5 3Radiation protection capability would be significant for space-based applications. Source: Jain, 1993,
1893.
54Jain, 1993, 1893.
5 5Ibid.
5 6Johnson, 1993, 2.
57Green et al, 1992, 317.
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operable on a laboratory scale while microwave technologies have advanced to the
stage of powering experimental aircraft. 58
While substantial advances in these technologies have been made over the past
three decades, much work must still be done before it is feasible to use WPT
technologies in electric power systems.
7.2.3.2 Projected Use of WPT on the Transmission System
The two most likely applications of WPT in electric power systems would be earth-
to-earth and space-to-terrestrial transmission.
In earth-to-earth systems, power would be generated at a typical generating station,
transmitted conventionally to the laser or microwave radiation source, transmitted
through the air, received, and either placed on another transmission system or used
at the site of the receiver. Presumably, a power wave would be bounced off a satellite
or some similar object as it is transmitted through the air.
In contrast, the space-terrestrial system would begin with in-space generation of
power 59 - probably on a photovoltaic device that is either in orbit or on the moon.
Once generated, the power would be beamed to earth, either to its consumption
point or to a conventional transmission system.
7.3 CRITERIA FOR EVALUATING THE IMPACT OF NEW TECHNOLOGY
In order for these technologies to be adopted on transmission systems, they will need to
display beneficial characteristics or relieve constraints: be they technical, political or
economic. Therefore, let us establish criteria for identifying potential benefits in each of
these realms (realizing that there might be overlap).
7.3.1 Technical Benefits
* Would the new technologies increase the capacity of current transmission systems?
* Would the new technologies change the fundamental character of the transmission
system?
* Would the new technologies reduce line losses, and if so, by how much?
58In one trial, a plane was able to stay aloft at a height of 150 meters for upwards of 20 minutes. Source:
Schupp and Brown, 1992, 2.272.
59Johnson, 1993; Schupp and Brown, 1992.
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7.3.2 Economic Benefits
* Would the new technologies reduce the fixed cost of transmission?
* Would the new technologies reduce the marginal cost of transmission? By how much?
7.3.3 Political Benefits
* Would the new technologies alleviate political concerns with current transmission
systems?
With these criteria in hand, let us examine how these technologies might change electric
power systems.
7.4 EVALUATION OF POTENTIAL TECHNOLOGIES ON ELECTRIC
POWER SYSTEMS
7.4.1 FACTS
7.4.1.1 Would FACTS increase the capacity of current transmission systems?
One of the largest benefits of FACTS is that they are anticipated to be capable of vastly
expanding the carrying capacity of today's transmission lines. As has already been noted,
these technologies offer increased power transport over the same conductors of up to 50%.
There are several implications of this. The first is that FACTS would increase the amount
of power that can be wheeled. Thus, they would help to promote competitive generation
markets. Secondly, they would delay, if not eliminate, the need to build additional
transmission capacity. As a result, their impact with regard to competition in transmission
would be opposite of that in generation. By increasing the capacity of the current system,
FACTS technology would reduce the necessity of building new lines, and therefore the
number of potential opportunities for non-utilities to build those lines. This would also
mean that the most efficient grid configuration would contain fewer lines, which would
increase transmission ownership concentration and heighten transmission's natural
monopoly characteristics.
7.4.1.2 Would FACTS change the fundamental character of the transmission system?
In general, FACTS would create significant improvements in the traditional functioning of
transmission systems. In particular, they should allow existing systems to carry more
power and to do so more reliably.
While the applications of FACTS would be evolutionary in nature, they possess one quality
that at some point in time could change the nature of transmission systems. Because of
their quick on-off times, FACTS could be the first "electric valves"' placed on the system.
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While FACTS would have the capability of gating power flows, it is unknown whether it
would be used; and if it were, whether it would fundamentally change the character of
transmission systems. Although individual transmission owners could use the "valves" to
control access to their lines, such actions would have negative consequences on overall
system efficiency, such as preventing power from flowing along the most technically
efficient path. Furthermore, in an era when open access to transmission systems is viewed
by regulators as being crucial to the success of a competitive industry, gating power flows
would likely be politically intolerable in the context of the current system.
7.4.1.3 Would FACTS reduce line losses, and if so, by how much?
FACTS would significantly reduce reactive power-caused line losses. Furthermore,
FACTS devices, themselves, could significantly reduce line losses, since they consume
1/10 to 1/20 the amount of power consumed by some of the devices they would replace. 60
7.4.1.4 Would FACTS reduce the fixed cost of transmission?
In most cases, FACTS would increase transmission fixed costs in the short-run, but would
reduce them in the long-run. This paradox exists because FACTS would reduce the
marginal losses of the system, but would not reduce fixed costs in the short term. At the
same time, these devices are fixed cost investments. The result is an overall increase in
short-term fixed costs. However, with time the amount of power flowing over a
transmission line increases -- eventually to the point of needing a new line. When FACTS
reduce line losses by an amount that postpones or eliminates the need to construct an
additional transmission line, there are significant fixed cost savings. It is estimated that for
every 10% increase in cumulative line loading, FACTS could save the industry $6 billion in
avoided construction costs.61
7.4.1.5 Would FACTS reduce the marginal cost of transmission? By how much?
FACTS reduce the marginal cost of transmission significantly. The payback period for
some devices can be as short as 4 months. 62
7.4.1.6 Would FACTS alleviate political concerns with the present transmission grid?
FACTS help to alleviate political problems of transmission systems by allowing heightened
use of existing facilities, thereby reducing the number of new lines that must be built and
the numerous political problems that accompany transmission line construction.
60 Hingorani and Stahlkopf, 1993, 85.
6 1Douglas, 1992, 6.6 2 Ibid., 8.
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7.4.1.7 Summary
FACTS offer the potential for more technically efficient and reliable use of the transmission
grid while lowering the marginal costs of transmission. In the process, they would reduce
the need for the construction of new transmission capacity. In addition, FACTS hold the
potential to change transmission system operation by gating transmission lines -- a
capability that would be important, if not necessary, in creating non-utility transmission
systems.
7.4.2 Superconductive Transmission Lines
7.4.2.1 Would superconducting technologies increase the capacity of current
transmission systems?
Presumably, superconductive transmission lines would replace segments of the existing
system. The magnitude of power that they would be able to carry would depend upon the
stage of their technological development when introduced for commercial use. Because
advanced superconductors are capable of carrying much larger amounts of current than
metal wires in the laboratory, eventually superconductive lines should increase the capacity
of the system, and consequently, the natural monopoly characteristics of transmission
lines. However, the first commercial superconductive lines may not be capable of doing
this.
7.4.2.2 Would superconducting technologies change the fundamental character of the
transmission system?
One way that superconductors could fundamentally change transmission systems is that
they might eventually allow for the creation of a national, if not international power grid
which could be operated by one or a handful of control areas. The Alaska generating
scenario is an example of the potential benefits of reducing transmission distance
constraints. The continued existence of heterogeneous regional electricity price levels
across the country would also serve as an incentive for a national power grid to develop. If
industry restructuring would lead to more homogeneous prices without the aid of
superconductors, however, this potential benefit of a national grid would be diminished.
Price homogeneity need not kill the benefits of a national grid, since a national grid would
allow for the futuristic scenarios mentioned above and could have other benefits as well.63
It should be noted that merely removing resistive losses would not reduce all of the
significant constraints that exist on transmission systems. Superconductors would not
63 See Section 7.4.2.5.
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solve problems such as reactive power and system instability. In fact, these become more
complicated in larger systems.
Much more significant is the probable impact that the use of superconductors would have
on transmission systems as electric storage devices. The current electric power industry
structure is built upon the premise that electricity cannot be stored, which, combined with
the need to instantaneously balance electric demand and supply, necessitates the provision
of spinning reserves, automatic generation controllers, etc. It also means that all the
electricity needed during peak periods must be produced during the peak period. As a
result, expensive generators run during peak demand times, while less expensive ones sit
idle during demand troughs. Furthermore, the market must perfectly clear at every given
instant, a constraint that will become increasingly important as a true power market
develops. These technological limitations make for tighter constraints on the electric power
market than exist in most (if not all) other competitive industries.
It is difficult to imagine all of the potential consequences that would result from an
undercutting of the fundamental assumption that electricity cannot be stored. Some likely
ones include: 64
* Reduction (if not elimination) of spinning reserves, and
* "Leveling" of generation quantities, resulting in a reduction in the number of
generators.
Superconductive storage devices would take on the current roles of:65
* Load following;
* Spinning reserves;
* Transient stabilization; and
* Synchronous resonance damping.
While it is difficult to predict all of the reverberations that would result from the elimination
of the no-storage assumption, it should be clear from the above lists that profound changes
in the electric power industry would occur.
7.4.2.3 Would superconducting technologies reduce line losses, and if so, by how
much?
One of the clear advantages of superconductive transmission lines is that they would
eliminate resistive line losses, although they would not eliminate reactive power losses.
64 This list is partially based on Bergsjo and Gertmar, 1989, 404; and Hosny and Dodds, 1993, 170; and
partially on the insights of the author.65 Ibid.
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7.4.2.4 Would superconducting technologies reduce the fixed cost of transmission?
Because of potential changes in technology, it is difficult to predict exactly how much
superconductive transmission lines would cost to build; however, at least one estimate has
been made. A 1987 study by the Department of Energy and Philadelphia Electric made
three important conclusions about the future of superconductive transmission lines:66
* The cost of construction of such lines ranges from 1.5 to 1.9 times that of
constructing a traditional overhead line;
* Superconductive lines are economically attractive alternatives to traditional
underground lines for large capacity purposes only, with a minimum of 5000
MW; and
* Widespread use of superconductive lines for the distribution system would only
be feasible with room temperature superconductors.
7.4.2.5 Would superconducting technologies reduce the marginal cost of transmission?
By how much?
By eliminating resistive line losses, superconductive transmission lines would reduce the
marginal cost of transmission quite significantly, since 3-5% of power placed on the grid is
dissipated by line losses. While this may not be a revolutionary technical change, 3-5% of
a $200 billion dollar industry does represent substantial savings -- $6 to $10 billion per
year. Furthermore, if superconductive transmission lines would lead to the creation of a
national grid, there generation reserve margin -- both installed and spinning -- could be
reduced, which would further reduce the marginal cost of power. Superconductors, in the
form of storage devices, would further reduce or even eliminate reserve margin capacities.
On the other hand, if non-room temperature superconductors are used, significant marginal
cooling costs would be incurred.
7.4.2.6 Would superconducting technologies alleviate political concerns with the present
transmission grid?
Superconductive lines could reduce the public's concerns with transmission line siting,
thus eliminating a key barrier to developing and expanding the grid.67 Public concerns
could be reduced becaiuse the superconductive lines would likely be built underground,
which would allow lines to be built in locations otherwise not otherwise be possible, due to
aesthetic or right-of-way difficulties. 68 However, superconductive lines would represent
an entirely new technology. Public acceptance of new technologies often is not as high as
might be expected. 69 This is because the public's acceptance of a new technology can
often have more to do with the context into which it is introduced than its specific technical
6 6Bergsjo and Gertmar, 400.
6 7 Rogers, 1994, 8.
6 8Forsyth and Thomas, 1986, 612.
6 9 Postrel, 1995.
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characteristics. As a result, superconductive lines could face unforseeable public
acceptance problems.
7.4.2.7 Summary
Superconductive transmission lines would eliminate resistive transmission losses, a
development that could save billions of dollars annually. Their benefit is less than might be
anticipated because these lines might still require costly cooling, would likely be more
expensive to build, and would not eliminate other significant constraints on the grid, such
as reactive power. Two other potential benefits of superconductive lines are that they could
create larger "tight pools," e.g. the creation of a single national or handful of super-regional
control areas might become possible; and they may also reduce transmission line siting
problems. Of even greater significance, however, would be the development of large-
scale, economical superconductive storage. Such a development would hold the potential
for profound changes in the functioning of electric power systems.
7.4.3 Wireless Power Transmission
Several factors make it difficult to predict the impact that wireless transmission technologies
would have on electric power systems. The first is the sheer duration of the time lag
between now and when the technologies would be adopted. It is difficult to predict with
any degree of certainty what the system would look like when the technologies are adopted.
Secondly, it is difficult to predict how even the present system would adjust to the
technologies. As a result, the evaluation of WPT technologies is more speculative than for
FACTS or superconductors. While the details of the impact of WPT technologies may not
be clear, it should become clear that WPT technologies hold the potential to revolutionize
the industry.
7.4.3.1 Will wireless transmission technologies increase the capacity'of current
transmission systems?
It is difficult to predict what impact WPT would have on the capacity of transmission
systems, since they are still so far from use. It is reasonable to assume that the first WPT
systems would not be able to handle as much capacity as today's high voltage lines, if for
no other reason because today's photovoltaic receptors "burn up" under relatively low
power flows. Whether that is a fundamental characteristic of the technology, or a
characteristic of its relatively young development, is a question that can only be answered
with time.
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7.4.3.2 Will wireless transmission technologies change the fundamental character of the
transmission system?
The impact of WPT technologies on the fundamental character of transmission systems
depends upon how they are used. Two scenarios for WPT use can be proposed.70
7.4.3.2.1 Scenario 1: replacement of wires
Wireless technologies could be used as "replacements" for current transmission lines, but
aside from eliminating the lines themselves, electric power systems would remain the same
-- the grid would remain interconnected and customers would be serviced by distribution
companies. In this scenario, electric power could easily and flexibly be sent to many
locations by the simple redirection of a laser beam, rather than through a multi-billion dollar
series of transmission lines that must be built to all of the places where power is needed. If
one invokes the economic theory of "contestable markets, 71 this scenario has implications
for the ability to deregulate the transmission segment of the industry. In terms of
contestable market theory, the sunk costs of immobile transmission lines are the largest
barrier to a "perfectly contestable" transmission market.
7.4.3.2.1 Scenario 2: increased flexibility and less centralization
The second scenario is that WPT technologies would allow for greater flexibility in system
operation. Currently, transmission system nodes (where power is put on or taken off the
system) are intimately interconnected and the system is constrained by the physical
connections of transmission lines. Wireless technologies would change the nature of the
system by eliminating some of the physical interconnections that exist. In the process, a
less intimate relationship would develop, as system components would not be physically
prevented from leaving the "system." What implications would this have?
While it is difficult to predict exactly how a "transmission system" would operate using
wireless technologies, one could imagine that the central system control function could be
bypassed, at least in some cases through direct, physical bilateral wireless transmission
transactions. 72 This would allow customers the opportunity to bypass the costs of
spinning reserves, etc. inherent in being connected to the grid.73 By making it possible to
7 0 As will be more elaborated in Section 7.5, it is likely that at first, Scenario 1 is most likely. However,
with time, Scenario 1 may evolve into Scenario 2.
7 1For background on this theory, see: Bailey and Baumol, 1984.
7 2As opposed to bilateral contracts in the current grid, where the electrons are co-mingled.
7 3 The ability of WPT technologies to quickly "reconnect" to the grid would have an impact on power
quality, and thus, the willingness of a customer to opt for such an arrangement. If technologies would
allow for almost immediate reconnection, there would be great incentives for bypass. However, even if
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bypass the system operator, wireless technologies would then remove the core natural
monopoly characteristic of the transmission system -- at least for those who choose to
bypass it.74
Wireless power transmission technologies could also reduce the centralized nature of
system operation by reducing geographic constraints for the provision of back-up power.
Similar to the superconductor case, reductions could be made in reserve margins since
power could conceivably be received from anywhere in the country with the change of a
laser beam. Furthermore, when an individual user or producer finds itself with excess
(insufficient) power at a particular moment, it might be able to sell (buy) the power on its
own through a "direct" wireless transmission, rather than rely on the power balancing
functions of the system operator. While the details are sketchy, this scenario suggests that
the impact of WPT technologies could have a similar impact on electric power systems as
telecommunication satellites had on the long-distance telephone industry in the late 1970s
and wireless telephones are having on local telephone service today.
7.4.3.3 Will wireless transmission technologies reduce line losses, and if so, by how
much?
Wireless "line losses," caused by photovoltaic energy conversion inefficiencies, would be
significantly higher than losses in current transmission systems. Although technological
improvements would help, wireless technologies have are some theoretical limits.75 While
it is difficult to predict the state of the technology if or when it is introduced, wireless
transmission technologies will probably not be used on a large scale 76 until "line losses"
are significantly reduced.
7.4.3.4 Will wireless transmission technologies reduce the fixed cost of transmission?
In addition to WTP's technological limitations is a problem of high fixed costs. At this
juncture, photovoltaics are rather expensive, and would likely make WPT uneconomical, at
least for large scale transmission. 77 There may be some low-density niche areas where
WPT would be more economical than traditional transmission technologies, however.
power quality were to be impacted substantially, customers who do not place a high value on power quality
would still find system bypass to be attractive.
74 It should be noted that such a possibility already exists in the form of on-site generation.
75 Estimates of the theoretical limits for energy conversion efficiency using today's basic technologies range
from the mid-50s% to 70%. Sources: Olsen et al, 1989; Zhao et al, 1995; and Green et al, 1992.
7 60ne could envision niche uses for the technology, such as supplying remote areas where the marginal
long run cost of constructing transmission lines would exceed the summation of the short-run marginal
costs that result from the wireless "line losses."
77 Johnson, 1993, 10.
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7.4.3.5 Will wireless transmission technologies reduce the marginal cost of transmission?
By how much?
If the analysis regarding "line losses" is correct, then the marginal cost of WPT would be
much higher than that of traditional technologies.
7.4.3.6 Will wireless transmission technologies alleviate political concerns with the
present transmission grid?
Wireless power transmission would cause current siting problems to vanish into thin air,
literally. However, as is often the case, WPT would create a whole new set of issues:
Would the public feel comfortable with having laser beams of power going though the sky?
What is the chance that an errant laser beam would annihilate a person on the ground?
What impact would such technology have on air transport? Would the Defense Department
attempt to place restrictions on this technology? What would the health effects be of having
high-energy microwaves being sent through space? Would any company risk the potential
legal liability of WPT? As time goes on, some of these potential concerns may go away,
while others may serve as real impediments to continued development of WPT technology.
7.4.3.7 Summary
Wireless power transmission technologies hold the potential for revolutionary changes in
the transmission grid by reducing the importance of centralized system operation, and
diminishing, if not eliminating, the natural monopoly characteristics of transmission.
However, until "line losses" (photovoltaic energy conversion inefficiencies) are alleviated,
WPT would likely be used only in niche situations. At first, they are also expected to carry
less power than traditional transmission technologies.
7.4.4 Technologies in Combination
7.4.4.1 Dynamics of Technological Change
Until now, our examination has focused on the potential impact of these technologies if
they were introduced individually on the current grid. This, however, is not an appropriate
assumption to make -- except perhaps for FACTS, which are starting to be used now --
since these technologies would not be introduced into a static situation. For example, WPT
and superconductors would be introduced on transmission systems that already have
FACTS and possibly other significant new technologies.
7.4.4.2 FACTS and Superconductors
When we examine the problem from the dynamic perspective, some of our conclusions
may change significantly. For example, we find that the introduction of FACTS and
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superconductive lines, on their own, would tend to increase the economies of scale of
transmission. But now, let us examine what happens when they are used together. We
mention above that FACTS could be used as electronic valves. While gating capabilities
may be helpful for some applications in today's systems, their implications are not
profound. Given the importance of economies of pooling and the free flow of electricity
through the system, the existence of an electric valve, by itself, would not fundamentally
change the structure of the industry. However, gating capabilities in conjunction with
electric storage would have profound consequences for the system.78 Specifically, this
could open the door for the development of competing, non-utility transmission systems.
The existence of electric storage would reduce, if not eliminate, the large economies of
scale from capacity pooling. One could conceive that if strategically placed in conjunction
with FACTS valves, superconductive storage would allow transmission companies to gate
their lines and through their storage capability, serve their customers with high reliability.
These technologies together would significantly reduce the economies of scale of system
operation, 79 and would solve the problem of parallel line flows on competing transmission
lines.
7.4.4.3 FACTS and WPT
Synergies between WPT and FACTS can also be seen. If WPT technology develops to the
point that power can be beamed from one part of the country or world to another, problems
could exist because the transmission systems in the sending and receiving locations would
sometimes be remotely connected, if at all. The result could be serious problems in
synchronizing power flows. Using current, non-FACTS technologies, it would be
difficult, if not impossible, to synchronize disparate power flows on the near-instantaneous
basis that would be necessary if WPT would used in place of spinning reserve capacity.
However, FACTS could handle this problem. Thus, FACTS serve as an enabler of
WPT's ability to make fuindamental changes to transmission systems.
7 81In particular, see the discussion in Section 11.4.2 with respect to the technical impediments to
competing transmission lines. If one could eliminate the need for the system to balance at all times, one
could "gate" the system without sacrificing efficiency, and therefore allow for competition in transmission
line service.
79 Instead of system operators that pool all of the generating capacity in a region together, the transmission
company (which could be in competition with others) would aggregate its own supply.
7.5 PROBLEMS IN FORECASTING TECHNOLOGICAL ADVANCE
This chapter has presented technologies and their predicted future uses in a rather matter-of-
fact manner. While such a presentation may appear appropriate in several cases, 80 in
general, doing so with the belief of being accurate is dangerous. With this being the case,
let us attempt to gain a better understanding of the potential imperfections in the preceding
analysis.
7.5.1 Implications for the Analysis in This Chapter
While this chapter has examined three technologies that are anticipated or speculated to have
a significant impact on transmission systems of the future, it must be remembered that
technological innovation (and predictions of it) is not a precise science. As a result,
predictions about future technologies abound -- some prove correct while many others turn
out to be wrong. 81 Just because the three technologies evaluated here appear to be leading
contenders for future use, that does not mean that they will be used, that they will be used
as predicted, or that they will be the most significant technologies introduced onto the grid.
Despite this "reality check," the preceding analysis is worthwhile. We can safely assume
that there will continue to be innovations in transmission technologies. Given the
importance of technological innovation in increasing economic efficiency, it is vital that the
new industry structure accommodate, if not encourage, technological change. Even if these
three technologies are not used on the system or are not the three most significant
technological breakthroughs during the next several decades, evaluating their potential
impact on the system can nevertheless be illustrative of the dynamic considerations that
must be made in planning a future electric power industry.
7.5.2 Why is it Difficult to Predict Technological Change?
The previous discussion leads to an obvious question, why is predicting technological
development, and commercial adoption of new technologies in particular, such an
inaccurate endeavor? Why is it that "even the greatest ideas and inventions can flounder,
whereas more modest steps forward can sometimes change the world?"8 2
8 0This is most notably true of the semiconductor industry, where technological advance has proceeded in a
remarkably predictable manner according to Moore's Law. But even in this case, where the development of
the basic technology has been predictable, its use has been anything but predictable. For a more complete
discussion of this see: Lester, Chapter 6, forthcoming.
8 1For example, see: "Futurist Schlock."
82 Rennie, 1995, 57.
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Rosenberg sheds some insight on the question when he concludes that there are four
constraints on human thinking that lead to misjudgments of a new technology's ultimate
value:83
* New technologies typically enter the world in a primitive condition;
* Their value is dependent upon advances in complementary technologies;
* Technological advances often create entirely new systems; and
* New technologies can identify human needs in a new context or in ways not
previously articulated.
While this may be implied by Rosenberg, Paul David adds another significant caveat --
even when people recognize that a technology is valuable, it often takes time to understand
how to employ it usefully. This was witnessed in his recounting of the story of the
adoption of electric power in factories, 84 and is being witnessed today with regard to
information technologies in today's productivity paradox. Along the way to the creation of
a new technology paradigm, many paths may be attempted (i.e. specific technologies catch
fire and then are replaced by better ones) before an accepted avenue develops. For
example, if this thesis were being written in 1993 or early 1994, it may have concluded that
the Wintel standard -- Intel-based personal computers, running Microsoft WindowsTM --
would be the basis for the future information industry. However, only one or two years
later, the paradigm has changed as attention has shifted to the Internet and the World Wide
Web. 85
Another source of unpredictability is the sheer amount of time that innovation takes, as
Hogan recognizes,
How fast does new technology penetrate? It takes a lot of time in the best of
circumstances -- and one speaker said that typically regulated industries are the
slowest to adapt. The transmission part of this industry is going to be regulated
for a long time. We're talking 10 to 15 years down the road before we could
start getting any significant inroads from things that are still on the drawing
board. 86
8 3Rosenberg, 1994, 4-5.
84 See Appendix J.6.4 or, perhaps, see describe and see David, 1990.
85 Sources: "Microsoft Battles for Hearts, Minds of Software Makers;" "Nearing the $500 Computer for
Internet Use;" "Stripped Down PCs Will Be Talk of Comdex;" "LSI to Unveil Chip Design for Building
Inexpensive Machines to Access Internet;" and "Gold Rush in Cyberspace." The design of real-time
information networks (RINs) for transmission systems (that would meet the Mega-NOPR's RIN concepts)
is illustrative of this. The first efforts were to develop Windows"m-based systems. At least seven
competing systems were developed. Source: "Real Time Networks: A Peek at Tomorrow's Transmission
Market." However, the RIN NOPR issued by the FERC in December 1995 calls for an Internet, World
Wide Web based system. Source: FERC, 21 December 1995.
86 Hogan, November 1995, 75.
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In addition, surprises can develop along the long path from initial scientific discovery to
commercial use. Chu concludes his discussion of the current state of superconductor
research with the following,
Although the pace of improvement has made workers optimistic, the existence
of a technology alone does not guarantee it a major position in a market-oriented
society. The cost-benefit factor dictates the outcome... Although unforeseen
applications are certain to arise -- no one predicted that MRI technology would
emerge from superconductors -- the high-temperature wonderland will most
likely consist of subtle yet economically profound changes, a conversion of
esoteric technology into instruments we can rely on every day.87
The important lesson from this discussion is that even if radically new transmission
technologies -- such as wireless transmission or superconductivity -- emerge at some point
in time, it would likely take some time for their value to be fully understood, and in turn,
for the system to adjust. At first, they would likely be used as "replacement parts" on the
system rather than the basis for a new network. As they become integrated with other
technologies, their ultimate use may be close to what is discussed here, or may it look very
different from what is projected in this chapter.
7.5.3 Other Technologies
One other important consideration is that these three are not the only technologies currently
being developed that could have an impact on future transmission systems. One
technology in particular -- distributed generation -- could do much to change the nature of
the transmission system.88 The basic concept of distributed generation is that electric
power would be generated on the site of the load rather than in central stations. If this
concept were to take hold as some predict, a grid might still be necessary for reliability
reasons, but it would carry much less power than it does today,89 which could render
much of this thesis moot.90 While perhaps the most likely candidate, distributed generation
is not the only emerging technology that could revolutionize the industry and render
asunder many of the assumptions of this chapter.
87 Chu, 1995, 165.
88 Casten, 1995; Lamarre, 1993; Olesen, 1995. Development of small-scale turbogenerators that could be
used for Distributed Generation is at a relatively advanced stage. Source: "Capstone Unveils Landmark
Turbogenerator."
89 Casten, 1995, 73.
90 This would lead to a highly complex problem, where a system operator would still be necessary to
maintain the reserve margin pool, but would be in a very weak position since grid users would only want
power in emergency situations. In day to day operations, the system operator would be more of a nuisance
than anything (in the eyes of the user).
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7.6 CONCLUSIONS
Three prospective transmission technologies are examined in this chapter, each of which
holds the potential of making significant improvements in the transmission system as we
know it today. By increasing the carrying capacity of transmission lines, FACTS can defer
or eliminate the need to build new lines -- and the financial and siting issues that go with
new construction. FACTS would also enable gating of the transmission system.
Superconductive transmission lines might allow for the development of larger power pools
and make transnational power exchanges possible, through their elimination of resistive
losses. However, they would not, by themselves, eliminate all of the important system
constraints. Of potentially greater consequence for transmission systems is
superconductive storage, which could undercut the fundamental assumption that electricity
load must be met exactly by generation on an instantaneous basis. The benefits of wireless
power transmission are less well understood, largely because of the nascent state of the
technology. At the very least, WPT technologies would likely service areas that are
currently too remote to be able to become connected to the grid.
While these technologies by themselves offer substantial promise for improving the
technical and economic performance of transmission system, they offer the possibility of
radically changing the system when they are used together. For example, the use of
FACTS as electronic valves, combined with superconductive storage devices would allow
for competition between transmission lines that would not impair the technical stability of
the system.
These predicted benefits illustrate the importance of technological innovation in ensuring
long-term efficiency improvements in transmission systems. Hence, policy-makers should
make an effort to accommodate, if not encourage, technological development as they
develop deregulation proposals.
The ability to predict the future is an important factor that is missing from this and all
similar analyses. Technological development is not a precise science -- e.g. promising
development projects can fail to meet their technical goals or can be undercut by new,
unexpected technologies. What does appear certain, however, is that technological change
has, and will continue, to play a vital role in the electric power industry and in the
transmission segment as well. The importance, yet inexactness of technological
development underscores the importance of developing a deregulated market structure that
encourages, and certainly does not impede technological development.
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Let us now shift gears and focus on one component of some of the deregulation proposals
-- divestment -- and examine whether it is economically efficient.

Chapter 8
Is Divestiture an Efficient Option?
The utility industry has reachedan intersection where aft roads and vehicles converge.
There are no stop signs or lights; no one is directing traffic. Industry drivers are going
to have to size up the situation and make decisions that wi"f determine the direction
and destination of thefuture. A6out the only thingyou can't do is apply the 6rakes.1
-- Stanley T Skinner (1995)
8.1 INTRODUCTION
Utility divestiture of transmission or generation assets is given serious consideration, if not
required, in each of the restructuring proposals evaluated in this thesis, as well as in other
proposals that have been put forward by industry participants. Such major ownership
changes could have implications for the efficiency of transmission systems. In this chapter
we explore the rationale for divestiture and the mechanisms by which it could occur. We
also develop and employ criteria that determine whether, or in what cases, divestiture
would be efficient.2 Let us begin by examining the question: why is divestiture being
considered?
8.2 WHY DIVEST? 3
There are several reasons why utilities might voluntarily, or be compelled to, divest some
of their assets.
8.2.1 Alleviate Market Power
Many analysts believe that market power in transmission or,generation could cause
distortions in an emerging competitive generation market. 4 As a result, a utility could be
requested to divest some of its assets in order to alleviate its market power, which would
have arisen from its long-time status as a vertically-integrated monopoly.
1Cited in: "Utility Asset Sales," 22.
2 These criteria are largely based upon Michael Porter's Competitive Strategy frameworks.
3 For a more extensive discussion of this topic, see: Navarro, 1995, 373-377.
4 For a detailed discussion of transmission and generation market power considerations and the FERC's
rulings with regard to a competitive wholesale market, see: Stafford, 1991, 298-311. While some
differences would exist between wholesale and retail markets, many of the principles are similar.
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8.2.1.1 Market Power in Generation
Currently, investor-owned utilities (IOUs) generate approximately 75% of the electric
power produced in the United States. 5 Utilities usually produce this power in plants that
are located within their decades-old service territories. As a result, there is often only one
dominant producer of electricity in any given service territory.6 This made sense when the
industry was structured to capture the natural monopoly characteristics of generation.
However, now that generation has lost its natural monopoly attributes, the domination of
generating capacity by one company in a service territory, and/or several utilities in a larger
region, is problematic. If a "competitive" market were to be created by a policy decision to
make generation prices market-based without consideration of market power issues and
without the existence of viable competitors, the incumbent utility would often possess
substantial market power, which could pose as a serious roadblock to the emergence of a
truly competitive generation market, thus reducing the market's economic efficiency.7
While the ability to economically transmit electric power across service territory boundaries
would act to alleviate the market power problem (through competition from neighboring
utilities), the grid, as it is currently built, was not designed to handle massive quantities of
wheeled power.8 Consequently, transmission constraints could limit the ability to mitigate
market power through wheeling. The East Coast would be the most likely exception to this
because the PJM, New York, and New England Power Pools have been designed for
extensive power sharing. However, these "tight" power pools are much more the
exception than the rule. And even on the East Cost, significant transmission constraints
exist with regard to importing power into the region.
The experience of the United Kingdom demonstrates the importance of ensuring that
market power is reduced (if not eliminated) and that a viable competitors exist before
generation prices become market-based. Upon privatization of the United Kingdom's
electric power industry, two private companies, National Power and PowerGen, produced
three-quarters of the UK's power,9 with much of the rest produced by the government-
owned National Nuclear. Not surprisingly, the two private companies have earned
oligopolistic profits overall,10 and on occasion have been able to reap windfall profits by
5Energy Information Administration, November 1995a, 1.
61n some areas there may be several, due to jointly owned plants. Also, areas located on the boundaries of
service territories could also have several close generators.
7 See: FERC, 1989, 84-85; Moskovitz and Foy, 1994; and Section 9.2.2.3.1.
8 Kelly et al, 1987, 1. Transmission capacity enhancements, in particular, as well as expansion, could
alleviate this constraint on market power reduction.
9 Chou, 1995, 71, 88.
10Chou, 1995. Prices from the British power pool shot up 46% between 1990 and 1994 according to a
Wall Street Journal article. Source: Holden, 28 November 1995A11.
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substantially "gaming" the pool." Therefore, based on economic theory and experience,
generation market power is clearly an important consideration when attempting to create a
competitive generation market. 12
One potential solution would be to forbid utilities from constructing new plants until the
market power problem is mitigated. New entrants (who would emerge with rising
demand) would dilute the market power in a region. However, due to the slow growth rate
in the demand for electricity, even if all new power plants were constructed by non-utilities,
the industry could remain essentially a vertically integrated one for many years, dominated
by today's utilities. 13
Another option for mitigating generation market power would be to force utilities to divest
some or all of their generation assets. 14 Presumably, if generation market power mitigation
is the only goal of divestiture, utilities should be allowed to keep some of their assets while
selling off others, 15 since transferring ownership of all of the assets to another company
would merely change the market power's source, rather than alleviating its existence. A
further implication is that those assets that would be divested should be sold off on a plant-
by-plant basis or in small blocks.
11Tabors, 29 October 1995. Some argue that cooperative gaming would occur should the California
POOLCO proposal be adopted. See Michaels, 1994, 64-65.
12Hogan, November 1995, 52; and "Almost There in California Restructuring."
13Joskow, 1995, 64. Paul Levy might dispute this claim, since the new entrants would be able to use
new, lower-cost technologies. He states, "we accept and adopt technological innovations in other areas.
We dispose of old computers and telecom gear while they are still highly useful because we can buy more
efficient products at lower cost. Likewise, are we at the point that it is worthwhile to mothball many older
power plants and replace them with new efficient ones?" Source: Levy, 1996, 89. One would expect that
once real competition enters into the generation segment of the industry, more efficient ones will be built
to replace, older, less-efficient ones. In contrast, the current industry mind-set is to use assets until they are
fully depreciated (and beyond). It is from this perspective that Joskow concludes that market power could
not be alleviated for years by new, non-utility capacity. However, until a competitive market develops and
investors behave as Levy anticipates, it would not be responsible public policy to assume that non-utilities
will build a sufficient number of new plants to eliminate market power. For example, there may be some
unforeseen barriers to entry that would accompany a large increase in the use of new technologies. One
could wonder if there would the natural gas supply or price would create constraints. If an insufficient
number of new plants would be built, and until these new plants are built, monopolies would be able to
reap supereconomic profits (although them doing so would likely hasten the arrival of new, lower-cost IPP
plants). The Mega-NOPR would not require this. It only calls for functional unbundling.
14This route was chosen in the California Final proposal, which requests that Southern California Edison
(whose parent company now is Edison International) and Pacific Gas and Electric sell 50% of their fossil
generating capacity. These two utilities recently submitted proposals for doing so. Source: "Edison
International, PG&E to Auction Some Power Plants."
15CPUC, December 1995.
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8.2.1.2 Market Power in Transmission
Another potential problem is that transmission-owning generating companies could utilize
their transmission market power to give them an unfair advantage in a competitive
generation market. 16 According to one FERC Commissioner, "the FERC has consistently
identified transmission market power as the key stumbling block to competitive generation
markets." 17 The concern is that when transmission owning utilities (TOUs) also own
generation assets in a competitive generating market, they could stifle competition by
blocking access to transmission "bottleneck" facilities. This could be done either through
an outright refusal to wheel "competing" power or by setting rates in a manner that gave its
own generation sales a price advantage. 18 Although the Energy Policy Act of 1992
(EPAct) attempted to eliminate the ability of utilities to block transmission access, TOUs
still partially retain this capability. For example, unless a utility has open access tariffs, 19
wheeling rates must be set on a case-by-case basis through the rule-making channels of the
FERC. 20 This process takes time, and also allows an opportunity for the utility to
selectively choose rates. The selective rate choosing practice is now being curtailed
through the FERC's "golden rule" comparability standard, by which utilities must offer the
same services and prices to others that they charge themselves.21 Furthermore, the time it
takes to process a rate case acts in the utility's favor. While a utility may not be able to
block competition forever, it can use the tools at its disposal to stall (and make money in the
process). This time delay is not trivial. For example, it took the FERC more than a year
and a half after the passage of EPAct to make its first order to mandate wheeling.22 The net
impact is that society experiences an efficiency loss when a TOU exercises its market
power to delay or eliminate (in the case of a short-term opportunity) a transaction that
would otherwise be economically efficient.
The FERC's recognition that the good faith of TOUs cannot be relied upon in the
development of efficient, competitive generation markets led to the issuance of the March
1995 Mega-NOPR. In it, the FERC stated, "unquestionably, this market power is still
being used today, or can be used, discriminatorily to block competition."23 While the
16 Source: "The Regulatory Experiment."
17 Santa, 1995, 16.18For details of specific cases, see: Rogers, 1994, 6.
19 As of FERC's 29 March 1995 Mega-NOPR, only 21 utilities had open access tariffs. Source: FERC,
1995, 17671.
20 In fact, the FERC does not have the resources to handle every case where disputes arise over transmission
access and pricing. Source: "Scherman to Electrics: Put Order 636 On Agenda."
2 1 Sources: "Landmark FERC Decisions Rock Industry."; and Falcone, 1995.
2 2Source: "Landmark FERC Decisions Rock Industry."
23 FERC, April 1995, 17664.
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Mega-NOPR does not mandate divestiture of utility assets, it does require the "functional
unbundling" of generation and transmission assets.24 In essence, functional unbundling
means that a utility's generation and transmission assets must be operated separately and
independently, as if they were separate companies, even though they share a common
ownership.
Some market analysts and participants believe that it is inappropriate for the same firms to
own both competitive generation and bottleneck transmission facilities, even if they are
functionally unbundled. As a result, there is a growing pressure on regulators to require
utilities to divest some or all of their generation 25 or transmission 26 assets. Scott Hempling,
a lawyer who represents a group of IPPs, lists a number of advantages to compete
corporate unbundling,
The cleanest solution [to this potential problem] is to have the transmission
assets owned and operated by an independent company. Then there's no
conflict of interest, no risk of cross-subsidy, no people who are denied
promotions because they have elevated the public interest over their own
company's interest.27
The counter argument is that functional unbundling should be sufficient, and since it is less
severe and is more flexible than immediate divestiture, it should be given a chance.
"Corporate unbundling is unnecessary if functional unbundling can achieve the goals of
comparability." 28 If not, functional unbundling can be turned into corporate unbundling at
a later date. The issue of utilities divesting assets in order to alleviate market power is one
that will likely take several years to resolve.29
While market power alleviation is a long-run economic efficiency-based reason for asset
divestiture, there are near-term reasons for considering divestiture too.
24 FERC, April 1995, 17681-17682.
2 5Joskow, 1995, 64; Howe, 1994, 71; Knight, 1995; "Looking for Landmines in FERC's 'Mega-NOPR',"
13; "PSI's Rogers, LGE's Hull Float Radical Transmission Plans;" and "AES: Real Reform Requires
Splitting Generation from Transmission and Distribution."
2 6Houston, 1992; "PSI's Rogers, LGE's Hull Float Radical Transmission Plans;" and "MGE Asks FERC
to Set Utility Divestiture of Transmission."
2 7Source: "Looking for Landmines in FERCs 'Mega-NOPR'," 13.
2 8 Woychik, August-September 1995, 78. See also: CPUC, May 1995, 12.
2 9For more discussion of the issue, see Santa, 1996, 32-33.
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8.2.2 Ameliorate Stranded Investments
One of the most contentious issues in the industry restructuring debate is that of stranded
investments (SIs). 30 While a consensus on dealing with the issue is still far-off, two
potential ways of handling it involve asset divestiture.
8.2.2.1 Determine Value of Stranded Investment
Some analysts believe that the only equitable manner by which the "true" value of stranded
investments can be calculated is through a market-based mechanism, specifically, for the
stranded assets to be divested. 31 The difference between the embedded cost of the assets
and price the utility receives for them would be the total stranded investment, for which the
utility would be partially or fully compensated. 32 Mathematically,
SI=  EC - MV
i=1 Ai Ai
(Equation 8.1)
where:
n = number of assets
EC = undepreciated embedded cost of Ai
MV = market value of Ai
The underpinning of this argument is that because these investments are being stranded by
market forces and because the industry is becoming market-based, the only accurate (and
efficient) manner of determining the value of stranded investments is through the market.33
Often those arguing this position assert that utilities who wish to receive stranded
investment payments would be required to sell all of their generating assets, so that utility
customers would receive the benefits from those assets sold at a super-embedded cost
price.
8.2.2.2 Pay Off Stranded Investments
A second option would be for a utility to sell its transmission assets in order to pay off its
stranded investment in generation. 34 The transmission assets would be sold based upon the
30 See Section 3.7 for more details.
3 1For a discussion of this, see: Knight, 1995, 59-64.
3 2 Calculating stranded investments would not necessarily mean that the utility would receive 100%
compensation, however. Recent advocacy for this idea is found in: "ELCON Offers Stranded Cost
Compromise;" "GMP Wants Resource Auction to Determine Stranded Cost;" and "Green Mountain
Auction Plan Wins Kudos." The May 1995 CPUC decision mentions this, but does not advocate it.
Source: CPUC, May 1995, 12-13.
3 3Source: "AES: Real Reform Requires Splitting Generation from Transmission and Distribution."
3 4For example, see, for example: Moskovitz and Foy, 1994; and Wright, 1995. This is further described,
but not espoused by: McDiarmid, 1995.
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assumption that their embedded cost value is well below their market value.35 Proponents
argue that these assets could be sold at a market value large enough to offset some or all of
a utility's stranded generation investments.
This strategy is not without risks, however. One risk would be that the predictions are
wrong and that the utilities would not receive enough above-embedded cost revenues from
the sale of their transmission systems to compensate for their stranded investments. This
could occur for at least two reasons: the inherent value of transmission assets minus their
embedded costs are less than the stranded generation investments; and capital markets could
be unwilling to invest tens, if not hundreds, of billions of dollars36 in an industry that is
currently fraught with uncertainties as it moves through a transition state.
The converse (although unlikely) risk is that utilities could receive too much for their
transmission assets. If transmission assets were sold at artificially high prices so that
utilities could recoup generation stranded investments, the new owners would need to
charge super-economic transmission fees.37
8.2.3 Utilities View Divestiture As A Strategic Move
A utility could view divestiture as a strategic decision. For example, a utility could choose
to divest generation in order to focus on perceived core competency strengths in T&D or
because of an internal expectation that T&D would be more profitable.38 Regardless of the
reason, utilities do not appear to be wedded to the notion that they will remain vertically
integrated forever. In a 1993 survey of 41 electric utilities, less than half viewed generation
as "central to their mission." 39 Forty percent of the utilities responding to a 1994 survey
indicated that they believe that their generation function would be spun-off.40
While completely leaving a segment of the industry such as generation is one option, full
divestiture need not be the only course of action. A utility may wish to sell specific assets
35 Largely due to relatively high construction costs and the significant difficulty of siting a new line.
3 6The current embedded cost of transmission assets is approximately $57 billion. Estimates of stranded
investments range from $20-$200 billion. Sources: Energy Information Administration, January 1993, 47;
and Baxter and Hirst, 1995.
37 McDiarmid, 1995, 43.
3 8Wagener, 1995; and Gottlieb and Colucci, 1995, 63. In a recent survey, senior utility executives were
asked if they were forced to unbundle, which segment of the industry would they stay in? Distribution was
the choice of 57%, generation 28%, and transmission 15%. Source: "Vanishing Act."
3 9Homola et al, 1994, 66.
4 0Doughty and Rode, 1995, 24.
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for reasons that include: a desire to unload a high-cost project, an escape mechanism from a
high-cost fuel or labor contract, and an attempt to receive value from a mothballed asset.41
Strategic divestment is already beginning to occur. For example, Pacific Gas and Electric
(PG&E) has announced plans to sell off several hydroelectric projects and Commonwealth
Edison42 and Dairyland Cooperative are selling off large coal plants. 43 The most radical
move was recently proposed by Niagara Mohawk Power Company. This embattled utility
proposed, among other things, that it would sell its nuclear plants to the State of New York
Power Authority and that it would split itself into a generating and a T&D company. 44
Agis Salpukas, who extensively covers the industry for The New York Times,
commented,
[Niagara Mohawk's proposal is] the most far-reaching example so far of the
new strategies utilities nationwide are adapting in response to a rapidly changing
competitive environment... [The proposal] could be a model for other utilities to
follow as the industry undergoes a profound shift from state-regulated
monopolies to a new era of competition for power.45
8.2.4 The Reality
For a combination of the reasons above, it seems clear that some, if not all utilities will
eventually undergo some divestiture.46 The industry's understanding of this reality was
captured in a recent survey, where only 17% of the responding utilities thought that they
would retain their "traditional" functions of generation, transmission and distribution. 47
Another recent survey, this time of 42 state public utilities commissions, found that 40% of
them expect electric utilities to unbundle transmission from generation before the turn of the
century. 48 Yet another survey, this time of 91 state commissioners and 41 executive staff
members (of commissions) found that, "[respondents, by] a two-to-one margin saw
unbundling as being in the customers' best interests."49 These bits of information support
the likeliness of eventual divestiture. With this being the case, let us now examine how
divestiture would occur.
4 1Boddington, October 1995, 20.
4 2 Source: "ComEd Puts Two Plants on Block."
4 3 Boddington, October 1995, 20.
44Source: "Niagara Unveils Proposal to Split Electric Utility."
4 5Salpukas, 7 October 1995, 35, 39.
46 Radford, 1995.
47 Doughty and Rode, 1995, 24.
4 8Source: "Will IOUs Unbundle by 2000?"
4 9Source: "S&P Survey: Industry May Need Preemptive Transition Rules."
8.3 HOW WOULD DIVESTITURE OCCUR?
8.3.1 Impetus
8.3.1.1 Voluntary (Purely)
The first, and least contentious impetus for divestiture is that a particular utility would come
to believe that divestiture is in its (and its stockholders') best interest. While almost
unheard of in the electric power industry, these moves occur frequently in the larger
American economy. During the first seven months of 1995, 26 major companies spun off
assets with a market value of $16.7 billion. Included in this was the quintessential
conglomerate: ITT.50 Later in the year, two members of the Dow Jones Industrial Index,
AT&T and 3M, also split up.51 In the three mentioned cases, the companies plan to split
up by giving their shareholders stock in the "parent" and "offspring" companies that will
emerge after divestiture. A common thread in each case was the intent to split the company
along functional lines (keeping together the parts that are common) and along profitability
lines (freeing high margin business units from poorer-performing ones). There are
significant parallels in these examples to the predicted voluntary divestiture in the electric
power industry. With the exception of a partial divestiture of generation assets, electric
power divestiture would mean splitting the company along functional lines (generation,
transmission, and distribution); and if done voluntarily would likely result in the low
margin (generation) assets being separated from higher margin ones (T&D).
A less rosy scenario could also cause voluntary divestiture. Most experts suggest that there
will be a shakeout in the utility industry, with bankruptcies and "a clear separation of the
market into winners and losers."52 Companies do not tend to go bankrupt without a fight;
instead, they tend to sell off assets until only a shell of their former selves exist. Therefore,
it is likely that as utilities begin to experience financial duress, they will begin to sell off
assets "voluntarily" in acts of desperation.
8.3.1.2 Quasi-Voluntary: "carrots and sticks"
The second impetus would also be "voluntary," but it would result from "regulatory
duress." In a regulated industry, regulators have many sticks and carrots at their disposal,
even in cases where they lack the authority to compel action. For example, in the natural
5 0Source: "The Whirlwind Breaking Up Companies."
5 1For example, see: "3M Moves to Boost Profits;" "Minnesota Mining to Spin Off Units, Take Major
Charge and Cut 5,000 Jobs;" and "AT&T Has The Plan Is Mandl the Man?"
5 2 Source: "Gale: Beware the Permanent MW Surplus." Also see: "States: Utility Bankruptcies Will
Increase."
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gas industry, "voluntary" functional unbundling occurred under Orders 436 and 500. 53
Likewise, prior to the passage of EPAct, the FERC did not have the authority to mandate
open access to electric power transmission systems. However, during the late 1980s and
early 1990s, the FERC used carrot and stick mechanisms during its review of proposed
mergers and proposals for market-based pricing of wholesale power transactions to pry
open the grid, at least on a limited, case-by-case basis.54 The FERC likely finds itself in a
similar situation with regard to asset divestiture, in that it does not have the authority to
mandate divestiture. FERC Commissioner Donald Santa noted, "I believe that the FERC
can not directly force divestiture. But it can encourage utilities through a combination of
'carrots and sticks'."55 While the FERC may not have the power to force divestiture, state
commissions might.56
8.3.1.3 Mandatory
If some regulatory bodies (presumably state commissions) do in fact have the power to do
so, the most extreme form of government intervention would be the forced divestiture of
some utility assets. This option, albeit severe, is a genuine possibility since two of the
proposals that we are evaluating call for such a move, a third leaves it open for
consideration, and a fourth is silent on the matter. Only the FERC Mega-NOPR explicitly
does not call for such a move (although the FERC does not have the authority to do so).
Because mandatory divestiture would likely be contentious and litigious, the carrot and
stick approach is a preferable approach.
8.3.2 Mechanisms of Divestiture
There are at least three mechanisms by which divestiture could occur.
8.3.2.1 Spin-Off
The first of these would be to "spin off" the assets to shareholders in the form of a new
corporation. Shareholders would receive shares in the "pieces" of the companies that
result.57 As mentioned above, this method was the option chosen by AT&T, ITT and 3M;
as well as by numerous other companies. 58 A spin-off would be a good move for a utility
5 3For a more complete discussion of this, see: Section 6.3.5.2.
54 Joskow, 1994, 26; Houston, 1992, 51-53; Kelly et al, 1990, 56-58; and Hall, 1991.
5 5 Santa, 1995, 18.
5 6Their exact powers could be questioned. It should be noted that the states could also use a carrot & stick
approach.
5 7 See, for instance: CPUC, May 1995, 13.5 8Also see: "And Then There Were Two;" and "The Whirlwind Breaking Up Companies."
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that is seeking to separate its high-margin business from low-margin ones. On the other
hand, if a utility were looking for a cash infusion from divestment to pay for stranded
assets, a spin-off would not be a desirable move. 59 This is because any financial benefits
that occur from the spin-off go directly to the shareholders instead of the company's
balance sheet.
8.3.2.2 Auction
A second option would be to sell-off some or all of the pieces of a utility through an auction
procedure. Presumably, the auction and its details would be developed and implemented
through extensive negotiations between the state commission and utility. These
negotiations would be important, because the auction rules (e.g. floor/ceiling prices,
bidding eligibility) would play a large role in the ultimate "success" of the auction. While
the utility would likely run the auction, there would undoubtedly be close surveillance by
the commission, especially in cases where its proceeds would be used to calculate or
compensate for stranded investments.
8.3.2.3 Negotiated Sale Agreement
The third option would be for the utility to conduct its own selling process and come to a
sales agreement on its own terms with a suitor. Utility management would spend months
hammering out an agreement, which would be made public only when the details are settled
(although "leaks" occur frequently). This is the mechanism by which most companies are
sold. In general, this method has its advantages. For example, "typically, a buyer will
want to talk confidentially with the seller to ensure that the plan is realistic and meets the
seller's needs." 60 Likewise, the existing management would be given more of an
opportunity to protect "important" cultural aspects of the business, as well as discretion
with regard to intangible values, such as: the buyer's name and reputation, post-sale
treatment of current employees, the future of current management. 61
If transmission assets are divested in order to alleviate market power (and not to pay-off
stranded investments), a negotiated sales agreement would probably be the most likely
mechanism -- especially since the likely buyer would be a regional transmission entity.
Hence, with only one potential buyer, closed-door negotiations would not be frowned
5 9Unless an approach like AT&T's was taken. While shareholders received many of the shares in Lucent,
its telecom equipment spin-off, AT&T also offered shares in the new corporation through an initial public
offering which netted three billion dollars. Sources: "How Glowing is Lucent's Future?;" and "Lucent's
Initial Offering Net Record $3.025 Billion."
6 0 Boddington, May 1995, 76.
6 1Porter, 1980, 354.
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upon. However, if a utility were selling its generation assets and the sale's proceeds would
be figured into a stranded investment charge, such a mechanism would likely be
unacceptable. Presumably the public and its agents (the commissions) would demand a
totally open, level-playing field mechanism -- either a spin-off or a closely-monitored
auction.
Until now we have discussed both spin-off and sale divestitures. Much of the remainder of
the chapter will focus on the latter -- auctions and negotiated sale agreements -- because
they would be mechanisms for stranded investment recovery and they can be evaluated by
the paradigm that is developed and used later in the chapter. Having now examined the
whys? and hows? of divestiture, let us examine the question: what would make such a
move economically efficient?
8.4 WHAT WOULD MAKE DIVESTMENT EFFICIENT?
We develop two criteria to evaluate the efficiency of divestiture.
8.4.1 Prices Received Should Be "Correct"
The first criterion is that the price received from utility asset divestment should be
economically "correct" -- it should reflect the "true" inherent value of the assets. We make
the assumption that this would occur in a perfect "market" for companies. 62 Purchase price
distortion in either direction would have an impact on the efficiency of the restructured
industry. If the purchase price was too low, the utility would have its financial integrity
compromised and would be unnecessarily weakened in the market segments where it
retains its assets. Charles Studness comments, "If a utility cannot raise needed capital
because its financial condition is compromised, the quality of service provided to customers
suffers." 63 On the other hand, if the price received were too high there would be several
problems. First of all, if this price distortion resulted from a mandated sale price floor,
there might be a dearth of investors willing to buy the assets. Secondly, the prices that the
6 2 Michael Porter describes these markets as follows. "The market for companies is the marketplace in
which owners of companies (or business units) are sellers and acquiring companies are buyers. In most
industrialized nations, particularly the United States, the market for companies is a very active market in
which many companies are bought and sold every year. The market is well organized, involving finders,
brokers, and investment bankers all seeking to match buyers and sellers and often reaping large
commissions for doing so. The market has become more organized in recent years as both intermediaries
and participants have become more sophisticated. Intermediaries now work actively to generate multiple
bidders for selling firms, and multiple bids are common." Source: Porter, 1980, 350-351.
6 3 Studness, January 1994, 32. Paul Levy makes a similar argument, in the context of stranded
investments. "The financial ruin of many electric utilities ... would not provide a reasonable foundation for
a future that will require significant investment. Rather, it seems desirable to have most of these
companies be vital participants in the new marketplace..." Source: Levy, 1996, 88.
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entity would have to charge to recoup its investment would be higher than the most efficient
price for the provision of electricity service.
However, to expect that the "economic" price would be paid for all assets is wishful
thinking. Imperfections exist in "mature" asset "markets" and are heightened in emerging
asset markets -- such as the "market" for electric power assets. As one participant in the
business mentions, "while the market for generating assets is active, it is also imperfect.
Buyers and sellers are not numerous, nor are projects homogeneous. Information
differentials exist and barriers to entry are real."'64
In this chapter, the "correct price" efficiency condition is tested through the use of Michael
Porter's Competitive Strategy65 framework with regard to acquisitions. 66 Porter's
acquisition framework is designed to identify imperfections in asset markets since they can
lead to "successful acquisitions." 67 Porter takes this viewpoint because the book was
written to aid a prospective buyer in making an economically favorable acquisition. Thus,
by finding the favorable conditions for an acquisition according to Porter's framework, we
can identify features of proposals that would make them economically inefficient from the
societal perspective.
8.4.2 Market Power Would be Alleviated
A second criterion for evaluating the efficiency of divestiture sales is that market power in
the resulting industry structure should be alleviated.
Let us next examine the concept of competitive strategy.
6
8.5 COMPETITIVE STRATEGY
8.5.1 What Is It?
All firms have a strategy, or strategies for carrying on their business, whether they be
implicit or explicit. The academic study of competitive strategy is an attempt to rationalize
these strategies by providing an analytical framework for their development. A classic
work on the topic is the 1980 book by Harvard Business School Professor Michael Porter
entitled, Competitive Strategy: Techniques for Analyzing Industries and Competitors .68 In
64 Boddington, 1995, 75.
6 5 Porter, 1980.
6 6This is explained in more detail in Section 8.5 and Appendix G.
67 Porter, 1980, 353.
68 Porter, 1980.
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it, Porter presents "a comprehensive framework of analytical techniques to help a firm
analyze its industry as a whole and predict the industry's future evolution, to understand its
competitors and its own position, and to translate this analysis into a competitive strategy
for a particular business." 69 Porter does this through a series of frameworks for analyzing
a wide range of strategic decisions that firms must make -- whether to enter a new industry,
how to deal with fragmentation, and how to operate in (or exit) a declining industry.
8.5.2 How Will It Be Used?
In our analysis we utilize two of these frameworks, acquisition and entry, for both
transmission and generation. The reason for doing the acquisition analysis is that we want
to know the conditions by which divestment through a sale would be efficient. There are
two motivations for performing the entry analysis. The first is that one method of
eliminating market power would be through entry. Thus, this evaluation should tell us if
there are any circumstances in which it would be realistic to eliminate market power by the
"natural" process of entry instead of the more painful process of divestiture. The second
motivation is rather utilitarian, the entry analysis is the first step in performing the
acquisition analysis in Porter's framework.
8.5.3 Limitations of Porter's Framework
As is true of any theoretical framework, competitive strategy has some limitations. In the
process of completing the analysis in this thesis, several of these rose to the surface.
8.5.3.1 Input Assumptions
The first limitation is that the results are relatively sensitive to input assumptions and
conditions. This problem is compounded because the framework does not tend to reveal
important inputs that may be overlooked. For example, in our analysis of the electric
power generation industry, the framework does not prompt consideration of the existence
of surplus capacity. 70 If one does not designate capacity surplus as an input condition, the
analysis is performed without it, which could lead to poor strategic decisions.
Additionally, when performing the analysis in the electric power industry, the framework is
of little assistance in helping to determine who the potential competitors might be despite
the requirement that the analyst must identify potential competitors ex ante.
69Ibid., xiv.
7 0An important consideration in the electric power industry analysis because of the durability of facilities
and low demand growth rate.
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8.5.3.2 Conceptual Stretching71
A second problem encountered when applying Porter's frameworks is that they are
designed for use in competitive industries that have homogeneous national markets, rather
than in the Balkanized monopoly structure of the electric power industry. In contrast, our
analysis attempts to use the framework to identify favorable areas and conditions in a
spatially heterogeneous market. Furthermore, while the generation segment of the industry
is becoming competitive, its initial state in the analysis is not competitive; and the
transmission segment is definitely not competitive, nor do any of the proposals envision
anything but a monopoly transmission market.
8.5.3.3 Neglect of Regulation's Impact
A third weakness of Porter's frameworks, at least when they are applied to a heavily
regulated industry such as electric power, is that it does not have provisions for actions that
are mandated by regulators. They assume that market forces, not regulatory fiats, guide the
industry. In order to accommodate regulatory decisions, we explicitly insert these
considerations into our analysis.
8.5.4 Continuing Utility of the Framework
Despite the imperfections of the Competitive Strategy frameworks that are detailed above,
they retain beneficial qualities that make their use worthwhile. The first quality is that when
capital is infused into the electric power industry, it comes from competitive sources.
When deciding which industry to place their money in, investors have many options. Both
frameworks are based upon this assumption, and the acquisition one in particular is much
more geared toward this fact than it is toward the exact technology or market structure of
the industry. Secondly, the frameworks are relatively useful when examining competitive
industries, and since an underlying theme in this thesis is to understand how competition
might develop in generation and transmission, the frameworks could help meet this
objective. Thirdly, the intent of using the frameworks is to obtain a qualitative feel for the
likely result of divestiture in terms of utilities receiving an "economic" price for their assets.
As such, the intent is to gain insights on policy, not to develop quantitatively precise
predictions.
7 1Thanks to David Reiner for providing terminology support.
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8.6 APPLICATION TO GENERATION ASSETS
Let us now apply the frameworks to the generation segment of the industry.
8.6.1 Method
8.6.1.1 Entry Analysis
The first step in the analytical process is to ask and answer two questions regarding entry
into the generation market in an area:72
* What characteristics would make an area a desirable location to build a retail
merchant plant?
* What characteristics would make an area a desirable location to enter a
competitive auction for wholesale power production?
From these questions we can observe several valuable insights which are discussed later.73
In order to answer the questions, we perform analysis based upon the Porter "internal
entry" framework.74 This entry analysis is conducted in a series of stages.
The first step is to identify areas that would be desirable for entry using Porter's
"Identifying Target Industries for Internal Entry" criteria.75 The next step is to perform a
structural analysis of the industry, attempting to identify characteristics that would make an
area favorable, based upon Porter's structural analysis framework.76 With these in hand,
four points which Porter believes should be balanced 77 are analyzed. And finally, these are
compared with six "generic concepts for entry" that Porter expounded. 78 From this
analysis, a list of desirable characteristics for an area is found.79
8.6.1.2 Acquisition Analysis
The acquisition framework is a patchwork of four parts of Porter's book. The heart of the
framework is found in the latter part of Chapter 16, it also draws upon concepts from
Chapters 3 ("Framework for Competitive Analysis") and 9 ("Fragmented Industries"), as
well as the first part of Chapter 16 (entry). While the acquisition analysis partially builds
upon the findings of the entry analysis, the frameworks actually have little in common.
This may seem counter-intuitive at first, but it is the result of the frameworks' very
7 2An area is somewhat of a nebulous definition. Presumably this would be a state. The intent here is not
to focus upon a specific area, but rather to identify what would make for an "ideal" area for entry in terms of
the existing electric power industry.
7 3 See Section 8.6.2.1.
7 4Further details on the steps involved can be found in Appendix D.
75 Porter, 1980, 344-349.
76 Ibid., 5-29.
77 Ibid., 341-342.
78 Ibid., 349-350.
79 This overall process is similar in intent to "opportunities and concepts contour mapping" and "strategic
choke point analysis." For more information, see: Dar, 1996, 33-34.
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different purposes. The entry framework seeks to identify imperfections in the market for
products while the acquisition one focuses on imperfections in the market for companies.80
The common ground occurs when the acquisition framework builds upon the entry one by
identifying industries and situations in which it would generally be favorable to have a
business. For example, it would be more desirable to be in the semiconductor industry
than in the blacksmith81 business. But beyond the basic desirability of the industry in
question, the acquisition framework seeks companies that would sell at a price that would
provide a buyer with above-average profits (i.e. sold at a sub-economic price).
The generation acquisition analysis focuses upon answering a set of three questions:
* From the viewpoint of a current utility, in what situations would it be desirable to
purchase the generation assets of another utility?
* From the viewpoint of a current IPP, in what situations would it be desirable to
purchase the generation assets of a utility?
* From the viewpoint of an industry outsider, in what situations would it be desirable
to purchase the generation assets of a utility?
From these questions we find underlying insights on the situations that would lead to
efficient asset divestiture.
8.6.2 Findings
8.6.2.1 Entry Analysis
A detailed description of the analysis of the generation entry assumptions and results is
located in Appendix E. We find that it would be most desirable to build a merchant retail
wheeling plant in an area where:
* The state commission is open to allowing retail competition;
* The local utilities: have many dissatisfied customers, especially due to high
prices; are not prepared for competition, nor have they undergone the changes
necessary to compete effectively; or are saddled with old, inefficient plants;
* Stranded investment costs are not so high that significant relief would likely be
sought and granted (which would be a barrier to entry), yet not so low that
utilities can enter into the competitive era unscathed;
* The concentration of generators is likely to remain high (few new entrants will
emerge);
* The potential exists for a significant cogeneration facility;
* The regulatory structure allows for the producer, not the consumer, to retain
any benefits from economic inefficiencies;
* The entrant could create product differentiation due to the location of its other
generation assets;
* Demand is growing relatively quickly;
* There are significant potential customers who are concerned about electricity
prices but are not hyper-price sensitive (i.e. they would be willing to leave their
80Porter, 1980, 353.
81Thanks to Anita Kafka on her help with this.
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utility for significantly lower rates, but would not, in turn, leave the new entrant
for marginal savings);
* The customer base is likely to be somewhat diverse -- there is not dependence
on one customer or one large industry;
* "Easy" energy savings cannot be made -- DSM, etc. -- by potentially prime
customers;
* The entrant might be able to create new market structures; and
* The entrant's management has business experience and contacts.
It would be most desirable to enter a competitive auction for wholesale generation when:
* The number of expected bidders is small;
* The number of expected "winners" is greater than one;
* The entrant has a knowledge of the local area and its processes;
* Uneconomical DSM and renewable energy projects are not given high priority
according to the rules of the auction;
* The entrant could create a differentiated product; and
* The entrant could build a cogeneration unit -- either tied to a plant owned by
entrant or a partner of it.
8.6.2.2 Acquisition Analysis
Next we examine the possibility of acquiring generation assets. The detailed findings of
this analysis are located in Appendix H. There are four general findings that cut across the
three different scenarios with regard to when a firm would be able to purchase utility
generating assets at a sub-economic price:
* Divestment is forced by law;
* There are few potential bidders;
* A utility is in poor financial shape; and
* A generating company (utility) has managerial weaknesses compared to the
competition.
The first three findings have policy implications, and the first two are directly relevant to
divestiture.
The implication of the first finding is that if a state commission forces a utility to sell its
generation assets it is quite possible that the utility would receive a lower than economic
price for them. The second finding could either ameliorate or exacerbate the situation. The
emergence of many buyers, especially those that Porter deems as "irrational," 82 could act
as a countervailing force to mandatory divestiture and result in the utility receiving an
economic or even super-economic price. On the other hand, if few buyers emerge, the
utility could find itself with a significant economic loss. If the utility is able to collect
82 These are bidders who have reasons for wanting the assets which transcend the pure bottom line -- or at
least the bottom lines of other bidders. Reasons can range from purely emotional to being part of a strategy
for growth to the ability on the part of a particular bidder to extract extra economic good out of an
acquisition, for example, if the additional assets would lead to further economies of scale. Source: Porter,
1980, 355-356.
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stranded investments, the public would find itself with the loss. Regardless of who pays
the bill, the result is economic inefficiency. In evaluating the likelihood of having too many
vs. too few buyers, it must be remembered that utility assets are quite expensive. In fact, it
is estimated that only 5 to 10 non-utility generators are credible buyers for utility assets. 83
The third, and less obvious policy implication from this analysis is that if utilities are not
allowed to operate on a level playing field, economic inefficiencies may result. However,
if it takes other economic inefficiencies to create the level playing field (significant action to
return a utility to financial health), the trade-off may not be worthwhile.
8.7 APPLICATION TO TRANSMISSION ASSETS
We would also like to determine under what conditions it would be favorable for new
participants to enter into the transmission industry segment, by constructing new assets or
by acquiring those of a utility. It should be noted that these scenarios rarely, if ever, occur.
8.7.1 Method
8.7.1.1 Entry Analysis
Examining transmission entry is important because there is a concern that insufficient
incentives for transmission construction would exist in a restructured industry. 84 By
exploring the reasons that firms could enter into the transmission business, policy measures
for enhancing the incentives could be discovered. This discussion is also be helpful for the
discussion of non-utility transmission systems.85 In order to do so, we examine the
question:
SUnder what conditions would it be favorable for a new entrant to build
transmission capacity in the service territory of a utility that is not affiliated with
the new entrant?
Although the question we evaluate for transmission is different than the two questions that
we examine for generation entry, we use the same basic entry framework. Thbrefore, we
do not re-explain it here.
8.7.1.2 Acquisition Analysis
We also examine the efficiency of purchasing of a utility's transmission assets. In order to
do this, we examine three scenarios:
83 Boddington, May 1995, 75.
84 See Section 9.6.2.4. This is collaborated by a recent survey of utility executives which found that only
15% would choose to stay in transmission instead of generation or distribution in an unbundled industry.
Source: "Vanishing Act."
85 See Chapter 11.
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* Under what conditions would it be desirable for a new entrant to purchase a
utility's transmission assets?
* Under what conditions would it be desirable for an IPP to purchase a utility's
transmission assets?
* Under what conditions would it be desirable for a utility to purchase the
transmission assets of another (utility)?
Once again, we use the same framework as we do for the generation acquisition scenarios;
therefore we do not re-explain it.
8.7.2 Findings
8.7.2.1 Entry Analysis
A detailed description of the transmission entry assumptions and results is located in
Appendix F. We find that under the following conditions, it would be favorable for an
entity other than the local service utility to construct transmission capacity: 86
* Local authorities are open to progressive regulatory policies;
* The state has a relatively easy transmission siting process;
* The cost of line construction, including compensation for environmental
externalities, is relatively low;
* Transmission demand is growing relatively quickly -- whether it be in the
immediate region or as a result of being located between regions with high
electricity price differentials; and
* There are many distribution companies/aggregators and/or non-concentrated
ownership of generators in the region.
Perhaps the most interesting finding, which has implications for the California debate on
POOLCO vs. Bilateral, is the last one -- that there are many distribution companies/
aggregators and that ownership of generation is not highly concentrated. The basic finding
is that increasing the number of potential transmission customers would increase the
possibility of finding a sufficient customer base.87
It should not be surprising that entities that are attempting to build new transmission assets
would find states where the transmission siting process is relatively easy and where there
are lower costs for environmental remediation more favorable. While not startling, this
finding could be significant. An implication is that transmission siting rules, which are
typically not included in deregulation discussions, could play a role in determining the
ability to build new transmission lines in the event that new capacity would be efficient. If
sufficient incentives for new transmission construction exist, this consideration is likely a
second order effect at best. However, if, as some predict, adequate incentives for new
86This is not the exhaustive list of conditions, others can be found in Appendix F. The ones listed here are
those which have policy-making implications.
87 Especially since there already is an incumbent that has a significant amount of capacity.
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transmission capacity do not exist in the restructured industry, the ease of siting could be a
non-negligible factor in the ability to efficiently expand the transmission system.
8.7.2.2 Acquisition Analysis
Located in Appendix I is a detailed description of the transmission acquisition assumptions
and results. While the three scenarios find slightly different conditions under which the
acquisition of transmission assets would be desirable for the varying types of firms, three
conditions are consistent across the scenarios and have policy implications:
* Divestment is forced by law;
* There are few potential bidders; and
* A utility is in poor financial shape.
These three are similar to the set that we find for the generation acquisition case.
Consequently, we come to the same conclusion -- that a state commission contemplating
the forced divestiture of transmission assets should balance the possibility of not finding a
significant number of bidders for the assets with the potential efficiency gains of a divested
transmission system. This decision would probably be more perilous in the transmission
case than the generation case. One reason for this is that while generation assets do change
hands occasionally and a non-utility generation industry has been thriving for a decade and
a half (and therefore a "market" for assets has been developed), little, if any such activity
(and corresponding market) exists for transmission. Furthermore, because transmission
assets would likely be sold to one entity in any given region, there would likely be even
less of a "market" mechanism, and at first, there would be little precedence for price-
setting.
8.8 MARKET POWER ANALYSIS
Our second criteria for efficient divestment is that it would lead to a reduction or elimination
of market power.
8.8.1 Generation Assets
The five deregulation proposals that we examine have three classes of provisions regarding
generation asset divestment. Let us briefly examine them and their efficiency implications.
8.8.1.1 No divestment
The FERC Mega-NOPR and the California POOLCO proposal do not require utilities to
divest any of their generation assets (although the California POOLCO proposal calls for a
monitoring of market concentration). Depending upon the state or region's specific
circumstances, this approach could range from being reasonable to causing a significant
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market power problem. In an area where there are many utilities (low market
concentration) and a large capacity surplus, this approach may be acceptable. However, if
the ownership of generation assets is concentrated, this strategy could lead to serious
market inefficiencies. The case in Great Britain exemplifies the problems that can occur in
a highly concentrated market. Another factor that should be considered is the concentration
of ownership of the "mid-merit order" generators -- those whose cost structures would
have them operating at some times and not at others. Mid-merit order generators would
essentially set the market price whether it be explicitly in a POOLCO arrangement, or de
facto in a bilateral market structure. 88 If the market concentration is high in these middle
cost generators there would be a large opportunity for gaming, especially in a POOLCO
arrangement.
8.8.1.2 Partial Divestment
The California Final proposal suggests the divestment of 50% of Southern California
Edison's and Pacific Gas & Electric's fossil-fuel generation assets. The process of partial
generation divestment will partially determine its impact on market power. If a utility were
to divest all of the assets in a block, the result would be a transfer of market power from the
utility to the buyer. If, on the other hand, the divested generators were sold individually or
in several blocks, there would be a substantial reduction in market power. The previous
discussion on the concentration of marginal generators is also an important consideration
with respect to the efficiency of partial divestment. It is important that these generators be
in the hands of several companies, which likely means that some of them should be
retained by the utility.
8.8.1.3 Complete Divestment
The California Bilateral proposal and Wisconsin Extreme model call for utilities to divest all
of their generation assets. In California this could be through an auction, spin-off, or other
appropriate method; in Wisconsin, the sale of generators would through an auction or
sealed-bid process. As mentioned in the previous section, the manner by which divestment
would occur would have important implications for the resulting efficiency. An additional,
nontrivial problem with this approach is that it would require utilities to sell assets, such as
nuclear plants, for which there may be little if any market. While the complete divestment
approach would conclusively solve the market power issue, this benefit should be weighed
against the loss of efficiency due to the likely inefficient sales prices of some assets.
88CPUC, D.95-12-063, 99.
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8.8.2 Transmission Assets
The five proposals essentially contain two options for the transmission system: functional
unbundling (taken by three models) and structural unbundling (chosen in the other two).
8.8.2.1 Functional Unbundling
The three proposals that would lead to functional unbundling take two approaches.
According to the Mega-NOPR, transmission-owning utilities would continue to own and
control their transmission systems, but their wholesale sales agents would not have any
access to information about the transmission system that was not available to any other
generator selling wholesale electricity. This would be accomplished through the wholesale
sales agents receiving their information from the same real time information network (RIN)
to which others would have access. According to the California POOLCO and Final
proposals, utilities would turn over the operation of their transmission assets to an
Independent System Operator (ISO), who would operate the transmission system
according to non-discriminatory rules.
Functional unbundling is the middle ground approach; it attempts to eliminate market power
without the more serious step of forced divestment (and the potential efficiency problems
that could accompany it). While functional unbundling would reduce market power
(especially in the ISO approach), it would not guarantee the elimination of market power
abuse. 89
8.8.2.2 Structural Unbundling (Divestment)
The Wisconsin Extreme model and the California Bilateral proposal also take diverging
approaches to structural unbundling. According to the Wisconsin model, the utilities
would be required to sell all of their transmission assets to a newly formed, state-wide or
regional Transco, which Wvould operate them on a non-discriminatory basis. According to
the California Bilateral proposal, the utilities would divest their generators; and while
retaining ownership of their transmission assets, they would turn system operation over to
an ISO.
The structural unbundling approach would eliminate any possibility that a transmission
utility would use its market power to distort the generation market. However, the structural
unbundling approach would raise the same types of trade-offs that complete generation
divestiture would. In the California Bilateral proposal the trade-offs are identical, since
89 For example, see: Hempling, 1995.
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structural unbundling occurs through generation divestment. The Wisconsin Plausible
Extreme model could be problematic with respect to garnering an efficient price for the
transmission assets.
8.9 CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS
From the analysis in this chapter we draw several conclusions and develop policy
recommendations regarding the economic efficiency of divesting utility assets.
8.9.1 Forced Divestiture Would Likely Lead to Inefficient Sale Prices
The forced divestment of assets during periods of uncertainty (such as during the current
industry transition) is predicted to provide a utility with sub-economic revenues. The
policy implication of this is that "buying time" before divestiture, while attempting to
correct for market power abuse in the interim, would be the most efficient approach. These
policies are embodied in decisions such as the FERC Mega-NOPR and the California
POOLCO proposal, 90 where functional unbundling occurs first (with the potential for
being a permanent solution), yet is done in a manner that would easily facilitate asset
divestiture should functional unbundling prove to be an ineffective solution to the market
power problem or should utilities voluntarily chose that option.
8.9.2 This Can Be Mitigated
The negative impact of forced divestiture depends upon the particular local/regional
situation. If, for some reason, there are a number of credible, interested asset buyers or
there are buyers who are irrational -- who have strategic or emotional reasons for paying an
excessive amount for assets -- the problems associated with being forced to sell during a
period of uncertainty could be mitigated.
8.9.3 Market Power Is An Important Issue With Multiple Solutions
Experience in the British deregulation has borne out the importance of mitigating market
power. There are a variety of strategies for dealing with market power. In selecting a
strategy, trade-offs must be made between the risk of market power abuse and the amount
of disruption incurred in the attempt to prevent abuse.
90 See CPUC, May 1995, 48-49; and Section 5.5.4 of this thesis.
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8.9.4 Careful Consideration of Market Power and Divestiture Issues Should Occur
The most significant implication of this chapter's findings is that the potential for sub-
economic divestiture revenues is important to consider; but, at the same time, it should not
preclude forced divestiture if a regulatory body has substantial reason to believe that serious
market power problems would exist without some form of divestiture. In the absence of a
careful examination of the number of serious buyers that could be expected to bid for utility
assets91 and of a serious study of the market power of utilities, 92 the more cautious
approach of functional unbundling would appear to be the most efficient course of action,
at least until the fears of market power abuses are borne out in industry practice. If these
careful examinations are made, the restructuring decisions should be consistent with their
findings.
Having now devoted several chapters to specific topics and lessons regarding economic
efficiency, let us incorporate these into a fuller discussion of the issue as we develop
criteria for evaluating the long-term economic efficiency of the five proposals.
9 1However, it must be borne in mind that the number of interested buyers will likely outstrip the number
of credible buyers as a result of the massive amount of capital that is needed to buy these assets -- especially
if they are sold in larger blocks. Furthermore, if there is a large number of credible buyers for the assets,
the sub-economic revenue concern would be diminished.
9 2 The California Final proposal would seem to meet this criterion. The Commission studied the market
power issue at length, and in the end only required Southern California Edison and Pacific Gas & Electric to
divest some of their assets (it didn't require 100% divestiture nor did it require San Diego Gas & Electric to
sell any of its generation assets, since it does not own enough capacity to have market power).
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Criteria for Economic Efficiency in
Transmission
The statesman, who should attempt to direct private people in what manner they ought
to empfoy their capitals, would not only load himself with a most unnecessary attention,
but assume an authority which could safely be trusted, not only to no single person, but
to no council or senate whatever, and which would nowhere be so dangerous as in the
hands of a man who had the folly and presumption enough to fancy himself fit to
exercise it.1
--Adam Smith (1776)
9.1 INTRODUCTION
In this chapter we develop the criteria for evaluating the restructuring proposals on the basis
of economic efficiency in transmission, which is an important but rather intangible concept.
This is done by combining an understanding of the industry's technical and structural
details with economic principles. Because of its important role in improving productivity
and increasing efficiency over time, we make a special attempt to incorporate considerations
regarding technological change. We also place special emphasis on pricing, since it will be
the conduit for signaling efficient behavior in a restructured industry. At the end of the
chapter we put forward our efficiency criteria, which are based on efficiency issues that we
identify during the course of the chapter as well as lessons which we have learned in the
three previous chapters (lessons which are reidentified near the end of this chapter).
9.2 BASIC ECONOMIC PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY
We begin the process of formulating our criteria by defining economic efficiency. After
defining it, we examine basic economic principles regarding economic efficiency in order to
identify issues that should be incorporated into our criteria.
1 Smith, 1937, 423.
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9.2.1 Allocative Efficiency Defined
While economic efficiency is at the heart of economics and is intuitively understood by
many, it is a somewhat intangible concept. In the briefest of terms, "efficiency means there
is no waste."' 2 A more formal definition states,
Allocative efficiency is present when all markets are in long-run competitive
equilibrium. Each good is produced as long as consumers value it more than
the alternative goods that might be produced with the same resources. No unit
of the good is produced if a more valuable alternative must be foregone, and if
any reallocation of resources toward different goods or different combinations
of goods ... would not benefit any one person without hurting someone else3.
Although these definitions provide a conceptual background for understanding economic
efficiency, they do not provide tangible criteria for evaluating restructuring proposals.
9.2.2 Allocative Efficiency and Perfectly Competitive Markets
9.2.2.1 Conditions for Perfectly Competitive Markets
The concept is more testable as a result of the nearly axiomatic relationship that economists
establish between economic efficiency and perfectly competitive markets. This relationship
has its roots in Adam Smith's "invisible hand" of economics, which states:
one involved in the market "neither intends to promote the public interest, nor
knows how much he is promoting it.... He intends only his own security; and
by directing that industry in such a manner as its produce may be of the greatest
value, he intends only his own gain, and is in this, as in many other cases, led to
promote an end which was no part of his intention.4
Consumer and producer surpluses are maximized 5 by three characteristics of competitive
markets:6
* Efficiency in Exchange: Customers' trade-offs between types of goods are
equal;
* Efficiency in the Use of Inputs of Production: Every producers' marginal rate of
technical substitution of labor and capital are equal; and
* Efficiency in the Output Market:: The marginal rate of transformation between
outputs equals the consumers' marginal rates of substitution.
In a perfectly competitive market, the simultaneous fulfillment of these three conditions
results in a market clearing price equal to the marginal cost of producing the good or service
at the supply and demand equilibrium quantity. This finding, in turn, is the basis for the
economic principle that efficient production and consumption behavior are signaled by
marginal cost-based prices.7 Therefore, economists assume that efficiency occurs in a
perfectly competitive market, and as a result, the latter can be used as a standard for judging
2 Samuelson and Nordhaus, 1985, 28.
3 Gwartney and Stroup, 1987, 442.
4 Smith, 1937, 423.
5 Pindyck and Rubinfeld, 1992, 576.
6 For more detail, see: Pindyck and Rubinfeld, 1992, 602-603.
7 We return to marginal cost pricing issues later in this chapter.
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market efficiency 8 (i.e. when a market meets the criteria for a perfectly competitive market,
it is deemed to be efficient).9
9.2.2.2 Conditions for Perfectly Competitive Markets
With this being the case, we now ask, under what conditions is a market perfect?
Unfortunately, answering this question holds some of the same problems as defining
economic efficiency. However, headway can be made when the converse question is
asked, what makes a market imperfect?
9.2.2.3 Impediments to Perfectly Competitive Markets
Economists have identified four general reasons for market failure (the inability of the
market system to be perfect, and therefore, to attain ideal allocative efficiency):10 market
power, public goods, imperfect or asymmetries of information, and externalities. Let us
now examine both the economic theory behind these categories and their implications for
efficiency in electric transmission systems.
9.2.2.3.1 Market power
Market power exists when a firm has the ability to affect the price or quantity produced of a
good or service. In its extreme, market power takes the form of a monopoly (a single
seller) or a monopsony (a single buyer). Economists have found that prices are higher in a
monopoly market than in a competitive one, and the quantity of goods produced is lower,
which makes for a loss in allocative efficiency. Likewise, inefficiencies occur in a
monopsony market because a monopsonist has some control over the price it pays for
goods and purchases them in a quantity that maximizes its own net benefit:
Quantitymonopsomnst = f{ max(utilitymonopsonist - price) }. (Equation 9.1)
In the electric power industry, utilities have been granted market power -- in the form of a
franchised monopoly -- by the government because the resulting scale economy benefits
have outweighed the market power losses (especially since the latter have theoretically been
checked by price regulation). However, as technological innovation has reduced, if not
eliminated, the benefits of a monopoly generation market, the regulation-controlled market
power that once was beneficial, has become an impediment to efficiency. As a result, the
8 Pindyck and Rubinfeld develop a "proof" of this, see: Pindyck and Rubinfeld, 1992, 572-602.
9 In the real world, of course, this never happens. It is like the physicist who develops principles
neglecting gravity, friction, etc. However, like in physics, it does provide a useful template for
understanding phenomena.
10 See: Gwartney and Stroup, 1987, 442; Pindyck and Rubinfeld, 1992, 603-670; and Samuelson and
Nordhaus, 1985, 712-721.
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reduction, if not elimination, of market power has become an important consideration in
restructuring the industry. This is necessary in the generation segment in order to ensure
that a truly competitive situation can occur. (When this does not occur, as has been
witnessed in the United Kingdom, significant inefficiencies can result.)" Market power is
also significant in transmission because the vertically-integrated structure of many
incumbent utilities could thwart competition in generation. In fact, the FERC views
transmission system market power as "the single greatest impediment to competition." 12
While market power can be diminished in the generation segment by either constructing
new plants or selling-off some utilities' assets, the natural monopoly character of
transmission prevents such solutions. 13 We therefore identify an efficiency issue --
transmission systems should continue to be regulated as long as they are natural
monopolies, in order to minimize the economic inefficiencies that result from monopoly
ownership.
9.2.2.3.2 Public/Collective Goods
A second source of market failure is public/collective goods, which have two important
characteristics:
* Once produced, they can readily be provided to additional consumers at a
negligible marginal cost; and
* Once produced, it is difficult (if not impossible) to prevent someone from
consuming or using them (non-exclusivity).
A classic example is national defense. An investment is made to provide the citizenry with
security. The cost of protecting an additional citizen is zero and all citizens are protected
from outside attacks. Because people cannot be prevented from receiving the benefits from
a public good, a "free rider" problem can develop (i.e. one receives benefit from the good
without contributing to its costs).14 The market failure is that public goods are not readily
produced by market mechanisms since their non-exclusive character makes it difficult to
recoup their costs.
The ancillary services and system control functions of transmission systems are in the
domain of public/collective goods. For example, a system operator would be necessary
whether there are 10 or 10,000 transmission customers in a control area, the incremental
11 For a recent discussion 6f this, see: "Short Circuit."
12 FERC, 7 April 1995, 17664.
13 This is because of the unified character of the grid and important economies of scale. Source: FERC,
1989, 73. This same report lists six ways by which market power in transmission could be mitigated:
customer self- generation, indirect competition, customer choice of mandatory access to firm service at cost-
based prices and flexibly priced non-firm service, competitive joint ventures, direct competition of
alternative transmission lines, and regulation. Source: Ibid., 109.
14 Gwartney and Stroup, 1987, 689.
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cost of controlling the system for an additional customer is negligible if not zero, and the
benefits of system control are shared by all who use the system. In a vertically-integrated
utility industry, the responsibility for providing system control is clear, as is the method of
paying for it -- the utility is responsible for its provision and the cost is rolled into the
bundled rate structure. However, if transmission systems no longer are the exclusive
domain of vertically-integrated utilities, their responsibility and/or ability to fund system
operation would be reduced, if not eliminated. At the extreme, no entity would have an
inherent incentive to provide system operation, even though its provision is in the best
interests of all. A resulting efficiency issue is that because of the existence of public goods
in transmission, financial incentives (or structural provisions) should be established to
ensure that these vital functions are identified and would be effectively provided in a
restructured industry. 15
9.2.2.3.3 Imperfect Information or Asymmetries Thereof
In a perfectly competitive market, all participants possess complete and symmetric
information regarding the quality and price of goods and services. However, in the real
world, this is often (if not always) untrue because complete information does not exist (it is
imperfect for all) or because some market participants have more complete information (it is
asymmetric). Information imperfections can cause customers to make "incorrect"
purchasing decisions and suppliers to make "incorrect" production decisions, both of
which are inefficiencies.
At least three impediments to perfect information currently exist in electric power
transmission systems. The first is that transmission owners currently have greater
knowledge of their systems (costs and loadings) than transmission customers (e.g. IPPs
who wheel power over it). In the natural gas industry, a similar asymmetric information
problem was alleviated through the functional unbundling of transportation supply and
sales by pipeline companies (through Order 636). In this functionally unbundled system,
pipeline companies' gas sales employees work in isolation from their operations personnel
and are required to receive all of their pipeline information through the same mechanisms
that a non-affiliated salesperson would receive it. The most significant information transfer
mechanisms are electronic bulletin boards, which also reduce the asymmetry of information
between pipeline operators and their customers. (The ability of pipelines to take advantage
of an residual asymmetry they enjoy over their customers -- including their own sales force
15 For a more thorough discussion of this topic, and the potential negative consequences of underfunding
system control, see Appendix J.10.
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-- should be mitigated by FERC regulation.) The electric power FERC Mega-NOPRI 6 and
proposed rulemaking for real-time information networks 17 are steps toward reducing
information asymmetries.
A second (future) source of information imperfection in transmission systems is that even if
transmission utilities currently possess "perfect" knowledge of their systems; the
information that would need to be "known" in a competitive, unbundled electric services
industry would be different (and greater) than in today's bundled structure. The change in
necessary knowledge stems from two sources. First, there is not a clear theoretical grasp
of what information would be needed to perfectly understand the system and run it in a
perfectly efficient manner, or even an understanding of what industry framework would
facilitate these conditions. Secondly, even if a framework and the theoretical economic
tools to decipher the information necessary to fully understand the system were developed;
it is quite likely that the technical tools necessary to provide sufficient information would
not exist (at least at a reasonable cost). Although the increasing capabilities of
microprocessors are rapidly reducing technological limitations, technology-based
information imperfections will likely continue for the foreseeable future.
Thirdly, even if the theoretical debates are resolved and sufficient technology exists, it may
not be economically worthwhile to know all that would be needed to known in order to
meet the perfect and symmetric information criterion. The costs of metering, information
reporting, and mitigation processes could well offset the benefits of perfect information.
9.2.2.3.4 Externalities
Externalities occur when "a consumption or production activity has an indirect effect on
other consumption or production activities that is not reflected directly in market prices." 18
Externalities are rampant in electric transmission systems 19 because whenever power is
placed on the grid, it impacts other transmission users in several ways. First, transmission
lines have finite capacities. When a line's maximum capacity is approached (i.e. it is
congested), one transmission customer's use of the line may prevent another from being
able to send power across it. Second, because power flows along the path of least
impedance, sending power across "one line" (i.e. a contract path) may significantly change
16 FERC, April 1995.
17 FERC, December 1995.
18 Pindyck and Rubinfeld, 1992, 604.
19 Stalon, 19 October 1995.
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the power balance on the contract path line and on other, electrically close lines. The result
is that even if one contracts with transmission company A to send power across its lines,
transmission company B is likely transmitting some of the power (without compensation)
and being impacted by it (which creates externalities). The impacts on transmission line B
can range from increased transmission line losses to out-of-order dispatch. Third, real
power transmission line losses increase with the square of current passing through the line.
Therefore, when a party sends power across a line, the power of other line users is
dissipated at a higher rate.
While these externalities pose technical challenges in a vertically-integrated industry
structure, they have been largely internalized in the bundled rates of utilities. However, as
the grid is opened up to many, competing transmission customers, these externalities
should be addressed in transmission pricing structures and operating protocols in order to
ensure efficient operation of the system in the short-term, and to signal efficient long-term
system planning.
9.2.1.4 Efficiency Issues
Based upon this discussion, electric transmission systems clearly do not meet the criteria
for perfectly competitive markets. This finding is not unexpected, however, since
transmission is generally considered to be a classic natural monopoly.20 For transmission
systems to operate in a relatively efficient manner following industry restructuring, several
issues should be included in the criteria we put forward at the end of this chapter:
* Price signals should reflect marginal costs;
* Information on pricing and service quality should be made available to all
transmission systems users in an open and non-discriminatory manner;
* Regulatory oversight of transmission systems should continue as long as they
are deemed to be natural monopolies;
* Mechanisms for internalizing externalities through pricing systems and technical
requirements should be developed;
* The public/collective goods of transmission systems should be identified, and
incentives/structures should be developed to ensure their provision in a
restructured industry; and
* The vertical market power of transmission utilities should be reduced, if not
eliminated.
While our study of basic economic principles has yielded the identification of some issues
that should be incorporated into our efficiency criteria, more issues should be identified. In
order to do so, we examine several studies that have evaluated economic efficiency in the
electric power industry.
20 Weiss, 1971, 144.
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9.3 ELECTRIC POWER INDUSTRY ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY STUDIES
9.3.1 Markets for Power
In their 1983 book, Markets for Power,21 MIT economists Paul Joskow and Richard
Schmalensee use economic efficiency as their primary criterion for evaluating a set of
industry restructuring proposals. Because of the difficulties in constructing an evaluation
framework for economic efficiency, they employ qualitative, rather than quantitative
"measures." Their analysis is based upon answering two broad questions: 22
* Is electricity being supplied today, and will it likely be supplied in the future, at
the minimum possible cost?
* Do the prices charged consumers of electricity appropriately reflect the costs of
electricity supply, so that consumer decisions about electricity use also reflect
those costs appropriately?
From the principles inherent in these question, Joskow and Schmalensee develop a more
comprehensive analytical framework, which consists of four sets of issues, and subsets of
criteria (in the form of questions) in each.23
9.3.1.1 Short-Run Production Efficiency Considerations24
* Are the current assets being used as efficiently as possible?
* Are there alternative institutional arrangements that are likely to improve the
efficiency with which plant and equipment are used?
* Specifically, is the system using least-cost supply?
- economic plant dispatch
- efficient maintenance
- minimum fuel procurement
- efficient utilization of labor
9.3.1.2 Long-Run Production Efficiency Considerations25
* Investment decisions (in generation, transmission, distribution) should provide
for least-cost production given the expected technology and input prices over
the lifetime of the facilities. This includes:
- appropriate mix of base-load, cycling, and peaking capacity (at least cost);
- planning and coordination that occurs on a level of aggregation that can take
advantage of maximum economies of scale;
- transmission and ties between generation facilities operate at least cost (at any
given point in time) and maximize system stability and reliability;
- minimum cost construction of new facilities; and
- realization of short-run efficiencies upon construction.
* What will be the effect of institutional arrangements and proposed alternatives
on the rate of technological change?
21 Joskow and Schmalensee, 1983
22 Ibid., 9.
23 They also take into account several other considerations, including the cost of regulation and transaction
costs. See Appendix J.8 for more on transaction costs.
24 Joskow and Schmalensee, 1983, 82-85.
25 Ibid., 85-88.
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9.3.1.3 Short-Run Pricing Efficiency Considerations 26
* Prices provide correct signals to buyers if and only if they are equal to marginal
cost. Ideally, one would set the marginal cost instantaneously, however,
transaction costs may make this inefficient.
* Long-term contracts may be desirable in the presence of uncertainty, imperfect
information, incomplete insurance, and the possibility of opportunistic
behavior.
* Prices should reflect marginal costs, taking appropriate account for metering
costs and contractual complexities (these can include: spot pricing, non-linear
rates, time of season rates, and time of day rates).
* Short-run consumption is mainly a function of current appliance stock (marginal
cost pricing will not impact consumption much in the short-term).
9.3.1.4 Long-Run Pricing Efficiency Considerations27
* New (consumer) capital purchases will allow for increased efficiency gains
(vis-h-vis short-run) due to marginal cost pricing.
9.3.1.5 Discussion of Framework
Joskow and Schmalensee's framework was effective for performing their analysis in 1983,
and many helpful insights can still be gained from it today. As a result, many of the issues
it raises are included in the set of criteria we establish at the end of this chapter. However,
we do not employ it lock, stock and barrel because:
* It was designed to evaluate the entire industry, rather than focusing on transmission;
* It was designed to evaluate an industry that has changed significantly in the past 13
years (as has the political climate); and
* It places equal weight on short- and long-term issues while we focus on the latter.
Therefore, we examine several other industry studies to see how they handle economic
efficiency.
9.3.2 Some Bconomic Principles for Pricing Wheeled Power
Several years later, Kevin Kelly, J. Stephen Henderson and Peter A. Nagler of the
National Regulatory Research Institute wrote Some Economic Principles for Pricing
Wheeled Power.28 The report established seven "insights about pricing" which would
promote economic efficiency in power wheeling: 29
* Good decisions are those that result in incremental benefits to all parties greater
than the incremental costs for all parties.
* There is no single best pricing rule for power exchanges or for wheeling that
results in good decision-making. A variety of pricing rules can do so; these rules
differ according to how the gains from trade are shared among the parties.
26 Ibid., 80-82.
27 Ibid., 82.
28 Kelly et al, 1987.
29 Ibid., 150-151.
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* All pricing rules that promote good decision-making produce the result that
marginal generation supply costs of any pair of companies differ at most by the
marginal cost of transferring power between them. We call this result the
equalization of marginal costs across the grid.
* Marginal transmission cost between any buyer-seller pair in a network with
parallel flow paths is determined on the basis of the weighted average cost per
unit of energy over all paths linking the pair, where these costs are weighted by
the fraction of the energy flow along each path.
* Either a series of direct two-party sales, a series of multi-party wheeling
transactions, or a combination of approaches is capable of achieving the efficient
result, the equalization of marginal costs across the grid. From the viewpoint of
good decision-making, there is no single best organization of the industry: ... if
power is priced efficiently and wheeling is priced efficiently, then (absent non-
price impediments to power transfers and absent significantly different
transaction costs with different ways of organizing the industry) the power flows
that result are the same as those achieved by economic dispatch of the entire
network.
* One may decide on the basis of fairness among pricing rules that promote good
decisions, but starting with a fairness criterion may result in a rule that causes
bad decisions to be made.
* Pricing for good decision-making requires that those who experience loop flow
costs and who can affect decisions about the use and expansion of the
transmission network be compensated at least for the incremental costs
experienced between any buyer-seller pair.
These insights were developed from two closely-related fundamental principles: marginal
cost equalization across the grid in the short-run and in the long-run. The latter principle is
achieved when the grid is optimally configured such that transmission capacity is fully and
optimally utilized at the planned peak-load level. The former occurs when the spatial
marginal cost of electricity at any point on the grid is equalized (which takes into account
marginal line losses and generating costs).30
9.3.3 Electricity Transmission: Realities, Theory, and Policy Alternatives
In 1989, a FERC-commissioned Transmission Task Force wrote Electricity Transmission:
Realities, Theory, and Policy Alternatives.31 This report features thorough discussions of
important issues and policy alternatives with respect to transmission. While helpful as
background -- basic concepts and policy options from it are used throughout this thesis --
the relevance of the report's analytical framework to this thesis is limited because:
* It is based upon assumptions of the pre-Energy Policy Act of 1992 (EPAct) era;
* Economic efficiency is only one of several issues in the framework's issue
matrix;32 and
* Its criteria are rather prescriptive in nature.
Nevertheless, we draw on this report extensively later in this chapter when we discuss
pricing efficiency.
30 Ibid., 247-248.
31 FERC, 1989.
32 Ibid., 148.
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9.4 TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE AND EFFICIENCY
Joskow and Schmalensee's framework identifies technological change as being important
to long-run production efficiency. 33 In this section, we attempt to answer the question,
why is technological change important?, at both the societal and industry levels; and then
examine some economic research and experiences within the industry with the purpose of
identifying further issues to include in our efficiency criteria.
9.4.1 Importance to Societies
Technological change on the societal level plays a central role in increasing real incomes 34
and serves as an important determinant of economic growth --- "technology is the engine
of economic growth,"' 35 its "prime mover." 36 In a pioneering study, MIT economist Robert
Solow estimated that during the period 1909 to 1949, when the gross output of an
American worker doubled, 87 1/2 percent of the productivity increase was due to technical
change. 37 Since Solow's findings were published, economists have paid a significant
amount of attention to the topic of technological change and economic growth.
9.4.2 Technological Change Within the Industry
9.4.2.1 Technological Change's Impact Through the Industry's History
The impact of technological change on the electric power industry has been profound. In
many ways, the growth of the industry has been driven by improved technologies in both
generation and transmission. In its early years, the electric power industry was composed
of many small generators, located close to the loads they supplied. Utilities began to serve
larger regions as advances in transmission technologies allowed for increasing transmission
voltages,38 which allowed for increased transmission distances. This was done, in part, to
take advantage of increasing economies of scale made possible by advances in generation
technologies. Incremental improvements to the thermal-steam generating plant (which
operates on the thermodynamic Rankine Cycle) allowed for higher energy conversion
efficiencies and increasing economies of scale. The technological improvements in the
industry over the past century have been matched by few industries. For example, between
1899 and 1953, the total factor productivity of the industry rose at an average annual rate of
33 Ibid., 85.
34 Joskow and Rose, 1989, 1483.
35 Clinton and Gore, 1993, 7.
36 David, 1986, 373.
37 Solow, 1957, 320.
38 Kelly et al, 1987, 281-284.
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5.5%.39 (See Table 9.1 for a comparison to other industries.) In another quantitative
study, this one of scale economies in the electric power industry, Christensen and Greene
found that while scale economies played a part in the decline in real electricity prices
between 1955 and 1970, technological improvement was a far more important
contributor. 40 However, when the thermodynamic limits of the Rankine Cycle were
reached in the 1960s4 1 and the supercritical generation technologies that were subsequently
employed were not as reliable as their smaller, less advanced brethren, 42 the industry
became fertile ground for the introduction of new generating technologies. From the
technology standpoint, these factors led to the sea-change in the industry that we see
today. 43
Table 9.1: Total Factor Productivity Gains in Selected Industries
Average Annual Total Factor Productivity
Industry Increase (%), 1899-1953
Electric Power 5.5
Manufactured Gas 4.7
Chemicals 2.9
Fabricated Metals 2.6
Railroads 2.6
Electric Machinery 2.2
Natural Gas 2.0
Telephone 2.0
Machinery, non-electric 1.7
Farming 1.1
Source: Kendrick, 1961, 136-137.
As the industry moves toward deregulation, many of the institutional changes that are now
occurring would not have been possible without continuing technological advance.44 For
example, advanced aeroderivative and combined-cycle turbine technologies have low
operating costs and per production unit capital costs that are as little as one-quarter those of
a large coal plant.45 Furthermore, the construction lead times on advanced gas turbine
generators are as little as one year. This is in sharp contrast to the situation only one decade
ago. In 1985, Paul Joskow and Nancy Rose stated, "we recognize explicitly that power
plants are not standardized piece of equipment manufactured in factories, but are brought
39 Kendrick, 1961, 137.
40 Christensen and Greene, 1976.
41 Yeager, 1994.
42 Joskow and Rose, 1985.
43 Yeager, 1994, 27.
44 Yeager, 1995, 50.
45 Bayless, 1994, 21.
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into operation as a consequence of large-scale construction projects."46 In addition to the
changes facilitated by new generation technologies are improvements in information
technologies (IT). In particular, advances in microprocessor technologies are increasing
information-processing capabilities while decreasing costs. These improvements allow for
metering and system control activities that were previously technically or economically
infeasible. In looking to the future, the industry's growth trajectory will likely be
determined by the industry's effectiveness in harnessing technological advance.47
9.4.2.2 Industry Structure and Innovation
Technological improvements occur within the context of an industry's organizational
structure. As William Hughes comments, "The evidence ... suggests that both technical
efficiency and technological progress have been closely tied to the organization of the
industry." 48 Changing organizational contexts have helped to drive the technological
improvements of the 1980s and 1990s. For example, while NUGs were not responsible
for the basic development work that went into advanced gas turbine generators, their
adoption of the technologies served as an important demand stimulus. As Paul Joskow
notes, "QF developers provided a major stimulus to advances in CCGT technology and
have been successful in applying this technology very efficiently." 49
9.4.2.3 Efficiency Issues Regarding Technological Change
From this discussion we make several findings about the importance of technological
innovation in the electric power industry and its implications for industry structure. First,
technological change makes an industry more efficient. Second, since industry structure
impacts technological advance, the restructuring proposals should be designed to facilitate
technological change and to reduce impediments to innovation. Third, because
technological innovations can lead to changes in industry structure, the industry should be
restructured in a manner that would allow it to adapt to innovations in a relatively efficient
manner.
9.5 TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE FACILITATION AND IMPEDIMENTS
These findings prompt two interrelated questions, how can technological innovation be
facilitated, and conversely, what are impediments to it? We attempt to answer these
46 Joskow and Rose, 1985, 2.
47 Yeager, 1995, 59.
48 Hughes, 1971, 46.
49 Joskow, 1994, 20.
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questions concurrently, by examining the results of economic research and experiences
within the industry. We start with a discussion of why it is important to make explicit
considerations for technological change.
9.5.1 Increasing Returns (Positive Feedbacks) and Technological "Lock-In"
Classical economics assumes that the market's invisible hand guides technological
development and market structures to the most efficient outcome. However, recent
economics research indicates that this is not necessarily true, especially in markets with
characteristics similar to a transmission system, which has been described as "the largest
interconnected system man has invented."' 50 W. Brian Arthur posits that technologies
which:
* are produced through knowledge-based processes,
* have high fixed and low marginal production costs, or
* are used in networks that require compatibility,
tend to have increasing returns characteristics (also known as positive feedbacks). 5'
Transmission systems likely have increasing returns characteristics as a result of their
network properties, and to a lesser extent, their significant sunk costs. When an industry
has increasing returns characteristics, technological "lock-in" (i.e. the technology or
product that takes a lead in adoption tends to stay ahead and increase its lead) can occur.
Arthur, in fact, posits that an increasing returns system will converge to dominance by one
technology with a probability of one. Nathan Rosenberg reaches a similar lock-in
conclusion in his evaluation of the telecommunications industry. Lock-in occurs because
"future investments must remain compatible with the currently chosen system, as capital in
telecommunications is usually long-lived." 52
The efficiency implication of this research is that transmission systems could readily
become locked-in to "inferior" technologies which would essentially prohibit the use of
more efficient technologies that might currently exist, or be developed in the future. (The
most cited example of an inferior technology being adopted is the near-universal adoption
of the QWERTY keyboard on typewriters.) 53 The challenge that results is to prevent lock-
in to inferior technologies. According to increasing return economics, however, this is
more difficult than it sounds, because "small chance events early in the history of an
50 Schweppe, 1978, 42.
51 See: Arthur, 1990; Arthur, 1989. For a less technical discussion of this, see: "The Theory That Made
Microsoft."
52 Rosenberg, 1994, 205.
53 See, for instance: David, 1985. According to the theory, a similar situation could have happened in the
electric power industry. See Appendix J.4 for a more thorough discussion.
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industry or technology can tilt the competitive balance." 54 This "chance" element may be
reduced in the case of electric power transmission, however, since "lock-in" to the current
transmission technologies has already occurred. Thus, it would likely take some
significantly "better" (presumably more efficient) technology to replace what is currently
"locked in." With this being the case, the significant lesson from this discussion is that
efficient technological change in transmission systems is not predetermined.
9.5.2 Impact of Market Structure on Technological Adoption
Some economists have concluded that "changes in industry structure ... do affect the
incentives for developing specific technologies." 55 In light of the previous discussion and
the significant changes that the restructuring proposals promise, it would be valuable to
examine what these impacts are.
9.5.2.1 Incumbent Firms
Some research suggests that the innovativeness of an industry's "established" firms tends
to athropy. For example, in a study of fifty innovations that led to new technological
paradigms in their respective industries, Burton Klein found "no case in which the advance
in question came from a major firm in the industry." 56 In a similar vein, a recent Harvard
Business Review article concluded that "every company that has tried to manage
mainstream and disruptive57 businesses within a single organization failed." s58 These (and
other similar) findings would suggest that allowing new, competitive entrants into at least
some transmission functions would increase innovation in transmission technologies. 59
9.5.2.2 Monopolies And Competition
From both theory and practice it has been observed that technological innovation appears to
be retarded in the presence of monopolies and to increase when competition enters an
industry.
54 Arthur, 1990, 92.
55 Greenwald, 339.
56 Klein, 1977, 17.
57 "Disruptive technologies introduce a very different package of attributes form the one mainstream
customers historically value." Source: Bower and Christensen, 1995, 45.
58 Bower and Christensen, 1995, 51.
59 A potential contradiction to this finding is that technological advances in the electric power industry have
traditionally been made by the equipment manufacturers rather than the utilities. Thus,
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9.5.2.2.1 X-Efficiency Theory
In his X-efficiency theory, Harvey Leibenstein claims that the largest efficiency loss caused
by monopolies is not the result of their ability to artificially constrain supply and raise
prices; but rather, that monopoly firms do not operate on the outer bound of their
production-possibilities curve.60 One of several contributors to this "X-inefficiency" is a
failure to innovate.61
9.5.2.2.2 Incentives of Rate of Return Regulation in 1970s
Some economists and environmental advocates criticized utilities during the 1970s for
being slow to adopt new generation technologies, especially "environmentally friendly"
ones such as renewables and cogeneration. In fact, PURPA's small power production
provisions were, at least in part, the result of frustration on the part of Congress and the
Carter Administration with this recalcitrance by utilities.62
9.5.2.2.3 Averach-Johnson Effect
Some argue that one reason for the utilities' recalcitrance was that rate-of-return (ROR)
regulation provided incentives for constructing coal and nuclear plants (instead of smaller,
alternative energy ones). Theoretical grounding for this argument came from Averach apd
Johnson, who theorized that a firm operating in a rate-of-return regulatory environment
faces incentives that lead to two types of socially inefficient behavior:63
* The firm does not equate marginal rates of factor substitution to the ratio of
factor costs; therefore a firm operates inefficiently in the sense that (social) cost
is not minimized at the output it selects.
* The firm has an incentive to expand into other regulated markets, even if it
operates at a (long-run) loss in these markets; therefore it may drive out other
firms, or discourage their entry into these markets, even though the competing
firms may be lower-cost producers.
Although Averach and Johnson focused on telecommunications in their analysis, the Effect
is intended to describe the behavior of all rate-of-return utilities. When its first finding is
applied to the electric utility industry, the Averach-Johnson Effect implies that ROR
regulation rewards utilities for large capital expenditures (such as building coal and nuclear
plants). The implication is that continued ROR regulation of transmission might impede the
adoption of less capital-intense new transmission technologies. It should be noted,
60 Leibenstein, 1966. Such effects are seen as one of the primary sources of expected efficiency
improvement in the restructured electric power industry. See, for example: Tabors Caramanis &
Associates, 1995, 47.61 Leibenstein, 1966, 398.
62 Dasovich et al, 1993, 50.
63 Averach and Johnson, 1962, 1052. These findings are commonly referred to as the Averach-Johnson
Effect.
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however, that the Effect's validity, like many economic theories, is not universally
accepted.6
9.5.2.2.4 Experiences of Deregulation in Other Industries
A widely accepted observation from the deregulation experiences of other industries is that
the emergence of new competitors in markets previously dominated by monopolies
stimulates technological advance.65 Explanations for this include:
* Firms in a deregulated market are forced to be more innovative in order to gain
or maintain competitive advantage;
* New firms bring with them new organizational structures that stimulate
innovation;
* The increased number of firms create a larger number of potential customers for
innovative suppliers and creates incentives for new firms to enter the supply
business; and
* The profit caps on regulated utilities provide insufficient incentives for adopting
new technologies which might improve.66
9.5.2.2.5 Firms With Special R&D Capabilities
The commonly cited counter-example to the above observation is the decline of several
exceptional laboratories affiliated with companies that had either legal or de facto
monopolies. 67 The most commonly cited ones are AT&T (Bell Labs), IBM (Watson
Labs), RCA (Sarnoff Labs), and Xerox (Palo Alto Research Center). As Vietor observes,
In basic science and engineering, Bell Laboratories was an extraordinary
innovator. Only the protected earnings produced by AT&T's regulated
monopoly made such a research effort possible.6
The common experience of these labs has been that they developed remarkable innovations
over the past five decades, but have faced significant cut-backs as their parent companies
encountered competition (or stiffer competition).69 A similar experience is now occurring
in the electric power industry -- major electric utility R&D budgets dropped by one-third in
1993 alone, with utilities in states at the vanguard of the competition movement making the
largest cuts.70
However, the negative consequences of this phenomenon are not likely to be significant in
the electric power industry for two reasons. First, the four cited examples were
64For a review of the various studies and an evaluation of their findings, see: Joskow and Rose, 1989,
1477-1480.
65 For example, see: Knight, 1995; Gardner and Gilson, 1994; and Bradford, 1994, 8.
66 This is a suggestion of the author, based upon: Lyon and Huang, 1995, 772.
67 For more discussion of this, see Appendix J.5.3.
6 Vietor, 1994, 319.
69 Sarnoff labs, in fact, was given away to a private firm when General Electric purchased RCA in 1987.
Source: Dertouzos et al, 1989, 227.70
"High Noon for R&D," 60.
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exceptionally innovative labs, matched by few, if any other industrial facilities. Beyond the
upper echelon which includes these four and perhaps several others, there is little evidence
that large industrial R&D facilities have advantages over smaller ones.71 Secondly, most of
the technological advances in the electric power industry have been made by electric power
equipment manufacturers, rather than utilities.72
9.5.2.3 Efficiency Issue
The significant finding of the discussion so far is that competition, in at least some aspects
of transmission, would likely have a positive impact on technological innovation.
9.5.2.4 Scope of Regulatory Bodies 73
A lesson on the relationship between the geographic scope of regulatory bodies and
technological innovation can be learned by contrasting the relatively advanced Chicago
electric power system prior to World War I with London's relatively backward system.
9.5.2.4.1 Chicago
Between 1890 and 1905, as many as 47 franchises were granted to provide electricity to
part or all of Chicago. 74 Because of a combination of engineering and economic skills,
Samuel Insull recognized that a consolidation of these many small (often competing)
electricity companies would increase efficiency. He also understood the political actions
necessary to form a consolidated system. After outmaneuvering a group of local cronies,
he was able to purchase a 50-year service franchise for all of Chicago. However, due to
the increasing scale economies provided by new technologies and observations on the
experiences of other "utility" industries in the corrupt Chicago political environment, Insull
concluded that state (rather than municipal) regulation would better promote the continued
expansion and improvement of electric power systems. After years of advocating state
regulation, he persuaded the National Electric Light Association (NELA) to support the
concept in 1907. Three states established regulatory agencies that year, and 33 states had
such bodies by 1916.75 With regulatory authority in the hands of the states, electric
companies were free to grow beyond city boundaries in order to take advantage of
economies of scale, and were exempt from the fragmentation and potential corruption of
municipal regulators.
71 Acs and Audretsch, 1991, 55.72 Mowery, 1983, 35; and Joskow and Sclunmalensee, 1983, 87.73 For a fuller account of the details in this section, see: Appendix J.6.1 or Hughes, 1983, 201-261.
74 Wilcox, 1910, 143.
75 Hyman, 1988, 68.
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9.5.2.4.2 London
In contrast, the governing structure of London was Balkanized -- electric companies had to
contend with at least three levels of local government, with forces at the lowest level being
least amenable to the creation of a consolidated system (i.e. each borough government
adamantly maintained control over its area). As a result, within the domain of the London
city council, there were 28 boroughs and twenty-eight utilities,76 and in the Greater London
area there were 65 utilities. These political and industry structures had a deleterious effect
on the development of new technology, which is best evidenced by the failure of the
Deptford power station. Despite being "considered as the forerunner of all modern central
power-stations," 77 the plant failed due to a lack of financial support from its investors
(which resulted from the balkanized London governance structure preventing it from taking
advantage of scale economies). When the plant failed, so too did Britain's attempt to stay
at the technological frontier in electric power systems. Between the late 1880s and early
1910s, London went from being one of the world's most advanced cities (in terms of
electrification) to being one of the laggards, in large part due to its Balkanized governance
of the industry.
9.5.2.4.3 Efficiency Issue
The most significant lesson from these contrasting stories is that in order for a system to
operate efficiently and take advantage of technological opportunities, the bodies that
regulate it should be composed in a manner that allows them to regulate with a system-wide
perspective.
9.5.2.5 Unnecessary Foreclosure of Technologies
Another example of a government-created impediment to technological innovation in the
industry was a sister bill of the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978 (PURPA) --
the Powerplant and Industrial Fuel Use Act of 1978 (PIFUA). As mentioned previously,
PURPA and its sister Acts were intended to wean the nation from foreign petroleum
dependence.78 PIFUA was the most blunt instrument in this strategy, and was especially
harsh on gas-fired power generation;
Natural gas or petroleum shall not be used as a primary energy source in any
new electric powerplant; and no electric powerplant may be constructed without
the capability to use coal or any other alternative fuel as a primary energy
source. 79
76 Hughes, 1983, 236.
77 Singer et al, 1958, Vol. V, 200.
78 See Sections 3.3 and 3.4.79PL95-617, 3298.
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The law further stated, "natural gas shall not be used as a primary energy source in an
existing powerplant on or after January 1, 1990."' 80 Exceptions to both provisions were
available by statute (such as the use of gas for fueling cogeneration plants) and at the
discretion of the Secretary of Energy. Although the end of the energy crisis led to broad
use of the latter exception,8' utilities faced significant disincentives to adopt the new,
revolutionary gas turbine generators until the Act was repealed in 1987 because their
investments could immediately be rendered useless if the law were "re-enforced."82
The most significant lesson from the PIFUA case is that caution should be taken before the
long-term use of a particular technology is foreclosed. By only looking at a technology's
current state of development, one can overlook the potential for technological development
as well as changes in the status of alternative technologies. That is not to say that
regulatory oversight should be abdicated, however, since there may be legitimate public
policy or safety issues at stake that are of a higher value than efficiency. But policy
decisions as drastic as PIFUA should only be made after carefully considering future
technological possibilities.
9.6 EFFICIENT PRICE SIGNALS
9.6.1 The Coming Shift From Completely Centralized to Partially Market-Based
Transmission Planning and Operation Decision-Making
Currently, utilities are the suppliers of bundled transmission service. They build and
operate transmission wires and associated equipment, are responsible for system control
and the ancillary services, and plan future transmission system improvements. While
utilities perform many of the short-term tasks individually, they make transmission
planning decisions in conjunction with other utilities (especially with those in the same
North American Electric Reliability Council (NERC) region) and with input from a variety
of government organizations. In a restructured industry, the role that utilities will play in
transmission planning is certain to change. For example, because of the intimate
relationship between transmission and generation, centralized transmission planning
includes generation site selection. But, as deregulation gives non-utility generators
(NUGs) more autonomy and NUGs become a larger force in the industry, centralized
planning of generation siting will likely cease. Furthermore, as utilities begin to compete
with each other, the gentlemanly planning agreements (through NERC's reliability
80 Ibid., 3305.
81 Pierce, 1988, 11.82 Budhraja, 1995 33.
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councils) that have been forged between "cooperative" firms will likely become strained,
and perhaps eventually break.
Transmission system "real-time" control may also be removed from the domain of
integrated utilities since many people believe that a truly fair, competitive generation market
cannot emerge as long as transmission systems are operated by vertically-integrated
utilities.8 3 Although the Mega-NOPR would not mandate independent system operators
(ISOs), numerous state proposals call for their creation and several groups of utilities are
proposing the voluntary formation of ISOs.M
If utilities lose internal control over transmission operation and planning, it would be
necessary to replicate at least some of these centralized functions with market mechanisms
-- specifically price signals -- in order for the grid to be planned and operated efficiently.
The shift in the locus (from central planning to the market) of some of these responsibilities
would be consistent with trends in the rest of the industry, although creating "proper"
pricing incentives would be a complicated undertaking.
9.6.2 Efficient Pricing as the Key to Increasing Efficiency in a Restructured Industry
9.6.2.1 General Discussion
The primary mechanism by which deregulation is expected to promote efficiency in the
electric power industry is that bundled prices which make costs opaque to consumers
would be replaced with unbundled prices which would make costs transparent. The
expectation is that efficient prices would signal efficient behavior by producers, consumers,
and intermediaries. Thus, the restructured industry will only be as efficient as the pricing
structure that is adopted (and the signals it sends).
It is expected that generation price signals will be set through the market process of
matching of supply and demand, while regulated transmission prices will be set by
bureaucratic decisions. In this context, the pricing decisions of regulators would be
extremely important determinants of economic efficiency in transmission. Because the
fixed costs of transmission are substantially higher than the variable operating costs,8s5 and
because both the fixed and variable costs are difficult to attribute to individual grid users,
3 Stalon, 1995.
84 In addition to ISOs mentioned in previous chapters, see: "Texas Moves to Open Access, ISO and
Unbundled Services;" and "Giant ISO Set for Midwest."85 There are essentially three types of transmission service costs: capacity, marginal losses, and congestion.
Source: Shuttleworth, 1994, 28.
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transmission prices are particularly difficult to set. As Peter Temin has stated, "there is no
uniquely correct way to allocate fixed costs to units of production. There is also no
uniquely correct way to allocate joint costs to disparate activities." 86 Therefore,
transmission prices must be set through a regulatory process where there is no "correct"
way to allocate costs, yet, as we see above, they should be set in a manner that signals
efficient system use.
9.6.2.2 System-Wide Efficiency Considerations
A fundamental principle of economically efficient transmission pricing is that the difference
between the marginal cost of generating electricity at any two locations should equal the
marginal cost of transmitting electricity between them.87 When this principle is not met, it
would be more efficient to produce power in another configuration of generation and load.
For example, if the cost of transmission is greater than the price difference between two
generators, the generator on the side of the transmission line to where power is being
"imported" should produce additional power (rather than have it transmitted from the other
generator). If the transmission price is lower than the difference in generation marginal
costs, the less-expensive plant should produce more power (and the more expensive one
should curtail production commensurately). While most easily applied for short-run
decision-making, this basic concept is also vital in signaling efficient system planning and
behavior by transmission "customers" and "suppliers" with respect to long-run marginal
costs.
9.6.2.3 Transmission "Customers"
The "customers" of future transmission systems will include generators, distribution
companies, aggregators, and large industrial customers.88 In order for the grid to operate
efficiently in both the short- and long-run, these "customers" will need to receive efficient
price signals.
In the short-run, efficient prices would signal efficient utilization of transmission systems
by their customers (and would include considerations for congestion and externalities). If
transmission is priced super-economically, competition in the generation market would be
6 Temin, 1994, 11. Also, Kelly et al's framework mentions that several pricing mechanisms might work.
see: Kelly et al, 1987, 150.87 FERC, 1989, 86; and Kelly et al, 1987,
88 Retail wheeling might also lead to individual customers being added to this list. Also, note that these
entities do not match those who are considered "customers" in usual discussions of the electric power
industry, as such discussions usually focus on power delivery.
Criteria for Economic Efficiency in Transmission
retarded. Similarly, artificially low transmission pricing would promote inefficient use of
transmission systems.89 For example, if prices are too low,
Entities may contract for firm capacity and then hold the capacity without using
it. This 'hoarding' of transmission capacity would be motivated by an
opportunity to resell it at a profit, to create a constraint in the transmission
system, or otherwise to manipulate the market.90
In the long-term, efficient pricing would signal efficient construction of generation, load,
and transmission facilities (i.e. it would signal the construction of facilities that equalize
marginal costs across the grid). As William Hogan comments, "the long-run market is the
key to overall efficiency. The most important requirement [in developing pricing
mechanisms] is to provide the right incentives for location and construction of generating
facilities and new load centers."91 If transmission prices were too high over the long-run,
otherwise efficient power trades would not occur because the generating capacity necessary
to facilitate them would not be built. In addition, an incentive to "over-build" transmission
capacity would exist. Conversely, if long-run prices were too low, generators would not
be sited in a technically efficient manner and there would be inadequate incentives for
efficient transmission facility maintenance and expansion. Because of the high capital costs
and long-lived nature of generation and transmission facilities, inefficient construction
decisions would have expensive, long-term consequences.
Therefore, in order for transmission systems to be constructed and utilized optimally (or in
a manner that approaches it), prices must send proper signals to transmission suppliers and
customers that encourage efficient location of new generators (and new customers)92 as
well as efficient operational use of those facilities.
9.6.2.4 Incentives for Transmission "Suppliers"
As mentioned above, efficient price signals should promote the construction of
transmission capacity in appropriate quantities and locations and at appropriate times. In
short-run marginal cost-based pricing schemes, revenues to signal and pay for new
transmission capacity would be provided by congestion charges.93 However, without
appropriate provisions to ensure that collected congestion revenues finance construction,
congestion charges could create an incentive to constrain transmission capacity.94
89 Kuhn, 1995, 24.90 Dairyland, 1995, 5.
91 Hogan, 1992,214.
92 Shuttleworth, 1994, 30.
93 Ibid.; FERC, 1989, 94; and Kelly et al, 1987, 182.
94 See, for example, Hogan, 1992. There is not consensus on the best mechanism for accomplishing this,
however. In the past year there has been a heated debate on the subject.
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The industry currently appears to be experiencing what happens when there are insufficient
incentives for capacity expansion. In the past several years, capacity expansion has fallen
precipitously -- today it is one-half of what it was 2-3 years ago. 95 The cause of this
significant drop appears to be uncertainty regarding the recovery of transmission
investments during and after the transition to a restructured industry. Thus, economic
theory and recent industry experience suggest that the development of efficient pricing
mechanisms, with sufficient incentives for capacity expansion, is important for ensuring
that the grid is expanded efficiently. 96
To summarize, in order for the system to be operated efficiently in both the short- and long-
run, it is imperative that efficient price signals be sent. This is a radical departure from past
and current transmission pricing practice, where embedded cost rates, command and
control regulation, internalized utility decisions, and utility cooperation have guided system
use and planning. Let us now briefly examine several issues regarding transmission
pricing mechanisms for a restructured industry.
9.6.3 Discussion Of Pricing Issues
9.6.3.1 Variable Pricing
Electricity prices have traditionally been time invariant -- pre-determined (based upon
historical average service and embedded costs) and constant from day-to-day (adjusted at
intervals on the order of years), regardless of the demand or production costs at any given
time. Similar pricing mechanisms have been used for electric transmission wholesale
wheeling rates97 (the rates that utilities charge non-native load customers to send power
over their transmission lines). The traditional (and until recently exclusive) wheeling rate
structure has been "postage stamp" rates -- which are "fixed rate[s] per kilowatt hour for
using a utility's transmission system."98 The problem with postage stamp rates is that they
do not promote efficient decision-making because they neglect temporal and'spatial cost
differences. 99 Clearly, time-invariant rates do not promote efficient use of transmission (or
generating) resources. In a previous chapter we discussed time-varying generation pricing
-- spot pricing. l00 The development and use of analogous transmission pricing
mechanisms (temporally and spatially variant) would promote efficient short- and long-run
use of the grid.
95 Masiello et al., 1995; NERC, 1992, 18-19, and NERC, September 1995, 23.
96 Corey, 1991, 15; Shuttleworth, 1994, 31.
97 Kelly et al, 1987, 154.98 Ibid., 242.
99 Ibid.
100o See Section 2.4.5.
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9.6.3.2 Marginal Cost Pricing
Despite widespread agreement among economists that marginal cost-based prices send the
most efficient price signals, there is a heated debate over the specifics of transmission
service pricing structures. In particular, the question of whether short-run or long-run
marginal cost pricing is a more appropriate mechanism for transmission service pricing has
long divided economists. Because it is not the purpose of this thesis to resolve the debate,
we do not discuss it any further here (although more details are provided in Appendix
J.10), but we do conclude that efficient pricing occurs when transmission customers see
prices that reflect marginal costs.
9.6.3.3 Other Pricing Considerations
Elsewhere in this thesis we discuss several "special" physical characteristics of electric
power systems. o01 Some of these also lead to economic complications because the
physical characteristics are associated with the creation of externalities or public/collective
goods.
Two sources of economic externalities in transmission systems are loop flows and
congestion. Their technical nature makes their economic costs difficult, yet necessary, to
appropriate. Since this thesis' purpose is to provide criteria for evaluating proposals, not to
develop pricing mechanisms, we limit our comments to saying that considerations for these
externalities should be incorporated into transmission pricing structures.
Public/collective goods also pose challenges for developing pricing mechanisms. As is
discussed in Appendix J.l10, the development of an efficient generation market requires that
the system controller have adequate resources at its disposal for providing system control
and ancillary services. However, because of the collective goods nature of these activities,
transmission customers do not have sufficient incentives to furnish these oh their own.
Therefore, transmission pricing structures should include mechanisms that sufficiently fund
and efficiently appropriate their costs.
9.6.3.4 Comments on Pricing Issues
Significant improvements in transmission pricing theory and the information technologies
needed to implement them have occurred over the past decade. Nevertheless, all
contemporary transmission pricing schemes have theoretical imperfections as well as
technological and economic IT limitations. While "perfect" prices that provide no economic
101 See Section 2.4.3.
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distortions would be ideal, some imperfections must be tolerated in the real world. 0o2
Continued technological and intellectual advance holds the promise for future pricing
mechanism refinements that could better capture the true costs of system use; and in turn,
monitor and appropriate them in a more economic manner. While these advances are not
certain, realizing their potential and laying the intellectual groundwork and policy flexibility
now would help facilitate them if they occur. As a result, policy-makers should not create
new structures that are inflexibly designed solely to meet today's capabilities. Nor should
they decide to continue to employ the inferior, traditional pricing mechanisms in hopes that
something better will come along someday. In short, functionality, rather than theoretical
perfection, should be the goal in developing transmission pricing for the restructured
industry.
9.6.4 Pricin2 Efficiency Issues
From out truncated discussion of pricing issues, we identify several issues that should be
incorporated into our criteria. First, the ability for transmission suppliers and consumers to
see proper price signals is essential for transmission systems to be efficiently constructed,
maintained, and operated in a restructured industry. Hence, economic (pricing) incentives
should be designed so that there is congruency between technical and economic efficiency
and rational individual economic behavior.
Second, transmission prices should be established by marginal cost-based pricing
mechanisms, whenever technically possible. The qualifying phrase is added because there
are limitations in the ability to price at marginal cost which result from deficiencies in
economic theory and in the technologies needed to send such signals.
Third, as a consequence of the above deficiencies, the regulatory framework should be
designed so that it can evolve with experience in a deregulated system and improvements in
IT and economic theory.
Fourth, transmission systems have several technical characteristics which have externalities
or public goods implications that should be included in transmission pricing mechanisms.
102 Kelly et al, 1987, 24.
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9.7 EFFICIENCY LESSONS FROM PREVIOUS CHAPTERS
In Chapters 6-8 we examine the deregulation of the natural gas and telephone industries,
potential new technologies in electric power transmission, and the efficiency implications of
divestiture. 103 Here we recall the efficiency lessons from these chapters:
* Market structure should be robust to changes;
* Price setting matters;
* It is vital that customers have access to understandable information and price
signals;
* Freedom for new market mechanisms to develop should be allowed;
* Transition costs should be equitably shared;
* In mixed regimes, regulation should match structure;
* There are some transmission technologies that are currently being developed
that have the potential to make substantial changes in transmission systems;
* Market power can be a significant impediment to the emergence of a truly
competitive market;
* Actions to mitigate market power should be based upon careful analysis of the
potential for market power abuse and the efficiency costs of remediation; and
* Technologies that are currently being developed hold the potential for making
significant changes in the industry's future structure (if they are allowed to
develop).
9.8 THE FRAMEWORK
We now pull together the efficiency issues identified in this and the preceding three
chapters and form the set of criteria that we use to evaluate proposals for industry
restructuring. The criteria in our framework are intended to be cumulative in nature (i.e. an
"ideal" proposal would meet each of them).
9.8.1 Transmission Pricing Criteria
* Prices provide correct signals if and only if they reflect marginal costs, taking
appropriate account of transaction costs.
* Prices should make marginal costs transparent to all market participants.
* Prices should send spatially and temporally efficient signals for generation and
transmission capacity construction and should take system considerations into
account.
* Prices should signal technically and economically efficient short-run use of the grid
by transmission "customers" and system operators.
* Pricing structures should retain sufficient flexibility to adjust to improved pricing
theories or new technologies that would allow for more "accurate" cost distribution.
* Pricing structures should be robust with respect to future costs and demand.
10o In Chapter 5 we also examined the experiences of other countries when they deregulated their electric
power industry.
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* Pricing structures that attempt to "protect" customer segment groups should be
carefully constructed to avoid the creation of uneconomic incentives to bypass the
transmission system.
9.8.2 Market Structure Criteria
* Transmission service functions should be provided competitively whenever possible.
* Transaction costs and re-integration through contract should be minimized.
* Information on pricing and service quality should be made available to all who use the
system in an open and non-discriminatory manner.
* The public and collective good aspects of the transmission system should be
identified and incentives/provisions should be developed to ensure that they will be
provided in a restructured environment.
* The market structure should be as simple and understandable as possible, although
simplicity should promote, not compromise, economic efficiency.
9.8.3 Regulatory Criteria
* The type and degree of regulation in each segment of the industry should be
concomitant with its technical qualities.
* The regulatory authority over the transmission system should be composed in such a
manner that it can regulate with a system-wide perspective.
* A dynamic and symbiotic relationship should exist between regulation and
technological change which promotes the continued development of more efficient
regulatory structures and technologies.
* Regulation should ensure that externalities are internalized in pricing systems and that
technical requirements are developed in a manner that assures economically and
technicilly efficient use of the system.
9.8.4 Transition Criteria
* Market participants, especially "bottleneck" participants, should be treated equitably
in order to ensure a smooth transition.
* The potential for market power abuse should be carefully examined.
* Actions to mitigate market power should be based upon careful analysis of the
potential for market power abuse and the efficiency costs of remediation.
9.8.5 Long-Term Transmission "Production" Criteria
* Pricing and regulatory incentives should promote cost minimization in the long-term
of construction and operation of transmission facilities.
Criteria for Economic Efficiency in Transmission
With a framework now developed, let us now apply it to the five restructuring proposals.
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Chapter 10
Evaluation of the Proposals
An opportunity to make efficiency improvements of the magnitude possib6le in electric
industry restructuring comes along only once in a lifetime. We must not (et petty
doctrinal differences or narrow interest groups in pursuit of short term gains prevent
the achievement of those improvements.'
-- Charles Stafon, paraphrasing PaufJoskow (1995)
10.1 INTRODUCTION
In the preceding chapters we discuss the technology and development of the electric power
industry, outline proposals for its impending restructuring, and establish criteria for
evaluating these proposals based upon their economic efficiency in transmission. In this
chapter we tie together these efforts by applying our criteria to the proposals. We then
synthesize and reflect upon our findings.
10.2 RESTATEMENT OF THE CRITERIA
Before we begin our analysis, let us restate our criteria, keeping in mind that they are
intended to be cumulative in nature -- the "ideal" proposal would meet each of them.
10.2.1 Transmission Pricing Criteria
* Prices provide correct signals if and only if they reflect marginal costs, taking
appropriate account of transaction costs.
* Prices should make marginal costs transparent to all market participants.
* Prices should send spatially and temporally efficient signals for generation and
transmission capacity construction and should take system considerations into
account.
* Prices should signal technically and economically efficient short-run use of the grid
by transmission "customers" and system operators.
* Pricing structures should retain sufficient flexibility to adjust to improved pricing
theories or new technologies that would allow for more "accurate" cost distribution.
* Pricing structures should be robust with respect to future costs and demand.
1Stalon, October 1995.
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* Pricing structures that attempt to "protect" customer segment groups should be
carefully constructed to avoid the creation of uneconomic incentives to bypass the
transmission system.
10.2.2 Market Structure Criteria
* Transmission service functions should be provided competitively whenever possible.
* Transaction costs and re-integration through contract should be minimized.
* Information on pricing and service quality should be made available to all who use the
system in an open and non-discriminatory manner.
* The public and collective good aspects of the transmission system should be
identified and incentives/provisions should be developed to ensure that they will be
provided in a restructured environment.
* The market structure should be as simple and understandable as possible, although
simplicity should promote, not compromise, economic efficiency.
10.2.3 Regulatory Criteria
* The type and degree of regulation in each segment of the industry should be
concomitant with its technical qualities.
* The regulatory authority over the transmission system should be composed in such a
manner that it can regulate with a system-wide perspective.
* A dynamic and symbiotic relationship should exist between regulation and
technological change which promotes the continued development of more efficient
regulatory structures and technologies.
* Regulation should ensure that externalities are internalized in pricing systems and that
technical requirements are developed in a manner that assures economically and
technically efficient use of the system.
10.2.4 Transition Criteria
* Market participants, especially "bottleneck" participants, should be treated equitably
in order to ensure a smooth transition.
* The potential for market power abuse should be carefully examined.
* Actions to mitigate market power should be based upon careful analysis of the
potential for market power abuse and the efficiency costs of remediation.
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10.2.5 Long-Term Transmission "Production" Criteria
SPricing and regulatory incentives should promote cost minimization in the long-term
of construction and operation of transmission facilities.
A "scorecard" of how each of proposals perform with respect to these criteria is found in
Section 10.8 (see Table 10.2). With the criteria fresh in mind, let us commence with an
evaluation of the California POOLCO proposal.
10.3 EVALUATION OF PROPOSAL I: CALIFORNIA POOLCO
10.3.1 Transmission Pricing Criteria
Let us begin by recalling several fundamental provisions of the California POOLCO 2
proposal. An Independent System Operator (ISO) would take responsibility for operating
the system, while utilities would retain ownership of transmission facilities. The rates and
service terms set by the ISO would be regulated by the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission (FERC).3 Transmission owners would be able to enjoy a revenue stream
from their assets only after operating experience confirms the ISO's independence. 4
Congestion pricing could be used to signal new transmission construction.
10.3.1.1 Transmission Pricing Criteria 1-7
POOLCO is difficult to evaluate using the transmission pricing criteria as it is relatively
silent on the details of transmission pricing. One provision that appears to comply with our
criteria is the possibility of signaling transmission construction by congestion pricing. A
second point of intersection and compliance is found in the area of customer protection --
specifically the continuance of lifeline rates and low income ratepayer assistance. These
programs would be funded through a non-bypassable fee, which should prevent perverse
market bypass effects. A third point of compliance lies in the half-hourly or hourly spot
market, which would inherently be robust to future prices and demand.
10.3.1.2 Transmission Pricing Criteria Summary
While POOLCO only touches upon and complies with three of our seven transmission
pricing criteria, none of its provisions run counter to them. Hence, if further details would
be developed, the proposal could meet most, if not all, of our pricing criteria. However,
2For the remainder of the chapter, the word "POOLCO" will be used to describe the California POOLCO
proposal unless explicitly stated otherwise.
3Which, according to the FERC's interpretation of the Federal Power Act, is where the judicial system
would rule that it belongs.
4CPUC, May 1995, 7.
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such compliance is not guaranteed and the criteria that are not addressed are among the
most significant of the seven.
10.3.2 Market Structure Criteria
10.3.2.1 Market Structure Criterion 1
Although it does not mention how, the proposal indicates that functional unbundling would
allow for the competitive procurement (by the ISO) of ancillary services. 5
10.3.2.2 Market Structure Criterion 2
Through its primary emphasis on a spot-market as the "market intermediary" between
generation and distribution, POOLCO eliminates the problem of reintegration through
contract and has relatively small transaction costs. Each market participant (i.e. generator,
distribution company) would need to establish the capability, in terms of human resources
and hardware, to trade in a spot market. However, the marginal cost of consummating any
particular contract would be low and the spot market mechanism would eliminate the long-
term costs of being locked into fixed contracts. 6
10.3.2.3 Market Structure Criterion 3
While it does not specify exact transmission pricing mechanisms, the proposal assumes that
the ISO would propose non-discriminatory pricing and service tariffs to the FERC that
would be transparent to all market participants.
10.3.2.4 Market Structure Criterion 4
Other than the establishment of the ISO, for which a funding mechanism is not mentioned,
POOLCO does not define, let alone provide funding mechanisms for the public and
collective goods of the transmission system (i.e. the ancillary services which cannot be
unbundled).
10.3.2.5 Market Structure Criterion 5
The overall industry structure would be relatively simple from the perspective of electricity
customers. In fact, many customers would not notice much change from today's
structure. 7 The trade-off for this simplicity is that, at least until bilateral trades were
5CPUC, May 1995, 51.
6For more on contract theory, see: Appendix J.8.
7Those that engage in bilateral contracts, once they are permitted, would experience a much larger change.
Furthermore, the change in market structure would become more pronounced once those who sell bilateral
contracts begin to actively court customers.
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permitted, there would not be an opportunity for innovative market structures to emerge
(except in the development of contracts for differences). With regard to transmission
specifically, it is difficult to know how "simple" POOLCO would be for customers (in this
case generators, distribution companies, etc.) since transmission pricing details are not
developed. The consolidation of operation of all utility transmission assets into one ISO is
a step in the direction of simplicity, however.
10.3.3 Regulatory Criteria
10.3.3.1 Regulatory Criteria 1 & 2
POOLCO appears to match the technical characteristics of the industry with appropriate
regulatory oversight. The proposal states that transmission retains its natural monopoly
characteristics and concludes that regulatory authority over it should be vested in the
FERC. Because the FERC would also be charged with regulatory oversight of the ISO's
pricing and operation of the transmission system, the regulators (the FERC) should have a
sufficiently broad perspective from which to regulate the transmission system. The
proposal would extend performance-based regulation (PBR) to the distribution segment of
the industry, which it asserts is a natural monopoly. The CPUC would essentially cease
oversight (with regard to pricing and entry) of the generation segment, which it finds to be
competitive.
10.3.3.2 Regulatory Criterion 3
It is unclear whether POOLCO would lead to a synergetic and dynamic, or a confining and
static relationship between regulation and technological change. This lack of clarity is
largely a result of the proposal's vagueness or complete deference to the FERC on most
transmission regulation issues.
10.3.3.3 Regulatory Criterion 4
One of the significant benefits of an ISO, which the proposal alludes to in several different
ways but does not explicitly address, is that it would allow for state-wide operation and
pricing mechanisms. This would facilitate the development of a consistent pricing system
that would internalize many of the transmission system's inherent externalities.
Furthermore, since the system would be operated by a party without any beneficial interest
in market participants and who would be required to economically dispatch generators on
the system, the ISO should be free to promote the most technically and economically
efficient use of the system.
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10.3.4 Transition Criteria
10.3.4.1 Transition Criterion 1
The proposal attempts to treat "bottleneck" transition parties equitably through a competitive
transition charge (CTC) that would provide utilities with full compensation for uneconomic
power purchase contracts and regulatory obligations. It would also allow for 100%
recovery of uneconomic generation assets.8
10.3.4.2 Transition Criteria 2 & 3
The proposal would make significant, if not complete, progress toward eliminating the
market power of transmission owners by turning system operation over to a regulated ISO
that is financially independent of other market players. POOLCO also considers the need to
reduce market power in generation, but does not come to a decision on whether utilities
should be required to divest their generating units, pending further review. The provisions
regarding transmission and generation market power appear to prudently balance the
potential costs and benefits of complete market power elimination.
10.3.5 Long-Term Transmission "Production" Criteria
Because the details of the incentives for constructing new transmission lines are not
developed in the proposal, we cannot determine whether POOLCO would ensure that new
facilities would be built in a cost-effective manner. The same can be said for the operation
of the system, which would largely depend upon the regulatory mechanisms for oversight
of the ISO and also upon the compensation scheme for the utilities who would continue to
own, and possibly maintain the assets. One potential concern is that waiting too long to
determine that the ISO is sufficiently independent of the utilities (during which period the
utilities cannot receive a return on their assets) would lead to significant disincentives for
the utilities to efficiently maintain their transmission facilities.
10.3.6 Other Analysis
From this discussion we conclude that POOLCO is on the right track with regard to
creating an economically efficient transmission system. However, the proposal is far from
complete, especially with respect to addressing important details that would have a
substantial impact on the transmission system's long-term efficiency. While the basic
structure appears to promote, or at least not constrain, economically efficient transmission
in the long-term, pricing signals and regulatory incentives which are not outlined in it
8
"Uneconomic" returns are defined as returns below an 8.5% rate-of-return on equity.
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would play a major, if not overriding role in determining the efficiency of an industry based
upon POOLCO.
Let us now perform the same analysis on the California Bilateral proposal.
10.4 EVALUATION OF PROPOSAL II: CALIFORNIA BILATERAL
10.4.1 Transmission Pricing Criteria
10.4.1.1 Transmission Pricing Criteria 1-7
The California Bilateral proposal9 is essentially silent with regard to transmission pricing.
One criterion that the proposal touches upon and meets is that of ensuring that consumer
protection mechanisms do not produce perverse incentives to bypass the grid. The
proposal explicitly indicates that cost recovery for public purpose programs, which include
discounts to low-income customers, should not be part of the transmission or distribution
fee, as "such a policy will produce unintended and undesirable consequences such as the
construction of non-utility transmission lines outside of the Commission's jurisdiction." 10
The only other pricing criterion that is touched upon regards the price signaling of new
transmission capacity. Although vague, the proposal indicates that the OPCO would be
responsible for system planning and for managing congestion. 11 While it is difficult to
make firm conclusions, the wording appears to indicate that planning processes and
congestion policy implementation, rather than price signals, are the intended mechanisms
for handling these issues.
10.4.1.2 Transmission Pricing Criteria Summary
While POOLCO provides precious little information with regard to transmission pricing,
the Bilateral proposal provides even less. It is worrisome that not only are transmission
pricing mechanisms absent from the document, but there is not even any mention of the
issues involved. As a result, while we cannot conclude that the proposal would produce
inefficient pricing mechanisms, we also cannot say that the proposal would tend toward
producing efficient ones (as we could for POOLCO) based upon what it explicitly states.
On the other hand, though, the Bilateral proposal is the most market-based of those
considered in California. Consequently, one would expect that if more details were
developed in the same spirit as the remainder of the proposal, efficient pricing mechanisms
could result.
9Hereafter, unless stated otherwise, "the Bilateral proposal" will refer to "the California Bilateral proposal."
10 Knight, 1995, 89. It should be noted that Commissioner Knight is paraphrasing input from TURN
(Toward Utility Rate Normalization) in this sentence.
11Knight, 1995, 32.
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10.4.2 Market Structure Criteria
10.4.2.1 Market Structure Criterion 1
The Bilateral proposal calls for the competitive provision of ancillary services in a broader
manner than does POOLCO when it suggests that competing firms would not be limited to
supplying ancillary services to OPCO, but could also supply individual market participants
directly. Transmission customers would also have the option of providing their own
ancillary services. Despite its competitive bent toward ancillary services provision, the
proposal makes no mention of transmission construction being signaled by market forces,
let alone being built as the result of a market process. Instead, the Bilateral proposal
charges OPCO with system planning responsibilities. 12
10.4.2.2 Market Structure Criterion 2
The proposal seeks market efficiency through bilateral contracts which it envisions would
lead to a truly competitive market, lower rates, and the fostering of innovation.
Allowing customers to choose from an array of goods and services provides a
better opportunity for them to find a service that best suits their needs. Lower
costs will be achieved when customers have alternatives among suppliers and
providers and can compare their prices and services. 13
It also anticipates that aggregators would be another source of potential efficiency gains. 14
However, this reliance on bilateral contracts is done at the (unmentioned) expense of
transaction costs. In a Bilateral proposal-based industry, customers would be required to
become more sophisticated, system operation would become more complicated (since each
of the contracts would have to be balanced), and generators would be required to have the
expertise to enter into contracts and enforce them. While it is quite conceivable that the
efficiency gains created by bilateral contracts would more than offset their transaction costs,
it is disturbing that the proposal does not at least address the issue.
10.4.2.3 Market Structure Criterion 3
The proposal implies that transmission service terms and prices would be available to all in
a non-discriminatory manner. It does so by summarizing the FERC's non-discriminatory
access proposal and by indicating that OPCO would operate in compliance with Western
System Coordinating Council (WSCC) standards.
12 Ibid., 32.
13 Ibid., 49.
14 Ibid., 50.
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10.4.2.4 Market Structure Criterion 4
In its attempt to outline the development of a competitive ancillary services segment of the
industry, the Bilateral proposal appears to ignore that some of the ancillary services are at
least partially public/collective goods, and that as such, may require more centralized
oversight than the proposal envisions. For example, because of the complicated technical
interactions that occur in power flows, a market participant probably would not be able to
provide for all of its load-following independent of OPCO. The proposal also appears to
assume that market participants desire the provision of these services, while in fact, there
are significant disincentives for any particular party to provide them (since they are
collective goods). Although its handling of ancillary services is innovative, the proposal
does not seem to grasp the difficulties that could occur when it essentially transforms public
goods into private goods. Furthermore, while the proposal implicitly identifies the
functions of OPCO as being public/collective goods, it does not describe how OPCO
would be funded.
10.4.2.5 Market Structure Criterion 5
The Bilateral proposal's emphasis on customer choice would allow electricity consumers
many opportunities for efficient service. In the process, however, it would also offer
customers many opportunities to be confused. In an attempt to minimize confusion, the
proposal offers all consumers the option of selecting "utility service customer" status.
Other than the anticipation of lower rates, this type of service would appear to customers as
being little different than their current service. Nevertheless, these customers would
undoubtedly be contacted by aggregators and perhaps even generators who would offer
much more "complicated" proposals. To the extent that customers make inefficient choices
based upon their confusion, an economic problem is created. While the market's invisible
hand would provide an incentive for marketers to simplify their offerings, it would also
provide a countervailing force to maximize the benefits of aggregation, especially since the
confusion efficiency losses would likely be a second-order effect. The ongoing complaints
about the "complicated" nature of deregulated telephone service and airline fares
(epitomized by a recent proposal in Washington to mandate simplified airfare structures)
could be a precursor to discontent with electric power choices. Policy-makers must make
an economic trade-off between confusion-related efficiency losses and the efficiency gains
created by the increased opportunities resulting from increased choice. This is not a simple
trade-off to make because the political issue of equity must also be factored into the
equation. Large, sophisticated customers would likely benefit from increased choices,
while, poorer, uneducated, smaller customers would not take less advantage of the benefits
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and could easily become confused, perhaps even swindled by an unscrupulous
aggregator. 15
10.4.3 Regulatory Criteria
10.4.3.1 Regulatory Criteria 1 & 2
The proposal appears to match the industry's technical characteristics with appropriate
regulatory structures. Generation would become a competitive enterprise, subject to little
CPUC oversight. Distribution would remain a regulated monopoly, although it would be
subject to performance-based regulation, rather than rate-of-return regulation (ROR). 16
The Bilateral proposal does not describe how transmission would be regulated, except to
say, in one passing comment, that the FERC would have authority over it.17 With that
being the case, another criterion is met -- that the body regulating transmission have a
system-wide perspective.
10.4.3.2 Regulatory Criterion 3
The proposal mentions technological innovation in two of its core objectives. It argues,
based upon the experiences of other deregulated industries, that a bilateral structure would
promote innovation. What is not clear in the Bilateral proposal, however, is the means by
which innovation would be fostered in the areas of the industry that remain regulated --
such as transmission and distribution. Implicitly, the proposal assumes that the market-
shaped industry structure would evolve to meet technological changes.
10.4.3.3 Regulatory Criterion 4
By mandating that OPCO "dispatch" plants and operate the system according to contract
provisions, rather than according to the actual, temporal operating costs of generators and
the constraints and costs of the transmission system, the Bilateral proposal could lead to
technical and economic inefficiencies. While the transmission pricing system could do
much to override these inefficiencies, the proposal does not indicate how it would price
transmission services. Supporters of bilateral models argue, in response, that bilateral
contracts, through trading, would converge to the same or even more economic dispatch of
the system (than in Pool-based, centralized dispatch systems). 18 An implication of this
argument is that it underscores the importance of ensuring that all grid externalities are
internalized into a transmission pricing system.
15For a more detailed discussion of these issues, see: Loughran, 1996.
16Which would replace rate-of-return regulation.
17Knight, 1995, 39.
18Tabors, 13 November 1995.
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10.4.4 Transition Criteria
10.4.4.1 Transition Criterion 1
The Bilateral proposal would allow utilities to receive compensation for 90% of their
stranded generation investments and 100% of stranded regulatory assets and QF wholesale
contracts. The 10% "penalty" on uneconomic generation assets is intended to provide
utilities with an incentive to minimize their stranded generation costs and to "share the pain"
of the transition.
10.4.4.2 Transition Criteria 2 & 3
The proposal addresses the issue of market power and proposes a radical solution to it --
the IOUs would be required to divest all of their generation assets. This requirement would
alleviate vertical market power concerns, 19 and with them, reduce the amount of regulatory
oversight necessary in the post-divestiture era. While it does examine the amount of market
power that the utilities possess, the proposal does not address the necessity of such a
radical move -- both in terms of the potential for market abuse and the economic
inefficiencies (i.e. subeconomic prices paid for assets) that could accompany such a drastic
action.
10.4.5 Long-Term Transmission "Production" Criteria
Because the proposal cedes transmission system regulatory oversight to the FERC and
provides few other details on transmission regulation, it is difficult to glean what types of
incentives would exist for minimizing long-term transmission production costs. However,
by explicitly expecting that third parties would compete with the OPCO for the provision of
ancillary services, the proposal would provide a market discipline on at least some of the
system's operating costs.
10.4.6 Other Analysis
As was true of POOLCO, the lack of details on crucial issues makes the Bilateral proposal
difficult to evaluate conclusively on the basis of our criteria. By not having developed
transmission pricing mechanisms, the proposal omits significant, if not the most important,
determinants of the economic efficiency of a transmission system shaped in the proposal's
image.
19And horizontal ones as well, provided that the utilities sell their generation assets to a variety of buyers.
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But not only is the Bilateral proposal as, if not more, vague than POOLCO with respect to
important issues, it also appears to have been written without a strong grasp of either the
operating (technical) nature of the system or of the difficulty of implementing some of its
provisions. For example, much of the (scant) information regarding transmission system
operation is confusing, if not contradictory. The first point of confusion is that in one
place, the proposal states that utilities would continue to be responsible for the provision of
ancillary services. 20 This contradicts three other parts of the proposal. Specifically:
* The independent OPCO, not the utilities, would be responsible for operating the
system;
* the utilities would be forced to divest themselves of their generation capacity,
which would render them incapable of providing many of the ancillary services;
and
* the proposal calls for competition in ancillary services and discusses multiple
methods by which ancillary services could be procured by market
participants. 21
A second point of confusion occurs when the proposal states that utilities "would bear the
duty to provide the comparable, non-discriminatory transmission, distribution and ancillary
services necessary to support direct access."' 22 Yet these utilities would lack the ability to
fulfill that duty with respect to the first and third items since they would not have any
control over the operation of the transmission system.
A provision that is likely more difficult to implement than the proposal recognizes 23 is the
requirement that utilities divest all of their nuclear and hydroelectric plants during the two
year period prior the start of direct access. Selling either of these sets of assets would not
only require finding a buyer who is willing to pay an efficient price for them (which could
be especially difficult for nuclear plants), but would also require approval from multiple
federal agencies. Approval processes can be drawn out in a relatively non-contentious
environment, let alone one where the stakes are high. It is reasonable to assume that
Bilateral proposal opponents would view these proceedings as an opportunity to scuttle its
implementation.
While the Bilateral proposal would not minimize transaction costs and would create the
potential for inefficiency due to the forced divestiture of generation assets, an advantage
20 Knight, 1995, 24.
2 1Ibid., 41.
22Ibid., 25.
23It should be noted, in Commissioner Knight's defense, that in his "questions parties should consider in
responding to this proposal," he backpedals a bit and asks whether a 1 January 1998 target date would allow
sufficient time for the resolution of a number of issues, including "the task of separating utility generating
assets." Source: Knight, 1995, 117-118.
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that it has over the other two California proposals is that it minimizes regulatory costs --
both on the part of the CPUC and the utilities. By making a clean break between
generation and transmission, it would entirely eliminate the risk of cost-shifting or self-
dealing (and much of the need for oversight).
In summary, the Bilateral and POOLCO proposals share a key similar fault -- their paucity
of details regarding important issues renders inconclusive the analysis of their impact on
economic efficiency in transmission.
Let us next evaluate the California Final proposal.
10.5 EVALUATION OF PROPOSAL III: CALIFORNIA FINAL PROPOSAL
10.5.1 Transmission Pricing Criteria
Relative to the first two California proposals and in keeping with its billing as a "much
matured description of market institutions...," 24 the California Final proposal25 includes
pricing mechanisms which can be evaluated more easily by our transmission pricing
criteria.
10.5.1.1 Transmission Pricing Criteria 1 & 2
The inclusion of congestion charges and spatial and temporal marginal costs in the
proposal's pricing mechanism should lead to efficient transmission pricing. The ISO
would make these prices transparent (to market participants) 26 by its calculation and
posting of congestion and spatial and temporal marginal costs prior to the Power Exchange
auction. This would provide a transparent price to all Power Exchange bidders before they
formulate their bids. At the same time, these prices would be available to those engaged in
bilateral contract transactions.
10.5.1.2 Transmission Pricing Criteria 3 & 4
The proposal explicitly recognizes that a system-wide pricing structure has many
benefits. 27 By relying on a state-wide, marginal cost-based pricing scheme, the Final
proposal should provide incentives for system-wide considerations in system operation and
planning. These efficient short-term price signals should promote the technically efficient
use of the grid; and, when used in conjunction with congestion contract rights, should also
24CPUC, D.95-12-063, 1.
25Hereafter, unless stated otherwise, "the Final proposal" will refer to "the California Final proposal."26CPUC, D.95-12-063, 18-19.
27Ibid., 29.
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send price signals for generation and transmission capacity construction. In fact, a reliance
on market-based mechanisms for planning and constructing transmission and generation is
explicitly desired by the proposal. 28
10.5.1.3 Transmission Pricing Criteria 5 & 6
While the Final proposal mandates that congestion and spatial and temporal marginal costs
be included in the pricing structure, it does not indicate a exact pricing mechanism. This
might allow for changes in the pricing structure as the ability to accurately distribute costs
improves. The proposal also avoids the problem of including assumptions about future
costs or demand in the pricing structure by its use of temporally varying prices, while at the
same time, granting long-term price protection through congestion contracts.
10.5.1.4 Transmission Pricing Criterion 7
No customer class would receive special treatment in the transmission pricing mechanism.
Special protections currently granted elsewhere in the industry are low income assistance
and baseline rates. The Final proposal would end the latter in order to reduce restrictions
on the market,29 while the low income assistance program would be maintained.30 Funds
for this program would be raised through a non-bypassable surcharge -- which should not
provide perverse incentives to bypass the grid.
10.5.1.5 Transmission Pricing Criteria Summary
From this discussion, it would appear that the proposal is well on its way toward creating
efficient transmission pricing mechanisms, although the exact transmission pricing
mechanisms (which are not mentioned in the proposal) would have a significant impact on
the efficiency that would result from the proposal's enactment and implementation.
10.5.2 Market Structure Criteria
10.5.2.1 Market Structure Criterion 1
The Final proposal takes several steps to promote competition in transmission services,
although its ancillary services competition provisions are more limited than those of the
Bilateral proposal. The ISO would directly provide the ancillary services best provided by
a central entity itself or solicit their provision as a monopsonist (competitively whenever
28 Ibid., 38, 46.
29 Ibid., 162.
30 In the future, administration of these funds might be shifted from the utilities to an independent
organization in order to level the playing field. Source: CPUC, D.95-12-063, 166.
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possible). The ISO would offer the remaining ancillary services in an unbundled manner.
A transmission customer could have its unbundleable ancillary service obligations met
directly by the ISO,31 by a third party, or through self-provision. Market forces would
also shape the transmission service market through congestion contract rights. The
proposal recognizes that these rights could lead to competition in the construction of
additional transmission capacity. At the least, these rights would create a contestable
market, which, in turn, would prevent utility transmission owners from stifling new
transmission construction.
10.5.2.2 Market Structure Criterion 2
The proposal would offer market participants the ability to individually determine the
transaction costs that they wish to incur. Those who choose to retain "utility service
customer" status and who purchase power at average-price rates would see essentially no
new transaction costs. 32 Likewise, generators and distribution companies who sell power
solely to the Power Exchange would see relatively low transaction costs, comparable with
those in POOLCO. On the other hand, market players who engage in bilateral contracts or
other hedging agreements would see higher transaction costs (which would be the price for
potentially greater financial gain).
10.5.2.3 Market Structure Criterion 3
The proposal seeks to ensure that all transmission customers would have open access to
transmission pricing and service information. One of the ISO's responsibilities is to "make
system data available quickly and on a comparable basis to all market participants."33
10.5.2.4 Market Structure Criterion 4
The Final proposal makes strides toward identifying and compensating for public/collective
goods. For example, it implicitly identifies the ISO as a collective good. It also indicates
that the ancillary services which cannot be unbundled for technical reasons would be
provided by the ISO, and charged to all users of the system. While it makes a start, the
proposal does not offer a complete funding mechanism for these goods. With regard to the
ISO, it does not determine what type of entity it would be -- for profit, non-profit private,
governmental -- nor the exact mechanism for funding its working capital. The proposal
recommends that the ISO's revenues be raised through a volumetric or cost-based charge.
3 1The ISO may, in turn, purchase these through a competitive process.
3 2And thus even avoid the cost of a new meter.
33CPUC, D.95-12-063, 42.
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The proposal leaves these details to the utilities to develop. 34 Thus, while the Final
proposal makes strides in identifying and funding public/collective goods, more work must
be done for it to satisfactorily addresses them.
10.5.2.5 Market Structure Criterion 5
The CPUC recognizes the importance of educating consumers about the new industry
structure and espouses the creation of an educational trust. It does this, in part, because the
Final proposal is even more complicated than the Bilateral or POOLCO proposals. The
Final proposal offers a default "utility service customer" status, but even this features
"complications," such as the choice of time-of-use or average price rate service.35 With its
sanctioning of hedging contracts and authorization of bilateral ones, the proposal would
create a market structure that is complicated, almost overwhelming, to the unsophisticated
customer -- thus creating the same potential problems that were mentioned in the evaluation
of the bilateral proposal. At the same time, though, these "complications" would allow
customers many opportunities for financial gain.
10.5.3 Regulatory Criteria
10.5.3.1 Regulatory Criteria 1 & 2
The proposal finds that transmission retains the characteristics of a natural monopoly, and
as a result, the Commission believes that it should continue to be regulated. The FERC
would have oversight of transmission facilities and of the operations of the Power
Exchange and the ISO. In this arrangement, the regulators (the FERC) should have a
sufficiently broad perspective to regulate the transmission system efficiently. The proposal
would substantially reduce the CPUC's oversight of generation, which it views as a fully
competitive market. The Commission would retain oversight of distribution service, which
the proposal views as a natural monopoly. The CPUC would use PBR to fulfill its
obligation to regulate distribution. In short, the proposal appears to pair the technical
characteristics of the industry segments with appropriate regulatory regimes.
10.5.3.2 Regulatory Criterion 3
It is difficult to determine the proposal's likely impact on technological development in
transmission. The competitive provision of ancillary services might lead to increased
innovation, but the proposal does not state this as an objective.
34 Ibid., 64.
3 5As well as the near certainty of many calls from companies seeking to sign customers up for "more
complicated" services.
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10.5.3.3 Regulatory Criterion 4
The regulatory structure, though its pricing system, should internalize system externalities
and lead to efficient system operation. The proposal notes that one of the four "immediate
and lasting advantages" of the ISO's establishment is that, "there will be a consistent
pricing system for the use of the common network facilities that prevents cost shifting and
supports the competitive market."36
10.5.4 Transition Criteria
10.5.4.1 Transition Criterion 1
The CPUC attempts to create an equitable solution to the stranded investment problem
through 100% recovery of stranded costs by utilities, although stranded generating assets
would receive a discounted rate-of-return adjustment on them.37 The intent of this discount
is to provide utilities with an incentive to reduce their stranded investments and to share the
pain and the benefits of the transition. Utilities would receive an adjustment to this
discounting based upon the percentage of fossil generating plants that they divest.
10.5.4.2 Transition Criteria 2 & 3
Through this divestiture enticement, the Commission attempts to reduce the utilities' market
power in generation. The proposal calls for Pacific Gas and Electric (PG&E) and Southern
California Edison (SCE) to divest 50% of their fossil-fueled generating capacity by the end
of the transition period. The Commissioners took this approach after extensive review of
the potential for market power abuse by PG&E and SCE. Furthermore, through its call for
continued regulation of transmission and the creation of the financially independent ISO,
the CPUC attempts to eliminate the market power of transmission owners.
10.5.5 Long-Term Transmission "Production" Criteria
While the CPUC has proposed transmission pricing mechanisms, the FERC would
ultimately regulate transmission rates and the operation of the ISO and Power Exchange.
Because of the CPUC's lack of authority, the proposal is relatively silent on some
transmission issues, such as the cost recovery for transmission assets, even though the
Commission is concerned about such issues.38 The method that the FERC chooses to use
in handling cost recovery, etc. would play a major role in determining the incentives for
long-term transmission "production" cost minimization. The proposal's ideas for
36CPUC, D.95-12-063, 29.
37Furthermore, uneconomic generation would be defined as returns less than 8.5%.
38Ibid., 45.
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competitive ancillary service provision should place at least some downward pressure on
transmission service pricing, however.
10.5.6 Other Analysis
Our criteria are better able to discern the probable long-term efficiency impacts of the Final
proposal than they were for the Bilateral and POOLCO proposals. This higher degree of
clarity is the result of the half-year of debate and discernment that occurred between the
simultaneous promulgation of the POOLCO and Bilateral proposals and the Final proposal.
However, it should be noted that while the Final proposal is more thoroughly developed,
several relatively important issues have yet to be resolved. For example, the proposal
charges the utilities with developing the congestion contract 39 and ISO & Power Exchange
structure provisions. It also does not specify the exact transmission pricing structure. The
mechanisms that are chosen on these and other issues would have a significant impact on
the efficiency of the resulting system. Since, the proposal promulgates solid principles for
their development, thus there is a high likelihood that efficient mechanisms would develop,
but this is not guaranteed.
Moving away from California, let us next evaluate the Wisconsin Plausible Extreme model.
10.6 EVALUATION OF PROPOSAL IV: WISCONSIN PLAUSIBLE EXTREME
MODEL
10.6.1 Transmission Pricing Criteria
10.6.1.1 Transmission Pricing Criteria 1 & 2
Through its use of "simple" rate structures, the Wisconsin Plausible Extreme model's 40
transmission pricing mechanism would be inefficient in both the short- and long-term.
This mechanism would only incidentally reflect the marginal cost of transmission at any
given location and at any given point in time.
10.6.1.2 Transmission Pricing Criteria 3 & 4
The construction of transmission lines would not be signaled by transmission prices but by
a centralized planning process or the requests of market participants. In the latter case, it is
not clear how those who request service would be charged (for their request). If the cost of
the new capacity would be averaged into the system's transmission price, inefficiencies
would result if each and every request were to be honored. But at the same time, it would
3 9Ibid., 38.
40 Hereafter we refer to this as the Extreme model.
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also be inefficient if only those who request new capacity pay for its construction, for two
reasons. First, most grid users would benefit, at least to some extent, from additional
capacity. Second, the large cost of transmission line construction would most likely erase
any gains that the transacting, requesting parties would receive from a line's
construction.41
Furthermore, inefficient generation siting would likely occur because the transmission
pricing structure would not signal efficient locations for generators and the central planning
process for generation construction would be eliminated.
10.6.1.3 Transmission Pricing Criteria 5 & 6
The Extreme model does not delineate a transmission pricing mechanism. As a result,
some flexibility (with respect to future demand and costs) in the exact pricing mechanism
could occur. However, the mandate for a "simple" pricing structure would preclude
improvements to the pricing mechanism that would allow it to more accurately distribute the
system costs (and therefore be inherently more complicated).
10.6.1.4 Transmission Pricing Criterion 7
All parties would be given the same treatment with regard to transmission pricing. Efforts
to protect customers in other segments of the industry -- such as through the low-income
assistance program -- should not lead to uneconomic bypass of the transmission system, as
they would be paid for through a non-bypassable distribution fee.
10.6.1.5 Transmission Pricing Criteria Summary
The model's explicit rejection of marginal cost pricing is a significant liability with respect
to our transmission pricing criteria. We find that it would likely lead to serious
inefficiencies in the operation and planning of the grid.
10.6.2 Market Structure Criteria
10.6.2.1 Market Structure Criterion 1
The model calls for the provision of ancillary services through a competitive process which
would establish the system operator (Poolco) as a monopsonist for ancillary service
41This is partially the result of economies of scale of transmission lines. In almost all cases it would be
more efficient to build a line larger than the capacity needs of one power transaction since to build one only
large enough to meet the needs of the requesters would be very expensive as it would be fighting the
economies of scale.
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procurement. This mechanism would appear to preclude self- or third party-provision of
ancillary services. In addition, through its granting of an exclusive service territory to the
Transco, the model would prevent any sort of competitive mechanism for constructing new
transmission facilities.
10.6.2.2 Market Structure Criterion 2
As in the Final proposal, the Extreme model would allow market participants to choose the
level of transaction costs that they deem most appropriate. Those participants who desire
low transaction costs would participate in the Poolco's spot market power pool. It should
be noted that by forcing individual service customers to choose a Retailco,42 customers in
the Extreme model would face a higher minimum transaction cost than in the Final
proposal. On the other end of the spectrum, the Extreme model calls for essentially
unlimited options with regard to bilateral contracts and contracts for differences. The
model anticipates that these mechanisms would lead to the creation of a futures market as
well as specialty contracts. 43 Some of these options would have high transaction costs,
while some (like the creation of a futures market) would have relatively low transaction
costs.
10.6.2.3 Market Structure Criterion 3
Both pricing (through the simple rates) and service standards would be available from the
Poolco to all market participants.
10.6.2.4 Market Structure Criterion 4
The public and collective good aspects of the transmission system are implicitly identified
as the functiort of the Poolco and the Transco, and the ancillary services. No mention of a
funding mechanism for the Poolco is made. The Transco would be funded through a
postage stamp rate. Ancillary services would be paid for by an adder to the spot market
price and fees charged to bilateral transactions. Therefore, some, but not all of the
system's collective goods have funding mechanisms proposed for them.
10.6.2.5 Market Structure Criterion 5
The model does not strike a good balance between simplicity and efficiency. At the retail
level, the model calls for many Retailcos to compete to serve customers in the role of
aggregators (energy service providers). These Retailcos would "offer different pricing
4 2Since there would not be an analog to the default "utility service customer" status.
4 3Wisconsin Public Service Commission, October 1995, 7.
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mechanisms to meet individual customer needs." 44 While unsophisticated customers
would face the vagaries (and the benefits) of the market without a default provider nor an
explicit call for customer protection, the transmission pricing mechanism would be made as
simple as possible. A state-wide postage stamp rate would eliminate the problem of
pancaking rates and be very understandable, but would achieve this lucidity at a great cost
to efficiency. It is rather perplexing that the model calls for simple transmission pricing
mechanisms -- considering that those who procure transmission service (generally
Retailcos and generators) would be rather sophisticated -- while residential users are
expected to deal with more complicated options.
10.6.3 Regulatory Criteria
10.6.3.1 Regulatory Criteria 1 & 2
The Extreme model assumes that transmission would remain a natural monopoly which
would be owned by a state-wide or regional transmission company and operated by an
independent system operator (Poolco). Interestingly, the model does not indicate under
whose jurisdiction the Transco and the Poolco would operate -- the FERC is not mentioned
while RTGs and NERC are mentioned, but in an unclear manner.45 Without the regulatory
authority being made explicit, we cannot predict whether the transmission system would
have sufficiently broad regulatory oversight. In the rest of the electric power system,
regulatory oversight appears to be well-matched with technical characteristics. Generation
and Retailco service are assumed to be competitive, and therefore would not regulated.
Lineco distribution service, a natural monopoly, would retain Public Service Commission
PBR oversight.
0
10.6.3.2 Regulatory Criterion 3
The Extreme model does not include considerations for stimulating technological
innovation in transmission nor for adjusting the regulatory structure to meet them should
they occur.
10.6.3.3 Regulatory Criterion 4
Through its use of simple pricing structures, the model would not promote the technically
or economically efficient use of the grid, nor would it internalize externalities through
44Ibid., 9.
4 5This confusion is enhanced by a suggestion later in the EIS that a statewide public Transco would not be
regulated by the PSC, but by another independent authority; and that a privately-owned Transco "would be
regulated by the PSC in much the same way as the privately-owned electric utilities are regulated today."
Source: Wisconsin Public Service Commission, October 1995, 311.
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transmission pricing. The model would grant the Poolco some authority in operation
procedures (i.e. adjusting for transmission constraints) that would increase the technical
efficiency of the system. However, such procedures would only partially mitigate
inefficiencies that result from "incorrect" pricing incentives.
10.6.4 Transition Criteria
10.6.4.1 Transition Criterion 1
Stranded costs would be calculated based upon the results of the mandatory utility
generation asset sales, however no further mention is made of the issue. It is therefore
unclear exactly for what and at what level the utilities would be compensated.
10.6.4.2 Transition Criteria 2 & 3
The model calls for the divestment of all utility generating assets through an auction or
sealed bid process (although utility affiliates could bid for them). The Extreme model
mandates divestment without an examination of the potential for market power abuse by the
utilities. The model also fails to include stipulations regarding the increments of sale (how
many generators would be sold together) and does not place limits on how many units
individual buyers could purchase. As a result, divestiture could result in an even higher
market concentration than exists in the present market structure. The model also does not
weigh the remediation costs of the divestiture mandate.
10.6.5 Long-Term Transmission "Production" Criteria
There is little assurance that new transmission facilities would be built or maintained at least
cost. The model is vague on how the Transco would be compensated for its ownership
and maintenance of the system, except that its costs would be fully recovered and it would
operate as a price-regulated monopoly. 46 The latter would indicate, although not
necessitate that regulation be based upon a rate-of-return model (which does not necessarily
lead to cost minimization).
10.6.6 Other Analysis
The Extreme model fails more of the efficiency criteria than any of the others. It does so
largely because of its attempt to simplify transmission pricing. This highlights the tension
that exists between creating a structure that is simple to use and one that is efficient.
4 6Wisconsin Public Service Commission, October 1995, 8.
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It is also interesting and disconcerting to note that not only is the model's impact on
transmission technology innovation unclear, there is good reason to believe that it was not
even considered during the model's formulation. Remember that, unlike the other
proposals we are evaluating, the Extreme model was developed as a "straw man" in the
Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) process -- to set one extreme of what could happen
in restructuring and then evaluate the impact it would have on a variety of measures. One
of the measures the Commission staff chose in its analysis was economic efficiency, which
it then broke into sub-parts (criteria).47 Technological innovation, either in general or
specifically for transmission, was not one of these criteria. This could lead to the
conclusion that technological innovation was not considered in the process of developing
the model. Given the changes that are now occurring in the industry as a result of
technological innovation, this would be a serious oversight.
While we focus our analysis on the economic efficiency of transmission, the Extreme
model gives us pause to consider potential benefits that could be realized from a non-
efficient transmission pricing scheme. For example, the analysis section of the EIS48
mentions that a distance-insensitive transmission tariff could allow for more power exports
or imports -- depending upon the number of suitable generator sites49 in the state vis-a-vis
its neighbors. 50 Such a pricing structure would also make it more feasible to build plants
in remote locations, far away from population centers. The EIS nevertheless recognizes the
inefficient incentives that would be created in the process. We mention this discussion
because it highlights the trade-offs that policy-makers face and demonstrates why they
sometimes make decisions that are not economically efficient, even when they are aware of
the inefficiency of their policy choices.
Having now examined the state-level deregulation proposals, let us turn to an evaluation of
the FERC Mega-NOPR.
10.7 EVALUATION OF PROPOSAL V: FERC MEGA-NOPR
10.7.1 Transmission Pricine Criteria
The Mega-NOPR's transmission pricing structure is divided into two temporal parts: the
near-term (stage one), when all utilities would be forced to use FERC-established generic
4 7 Ibid., 141.
4 8Ibid., 181.
4 9 With suitability not being defined by the economic or technical characteristics of the transmission grid.
50 Depending upon how one balances the economic gains of power plants with their environmental impacts,
and where the most suitable sites are located, this could be a benefit or detriment.
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rates, and the long-term (stage two), when utilities would use FERC-approved pricing
systems that they develop individually. The intent is to have utilities submit stage two rates
in a staggered fashion, at their own initiative. The route is chosen because the FERC
believes there would be a long regulatory lag if all transmission utilities were required to
have their individual rates approved at once, and hopes that the stage one rates would be
acceptable for many utilities for a significant period of time. While for the purposes of this
thesis we are interested in evaluating stage two pricing structures, only the stage one
pricing system is defined in the Mega-NOPR. As a result, we need to remain cognizant of
the distinction between the short- and long-term, and while we comment on the stage one
rate structure, we must remember the stage two is of equal, if not greater concern.
10.7.1.1 Transmission Pricing Criterion 1
During stage one, the Mega-NOPR would continue the practice of using uneconomic
"postage stamp" rates. Because these rates are spatially and temporally insensitive, they
bear little resemblance to the marginal costs of system operation. In stage two, there would
be an incentive for utilities who make extensive wholesale power sales to develop marginal
cost-based rate requests to the FERC because the utilities would have to use these rates for
their own power sales. However, it is not clear that all utilities would have the same
incentive to make such a switch; some would undoubtedly find the stage one embedded
cost-based rates more attractive. One mitigating factor to this embedded-cost inertia is the
ability of transmission customers to propose new rate structures. 51 What can be concluded
from this discussion is that marginal cost pricing might develop in the long-term, but a
quick convergence to it is not expected.
10.7.1.2 Transmission Pricing Criteria 2
While all participants would have an equal opportunity to see the system's marginal costs,
the extent to which they can actually see the marginal costs would be determined by the
correlation between pricing and marginal costs, as discussed above.
10.7.1.3 Transmission Pricing Criteria 3 & 4
While this implication is not discussed in the Mega-NOPR, the requirement of offering
both non-firm and firm service would allow for short-run and long-run marginal cost
transmission pricing, respectively. If its potential is utilized, the benefit of this dual rate
structure is that efficient price signals could be sent for both the location of generation and
transmission assets and the short-run use of the system. However, the resulting efficiency
5 1FERC, April 1995, 17719.
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would depend upon how utilities formulate their non-firm and firm rates and what
standards the FERC uses to evaluate their formulations. Unfortunately, based upon what
is said in the Mega-NOPR, the FERC does not appear to recognize the potential for
marginal cost pricing. It only mentions that non-firm service would be interruptable and
tariffed at a lower rate -- it does not equate non-firm pricing with short-run marginal cost
pricing (nor does it equate firm service with long-run marginal cost pricing). Thus, it is not
clear that the FERC would encourage utilities to engage in short-run and long-run marginal
cost pricing, despite having provided a template for doing so.
Furthermore, the extent of flexibility that the Mega-NOPR gives customers could be a
source of inefficiency. By giving customers almost unlimited flexibility in the length of
transmission capacity reservations, the choice of firm and non-firm service, the option of
network or point-to-point service, and the ability to request new capacity expansion,
transmission customers would be given wide latitude to evade the full costs of running the
system and the economic impacts of their transactions on the system. This cost-evasion
capability, combined with the fact that transmission grids are intentionally built with excess
capacity 52 -- they are not intended to operate in a congested fashion -- leaves open the
possibility for insufficient funding of transmission investments.
For example, the ability of customers to procure non-firm service over unlimited time
periods would appear to be especially problematic. There are some clear benefits to
allowing short-term, non-firm service, such as maximizing use of the system by allowing
short-term, beneficial transactions that would be uneconomic if the full cost of the system
were incorporated into the transmission tariff.53 In essence, this signals efficient short-
term use of the system. However, non-firm pricing turns into a free-rider problem when
parties are able to use transmission facilities without paying for their capital cost on a long-
term basis. In situations where congestion does not exist and would likely not exist in the
foreseeable future, there is little reason for a long-term transmission customer to opt for
higher-priced firm service rather than lower-cost non-firm service. Yet the Mega-NOPR
would give the customer this option. 54 The proposed development of a secondary market
for transmission service could even further lower the incentive of "free riders" to purchase
5 2This is done for reliability reasons and because unconstrained transmission lines have fewer externalities
(i.e. power dissipation, reactive power, etc.).
53 Remember from Chapter 2 that the fundamental short-run pricing principle is that which equalizes short-
run marginal cost pricing across the grid. See Section 2.4.5.2 (short run marginal cost pricing) and Kelly
et al, 1987, 167.
54 As mentioned before, this choice is economically efficient for the short-term transactions. However, it
does not take into account the technical "absence of congestion" benefits.
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firm capacity. 55 When balancing the savings of a non-firm contract and the credible "back-
up" of being able to purchase capacity in the secondary market (albeit at a premium) with
the price of taking firm service during the entire duration of the need for transmission
service, the non-firm option might seem like a good risk in many cases. Furthermore, the
customer could avoid having to go to the secondary market by purchasing firm capacity at a
later point in time if it sees that capacity is being taken by other users. Even if a customer
eventually decides to switch from non-firm to firm service, it would be a free-rider during
the period it was taking non-firm service.
Exacerbating the problem further is the responsibility of utilities to make good-faith
attempts to build new capacity when needed.56 The consequence is that even if a customer
bets wrong on non-firm service and does not take steps to protect itself in the secondary
market, it might still have the opportunity to receive transmission service in the long-term.
The Mega-NOPR attempts to deter customers from relying on requests for new capacity by
assigning the customer with "financial responsibility for its share of the incremental
expansion costs."' 57 However, customers on low-usage lines might find the risk worth
taking. A similar conclusion could be reached by customers on higher lines too, since the
"threat's" inefficiency may make it non-credible. The economics of transmission line
construction would make it inefficient to add capacity only to accommodate the needs of an
incremental customer. When reinforcing an existing line or building a new one, there
would be substantial benefit in adding additional capacity for further load growth and to
relieve congestion. In relieving the congestion, other users on the system benefit (i.e. the
technical externalities are reduced). But question then becomes, who would pay for this
extra capacity? The existing users would already have firm service agreements at a
specified price so they could not be charged. The incentives for purchasing firm service
would decline with the creation of a new reserve margin so there would be a disincentive
for the utility to provide it. At the same time, having the "incremental" customer bear the
full cost of capacity expansion would squelch potentially efficient power transactions.58
This would not lead to an efficient use of the system and would be orthogonal to the
FERC's objectives of a more competitive wholesale power market. The result would be
that either the utility would be forced to carry out its obligation to build new capacity
55 Although for some it might raise the incentive to purchase it.
56 FERC, April 1995, 17682.
57 Ibid.
58 This is especially true since the Mega-NOPR does not define what rights these customers would have.
For example, would they receive firm capacity rights for the lifetime of the transmission line(s)? What say
would they have in the future of the line -- i.e. could the utility take down the line in 10 years?
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without the threatened "full" compensation from the marginal customer or the FERC's goal
of wholesale competition would be forsaken. A potential transmission customer might
assume that the FERC would rule in favor of the former. While the preceding argument is
perhaps tangential, it illustrates that the Mega-NOPR's treatment of firm and non-firm
pricing does not provide a consistent set of incentives for short- and long-term efficient
transmission system use. 59
Furthermore, it is not clear that the Mega-NOPR's division between firm and non-firm
service would translate into short-run and long-run marginal cost pricing (which would be
desired). In calculating the stage one rates, the FERC uses embedded cost pricing. While
this would ensure cost recovery of the transmission facilities by the utilities, it would not
promote efficient use of the grid. Utilities might be reticent to switch from embedded cost
to marginal cost pricing because of the unfavorable incentives (such as the ones mentioned
above) that the Mega-NOPR's provisions would create in a marginal cost pricing
environment.
10.7.1.4 Transmission Pricing Criterion 5
The ability of utilities to update their transmission tariffs over time would allow for the use
of more sophisticated pricing structures as they develop. The utility-by-utility method
would also allow for the development and real-time experimentation with several pricing
standards. For example, some utilities may choose MW-mile-based rates while others may
choose nodal pricing. Since there is no clear consensus on what is the best and/or most
feasible method for pricing transmission, the opportunity to experiment with different
pricing structures could be helpful. However, the constraint that utilities have firm and
non-firm, and network and point-to-point service tariffs might serve as a barrier to
innovative pricing structures,60 such as those that would place each participant on the same
footing in order to incorporate considerations for congestion, etc. Another problem is that
the utility-by-utility price structure method could easily create a grid where there are
incompatible pricing mechanisms. If one utility uses a postage stamp rate while the
neighboring one uses distance- and time-sensitive pricing, the grid could become confusing
indeed, as well as rather inefficient. Customers could conceivably choose their
"transmission provider.' based upon how they could minimize their transmission payments
(even though they would have the exact same power flows regardless of which
59It is precisely these issues that are integral in the formulation of congestion contracts. See: Hogan,
1992; and Bushnell and Stoft, 1996.60FERC, 24 April 1996, RM-96-11.
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transmission provider they "chose"). While the FERC might argue that these issues are
what motivates it to push for Regional Transmission Groups (RTGs), 61 it is somewhat
troubling that the FERC is taking such a hands-off role on such important issues.
10.7.1.5 Transmission Pricing Criterion 6
The staged process would also allow for greater flexibility should demand or prices change
drastically.
10.7.1.6 Transmission Pricing Criterion 7
In effect, the Mega-NOPR protects firm transmission customers by granting them the same
priority status for transmission access as native load customers. This should not
disadvantage firm service customers in any way. However this prioritization may be to the
detriment of the native load customers (who are responsible for residual transmission costs
as long as transmission assets are in the rate base).62 While this probably would not create
perverse incentives for the operation of the grid, it does raise equity issues.
10.7.1.7 Transmission Pricing Criteria Summary
In its stage one rate proposals, the Mega-NOPR clearly does not create an efficient industry
structure, nor does it appear to move the industry toward one. This results from several
provisions, most notably the use of embedded cost rates that are spatially and temporally
insensitive. While in the long-term it is anticipated that there would be a move away from
these inefficiencies, the speed at which this would occur is unclear, and the resulting
situation -- a rebalkanization of the system, this time in terms of pricing rather than access
-- is not particularly desirable. While this balkanization would allow for experimentation
with pricing models,63 it would nevertheless create hurdles in the formulation of wholesale
wheeling contracts and could send perverse price signals. Another problem lies in the
conflict between the desirability of marginal cost pricing and necessity of paying off the
investments on transmission facilities. In the absence of congestion, the incentive for
customers would be to purchase non-firm contracts which, in an ideal would, would reflect
only short-run marginal cost (since this would allow for the maximum number of efficient
transactions). However, by allowing long-term, non-firm service contracts on
uncongested, unpaid for assets, a free-rider problem is created. In short, while many of
the long-term details remain unclear, there is a high probability that the stage two pricing
61And, in fact, the resulting inefficiencies may lead market participants to create more RTGs.
62Source: "Looking for Landmines in FERC's 'Mega-NOPR'," 14.
6 3For how this might occur, see: Kingdon, 1995, 229-230.
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structures created under the Mega-NOPR's guidelines would not meet several of our most
important transmission pricing criteria.
10.7.2 Market Structure Criteria
10.7.2.1 Market Structure Criterion 1
There are several mechanisms through which transmission service would be provided
competitively. First, the Mega-NOPR calls for competitive provision of ancillary services
whenever technically feasible. (In its description of the individual services, the proposal
indicates the degree of competition that the FERC imagines could occur.) Second, the
Mega-NOPR's mandated creation of reassignable firm transmission rights would create a
competitive firm transmission service market.
10.7.2.2 Market Structure Criterion 2
The use of real-time information networks (RINs) with "published" tariffs should lead to
low (marginal) transaction costs and should avoid the problem of reintegration through
contract. Once firms have acquired the technological hardware and the expertise to use
these standardized systems, the marginal transaction costs should be small. Furthermore,
RINs, with their publicly available information, should reduce the costs of enforcing
contracts by limiting the ability of parties to renege on their commitments.
10.7.2.3 Market Structure Criterion 3
One intent of the Mega-NOPR (and the primary purpose of RINs) is to ensure that price
and service information is made available to all parties in a non-discriminatory manner.
10.7.2.4 Market Structure Criterion 4
Through the Mega-NOPR's detailed discussion and delineation of six ancillary services and
their pricing, the FERC attempts to identify and compensate for the collective goods aspects
of the transmission grid. There is some question, however, about the success and accuracy
of the FERC's work. Although many in the policy community consider the Mega-NOPR's
list to be the definitive set, some in the technical community do not believe that it adequately
spans the full complement of ancillary services that transmission utilities provide. 64 For
example, researchers at Oak Ridge National Lab (ORNL) have identified 19 ancillary
services (see Table 10.1 for a comparison of these two lists). The failure to identify (and
compensate) for some services would create a disincentive for their provision.
64Source: "Looking for Landmines in FERC's 'Mega-NOPR'," 15.
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Table 10.1: Comparison of FERC and ORNL Classifications of Ancillary Services
FERC Ancillary Services ORNL Ancillary Services
* Reactive power/voltage control * System reactive power management and
voltage control
* Local reactive power management and
voltage control
* Loss compensation * Real-power-loss replacement
* Scheduling and dispatching * Unit commitment
* Economic dispatch
* Load following * Load following spinning reserve
* Reliability spinning reserve
* System protection * Supplemental operating reserve
* Stability enhancement reserve
* Local area security
* Transmission reserves
* Energy Imbalance * Unscheduled energy
Services not identified by the FERC * Time correction reserve
* Nonoperating reserve
* Black start
* Metering, billing, and communications
* Transmission monitoring and control
* Repair and maintenance of network
* Power quality
Source: Hirst and Kirby, 1995, 15.
Even more contentious than the definition of ancillary services has been the stage one rate
structure that the Mega-NOPR proposes for their provision.65 The proposal would assign
a uniform 3% transmission loss factor for all wholesale transactions, with loss
compensation charges set equal to 110% of the marginal cost of generation. A problem
with this approach is that while a 3% power loss rate may be true for some transactions,
transmission losses are a function of specific power flows, and can be much higher than
3%.66 As a result, this blanket rate would bear little resemblance to the actual costs
imposed by many transactions. Furthermore, this rate structure would send the most
erroneous price signals at the worst times, since the lowest actual losses are most apt to
occur on the least constrained lines and the highest loss rates are apt to occur on the most
congested lines.
Energy imbalances would be handled by a ±1.5% deviation band, where any hourly
average energy deviation within this band would be compensated for by an in-kind or
incremental cost payment, while deviations outside that band would be subject to a 100
6 5This pricing structure is established in: FERC, April 1995, 17720.
66 Office of Technology Assessment, 1989, 121.
Evaluation of the Proposals 315
mils/kWh charge. Hirst and Kirby believe that an hourly-averaged deviation would allow
for significant gaming of the system.67
No extra charge would be made for scheduling and dispatching functions, as the
Commission includes these in the fixed costs portion of rates. The Mega-NOPR assumes
that transmission companies would retain responsibility for system operation. If ISOs
operate transmission systems instead, the FERC should revisit the no extra charge for
scheduling and dispatch provision.
The remaining ancillary services -- load following, system protection, and reactive power --
would be bundled into a single rate (since they are difficult to quantify) of 1 mill/kWh.
Once again, a serious weakness of such a rate structure is that items such as reactive power
vary greatly (i.e. orders of magnitude) from location to location.68
The aforementioned criticisms of the pricing policy mention just some of the concerns that
exist in the industry. Although ancillary services are a small part of the $200 billion electric
power industry, the consequences of inefficient pricing are significant because ancillary
service provision costs utilities approximately $10 billion per year.69 Pacific Gas and
Electric (PG&E) calculates that the FERC-proposed ancillary services tariffs would
consistently cover less than half of PG&E's cost of providing them.70 If these calculations
are accurate and representative of the entire industry, transmission providers could lose $5
billion or more per year. This would indicate that there are significant problems with the
Mega-NOPR's stage one compensation plan for ancillary services. If the inefficiencies
created by the rate structure are as large as PG&E predicts, utilities would have a significant
incentive to propose their stage two rates quickly. Nevertheless, the magnitude of potential
losses is troubling and rapid rate filings by utilities would defeat the intent of the Mega-
NOPR's two stage process. 71
10.7.2.5 Market Structure Criterion 5
Through its use of posted transmission tariffs on standardized systems, the Mega-NOPR
would create a structure that is relatively easy to use from the customer's perspective, with
little loss of economic efficiency.
67 Hirst and Kirby, 1995, 17-18.
6 8Ilic, 18 September 1995.
69 Hirst and Kirby, 1995, 16.
70 Mara, 1995.
7 1FERC, April 1995, 17719-17720.
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10.7.2.6 Market Structure Criteria Summary
It would appear that the FERC has taken positive steps toward creating an efficient market,
although further study, discussion, and policy refinement is necessary (and has occurred).
Work is especially needed to address inadequacies in the definition of and compensation for
ancillary services.
10.7.3 Regulatory Criteria
10.7.3.1 Regulatory Criteria 1 & 2
The Mega-NOPR states that transmission retains and is expected to retain natural monopoly
characteristics. Consequently, the FERC would continue its regulatory oversight of it.
Given that the FERC has a national perspective, it should be capable of regulating
transmission systems with a system-wide perspective. The FERC intends to continue to
regulate wholesale power generation as well, at least in the short-term. However, the
Mega-NOPR elucidates the FERC's ultimate desire of creating a market-based wholesale
generation market over which it would conduct only light-handed regulation. 72 The states
are left with the task of regulatory oversight of distribution functions. This approach
appears to match the technical characteristics of the industry segments with appropriate
regulatory oversight.
10.7.3.2 Regulatory Criterion 3
The Mega-NOPR does not appear to recognize the potential for technological change in the
transmission segment of the industry -- it makes no mention of it and does nothing
explicitly to attempt to foster it.
10.7.3.3 Regulatory Criterion 4
In the short-term (stage one), the Mega-NOPR would not ensure that externalities are
internalized (per our extensive discussion on transmission pricing). Even in the long-term,
it would appear that the Mega-NOPR, through its utility-specific pricing regime, would not
internalize all of the externalities that occur on an interconnected transmission system. As
mentioned above, this method could create an incompatible set of pricing incentives.
10.7.4 Transition Criteria
The twin tenets of the Mega-NOPR addresses the transition criteria.
7 2 Ibid., 17688-17689.
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10.7.4.1 Transition Criterion 1
The FERC believes that "the recovery of legitimate and verifiable stranded costs is critical
to the successful transition ... to a competitively-priced industry.' ' 73 As a result, the Mega-
NOPR calls for the full recovery of stranded investments that result from wholesale
wheeling. Similarly, while the Mega-NOPR indicates that states have the authority to
determine how to handle stranded investments that result from retail wheeling, the FERC
encourages the states to allow utilities full recovery.
10.7.4.2 Transition Criterion 2
At the same time, the FERC believes that "market power through control of transmission is
the single greatest impediment to competition." 74 The FERC has come to this conclusion
as.a result of its experience in regulating the industry and believes that market power is a
continuing problem that requires action to alleviate.
10.7.4.3 Transition Criterion 3
The FERC chooses a moderate route in alleviating market power. By mandating the
functional unbundling of utilities, while allowing for structural unbundling at some point in
the future, the Commission avoids the potential efficiency losses that could result by
turning loose $56 billion in assets.75 At the same time, though, it chooses a course that
could readily lead to more serious action should it be necessary to halt market power abuse.
10.7.5 Long-Term Transmission "Production" Criteria
Because a long-term pricing transmission structure is not articulated in the Mega-NOPR, it
is difficult to know if incentives would exist for transmission "production" cost
minimization. The competitive solicitation of some ancillary services should place at least a
partial downward pressure on transmission rates, however.
10.7.6 Other Analysis
Another inefficiency of the Mega-NOPR is that its network service pricing provisions could
lead to gaps between prices and the customers' "fair share" of embedded costs. According
to the FERC's proposed pricing structures for stage one (and utilities would likely set
analogous tariffs for stage two), network service customers would be charged an
embedded cost rate based upon their average fraction of the total power on the system
73 Ibid., 17689.
74 Ibid., 17664.
75 Energy Information Administration, December 1993, 46.
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during monthly customer coincident peaks. However, when there are multiple network
service customers, counterflows -- which effectively reduce the amount of power that a
customer sends over the transmission system -- result. Consequently, the effective amount
of transmission capacity used by network service customers decreases (in almost all cases)
as the number of customers increases, but, the capital recovery burden of network service
customers would be insensitive to this.
An interesting contrast between the Mega-NOPR and the state proposals is that the FERC
chooses to retain the utility transmission ownership and operation industry paradigm, while
the state proposals we evaluate (and numerous others mentioned in Chapter 5) call for the
formation of ISOs which would transcend the boundaries of utility ownership.
Presumably, the ISO structure would take better advantage of system operation scale
economies and would allow for more consistent pricing mechanisms. Instead, the FERC
sees RTGs as the mechanism for solving the conflicting transmission pricing problem.
While the pricing-Balkanized transmission system may serve as an incentive to form RTGs
and for them (the RTGs) to develop a region-wide pricing scheme, a great deal of
inefficiency could occur in the meantime.
Having now evaluated each of the five deregulation proposals, let us conclude this chapter
by synthesizing the results.
10.8 SUMMARY OF RESULTS
In Table 10.2 we outline the findings of our evaluation. By examining this chart and
looking at our previous analysis, we see that the California Final proposal is the state-level
restructuring proposal that is predicted to be the most economically efficient with respect to
transmission in the long-term. The California POOLCO proposal appears to be more
advantageous than the California Bilateral proposal. However, this comparison could best
be described as incomplete. Although POOLCO appears to be more efficient based upon
the criteria that could be evaluated, the proposals' ultimate relative efficiencies would be
greatly impacted by more specific details that are not developed in the proposals. Thus, the
Bilateral proposal could conceivably end up being more efficient. The Extreme model,
largely due to its blatantly inefficient transmission pricing system, is the least efficient of
the bunch.
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Table 10.2: Summary of Evaluation Results
California Califomrnia California Wisc. FERC
Criteria POOLCO Bilateral Final Plausible Mega-
Extreme NOPR
Pra reflect, ma rg•.inal co s U l .. • /Mayberr ....=.
Prices reflect marginal costs Unclear Unclear Yes No No/Maybe
Price signals make marginal costs Unclear Unclear Yes No No/
transparent Maybe
Prices efficiently signal location and Yes No/ Yes No No/
timing of new generation and Unclear Unclear
transmission according to system-wide
considerations
Prices signal short term economically Unclear Unclear Yes No No/
and technically efficient use of system Unclear
Pricing structures flexible enough to Unclear Unclear Yes No/ Maybe
able to be upgraded with time Unclear
Pricing robust to future costs and Yes Unclear Yes Unclear Yes/
demand Unclear
Customer protection mechanisms Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
would not create perverse incentives
Competitive provision of transmission Yes Yes Yes Maybe Yes
services
Transaction costs are considered and Yes No Yes Yes Yes
minimized
Pricing and service information made Yes Yes/ Yes Yes Yes
available in an open and non- Unclear
discriminatory manner
Public and collective goods aspects Unclear No Yes/ Maybe No/
are identified and compensated for Unclear Maybe
Simplicity in structure without Maybe/ Yes/ Yes/ No Yes
compromising economic efficiency Unclear Maybe Maybe
Types and degree of regulation match Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
technical characteristics
Regulatory bodies composed with a Yes Yes Yes Unclear Yes
system-wide perspective
Dynamic, symbiotic relationship Unclear Yes/ Unclear Unclear Unclear
between technology and regulation Unclear
Regulation internalizes externalities Yes/ No/ Yes No No
and promotes efficient technical Unclear Unclear
requirements for syste m operation
Equitable treatment of bottleneck Yes Yes Yes Unclear Yes
market participants
Examination of market power Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Balancing of efficiency costs of Yes No Yes No Yes
potential market power abuse and of
mitigation actions
Incentives for minimum construction Maybe/ Yes/ Yes/ Unclear/ Unclear
and operation costs in the long term Unclear Unclear Unclear No
NOTES: Yes = Proposal meets the criterion
No = Proposal specifically does not meet the criterion
Maybe = The efficiency implications were mixed or could not be determined
Unclear = Proposal details regarding criterion have not yet been developed
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The FERC Mega-NOPR contains some significant uncertainties at best, problems at worst,
with respect to our criteria. Its compliance with many of the most important criteria is
doubtful. This is particularly troublesome since the Mega-NOPR would serve as the
foundation for the transmission segment of the industry during (and after) the restructuring
process. Fortunately, the FERC appears to recognize that the Mega-NOPR contains
inadequacies and is striving to improve it during the rule-making process, which has
extended for more than one year.
10.9 REFLECTIONS ON THE FINDINGS
10.9.1 Representativeness of Proposals
It must be remembered that in this thesis we examine five specific deregulation proposals,
and in the process, attempt to generalize our findings in order to answer larger questions,
such as: are pool systems inherently superior or inferior to bilateral ones with regard to
long-term economic efficiency in transmission? In order to do this, we are assuming that
the proposals we evaluate are "representative" of the larger "frameworks"' 76 of which they
are a part. However, each proposal has its own wrinkles. This was evidenced in some of
the weaknesses of Commissioner Knight's California Bilateral proposal, which were the
result of specific details of his conception of a bilateral system, not necessarily inherent
weaknesses in the bilateral framework. The same can be said for pool systems. A
fundamental difference between the California POOLCO proposal and the British pool
system77 is that former considers market power issues while the formulators of the latter
appear to have been blind to such issues.78 An even more glaring example is the Extreme
model, where its insistence on simple (and non-marginal cost) pricing causes it to "fail" our
criteria more often than any other proposal. While the Extreme model is clearly inefficient,
one could imagine that a framework which employs a state-wide or regional transmission
company could offer the ability to be as efficient as the other the proposals with respect to
transmission pricing. 79 However, based upon the specific, glaring weakness in the
specific model we evaluated, we could come to negative findings on the larger framework
of which it is a part.
76 A framework is here considered to be a broad category of deregulation proposals, such as: pool-based,
bilateral contract-based, single transmission company-based model. Within each framework would be a
number of specific proposals. For instance, POOLCO was just one of several pool-based proposals (many
of which were quite similar) that were bantered about in California. Similarly, PG&E proposed a bilateral
model which would be within the same framework as the California bilateral model, but differ in details.
7 7Henney, 1996, 23.
7 8In fairness to the British, they were facing many unknowns when they began their "real-time experiment"
with deregulation.
7 9 For example, one could hypothesize that with a single ownership structure, any potential pricing
distortions that could result from multiple ownership of singularly operated system would be eliminated.
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This discussion underscores an important finding of this thesis -- that the details do in fact
matter.
10.9.2 Details Matter
In the preceding discussion we see how specific details of a proposal can drastically change
our evaluation of its impact on the efficiency of transmission systems. The same basic
finding (that details matter) was also observed earlier -- in our analysis of the California
POOLCO and California Bilateral proposals -- where we found their performance with
respect to many criteria to be "unclear." While we posited the direction that the proposals
were leading with respect to efficiency (i.e. the POOLCO framework seemed slightly
better), we could not make any definitive conclusions on their relative predicted efficiencies
without knowing some of the details that are at a level one or two steps below what was
included in the proposals. Depending upon the resolution of the details, it would be
possible that a resulting POOLCO structure could be significantly more efficient with
regard to transmission than the Bilateral one, or visa-versa. The most significant finding
from this discussion, then, is that the decisions made when the details are developed --
mundane or boring to the masses as they may be -- are predicted to be more important in
determining the efficiency of transmission in the restructured industry than the decision to
adopt a POOLCO, Bilateral or other framework.
In saying this, we are not precluding the existence of an "optimal" framework. But our
findings do indicate two corollaries. The first is that if an optimal framework exists, in
order for it to produce superior efficiency results, it must be accompanied by optimal
details. 80 Secondly, none of the proposals that we evaluate in this thesis have the
combination of both of these items, at least according to our criteria.
10.9.3 Findings and Their Inconclusiveness
The result of this is that while we can rank-order the proposals in terms of their predicted
long-term economic efficiency based upon our criteria, the lack of detail in all of them
makes this rank-order sensitive to change. We can conclusively say that the California
Final proposal is superior to the Wisconsin Plausible Extreme model. It also appears to be
superior, in a less conclusive manner, to the California Bilateral proposal; and would be
ranked higher than the California POOLCO model because of the latter's lack of clarity on
80This discussion is of course simplistic, in the sense that the way that a proposal is implemented plays a
significant role -- probably equal to if not greater than design -- in its ultimate success. While
implementation can be facilitated by the design of a proposal, it cannot be mandated.
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key points. But the remaining rankings (i.e. which is 2nd best...) are very sensitive to the
undeveloped proposal details.
From this discussion it would appear that the CPUC chose the best option of the four state-
level proposals that we evaluate, based upon our criteria for long-term economic efficiency
in transmission. While the California Final proposal may be the best option, it is difficult
to determine the magnitude by which it is the best choice. In short, the thesis affirms the
Commission's choice, but does not give it a "ringing endorsement."
Unfortunately, we cannot generalize this finding and determine from our analysis whether a
hybrid framework is superior to the other frameworks. Most all of the problems that exist
in the proposals are a result of the specific proposals, rather than in the framework that they
represent. It is unclear whether these proposal-level problems mask more fundamental
weaknesses with the frameworks, however.
10.9.4 Disregard of Technological Change
When one ponders the analysis, examines Table 10.2, and then thinks back to discussions
earlier in the thesis, one is struck by the lack of attention that the proposals pay to
technological change. In only two of them can one even infer the possibility of
technological change in transmission. It is ironic that the Bilateral proposal, which we
mention earlier is deficient in terms of its understanding of electric power systems, is the
one that most explicitly discusses the value of technological change. Yet even its
discussion of innovation in transmission technologies is a stretch -- it does so by arguing
that, in general, innovation results from competition. The argument would continue by
saying that the proposal attempts to stimulate technological innovation in transmission by
introducing competition in ancillary services. While this argument may be a stretch, the
only other place where technological change in transmission is implied is even a further
stretch. The Final proposal contains two obscure references to potential future changes in
the structure of the transmission system which could only result from technological
advances. 81
After having seen how the industry has developed as a result of technological innovation,
this lack of attention to, let alone the lack of development of incentives for, technological
innovation in transmission is distressing indeed. It is even more disconcerting in light of
8 1See Section 11.6.3 for further discussion of this.
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our previous discussion of potentially revolutionary transmission technologies that are
currently under development, and our discussion of how difficult it can be to dislodge
older, less-efficient, capital-intensive technologies.
10.9.5 Transmission as a Natural Monopoly - At Least in Part
It is interesting to note that each of the proposals view transmission service as a natural
monopoly, but at the same time, they each also seek to stimulate competition in at least
some part of the "transmission" system. It is yet further interesting to note that there appear
to be significant differences of opinion about which transmission functions could be made
competitive. This is most strikingly presented in the following chapter (see Table 11.1).
Some of the differences are the result of the varying industry structures. But others appear
to result from differing beliefs on what is technologically feasible, and/or differences in the
innovativeness of proposal developers. The consequences of introducing competition into
some parts of the transmission segment of the industry are examined in more detail in the
next chapter.
10.9.6 Neglect of Basic Economic Principles
Throughout the policy discussions of the inefficiencies of the present generation market
structure, and of deregulating it, is the reiteration of the superiority of marginal cost pricing
and the importance of efficient price signals. Yet, when we evaluate these five
restructuring proposals, we find that these basic economic principles were virtually ignored
with respect to transmission pricing. Only the California Final proposal clearly and
consistently strives for marginal cost pricing and efficient price signals in transmission
services.
Having now completed the first main objective of the thesis, to evaluate these five
proposals based upon our criteria, let us turn our attention to the prospects for the
development of non-utility transmission systems (NUTS), by answering the question: "Is it
crazy to think about the NUTS option?"

Chapter 11
Is It Crazy to Think About NUTS?
Political economists have been reproached with too smalf a use offacts, and too farge
an employment of theory. Iffacts are wanting, fet it be remembered that the closet-
philosopher is unfortunately too litte acquainted with the admirab6e arrangements of
the factory; and that no class of persons can supply so readify, and with so little
sacrifice of time, the data on which aft the reasonings of political economists are
founded, as the merchant and manufacturer, and;, unquestionably, to no class are the
deductions to which they give rise so important. Nor let it be feared that erroneous
deductions may 6e made from such recorded facts: The errors which arise from the
absence offacts are far more numerous and more dura6te than those which result from
unsound reasoning respecting true data.'
-- Charles (Babbage (1835)
11.1 INTRODUCTION
This thesis examines five proposals for electric power deregulation that, as sweeping as
they may be, would deregulate only part of the industry -- generation and, in some cases,
electricity sales/energy services. Transmission and distribution (T&D) would remain
regulated, perhaps even more than in the past. But is it correct to assume that a
deregulation "fire wall" can be built between generation and T&D? Would the attempt to do
so even be efficient? In other industries, deregulation has "unleashed 'a gale of creative
destruction' in which competitive forces could redefine market structure."2 Why would the
same not occur in electric power?3 Nevertheless, there is nearly universal agreement that it
is not possible to deregulate transmission -- that it is a natural monopoly, and as such,
cannot be opened to competition. Yet, many other "special cases" -- segments of or entire
industries that seemed impervious to competition -- have been deregulated with success.
With these ideas in mind, the focus of this chapter is to examine the question: would it be
possible, either now or at some foreseeable time in the future, for non-utility transmission
systems (NUTS) to develop? To answer this question, we examine why NUTS might and
might not be beneficial, the impediments and potential pathways to their development, and
their future prospects.
1Babbage, 1971, 156.
2Vietor, 1994, 310. Vietor borrows the "gale of creative destruction" concept from Schumpeter. For the
original context of this statement (which is applicable to competition in general), see: Schumpeter, 1962,
84.
3Especially in transmission since the corresponding segment in the telephone industry (long distance) was
the first to be deregulated, and since generation and transmission are, to some extent, interchangeable.
326 Chapter 11
11.2 WHAT IS A NUTS?
Let us start by defining non-utility transmission systems. Given our earlier definition that
"transmission" includes all the functions of transmission systems: "the wires," system
control, and ancillary services (even those that are generation-based); the broadest
definition of NUTS is that they are complete transmission systems, here defined as
"complete NUTS." 4  According to this definition, complete NUTS would operate
independently of the current grid (and other complete NUTS that might develop). As such,
complete NUTS would create competing transmission systems -- consisting of separate
lines and system control. While we keep complete NUTS in mind throughout this chapter,
we also consider "partial NUTS" -- "transmission" functions provided by competitive
(non-utility) firms (Nutcos) 5 on the same, existing transmission system. Thus, partial
NUTS would create competing transmission services on the same transmission system.
Specifically, we anticipate that the following transmission services could be operated as
partial NUTS in the foreseeable future:
* ancillary services provided to a system operator;6
* ancillary services provided directly to transmission customers;
* transmission line ownership;
* transmission line construction;
* transmission system operation; and
* transmission service reselling.
Although we use the complete/partial NUTS terminology throughout this chapter, an
alternative, although perhaps initially more confusing, convention might be worth
considering. In switching to these alternative terms, "complete NUTS" would be simply
"non-utility transmission systems (NUTS)", and "partial NUTS" would be "non-utility
transmission services (NUTs)". We do not use the alternative convention here because the
big "S"/little "s" difference might be too fine for the introduction of a new concept.
These definitions prompt the question, what is a utility? For our discussion, a utility is a
firm that operates in a regulated environment: 7 it has its prices set through some sort of
regulatory process, and competition in the services it produces is limited, if not prohibited,
4 Not to be confused with "completely nuts," although many might suggest that advocates of this type of
transmission system would fit said description.
5 Presumably, these would be firms other than the incumbent transmission utility, although they could
include affiliates of other transmission utilities, similar to IPP affiliates of utilities.
6 As we discuss below, it may not be possible to provide all of the ancillary services in a competitive
manner.
7 Borrowing from George Stigler, regulation here is defined as "the attempt by the state to use its legal
powers to direct ... the economic conduct of non-governmental bodies." Stigler, 1981, 73.
by regulation or statute. With definitions of complete and partial NUTS in hand, let us
examine the potential benefits of their emergence.
11.3 WHY MIGHT NUTS BE BENEFICIAL?
11.3.1 General Benefits from Competition
A distinguishing characteristic of the American economy has been its broad reliance on free
market forces. Hughes and Hall note,
Economic regulation has generally been limited to a few industries that are either
natural monopolies or subject to other kinds of market failure. This practice
reflects a faith in the superiority of free, unregulated, competitive markets
wherever competition is adjudged feasible and effective. 8
While most segments of the American economy have always fallen in the domain of the
free market, membership in the "limited few" has been fluid, partially as a result of larger
political trends. During the past two decades the political winds have shifted from a New
Deal Era societal desire to err on the side of preventing market failure to a desire to take the
leap of faith of competition. As Gardner and Gilson note, "Over the course of two decades
the inertia of public policy has shifted from a force restraining to a force propelling
deregulation." 9 This was precipitated, in part, by economists' predictions of the benefits of
deregulation. Most of these early 1970s predictions have come true -- a recent estimate
places the annual social welfare benefit from the deregulation of seven industries at $35.8
to $46.2 billion 1990 dollars. This amounts to an efficiency improvement of 7% to 9%10 in
the part of the economy affected by regulatory reform. Corresponding efficiency gains
from electric power transmission deregulation would be approximately $160 million,11 not
taking account for cost savings that could occur in other segments of the industry (which,
as we see below, could be much more substantial).
11.3.2 Instability of Partially-Competitive, Integrated Industries
The regulatory instability of partially competitive, integrated industries is another reason
that the development of NUTS might be desirable in an industry structure that features
competition in generation. Reflecting upon the deregulation experiences of other
industries, Alfred Kahn comments, "Once you begin to admit competition, it introduces
strains and distortions that can typically be resolved only by further deregulation." 12 For
8 Hughes and Hall, 1990, 245.
9 Gardner and Gilson, 1994, 18.10 Winston, 1993, 1284. The industries included in this estimate are: airlines, railroads, trucking,
telecommunications, cable television, brokerage, and natural gas.
1 1This number is calculated by taking 8% of the total variable cost of transmission service. Data source:
Energy Information Administration, December 1993.12 Kahn, October 1994, 27.
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example, the pace of deregulation in the telephone industry started slowly, beginning with a
series of small, incremental decisions; but once the Pandora's box was opened, it was
impossible to shut. Deregulation continued after AT&T's divestiture. In 1984 it was
intended that competition would be limited to long distance service, and that the Baby Bells
would operate only within their own service territories. However, only several weeks after
the divestiture agreement took effect, the Baby Bells were seeking entry into the long
distance market, 13 and today AT&T is actively pursuing a strategy to get back into local
service. The lesson is that pressures to push competition into transmission can be expected
once generation deregulation occurs.
Furthermore, problems occur at the boundaries in industries that are mixed between
regulation and competition. 14 McKie notes,
Marking the boundary of regulation in these circumstances is a delicate task. To
draw it too far out causes inclusion of some activities that competition could
manage well, or perhaps better, and possibly suppress independent supply of
those activities. To draw it too close in would cut across some activities that are
organically incapable of separation without loss of efficiency and might permit
some monopoly functions to escape control. 15
This experience was borne out in the natural gas industry, as Vietor has observed,
The issues raised by this case [natural gas] exemplify the problems inherent in
applying ratebase regulation to just one segment of an integrated economic
activity. Artificial jurisdictional boundaries either distorted the competitive
position of the integrated firm, or broke down.
A root cause of the instability of partially deregulated markets is that firms operating under
"regulated competition" face fundamental asymmetries between risk and earnings. 16 These
asymmetries create a force that propels firms to remove their "regulated competition" status
-- through political or technological change. These problems could be particularly acute for
electric power transmission in the presence of a competitive generation market because, at
least to some degree, transmission and generation are interchangeable. For example,
congestion on transmission lines can lead to out-of-merit generation dispatch.
Furthermore, many of the ancillary services -- which (following the FERC's lead) we have
defined to be "transmission" functions -- are "produced" by generators.
There are already indications that the forces are in motion to bring competition into electric
power transmission. The North American Electricity Reliability Council reports that,
13 Gardner and Gilson, 1994, 5.
'
4McKie, 1970.
15Ibid., 11.
16Vietor, 1994, 330.
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[I]n a few areas, transmission lines have been built by non-utility generators
(NUGs) to deliver their electrical output to the utility systems... 17
And Gardner and Gilson note,
as with other cautious steps down the path of deregulation, small steps set in
motion forces that then compel larger steps... When transmission becomes an
economically priced commodity, then utilities will actually have grounds to
compete in providing it to both suppliers and users, and a valuable market will
develop. 18
While this last quote may be based upon an overly simplistic view of the technical nature of
transmission systems, it captures the tendency of market forces to free firms from the
complications that arise in mixed regulatory structures and applies it to transmission.
11.3.3 Spur Further Power Transactions
Perhaps the largest potential benefit of NUTS is that entrepreneurial Nutcos might facilitate
beneficial power transactions that would not occur in the current transmission market
structure, or even in the one envisioned by the FERC. There are two primary reasons that
utilities might not facilitate these transactions. First, in a situation where utilities are
functionally but not structurally unbundled, some utilities would have incentives to
minimize wheeling across their lines so that they can maximize sales from their existing
(often not paid for) generators. In such a case, the utility's transmission affiliate may
neither deny nor unfavorably price transmission service to IPPs, but it would deliberately
not actively facilitate transactions. Second, even if utilities do not intentionally refrain from
actively seeking wheeling transactions, the historical roots of utilities and the traditional
function of transmission systems within the utility structure, 19 could be a source of inertia
that prevents an "entrepreneurial" transmission company from developing. 20 As a result, a
utility transmission company may not entrepreneurially seek to increase the use of its
system.
In contrast, based upon the experiences of NUGs, we expect that entrepreneurial Nutcos
would actively attempt to create new transmission business. For example, a Nutco might
encourage the construction of additional generation capacity to serve a high-cost region that
would require the construction of both transmission and generation capacity. The
willingness of the Nutco to build capacity may make opportunities for generation
17North American Electricity Reliability Council, 1990, 30.
18Gardner and Gilson, 1994, 18.
19To coordinate existing and future generation and load needs.2 0 In the preceding paragraph this is due to an implicit corporate policy, in this paragraph the argument
concerns cultural factors.
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companies transparent that had previously been hidden due to the lack of a transmission
link. Nutcos could also find innovative ways of soliciting new business for their existing
lines. While it is difficult to predict all of the mechanisms by which Nutcos could increase
socially efficient trades, the existence of Nutcos would create incentives for the imagination
of the market to consummate them.
Figure 11.1: Average Retail Electricity Price, All Customers (1994)
U.S. Average Revenue per kWh is 6.91 Cents
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Note: The average revenue per kilowatthour of electricity sold is calculated by dividing revenue by sales.Source: Energy Information Administration, Form EIA-861, "Annual Electric Utility Report"
Source: Energy Information Administration, November 1995b, 24.
An example of how Nutcos could be beneficial can be seen by examining the electricity
price differentials that exist between the Midwest and the Northeast. (See Figure 11.1)
Often mentioned in discussions of deregulation, especially at the wholesale level, is that a
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more competitive market (and open transmission access) would allow low-cost Midwest
utilities to sell power in the high-cost Northeast region.21 Although the Mega-NOPR seeks
to eliminate the policy constraints which prevent this from becoming reality, these
discussions ignore physical constraints. For example, the peak power demand for the
United States portion of the Northeast Power Coordinating Council (NPCC),22 which
includes New York and the six New England States, was 45,031 MW in the summer of
1989.23 However, the maximum transmission transfer capability from American sources
into the region was 2250 MW.24 Thus, transmission system constraints would limit power
imports to approximately 5% of the total demand. Clearly, this is insufficient to reduce
New England power rates to the degree that many desire, and in the process, to maximize
dynamic efficiency over the larger eastern interconnected region. Thus, even if the Mega-
NOPR eliminates the policy barriers to Midwest to Northeast power wheeling, daunting
physical constraints will remain.
Although important, alleviating these physical constraints is a non-trivial task since it would
require capacity expansion and enhancement. However, there are currently few incentives,
and possibly disincentives, for utilities to add capacity, especially for wheeling purposes.
These disincentives are caused by uncertainties regarding transmission pricing and,
consequently, the ability of utilities to recover their transmission investments. As a result
of these uncertainties, which have become acute as the industry moves into a transition
period, transmission capacity expansion activity has dropped significantly -- on the order of
50% -- and this trend is expected to continue until at least 2005.25 These disincentives are
magnified by the challenges of transmission siting. While the Mega-NOPR would
empower potential electricity transactors to petition the FERC to mandate the construction
of new facilities, the process would be daunting. In the case of Midwest to Northeast
wheeling, petitioners would have to force multiple utilities to build new lines. These
utilities, many of which would have incentives to drag their feet, would have to secure
approvals from multiple jurisdictions. In short, this situation would be ripe for delays of
years, if not decades. Furthermore, a quasi-collective goods problem would be created --
2 1For instance, see: "Electric Utilities to Provide Access for Competitors."
22 The NPCC also includes five Canadian provinces.2 3North American Electricity Reliability Council, 1990, 62.
24 Ibid., 25. While these statistics are several years out of date, at the macro level (which is what they are
intended to demonstrate) they are still representative of the situation as it exists today. Realize that exactly
defining transmission capacity is a somewhat elusive concept. For more on this topic, see: Ilic' et al,
August 1996.
2 5 North American Electric Reliability Council, 1992, 30; and North American Electric Reliability
Council, September 1995, 23.
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societal efficiency would be improved by building additional capacity, but the cost to
potential transactors of "forcing" (through a litigious process) a series of utilities to do so
would be a large, if not prohibitive.
In contrast, an entrepreneurial, profit-seeking Nutco would see the potential financial gain
of long-distance power wheeling and act upon it. While it would still face significant siting
obstacles, the firm's very purpose would be to construct the lines and operate them in a
profitable manner. It would have a large incentive to have its capacity built as quickly as
possible at the least-cost. Thus, the emergence of Nutcos could substantially improve the
level of dynamic efficiency in the entire industry, when viewed at the level of the
interconnected systems. Quantitatively, the benefits of this could be very substantial. For
example, the FERC estimates that its open access transmission policies could save
customers $3.8 to $5.4 billion per year26 based upon the currently constrained network
plus planned capacity expansions.27 We expect that benefits of equal or larger magnitude
could be realized from removing the transmission grid's physical constraints.
The most important point of this section is that entrepreneurial Nutcos could see, create,
and seize otherwise unimagined opportunities for expanded use of the transmission system
that would increase social efficiency. Nutcos could change the transmission operating
paradigm -- from a relatively passive activity that focuses on reliability and support for the
competitive generation segment of the industry, to one where significant opportunities for
entrepreneurial growth could occur -- and in the process, create large efficiency benefits,
potentially over areas as large as the regional interconnections.
11.3.4 Market Power Alleviation
By providing competing transmission service, NUTS could reduce or eliminate the market
power of transmission companies. 28 The magnitude of this potential benefit is directly
proportional to the amount of market power that transmission utilities possess. Prior to the
passage of EPAct and the issuance of the Mega-NOPR, competition from NUTS would
have provided large benefits. However, if the Mega-NOPR and state proposals achieve
their goal of eliminating the market power of transmission utilities, this benefit of NUTS
would also be eliminated.
26 Source: "Regulators Issue Rules to Open Up Competition in Electricity Industry."
27 Meroney, 9 May 1996.
2 8FERC, 1989, 108-116.
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11.3.5 Spur Innovation
Based upon what has occurred in other deregulated industries, the emergence of NUTS
could increase transmission technology innovation.29 Gardner and Gilson comment,
As new markets emerge, and as new refinements of existing markets are
discerned, the pace of technological change accelerates. Rather than delaying
technological innovation to fit cycles of asset depreciation, firms force
innovation to establish a basis for market advantage. 30
Absent NUTS and given the typical utility mind-set of standardization and conservative
reliance on well-proven technologies, transmission utilities would likely be slow to
embrace new transmission technologies. In addition, combining what Gardner and Gilson
mention about depreciation cycles and the fact that transmission systems' operating costs
are approximately 1/28 of their fixed costs,31 utilities face financial disincentives to
upgrading transmission technologies prior to the end of their (long) depreciation cycles.
Thus, economic incentives compound the conservative technical inclination of utilities to
deter the adoption of new transmission technologies, absent competition.
In contrast, the use of new technologies -- such as flexible alternating current transmission
systems (FACTS) -- may be the only realistic entry strategy option for new transmission
entrants. Without some type of technical advantage over existing systems, it is difficult to
imagine how a Nutco could develop a comparative advantage vis-a-vis a traditional utility.
Another innovation-related benefit of new entrants is that they create new opportunities for
innovative supply companies. Jorma Ollila, Chief Executive of Nokia Group, a cellular
telephone equipment company, recently described how the international trend toward
telecommunications industry deregulation is helping his company.32 In the old era,
telecom companies (analogous here to transmission utilities) had century-old working
relationships with their equipment suppliers. Therefore, innovative (or potentially
innovative) suppliers had no market for the new technologies they developed. However,
the emergence of new entrants is creating new customers (without these century-old
relationships) for innovative technology supply companies, which in turn, is stimulating
innovation.
11.3.6 Successful Deregulation in Telephone and Natural Gas "Transmission"
The experience of other industries illustrates another potential benefit of NUTS. In both
the telephone and natural gas industries, the segment of the industry comparable to
29 See, for example: Knight, 1995; Hughes and Hall, 1990, 245; and Levy, 1996, 89.
30 Gardner and Gilson, 1994, 5.
3 1See Section 11.5.1.
3 2011ila, 1996.
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transmission has experienced at least some form of deregulation during the past 15 years.
In the telephone industry, this was a near complete move toward deregulation. It was more
limited in natural gas. As observed elsewhere, there are many physical similarities between
telephone, natural gas, and electric power systems. Thus, the same substantial benefits
achieved from the deregulation of these "transmission" segments of analogous industries
could also occur in the electric power industry. (We emphasize "could" because despite the
structural similarities between the three systems, there are also important differences
between them.33 As Ilic" et al comment, "it is the presence of the transmission gird that
makes the economics of power industry deregulation a qualitatively different problems than
the deregulation problem of many other industries. '"34)
11.3.7 Lower Transmission Costs
The emergence of competitive NUTS could lower transmission service rates through
reduced variable costs.35 While capital costs are the largest component of transmission
service costs, ancillary services and maintenance costs are variable costs. We expect that
Nutcos would be able to realize at least some variable cost savings, if for no other reason,
because of lower overhead expenses. 36 If Nutcos could provide less expensive
transmission service, utilities would likely find and eliminate some non-value-added costs
in order to compete. Even if utilities were not to reduce their costs, Nutcos would offer a
lower cost option to price sensitive customers.
11.3.8 Advantages in Project Finance
Non-utility generators have typically used a substantially higher debt-to-equity ratio in their
project finance than their utility counterparts. 37 If this experience is a guide, Nutcos would
likely use a larger percentage of debt in the financing of transmission facility construction
than utilities currently do. While it does not necessarily follow that Nutcos would face a
lower required return on investment, they could. Also, Nutcos would be free of utility
commission oversight of debt-equity ratios, which should allow for added flexibility in
transmission facility financing.
3 3See Section 1.1.2.1.
34 Ilic' et al, August 1996, 2.
35 It should be noted that this benefit would likely produce a second order effect societal benefit.
3 6In 1991, administrative and general expenses accounted for 11.8% of total electricity costs. Presumably,
in an unbundled industry, these will be partitioned amongst the functions of the utility. If they were spread
evenly over generation, transmission, and distribution, the overhead costs of transmission would be larger
than its O&M costs. Source: Energy Information Administration, January 1993, 31.
37 Roseman, 1991, 35.
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Despite these potential benefits, any discussion of NUTS is quickly dismissed as being
infeasible. 38 Let us now explore the reasons for this pessimism.
11.4 IMPEDIMENTS TO (COMPLETE) NUTS
11.4.1 Natural Monopoly Characteristics of Transmission Systems
A belief that resonates through the literature is that "transmission qualifies as a classic
'natural monopoly'." 39 While this assumption may indeed be true, scant effort has been
made to test it40 -- perhaps because of the Herculean effort that would be required. While
we do not attempt to rigorously test it here, we qualitatively probe the presumed natural
monopoly characteristics of transmission.
11.4.1.1 FERC's Basis for Believing that Transmission is a Natural Monopoly
In the Mega-NOPR, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) discusses why it
believes that transmission "remains and is expected to remain a natural monopoly."41
The [natural] monopoly characteristic exists in part because entry into the
transmission market is restricted or difficult. In addition, as unit costs are less
for larger lines and networks, transmission facilities still exhibit scale
economies. From an economic, environmental, and aesthetic viewpoint, it is
often better for a single owner (or group of owners) to build a single large
transmission line rather than for many owners to build smaller parallel lines on a
non-coordinated basis. Further, effective competition among owners of parallel
transmission lines is unlikely, and often impossible, with existing practices and
technology.42
While the FERC's discussion of the natural monopoly characteristics of transmission
captures a number of points, it does not include all of them. Let us dig a bit further in order
to elucidate several more prescient points.
11.4.1.2 Joskow and Schmalensee Natural Monopoly Framework
In Markets for Power, Joskow and Schmalensee propound eight criteria for evaluating the
natural monopoly character of the entire electric power industry.43 Let us utilize their
criteria (which take the form of questions) in order to better understand the natural
monopoly characteristics of transmission. Because their evaluation was focused on the
industry as a whole, some of their criteria would not be relevant to our evaluation exactly as
3 8 For example, see: FERC, 1989, 111.
39Weiss, 1975, 144.
4 0Very few extensive studies have been done on the topic. In the most extensive one found by the author,
Huettner and Landon were unable to find, based upon 1971 economic data, that economies of scale existed
in transmission. They note, however, that since generation and transmission are interchangeable; their data
might have been corrupted by firms minimizing generation costs. Source: Huettner and Landon, 1978, 907.
4 1FERC, April 1995, 17675.
4 2 Ibid.
4 3 Joskow and Schmalensee, 1983, 32-33.
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stated. In these cases, we alter the criteria's wording to have them fit our transmission
evaluation while retaining the essence of the questions.44
11.4.1.2.1 Does the transmission of electric power have natural monopoly characteristics?
This question is rather broad -- we attempt to answer it through our responses to the next
seven questions.
11.4.1.2.2 If the transmission of electric power appears to have natural monopoly
characteristics, what are the sources of the economies of single-firm production?
The natural monopoly characteristics of transmission occur at two levels: individual lines
and the overall system. At the line level there are three sources of natural monopoly. First,
the fixed and operating costs of higher voltage lines are substantially smaller per unit
capacity than lower voltage lines. As a result, it is significantly less expensive to build one
higher voltage line to serve a transmission corridor than to build multiple lower voltage
lines to serve the same load. Second, building one line, rather than several smaller parallel
lines, reduces siting expenses (e.g. costly hearings, litigation, and land purchases).
Correspondingly, if a corridor's transmission capacity requirements substantially increase,
it is less expensive -- in terms of siting and structural costs -- to reinforce an existing line
(by adding another set of conductors or FACTS devices) than to build a new, parallel line.
Third, transmission assets are very immobile due to "substantial investments in rights of
way, towers, transmission lines, and switching stations."45 As a result, immobility is a
substantial barrier to exit that reciprocally acts as a barrier to entry.
The most fundamental natural monopoly at the system level results from the scale
economies of system control and pooling. Transmission systems not only transport power
from one point to another, they provide a vital coordination role in modem power systems
-- they are the integrators of the electric power industry. In the words of Joskow and
Schmalensee, "Transmission plays the most fundamental role in achieving the economies
of electric power supply that modem technology makes possible."46 It has been estimated
that the economies of scale of power pooling are exhausted at approximately 10,000
MW. 47 In other words, a complete NUTS would need to be connected to a daunting
10,000 MW of generating capacity or potentially find itself at a scale economy
disadvantage.
44For example, we change "does the supply of electric power" to "does the transmission of electric power."
4 5Joskow and Schmalensee, 1983, 125.4 6 Ibid., 63.
4 7 Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), 1981, 10.
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11.4.1.2.3 Over what stages of the transmission process: ancillary services, maintenance,
transmission line ownership/construction/operation do natural monopoly characteristics
extend?
We mention above that individual transmission lines have several natural monopoly
characteristics. We also find that system operation and control is a natural monopoly with a
high threshold for exhausting economies of scale. Currently, transmission system
ownership and operation are typically bundled; however, it is the operation of system
where scale economies exist at the system level. If ownership and operation were to be
unbundled, it is conceivable that ownership would not display economies of scale, or at
least not such large ones.
Because many of the ancillary services are generation-based, some of these may not have
natural monopoly characteristics. However, it is dangerous to assume that all ancillary
services are not natural monopolies. For example, reactive power support is an ancillary
service that is spatially variant. In remote areas, localized reactive power support natural
monopolies may exist. As a result, when we later recommend that ancillary services be
made competitive to the greatest extent possible, the qualifying statement is important -- and
both technical and economic considerations should be considered in evaluations of the
feasibility of competitive ancillary service provision.
11.4.1.2.4 Are there important economies of vertical integration and coordination between
stages that extend the natural monopoly from one stage to another?
Vertical integration in the electric power industry was undoubtedly once desirable.
However, the current restructuring proposals are built upon the assumption that this is no
longer true. With respect to transmission, for example, there may not be large benefits of
having the same company own transmission assets and provide some of the ancillary
services -- although centralized coordination of these activities is still desirable. Likewise,
there may not be large benefits of having the same entity that owns the transmission system
also own or dispatch generators. The technical nature of transmission systems require that
there be coordination, although this could occur through "contractual arrangements," such
as system operation protocols, rather than through the internalized decision-making of a
single firm.48 The ability to perform coordination functions outside of a single firm has
been facilitated by technological improvements, especially information technology (IT).
4 8For more on contracts and internal firm decisions, see: Appendix J.8.
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11.4.1.2.5 If the transmission of electric power does not have natural monopoly
characteristics, what types of market behaviors and performance would be expected if price
and entry regulation were eliminated?
We find above that transmission systems have some natural monopoly characteristics. As a
result, we expect that if transmission were to be deregulated today, the market power abuse
that the FERC is attempting to curb in its Mega-NOPR would continue, if not intensify.
Utilities that are well-positioned for competition may be exceptions to this behavior, since
they would have much to gain from an open access environment (or something resembling
it). However, they would likely open up their grids as part of reciprocity agreements,
rather than on a true "open access" basis. Utilities that are uncompetitive would likely
refuse wheeling or levy transmission charges that would make their own generation price
competitive with those of other suppliers.
If entry restrictions were to be removed today, before an industry restructuring, we would
not expect the emergence of new transmission entrants. After a restructuring that would
unbundle some transmission services, however, there would be some opportunities for
Nutcos to enter into niche markets, such as the provision of some of the ancillary services.
In general, due to the scale large economies that exist at the system level, it is unreasonable
to expect that complete NUTS could emerge without technological changes that undermine
the natural monopoly characteristics of transmission systems.
11.4.1.2.6 Will we get competitive outcomes or oligopolisitic outcomes in the absence of
regulated franchised monopoly?
Given the large capital requirements of transmission facilities and the complete penetration
of the current market participants, it is almost inconceivable that anything but monopolistic
outcomes would occur.
11.4.1.2.7 If natural monopoly characteristics are present but extend only over a subset of
transmission functions, what kind of outcomes will emerge if price and entry regulation is
eliminated in some stages of the process but not others?
As noted in our discussions of the restructuring proposals, some "transmission" functions
-- specifically some of the ancillary services -- will likely be provided through competitive
processes following restructuring. In the context of a utility-owned and operated
transmission system there would be substantial opportunities for self-dealing in
"competitive" ancillary service markets. As a result, it seems imperative that system
operation and generation ownership be unbundled. But even with an unbundling of system
dispatch -- which would take on the role of coordination of the "market" for ancillary
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services -- from ancillary service providers, there could still be opportunities for
monopolistic behavior. For example, there may be a limited number of providers that
could participate in a "competitive" process for the provision spatially dependent ancillary
services. It may be that some services can be provided competitively in some areas but not
in others. As a result, the process of determining which services can be made competitive
will be important yet difficult.
11.4.1.2.8 What structural changes can facilitate competitive outcomes in transmission
functions where natural monopoly characteristics are not present?
The provision of some ancillary services may not have natural monopoly characteristics.
While work must still be done to determine exactly what mechanisms would work best,
coordination by an independent system operator is likely necessary in order to create and
maintain a competitive market.
A second area of potential competition is in the construction of new transmission lines --
either in a new corridor or one that is in need of a new set of transmission structures and
conductors. While it is not feasible to have transmission lines operating in competition, it
should be feasible to harness market forces in constructing and owning new lines, which
would be operated by an independent system operator (ISO).
An implication from this discussion is that the Mega-NOPR's call for functional
unbundling (which does not include the creation of an ISO) might not lead to competitive
outcomes in some "transmission" functions that the FERC intends to unbundle, and may
prevent the development of competition in some other transmission functions.
11.4.2 Transmission System Physics
Another impediment to the development of NUTS -- specifically competing parallel
transmission lines on the same system -- stems from power system physics. In light of the
above finding that system operation has huge economies of scale, one could ask, why not
have "competing" transmission lines on the same system? After all, competing generators
are connected to the same grid in the wholesale power market. While in the abstract there
may be parallels between competing wholesale generators and competing transmission
lines, there are important physical differences. Unlike the generation of electric power,
where power output can be carefully controlled in an economically and technically efficient
manner, the system operator does not control power flow paths through the transmission
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system. Instead, power flows along the path of least impedance and any attempt to alter
this would be technically inefficient. 49
Recognizing these physical constraints, let us hypothesize what would result if connected,
parallel transmission lines were to compete. In this situation, competing transmission line
Nutcos would solicit customers, but then would have no control over whether power
flowed over their lines or the lines of their competitors. The result would be a substantial
opportunity to "game" the system, which the FERC Mega-NOPR directly addresses.
With two electric systems providing parallel contract paths, a share of the actual
power flows would occur on each system according to the physical
characteristics of the system. Thus, each of the two transmission service
providers would have the incentive to underbid the other because the winner
would receive all of the transmission revenues, but only incur a fraction of the
costs. The loser, on the other hand, would incur the remaining costs, but
50
would receive no revenues.50
This is clearly an unsustainable situation. The implication is that as long it is not technically
and economically feasible to control power line flows, it is not feasible to have competing
transmission lines on the same system. In addition, as long as system control and line
construction in any given corridor have large natural monopoly characteristics, it is not
reasonable to anticipate the development of competing transmission systems.
11.4.3 Siting Issues
We mention elsewhere that it is becoming increasingly difficult to site transmission lines,
largely due to public concern about aesthetic, environmental, and health issues.51 Despite
these obstacles, most proposed transmission lines are eventually constructed, often by
resorting to the power of eminent domain. States grant utilities this power when necessary
because transmission lines are deemed to serve a public benefit. Correspondingly, eminent
domain cannot be used for a private purpose.52 The frequent need to employ (or threaten
the use of) eminent domain powers to build transmission lines would lead to two
complications if transmission were to become a deregulated, competitive industry.
4 9 It should be noted that in the event of emergencies the operator can control power flows by flipping a
switch, but this is more of a "digital" control than an "analog" one.
5 0 FERC, April 1995, 17675. See also: FERC, 1989, 111.
5 1It should also be noted that there is a trend that makes the construction of large-scale projects in general
difficult, which includes a range of undertakings from highways to electric plants to pipelines. Source:
Hansen, 1995.
52 Wisconsin Public Service Commission, July 1995, 287.
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11.4.3.1 Loss of Eminent Domain for New Transmission Construction
If complete Nutcos were to emerge, it could be argued that the construction of transmission
lines would serve a private rather than a public purpose. Consequently, Nutcos would
probably face the large barrier of having to construct transmission lines without the
assistance of eminent domain powers.53 Instead of having the force of law behind it, a
Nutco would have to rely upon commitments from willing landowners and be required to
purchase easements. Transmission lines would likely be sited on unproductive land, such
as swamps and marshes, rather than along the most economically and technically efficient
routes.
11.4.3.2 Implications for Current Transmission Lines
Lines that already exist could also face problems regarding eminent domain and the
philosophically appropriate use of facilities build using it. As mentioned above, many
transmission lines were built using eminent domain powers for a public purpose.
However, in a competitive transmission industry, much of their public benefit would be
transferred to a private benefit. As one commentator states, "Rights of way have been
acquired, directly or indirectly, through eminent domain. Eminent domain proceedings,
when they are needed, are brought in the name of, and for the good of, the people of the
state involved, not the name of the utility directly." 54 As a result, there could be some
opposition to having existing lines serve a competitive purpose (which would occur if the
current grid were to compete with emergent NUTS). While this is more likely to be a
philosophical stumbling block than a real impediment to transmission competition, it could
be used as a political argument by those opposed to competition in transmission (or by
Nutcos who would seek eminent domain fees charges the utilities in order to compensate
the public and/or level the playing field).
11.4.4 Trend Toward Service Customization
A final potential impediment to the creation of complete NUTS is that such a move would
go against the prevalent tides in the industry and society. Later in this chapter we postulate
that the most realistic pathway to complete NUTS would be through an unbundling of the
current transmission system functions (i.e. the creation of partial NUTS), and an eventual
rebundling of transmission services in a competitive environment (i.e. formation of
complete NUTS) after significant technological change occurs. It should be recognized that
the definition of a "complete NUTS" might change during this unbundling/rebundling
5 3Wisconsin Public Service Commission, October 1995, 308-309.
5 4McDiarmind, 1995, 44.
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process due to technological change. However, such a rebundling would run counter to
what has happened in many other industries. The general experience has been that when
deregulation hits an industry, services are continually physically unbundled and niches are
discovered and filled with financial rebundlings. One of the reasons for this is increased IT
capabilities, which eliminate many of the benefits of vertical integration. In some cases,
customers value the unbundled services more than they do together. They may also take
only some of the previously bundled services because they do not value the others.55 As a
result, this "natural" tendency against rebundling may serve as a significant impediment to
complete NUTS development. 56 This would be especially true in the presence of electric
service aggregators, who would be able to financially rebundle a broad range of services.
Here the rebundling would not be a vertically-integrated physical bundling (as would occur
in a complete NUTS), but bundling through a series of contracts that are flexible enough to
meet the needs of individual consumers. In the presence of aggregators, quite simply,
there might be no need for complete NUTS. 57
11.4.5 Reflections on NUTS Impediments
It should be clear from this discussion that the impediments to complete NUTS are large,
and that without fundamental changes in transmission technologies, their emergence is
almost inconceivable. At the same time though, it appears that some transmission system
functions (partial NUTS) could be provided on a competitive basis.
Having now examined why might NUTS be beneficial, and the impediments to their
creation, let us look at why NUTS might be undesirable, even if they were to become
technically feasible.
55 Gottlieb and Colucci, 1995.
56 For a discussion of the evolution of the industry that sheds insight on this point, see: Warsh, 24 March
1996.
57 In discussing the evolution of the industry, Joskow discusses the implications of PURPA, "PURPA
maintained the traditional model of a utility as a "portfolio manager" that must acquire generating resources
to serve the needs of its retail franchise customers which it serves on an exclusive basis. However, rather
than meeting this obligation only by owning and operating its own generating facilities, utilities now had
to look to QF suppliers to meet their needs as well." Source: Joskow, 1995, 35. It seems rational that the
natural course of the industry's continued evolution, perhaps into a larger energy services industry, would
have this portfolio management switch into the realm of financial aggregators, and away from physical
aggregators. In which case, the need/benefits of complete NUTS would be diminished.
11.5 WHY MIGHT NUTS BE UNDESIRABLE?
11.5.1 NUTS Might Not Increase Performance Meaningfully
11.5.1.1 Relative Insignificance of Transmission Variable Costs
Driving the deregulation of generation is the belief that it will lower the cost of electricity,
by forcing utilities and other generating companies to trim fat from their operating costs and
to increase the use of new, lower-cost technologies. But fundamental financial differences
exist between generation and transmission. In particular, fixed costs make up a much
larger portion of the cost of transmission (than of generation). In 1992, the transmission
operation and maintenance (O&M) expenses of 180 major U.S. utilities were $2.03
billion, 58 which amounts to 2.0% 59 of the variable cost of producing and distributing
electricity. In contrast, generation O&M expenses were $74.9 billion,60 which is 75.3%61
of the variable cost of electricity. The relative gap is much narrower with regard to plant
capital cost. The cumulative value of utility transmission plant is $56.9 billion62 while
generation plant is valued at $281.0 billion.63 These statistics have two implications.
First, at the absolute level, the potential reductions in transmission variable costs are trivial
when compared with generation variable costs. Second, because of the high proportion of
fixed costs to variable costs, new entrants have a limited opportunity to pursue the same
strategy that IPPs have -- operate at lower variable costs than utilities. 64 They may be able
to cut some variable costs,65 but these savings could easily be insignificant. Consequently,
when looking only at the transmission segment of the industry, the potential benefits of
transmission deregulation would be relatively insignificant, at least with respect to the
rationale that is driving generation deregulation.
11.5.1.2 Could NUTS Lower Capital Costs?
However, it could be asked, is there any way that NUTS could lead to reduced
construction expenses (i.e. lower fixed costs)? One observer answers this negatively,
"currently there is no evidence that private firms could site, permit or build transmission
58Energy Information Administration, December 1993, 26.
5 9 Ibid., 31.6 0 Ibid., 25.
6 1Ibid., 30.
62 Ibid., 46.
63 Ibid.
64 It should be noted that far more important is the use of new technologies by new entrants. However,
there are some organizational differences between IPPs and utilities which makes this sentence at least
partially correct.
6 5Without an in-depth understanding of the cost structure of transmission utilities, we cannot conclude that
Nutcos would be able to cut operating costs.
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lines more cost-effectively than utilities, or with fewer environmental impacts." 66 It is
possible that this observation does not take into account some of the factors that have
allowed IPPs to build generating stations less expensively than utilities. For example, by
actively courting the communities where they wish to build plants, and by being viewed as
a entrepreneurial opportunity for a community (not as a quasi-governmental organization
from which large concessions can be taken), IPPs have been able to reduce litigation costs,
delays, and quasi-extortion payments.67 The question then becomes, would the same be
true for non-utility transmission? Perhaps, but there are two large differences between
generation plants and transmission lines. First, a generating plant creates a number of
local, permanent jobs; while the few jobs created by a new transmission line are likely to be
less concentrated and less visible. Second, a generating plant may "impact" one
community, a handful at most. In contrast, transmission lines could extend for hundreds
of miles, affecting scores of communities. This makes close contact with those impacted
more difficult. Thus, the process of "courting" communities much more difficult: because
the benefits and communication efforts must be spread out over many more communities. 68
11.5.1.3 System Considerations
Even if Nutcos resulted in (limited) financial benefits in the transmission segment of the
industry, these benefits would need to be balanced against the potential system-wide impact
of NUTS. For example, the FERC believes that transmission systems should be common
carrier networks that support a competitive generation market. If the emergence of
(complete) NUTS were to impair the functioning of competitive generation markets by
creating a new set of grid fiefdoms, the relatively small benefits in transmission would
probably not justify the inefficiency costs to the much larger generation market. We do not
conclude that NUTS would cause a negative impact on the generation market (we propose
earlier that the partial NUTS could have a positive impact on overall efficiency); however,
the potential for it highlights the importance of looking at the entire electric power system --
not just the transmission component -- when making restructuring decisions.
6 6Roseman, 1991, 35.
67 Sources: "International Conference on the Future of Industry in Advanced Societies, Conference Report,"
6-7; and Tabors, 19 October 1995.
6 8 Conversely, not all communities are courtable -- for whatever reason there is latent opposition. In the
case of a generator, an IPP is able to "walk away" from a hostile community. In contrast, because of the
number of communities impacted by a transmission line, the probability of running into hostility is high,
and the ability to walk away is much lower because working around one community would have impacts on
many others.
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11.5.2 Reduction of Power Pooling
A tenet of electric power system operation and planning is that power pooling has many
benefits and is an activity with large scale economies. Two broad categories of benefits are
economic power exchanges and reliability. 69 The construction of totally independent,
complete NUTS could undercut pooling. In order to create a system that is large enough to
take advantage of economies of scale, a complete Nutco would need to connect a large
number of generators to its NUTS. Since the complete NUTS would be independent of the
other power systems in its region, generators which could have been pooled together in one
system would be operated separately. In such a case, some scale economies might not be
exhausted. This could result in reduced reliability and could hamper the market's ability to
utilize the most efficient combination of generators.
One remedy to these problems would be to design competing systems so that they could
periodically interconnect in order to take advantage of socially efficient power trades and
for reliability reasons. However, Nutcos would likely oppose such a practice, because if
defacto circumvention of the centralized NUTS system operation became common, there
would be a convergence back into one system. At the same time, though, aggregators,
customers, and generators would probably not be willing to forgo beneficial power trades
for the sake of the Nutcos. As a result, this undesirable feature of complete NUTS could
be a large impediment to their creation.
11.5.3 Provision of Insufficient Capacity
11.5.3.1 The Capacity/Reliability Problem
It has been engineering practice to design and operate electric power systems in a manner
that errs on the side of robustness in order to maintain high levels of service reliability.70
Regulatory authorities have passed along the associated costs to ratepayers, who lacked the
ability to send economic signals on their desired level of reliability. Analogous high levels
of reliability and/or service existed in many of the industries that have been deregulated.
The continued experience has been that many customers are willing to accept lower quality
service in return for lower prices. Not surprisingly, there are many electric power
customers who would be willing to accept lower levels of reliability in return for lower
electricity prices. 71 In short, the emergence of transmission competition would tend to
drive the price of transmission service toward its short-run marginal cost. However, when
6 9For a much more detailed list (of 15 benefits), see: FERC, 1981, 15-16.
7 0Termed by some as "gold plated" systems. See, for instance: Navarro, 1995, 398.
7 1Source: "Has Reliability Been Affected by Downsizing and Cost Cutting?"
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reserve margins exist,72 the short-run marginal cost is consistently less than the long-run
marginal cost.73 The implication of this is that the market would not provide these reserve
margins -- unless their cost could somehow be included in the transmission price.
One could ask, if some customers do not value high reliability, then why should we be
concerned that transmission deregulation would not provide "sufficient" reserve margins?
One answer is that the reliability of all electric transmission customers is more intimately
intertwined than in the other deregulated industries. In the airline industry for example, the
decision of some customers to fly in coach class has little impact on those who fly first
class. In electric power transmission, however, the power of all customers flows across
the same facilities with no differentiation between the electrons. Richard P. Felak
comments on these problems,
Some significant facets of the overall existing electric power quality/feature are
not readily physically separable, salable, or accountable -- wholly or partially --
to satisfy customers who may desire these differentiable options. In addition,
full-service customers who might want to remain so could have some of their
own power quality and/or cost characteristics impacted by the actual or
hypothetical service differentiation to satisfy non-full service subscribers.74
In addition, a substantially robust grid may be necessary to maintain generation competition
in a restructured industry. The FERC's Transmission Task Force posited, "a grid that
meets only a modest standard of robustness runs the risk of unreliable operation and also
the risk of not accommodating competitive power supply alternatives. '"75 The root of these
problems lies in the fact that transmission reliability is not only an individual good, but is
also a collective good, whose benefits may not be fully attributable to users, or recoverable
by suppliers (if charged as an individual good).
11.5.3.2 The Futures Market Solution?
It is possible that this discussion of reliability is overstated and is a relic of the thinking of
the old era -- when demand was assumed to be insensitive to price, and utilities were
required to provide customers with all the electricity they desired. These assumptions
change in the presence of competitive markets. Futures markets have emerged to hedge
against risk in other industries. Some of these sophisticated financial instruments are
beginning to be brought to the wholesale power business 76 along with the creation of an
72 In this case they are desired for technical reasons that customers cannot fully appreciate.
7 3FERC, 1989, 92.
74 Felak, 1995, 61.
7 5FERC, 1989, 93.
7 6For example, see: Southerland, 1996.
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electricity futures market.77 In the new electric power era, customers could be offered
differentiated levels of reliability through market mechanisms.78 For example, those who
are especially sensitive to power losses could construct on-site back-up power or purchase
hedging contracts. Those who value reliability less could agree to have power supply
curtailed when necessary -- in return for lower rates. However, the "public goods"
characteristics of transmission system reliability create a potential for market failure or cost
shifting. As a result, while market mechanisms may be sufficient to meet some customer
desires, it is not certain that they would supply the reserve margins that, at least according
to conventional wisdom, are necessary to ensure reliability and prevent the larger system
from collapsing.
11.5.3.3 A Technical Solution?
Later we suggest that Flexible Alternative Current Transmission Systems (FACTS) could
be a technical solution to the problem of reduced reliability resulting from smaller power
pools caused by complete NUTS. The idea is to have independent, competing systems run
in a manner that would allow them to interconnect via FACTS during system emergencies.
The concept would be applicable here, too -- FACTS interconnections could allow
competing NUTS to share reserve margin capacities. However, the ability to switch to
another system in the event of an emergency might externalize the costs of system
reliability. If competing systems believed that they could rely upon others during
emergencies, an incentive to provide insufficient reserve margins would be created. As a
result, the only way to garner sufficient funds to construct sufficiently robust competitive
grids might be to internalize all of the reliability costs and not take advantage of the
capabilities of FACTS. However, in turn, this would require larger reserve margins,
making complete NUTS less economically viable.
11.5.3.4 Summary
There is a possibility that transmission system reliability may not be sufficiently provided
for if competing complete NUTS were to exist. Market mechanisms and technological
innovations may be able to solve this problem, but because of the public goods nature of
reliability, it is not clear that they could eliminate all of the externalities of transmission
reliably. This issue should be given more consideration should the emergence of complete
NUTS become a real possibility.
7 7Source: "In Search of New Commodities."
7 8 Felak, 1995.
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Thus far we have engaged in abstract discussions of the benefits, impediments, and
liabilities of developing NUTS. Let us now turn to slightly less abstract discussions of the
prospects for the development of NUTS.
11.6 PROBABLE IMPACT OF DEREGULATION PROPOSALS ON NUTS
Elsewhere in this thesis we extensively study and evaluate five proposals for deregulation.
Let us now evaluate these proposals one more time -- this time with an eye on their
probable impact on the development of NUTS.
11.6.1 California POOLCO Proposal
The California POOLCO proposal is based upon the assumption that "transmission retains
the attributes of a natural monopoly." 79 The POOLCO proposal would keep transmission
ownership in the hands of utilities but turn over system operation to an ISO.
There are several promising features of the POOLCO proposal with respect to partial
NUTS. First, the proposal mentions in passing that the functional unbundling it proposes
would create competition in ancillary service provision. Second, the proposal states that
future transmission construction should be signaled through congestion pricing. While it
does not specify how congestion charges would be collected, let alone the mechanism for
funding construction, signaling transmission construction through congestion pricing could
allow for transmission line Nutcos.
Therefore, while the proposal would keep existing transmission lines solely in the hands of
utilities, the California POOLCO proposal should lead to the development of partial NUTS
in ancillary services and could possibly spawn partial NUTS in new transmission line
ownership. However, the development of complete NUTS in the foreseeable future would
precluded by the mandatory ISO.
11.6.2 California Bilateral Proposal
The California Bilateral proposal anticipates that partial Nutcos would emerge in a "direct
access" electric power industry. It explicitly recognizes that market participants would have
multiple options with regard to the provision of their ancillary services: a generator could
self-provide, purchase them from the independent system operator (OPCO), or purchase
them from a third party. In short, these third parties (partial Nutcos) would be in
competition with the OPCO80 and each other for the provision of ancillary services. The
79 California Public Utilities Commission, May 1995, 7.
80 Knight, 1995, 41.
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proposal also recognizes that individual plants could become dedicated to providing third
party ancillary services, such as spinning reserves81 and balancing/back-up services.82
The California Bilateral proposal calls for the creation of a state-wide OPCO, which would
preclude the development of complete NUTS in the foreseeable future.
In addition to its advocacy of ancillary services partial NUTS, the California Bilateral
proposal is the most encouraging with respect to creating new, more efficient industry
market structures. This could make it more likely to spur the development of NUTS.
11.6.3 California Final Proposal
The California Final proposal is built upon the assumption that "transmission retains the
attributes of a natural monopoly." 83  It furthers the transmission system's natural
monopoly character by placing the system's operational control into the hands of a state-
wide ISO, whose creation would appear to preclude the development of complete NUTS in
the foreseeable future.
The future of partial NUTS is bright, however. The California Final proposal would allow
for the development of a competitive ancillary services market. While some ancillary
services, such as system control and load balancing, would be the ISO's responsibility
(and would be paid for by all grid users), transmission customers could choose the
provider of other ancillary services. The ISO would post a list of the unbundled ancillary
services and its charges for them. Customers could opt to purchase these from the ISO or
procure them independently. 84 In such a market we expect that ancillary services partial
Nutcos would develop to fill the third party provision niche.
The proposal also calls for the creation of tradable congestion contracts, which would
provide correct signals for system upgrades and would provide long-term price stability for
those who depend upon the grid.85 The proposal and some observers believe that these
mechanisms would create incentives for outside investors (Nutcos) to build new
transmission lines when congestion occurs. 86 Congestion contracts could also allow for
8 1 Knight, 1995, 41.
8 2 Ibid., 42
83CPUC, D.95-12-063, 94.
84Ibid., 40.
85Ibid., 38. Included in this lot would be IPPs and others who sign long-term power contracts.
86For example: Hogan, 19 October 1995; and Bushnell and Stoft, 1996. The proposal indicates that one
method might be for the ISO to construct capacity itself.
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the creation of transmission service reseller Nutcos, which would purchase transmission
congestion contracts and then resell them.87
The California Final proposal includes two comments which are interesting, in that the
CPUC appears to recognize at least the possibility of Nutcos developing at some point in
time. They are: "we view distribution as a natural monopoly with respect to serving those
customers who do not opt for self-generation or construct transmission and distribution
facilities of their own;"88 and "the ISO will operate as a monopoly (at least for the
foreseeable future) ...,"89 The proposal does not further elaborate on these comments,
however.
While the California Final proposal has the assumption that transmission is a natural
monopoly at its core, by encouraging competition in some aspects of transmission service
provision, it could stimulate the emergence of partial Nutcos in ancillary service provision,
new transmission line ownership and construction, and transmission service reselling. In
short, the California Final proposal foresees the development of a Nutco industry more
than any of the other proposals we evaluate.
11.6.4 Wisconsin Plausible Extreme Model
In sharp contrast, the Plausible Extreme model is the most constricting with respect to
NUTS. The model holds the implicit assumption that transmission is a natural monopoly.
Consequently, it places transmission system ownership and operation into the hands of a
single entity (Transco), which would be state-wide at minimum. The proposal explicitly
precludes the construction of complete NUTS and of transmission line ownership partial
NUTS in its statement, "all new facilities will be built and owned by the Transco, which
would be a price-regulated monopoly with a statewide franchise."90
The competitive solicitations for ancillary services made by the independent system
operator (Poolco) should stimulate the development of ancillary services partial Nutcos.
Because the Poolco would be responsible for soliciting and providing all ancillary services
(self-provision and third party service do not appear to be allowed), this competition would
be more limited than under the rules of some other proposals.
8 7There is some opposition to such behavior, however. In fact, currently the FERC caps the reselling of
transmission reassignment rights at the price paid to the transmission utility. Source: FERC, April 1995,
17685.
88CPUC, D.95-12-063, 94.
89Ibid., 63.
9 0 Wisconsin Public Service Commission, October 1995, 8.
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In short, the Plausible Extreme model is the least hospitable toward the development of
NUTS of the proposals we evaluate. Not only would the options for partial NUTS be the
most limited of the four proposals, the creation of complete NUTS would be explicitly
interdicted.
11.6.5 FERC Mega-NOPR
The FERC Mega-NOPR is based upon the assumption that "transmission remains and is
expected to remain a natural monopoly."91 The Mega-NOPR also assumes the current
market structure: transmission utilities who own and operate their transmission assets.
With that being the case, the likelihood of transmission line construction partial NUTS is
quite small. On the other hand, the proposal calls for competitive ancillary service
provision whenever technically feasible, although the Mega-NOPR only speaks to the issue
of competition in terms of transmission customers having the option of choosing self-
provision, third-party provision, or provision by transmission utilities. The Mega-NOPR
does not indicate that the transmission system provider should procure them on a
competitive basis (even though the Mega-NOPR recognizes that some utilities procure them
from third-party providers currently). 92 One possible reason for this ties back to a
previous discussion -- that a "competitive" ancillary services market that supplies a non-
independent system operator 93 would create large incentives for self-dealing.
Through the FERC's intent to create a "robust reassignment market,"94 the Mega-NOPR
could also stimulate the creation of transmission service reseller partial NUTS. As the
Mega-NOPR states, "capacity reassignment, combined with assured access to firm
transmission service, reduces the transmission provider's market power by enabling
transmission customers to compete with the owner to some extent in the firm transmission
market."' 95 However, continued caps on the resale prices (set at the price paid to the
transmission owner) would squelch the creation of this potential type of NUTS. Capacity
reassignment markets would still develop, but resellers would not emerge to purchase
capacity from transmission companies with the intent of making a profit.
9 1 FERC, April 1995, 17675.
9 2 Ibid., 17684. Although competitive provision to the transmission system owner is not explicitly
anticipated by the proposal, it is certainly possible that such could occur in Mega-NOPR-shaped restructured
industry.
9 3The Mega-NOPR does NOT call for the creation of ISOs.
9 4 FERC, April 1995, 17685.
95 Ibid.
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In summary, the Mega-NOPR calls the development of NUTS in terms of ancillary service
provision and could lead to transmission service reselling Nutcos. However, it would
appear to limit transmission construction, ownership, and system operation to the
established utilities.
11.6.6 Evaluation
The future of partial NUTS looks promising indeed. All of the five proposals call for the
provision of some transmission services (most frequently ancillary services) on a
competitive basis whenever possible. The California Bilateral and California Final
proposals envision competition not only to supply the Independent System Operator
(ISO/OPCO) with ancillary services, but to compete with the ISO/OPCO. The California
Final proposal appears to be the most amenable to the creation of partial NUTS, while the
Wisconsin Extreme model is the least amenable.
Table 11.1: Likely Impact of Proposals on the Develo )ment of NUTS
California California California Wisc. FERC
Prospects for: Poolco Bilateral Final Plausible Mega-
SI I Extreme NOPR
Partial NUTS: Ancillary Services Expected Expected Expected Expected Possible
provided to ISO
Partial NUTS: Ancillary Services Possible Expected Predicted Poor Expected
provided directly to participants
Partial NUTS: Transmission Lines, Possible Poor Predicted Very Poor Poor
Ownership
Partial NUTS: Transmission Lines, Poor Poor Poor Very Poor Poor
Operation
Partial NUTS: Transmission Lines, Poor Poor Possible Very Poor Poor
Ownership and Operation
Partial NUTS: Reselling of Poor Poor Possible Poor Predicted
Transmission Service. I
Complete NUTS Poor Poor Poor Very Poor
Poor
Notes: Expected = The proposal explicitly calls for this
Predicted = The proposal explicitly anticipates this could happen
Possible = One could imagine how this could develop
Poor = This is not a foreseeable outcome
Vey = The extreme of the proposals with regard to the possibility
At the same time, however, the future of complete NUTS looks bleak. All of the proposals
assume that transmission is a natural monopoly. All four of the four state proposals,
through their creation of some form of independent system operator, would essentially
enlarge the scale of the most fundamental system natural monopoly characteristic and/or
inherently suggest that the scale of system operation has not been appropriate in the past.
Based upon our evaluation, one could conclude that the current industry restructuring is the
death-knell of any (slim) chance that there might have been for complete NUTS to develop.
This may be a correct conclusion; however, despite the additional barriers that would be
created by the restructuring proposals, the emergence of complete NUTS might yet occur,
under the right conditions.
11.7 PATHWAYS TO COMPLETE NUTS DEVELOPMENT
By drawing upon various discussions in this thesis, we can make informed speculations on
pathways -- industry events that individually or cumulatively could lead the industry down
an incremental path -- to the development of complete NUTS. Here we present ideas on
embarking points for these pathways. More speculative discussion -- regarding the routes
that the pathways may take toward deregulation -- can be found in Appendix K. Let us
begin by building upon the "Revised Garbage Can Model" interpretation of the events
leading up to the current industry restructuring.96
11.7.1 Lessons From the Revised Garbage Can Model
11.7.1.1 Lessons From PURPA
An important implication of the PURPA story is that small incentives in the structures of
today's deregulation proposals hold the potential for large changes in the future.
Furthermore, these incentives need not be integral components of the restructuring
proposals or legislation.97
One way to characterize the current restructuring proposals is that they are underpinned by
an attempt to create a competitive generation market by maximizing transmission scale
economies. While all of the restructuring proposals hold the fundamental assumption that
transmission is a natural monopoly, we have seen how a competitive generation market
evolved out of PURPA, an Act which assumed the continuation of the "old era's"
fundamental paradigm for electric power provision. 98 This paradigm was an industry
structure built upon an attempt to maximize economies of scale in generation at the plant
level and predicated upon the assumption that generation was a natural monopoly at the
9 6See Section 3.3.
9 7Remember that the foci of PURPA were regulatory rate reform and the power to mandate power pooling.
9 8Even though PURPA inherently undermined it because by allowing non-utility generators on the grid,
PURPA assumed that generation was either not a natural monopoly, or that there were "higher" objectives
than harnessing the benefits of economies of scale.
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system level. 99 These assumptions were undoubtedly true, once upon a time. But then
separate revolutions occurred in public policy and technology that undermined the basis of
this system. It should be stressed that these revolutions were mutually dependent -- it was
a combination of both technological innovation and policy change that led to today's
upheaval. If it were not for the QF incentives of PURPA, it is difficult to imagine how a
NUG industry would have developed, and in turn, how a competitive industry would be
emerging today. 100 The generation technologies that are driving today's policy revolution
had been under development prior to PURPA, but it was the (re)emergence of a NUG
industry, beginning with QFs, that provided incentives for them to be adopted and further
improved. Without these technological breakthroughs, today we would likely be seeing
small PURPA plants augmenting integrated utility systems' generation capacity at best,
serving as the butt of jokes at worst. 1°0 Thus, it was the coupling of public policy and
technology that allowed for the restructuring we are witnessing today.
And how did this process get set into motion? From the policy end, it was the result of
seemingly benign incentives for PURPA plants that were written into the legislation and
acted upon by the FERC and state commissions. This is similar to the case of long distance
telephone service, where new participants entered when the FCC offered competition in
limited segments of AT&T's turf. These cases demonstrate that the incentives created by
policy decisions, even small ones, can lead to large changes.
11.7.1.2 The Future "Streams" in the Revised Garbage Can Model
Taking Peter Temin's claim that "history does not repeat itself, but it does have echoes,"1 02
we can gain insights from studying the flows of the various streams in the industry's
evolution. (See Figure 3.3) Based upon the PURPA experience, we posit that the creation
of a constituency with interests other than maintaining the status quo transmission structure
(such as partial Nutcos) could add a significant new current to the politics stream. We also
99 While in retrospect, PURPA clearly undercut these natural monopoly assumptions, it is not evident that
this implication was understood at the time. Likewise, today we see proposals that assume that
transmission is a natural monopoly; however, in Section 11.6 and in the remainder of Section 11.7, we see
how decisions being made today are undercutting the transmission natural monopoly assumption.
100Or at least as quickly as it has. One could imagine a scenario where mavericks such as Virginia Power
might have seen opportunities as a result of price differentials between utilities. However, attempting to
restructure the industry from within would have required the breaking of gentlemen's agreements without
forces on the outside to encourage it.
10 1Some of the PURPA plants that fit under the small power plant definition utilize esoteric technology
and produce power much more expensively than current market rates. For examples see: "Engineer's Ice
Plant Helps Power County;" Salkpukas, April 1995; and "Carter-Era Law Keeps Electricity Prices Up In
Spite of Surplus."
10 2Temin, 1994.
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posit that a new current could eventually develop in the "problem" stream if a deregulation
proposal were to include incentives for new transmission companies (partial Nutcos) to
employ innovative technologies, 10 3 specifically, if these new technologies would enable
Nutcos to provide less expensive transmission service (than traditional utility transmission
service). The events set in motion by having a new competitive constituency and incentives
for new technologies should be self-reinforcing, since competition has spurred innovation
in other industries 104 and technology can be used for competitive advantage. 105 The
policy-making window opening and stream coupling 106 that could result, could lead to
another cycle of deregulation and technological innovation, which could make complete
NUTS feasible.
In contrast, if competitive new constituents are not created, utilities not facing competition
have disincentives to develop or adopt innovations that would lead to the premature
obsolescence of high fixed-cost network technologies. Furthermore, without new
technologies, new entrants would have no basis for competitive advantage. As a result, in
such a case we expect that there would be no new constituents in the politics stream and no
new price-differentials in the problem stream that could be coupled, and consequently cause
another restructuring.
11.7.1.3 Guiding Policy Objective for Complete NUTS Creation
Another implication of the PURPA case is that a guiding policy objective should be to
create a situation where a policy-making "window" could be opened in the event that
complete NUTS would make sense. While we have identified some reasons why complete
NUTS might be beneficial, the desirability of their development is not conclusive.
Furthermore, we cannot predict what other developments might make complete NUTS
beneficial. The technological changes necessary for them to become economically feasible
could easily mean that a "complete NUTS" would bear little resemblance to what it would
today. This redefinition of NUTS could, in turn, lead to benefits that are currently hidden.
Thus, restructuring proposals should foster opportunities for NUTS development and not
preclude their development. Additionally, the general concepts and pathways for fostering
NUTS that are discussed in Section 11.7 should not be thought of as definitive pathways
103 An interesting coincidence is that in Chapter 7 we saw that there are technological developments in
progress, which is somewhat analogous to 1978, when research on combined-cycle gas turbines was leading
to progressively more efficient systems. Source: Wunsch, 1978.
10 4 For example, see: Knight, 1995; and Gardner and Gilson, 1994.
105 Porter, 1980, 348.
106 New constituents in politics stream and price differentials in problem stream.
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for establishing NUTS, but as opportunities that would lead to the opening of the policy
window should they make economic sense.
11.7.1.4 Partial NUTS as Precursors to Complete NUTS
In a similar vein, a further implication of the PURPA case is that we should not focus on
events/decisions that would lead to the immediate creation of complete NUTS, but rather,
we should examine ways that partial NUTS could emerge and expand. The incremental
nature of technological and political change favors the development of complete NUTS as
the climax of a series of partial NUTS stages, rather than a process by which they are
created overnight. With this in mind, let us explore some of the pathways by which partial
NUTS might develop and eventually lead to the emergence of complete NUTS.
11.7.2 Secondary Markets
Secondary transmission markets and/or congestion contract rights 107 are one potential
pathway for NUTS development. William Hogan developed the most elegant secondary
markets formulation, the contract network model for transmission rights. 108 This system
explicitly provides revenues to build transmission lines -- whether they be built by
transmission utilities or "outside" investors (Nutcos). 109 In a similar vein, Mark Lively
proposes that a real-time pricing scheme could allow a financier to offer a transmission
futures contract. In such a case, "when the expected RTP [real time price] difference
[between two points on the grid] grows too large, the financier would invest in a
transmission line connecting the two geographic points." 110 Eric Woychik divines what
could result when ownership and operation of transmission assets are separated and
secondary markets are created.
If tradable transmission rights and congestion pricing can be market-based, and
third parties are allowed to invest, these mechanisms can supplant many of the
needs for regulation... Private entities in competition can then develop and can
offer other services. 111
Tabors et all112 envision an even more competitive transmission market -- where firm and
non-firm transmission service contracts would be consummated and an active spot market
for interruptable transmission service would develop. Transmission companies,
aggregators, and generation companies would buy and sell in the interruptable spot market.
In all of these scenarios, transmission system finances and operation would be unbundled,
107Which could take different forms and have varying degrees of efficiency.
108 See Hogan, 1992; and Hogan, March, 1993.
10 9 Hogan, March 1993, 27-28; and Hogan, 19 October 1995.
110 Lively, 1994, 31.
11 Woychik, August-September 1995, 79.
112Tabors, Caramanis and Associates, 1995.
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new constituencies would emerge, and sources of transmission service revenue would be
created that could be captured by Nutcos. At least parts of the aforementioned industry
visions will likely come into being soon. The Mega-NOPR calls for the development of
secondary markets for firm transmission service, and the California Final proposal also
calls for an undefined system of transmission rights and congestion contracts.
Three types of partial Nuctos could easily emerge in this environment: transmission
construction, transmission ownership, and transmission service reseller partial Nutcos.
11.7.3 Utilities Actively Turn to NUTS For Additional Capacity
In the generation segment of the industry, the emergence of IPPs was partially the result of
an "almost total abdication by the industry of its traditional role as builders of new
capacity" 113 during the period of rate suppression. There are several circumstances that
could lead to similar behavior by transmission utilities (i.e. cessation of building new assets
or even the sale of existing ones), which would allow a segue for partial Nutcos.
Circumstances or strategies of individual utilities that could lead to their partially or
completely leaving the transmission business include:
* Problems with transmission siting, financing, permitting, and construction; 114
* EMF lawsuits;
* Corporate decision that transmission is no longer part of the utility's
mission;1 15
* Continuation of the current transition-era disincentives for transmission capacity
expansion that are resulting from uncertainties about capital recovery in a
restructured industry; 116
* Requirement, based upon Mega-NOPR common carrier obligations, that a
financially weak utility build additional capacity when it lacks the ability to raise
capital at a reasonable rate; and
* State commission-encouraged, if not mandated, auctions for transmission
capacity expansion.
The transmission capacity auctions could, in turn, stimulate technological progress if they
are conducted in a manner that would favor bids employing new technologies. New
transmission capacity is not the only type of transmission service provision for which there
could be supply auctions; proposals are already being developed for ancillary services
provision auctions. Once again, regulatory bodies could attempt to stimulate technological
development by tweaking the auction rules to favor new technologies. While attempts to
113 Navarro, 1995, 350.
114 Roseman, 1991, 36.
1 15 it is doubtful that many utilities would forsake the relatively comfortable world of regulated
transmission, but a few might -- perhaps those that are in the upper echelon of generation efficiency.116 See Section 9.6.2.4.
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stimulate new technologies through these methods may not be economically efficient in the
short-term, they may lead to long-term efficiency increases. 117
11.7.4 Fissure Between Ownership and Operation
The unbundling of transmission ownership from operation has a profound implication for
the nature of transmission ownership. In the past, the prerequisites for transmission
system ownership were (1) the ability to operate and maintain a transmission system, and
(2) the ability to attract the capital necessary to finance its construction. The implication of
unbundling these technical and financial prerequisites is that there is no reason that any
company or group of investors could not own transmission lines. Thus, transmission line
partial Nutcos would be more viable in an ISO environment.
11.7.5 Continued Unbundling of Industry
The current industry restructuring features an unbundling of generation, which was once a
natural monopoly, from those functions that are still natural monopolies -- transmission and
distribution. In some conceptions of the industry, the latter would also be unbundled into
electricity sales (not a natural monopoly) and the monopoly "wires" distribution
functions. 118 In other industries, unbundling has been a progressive phenomenon --
functions once considered inseparable become unbundled over time. 119 Given current
technologies, some transmission system functions, such as system control, will likely
retain natural monopoly characteristics. However, there are some transmission system
functions that do not appear have natural monopoly characteristics and therefore could be
unbundled from those that do. First, some of the ancillary services are likely
unbundleable. Doing so will be more complicated than many in the policy community
expect, howeer. This is a result of the collective goods economic nature and the technical
complexity of these services. Improved technologies and theoretical understandings, as
well as experience in a 'competitive market, should make the unbundling of ancillary
services a progressive phenomenon, even if few of them are unbundled initially. Second,
transmission ownership could be unbundled. Per our previous discussion, this would be
facilitated through the creation of ISOs. Third, the ISO could have responsibility for
constructing new transmission facilities.
117Note the emphasis on "may." PURPA has caused some successes and some dismal failures. As
mentioned in Appendix B.8, significant stranded liability bills have been amassed as the result of pushing
PURPA technologies.
118For example, see: Wisconsin Public Service Commission, October 1995, 9; and Tabors Caramanis &
Associates, 1995.
119 Gottlieb and Colucci, 1995.
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These three types of unbundlings could lead to a "hollowing out" of grid functions, where
the transmission "provider" changes from being an integrated transmission utility to a
collection of companies providing services that are coordinated by a system operator. We
postulate that a transmission system that includes multiple Nutcos would more readily
allow for the emergence of competing complete NUTS than would a transmission system
that is operated by a vertically-integrated transmission utility with a franchised service
territory. We postulate this for several reasons. First, a multiple partial Nutco situation
would build technical competencies in multiple players. Second, it would create new
political constituencies (partial Nutcos) who could then clamor for a "bigger piece of the
action" should new technology make it feasible. Third, a situation where multiple players
would be seeking competitive advantage would likely encourage technological
development, which could drive further change.
11.7.6 Contestability
Contestability is an economic theory that suggests that a firm behaves as if it were in a
perfectly competitive market if entry is credible and imminent should the firm reap super-
economic profits, even though it may be a monopolistic or oligopolisitic firm in its market.
The theory's proponents claim,
Contestability theory focuses increased attention upon entry barriers and
redefines their character. Economies of scale, for example, have frequently
been considered an impediment to entry; contestability analysis shows,
however, that they need not permit excessive profits or prices or any other
manifestations usually associated with market power, even when scale
economies make an industry a natural monopoly or oligopoly. It is the presence
of sunk costs rather than economies of scale that is of vital significance for both
theory and practice. 120
When these conditions are met, a market is contestable (in the ideal case it is perfectly
contestable) and the need for extensive regulation is significantly reduced, if not eliminated.
However, transmission systems have significant sunk costs. As a result, transmission
systems, in their present form, are not contestable.
While transmission systems do not meet the conditions of contestability, concepts from
contestability theory are still helpful in our analysis. For example, the ideas of Woychik 121
and Tabors et al,122 have contestability underpinnings. In their conceptions of the
industry, secondary markets are competitive and create some degree of contestability.
Likewise, the California Final proposal contains the option of having the ISO collect
12 0Bailey and Baumol, 1984, 111-112.
12 1Woychik, August-September 1995.
12 2Tabors, Caramanis and Associates, 1995.
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congestion fees and use these revenues to build and upgrade transmission facilities in order
to prevent market power abuse by transmission utilities. The Chilean power industry
already uses contestability -- the transmission utility would be required to interconnect any
new lines that would be built by a non-utility. In these cases, contestability is used to
circumvent market power problems regarding the construction of new transmission lines
that would function on the established transmission system, rather than to contest the
operation of existing facilities. Under these scenarios, the development of a transmission
construction partial Nutco would only occur once contestability fails to motivate the
transmission utility to construct new capacity. However, in the presence of zealous ISO's,
disgruntled transmission customers, entrepreneurial would-be Nutcos, or utilities who do
not want to wish to build new capacity, this "failure" could easily occur.
11.7.7 Openings Due to Pricing Structure and Cross-Subsidization
Partial NUTS could also develop as a result of customers attempting to bypass a cross-
subsidy or other non-economic charge imposed on the transmission system. It has been
demonstrated by economic theorists 123 and in practice 124 that the assessment of non-
economic fees creates an incentive to bypass the tariffed system. 125 Such a situation
entices new entrants to "cream skim," to serve those customers whose marginal service
costs are well below the "average cost" or "marginal cost plus" that they would pay under
regulated service rates.
While free market advocates might argue that such inefficiencies (cross-subsidies) would
not be tolerated in a competitive, restructured electric power industry; political realities
indicate otherwise. Restructuring will create winners and losers, and those who perceive
that they will lose have a strong incentive to fight the changes or seek remediation. 126 As a
result, it is unlikely that deregulation will fully eliminate the current cross-subsidies, and
some new ones may be created in the process. Even the Telecommunications Act of 1996,
with its sweeping moves toward deregulation, featured some cross-subsidies. 127
12 3For example, see Faulhaber, 1975; and Faulhaber and Levinson, 1981.
12 4 One interpretation of the cause of the Bell System Break-up was the price structure used by the FCC
that subsidized local service by higher long distance rates. Source: Temin, 1987.
125Whether the incentive leads to actual bypass depends upon the size of the fee and the availability and
cost of the bypass option.
126 Hyman, 1994, 131.
127 For example, the current legislation maintains subsidies for rural users, in order to guarantee universal
service, despite wireless alternatives. Source: Pearl, 1995; and United States Senate, 1996, S688 (floor
speech by Sen. Ernest Hollings).
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The potential for NUTS developing because of uneconomic transmission fees has already
been recognized. The California Bilateral proposal mentions that collecting a Competitive
Transition Charge (CTC) through transmission service tariffs, rather than through a non-
bypassable fee, might lead to the development of non-utility transmission. 128 However,
the opportunity for bypass via NUTS is less likely than analogous bypass in most
industries because of the high sunk costs that would be incurred and the scale economies of
transmission systems. (Self-generation would likely be a more economic form of bypass
than NUTS.) Nevertheless, bypass is not impossible and a technological breakthrough
such as wireless power transmission (WPT) would greatly increase its feasibility.
11.7.8 Elimination of the Natural Monopoly
While it is likely that one or a combination of the previously mentioned policy-based
pathways would need to be taken for the development of complete NUTS to occur, these
alone would not allow complete NUTS to emerge. The policy pathways would need to be
augmented by a reduction or elimination of the natural monopoly characteristics of
transmission systems; which, in turn, would require technological innovation. In Chapter
7 we examine three technologies currently under development that could drastically change
the nature of electric power systems when used alone or in combination. Let us explore
several scenarios for their adoption on transmission systems.
11.7.8.1 FACTS to Mitigate Reduced Economies of Scale of Complete NUTS
Much of the basis for the natural monopoly nature of transmission systems lies in the
requirement that generation instantaneously match demand without storage. Consequently,
the result of '.'competing" systems using current technologies would be reduced pool sizes,
which would clash with the system's economies of scale. FACTS could mitigate, if not
eliminate this problem .through their ability to function as "electric valves." With this
capability, competitive and independent systems could operate with an interconnect that
could be used for emergencies, which would have the effect of pooling their reserve
margins. (However, we mention above that such pooling could lead to unfavorable
economic externalities.)
The ability to gate lines would also allow competing complete NUTS to have overlapping
connections to transmission customers. Conceivably, generators could send some of their
power over one complete Nutco's lines and some over another system's lines. Likewise,
12 8 Knight, 1995, 89.
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load transmission customers (distribution companies, industrial customers, etc.) could
receive power from multiple Nutcos simultaneously, or could readily switch from one to
the other in order to take advantage of favorable prices.
11.7.8.2 Superconductive Storage
Another revolutionary innovation would be the development of economical storage
technologies, such as large-scale superconductive storage devices. These devices would
substantially reduce the scale economies of transmission systems (thereby reducing the
impediments to complete NUTS development) by internalizing, in the form of stored
energy, many of the transmission functions necessary to keep generation and load
balanced. In particular, a complete NUTS could use these as the primary source of
emergency reserve margins and peak generation capacity.
11.7.8.3 Superconductive Lines and/or Wireless Power Transmission (WPT)
Superconductive transmission lines and WPT could offer opportunities for overcoming the
system scale economies barrier to complete NUTS through their ability to "pool" generators
over a large geographical area. In the case of superconductive transmission lines, pooling
would occur through long-distance physical interconnections that would be free of resistive
losses. In the case of WPT, pooling would occur through the ability to send a beam of
energy across a long distance in the event that it should be needed. Therefore, a Nutco
could be connected to only a small percentage of the generators in any given region yet still
achieve scale economies of system operation, reliability, etc., over a large area -- if not the
whole country. This would lower the entry barriers for complete Nutcos and would
diminish the negative impact of Nutcos in any particular region.
With respect to contestability economic theory, WPT technologies would also eliminate the
immobile investment problem that helps to make transmission line service an incontestable
market. WPT would allow a Nutco to contest transmission utilities in multiple places
simultaneously. Much like airlines have done in the deregulation era, a Nutco could
relatively easily withdraw service from those areas where it was unsuccessful in attracting
customers, and redeploy its assets (i.e. lasers, antennas, rectennas, etc.) into more
successful corridors.129
12 9 Sinha, 1986.
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11.7.8.4 Economic Realities and Technological Change
The technology innovations and their uses mentioned above illustrate just several
possibilities, other technologies or applications could be developed in their stead. Although
these technologies and their potential to transform the industry sound exciting, often
technological viability can often lead economic viability. 130 New technologies may be able
to eliminate some of the technical impediments and drawbacks of complete NUTS; but for
them to facilitate the development of complete NUTS, these technologies must do so in a
manner that is less expensive than the existing technologies (with their very low variable
vis-a-vis fixed costs). As a result, the hurdle of economic viability is likely much higher
than the technological viability hurdle. The economic hurdle could be lowered if
technological innovations would lead to currently unforeseen benefits that would result
from a reconceptualization of electric power systems. For example, if new technologies
were able to eliminate or reduce the need for spinning reserves and the amount of
transmission losses (which are not included in the O&M costs of transmission), the
economic hurdle would be much lower (although still not insignificant).
11.8 WHO MIGHT GO NUTS?
Having now discussed how NUTS could develop, we ask: who would "go NUTS."
11.8.1 Non-Utility Generators (NUGs)
Since the ownership of NUTS by NUGs could lead to operating synergies, NUGs might
be first to become Nutcos. 131 For example, if a NUG were to build a new generator in a
transmission-constrained area, it could seek mandatory wheeling over existing lines or
request the construction of a new transmission line by the local utility. Alternatively, it
could view becoming a partial Nutco as a strategic business move -- the NUG could build
its own line and gain income from what would have otherwise been an expense. The line
construction could also facilitate future planned generation construction by the NUG.
11.8.2 Utilities
Just as some entrepreneurial utilities have built upon their core competencies by creating
IPP affiliates, 132 utilities could view partial Nutco affiliates as another rational corporate
growth vehicle. Since some ancillary services require capabilities that go beyond operating
130Angerman, 1996; and "Please Hold For New Technology."
13 1Roseman, 1991.13 2 For a description. of one of the most entrepreneurial, recent moves by a utility see: "Puget, Duke
Discuss Generation Buyout."
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a plant for the purpose of producing only megawatts, experienced utilities could have a
comparative advantage in providing them. For example, load following ancillary service
provision requires that a generator constantly increase and decrease output in order to match
load. Similarly, a well run transmission utility could be well positioned to build and
maintain new lines in the event of a transmission capacity construction auction.
In order to implement an ancillary services Nutco strategy, a utility's Nutco affiliate could
scour the country, purchasing a niche of power plants that may not be the most efficient or
least cost, but that are well positioned, either technically or spatially, to serve as ancillary
service providers.
11.8.3 Other Related Companies
Companies in related industries such as Bechtel (engineering and construction) and
ENRON (natural gas) 133 have been strong new entrants into the generation industry in
recent years. These and other similar companies could see synergies in the Nutco business
as well. For example, a company that builds transmission lines or supplies new
transmission technologies could see operating a Nutco as a way of stimulating demand for
its products by its being a captive customer. Natural gas companies could form
transmission line Nutcos as alternative "pipelines" for natural gas (that is changed to
electricity in highly efficient gas turbines).
11.9 CONCLUSIONS
Non-utility transmission systems could take two general forms: complete NUTS (complete,
non-utility transmission systems), and partial NUTS ("transmission" functions on the
current grid that would be provided competitively). Complete and partial NUTS have
different predicted fates.
The four state-level proposals and the FERC Mega-NOPR expect that partial NUTS will
develop in some transmission functions -- especially ancillary services. We anticipate that
the number and scope of partial NUTS opportunities will increase beyond what is expected
in the proposals as new technologies are developed and experience is gained in a more
competitively-based industry. Partial NUTS could provide several benefits, including the
potential to move the industry to a higher state of dynamic efficiency by entrepreneurially
removing transmission constraints on the macro level (which would likely not occur, or
13 3See, for instance: Southerland, 1996.
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would be substantially delayed, in the context of the current utility-owned industry
structure).
In contrast, the future of complete NUTS looks dim. All of the restructuring proposals
assume that transmission systems are natural monopolies. Furthermore, through their
creation of state-wide ISOs (which would combine multiple, smaller control areas), the
state-level proposals would extend the most fundamental system natural monopoly
characteristic over a larger area. This policy approach appears to be well-founded because
the near-term development of complete NUTS is technologically and economically
infeasible. Furthermore, consistent with trends in other industries, electric power
provision appears to be moving from business structure paradigm of physical integration to
one based upon financial integration. Complete NUTS would likely be "selected against"
in this evolutionary process.
Although the restructuring proposals and industry trends are moving in a direction away
from the development of complete NUTS, it is conceivable that complete NUTS could still
emerge. If partial NUTS emerge and transmission service becomes increasingly
unbundled, the natural monopoly "transmission system" would be pared back to fewer
functions. Competitive Nutcos and technological innovations could lead to a drastic
reconstitution of these "pared back" transmission systems. An implication of this is that a
"complete NUTS" several decades from now may be entirely different than our current
definition of a "complete NUTS." Since we can identify a number of potential benefits to
complete NUTS (as we know them today) as well as some transmission technologies that
are under development that could make complete NUTS (either as defined now or in the
future) technically feasible, it would be prudent to leave the possibility for their
development open. We assume that they (both complete NUTS and the technologies)
would only develop if their benefits outweigh their detriments. Even if they ultimately are
not adopted, leaving the possibility of their development open could stimulate other
positive, unintended consequences.
The question now becomes how? On a broad level, the forces of technological and political
change should be stimulated and definitely should not be unnecessarily shackled. On the
technological level, a goal should be to "sow the seeds" for complete Nutcos by creating a
demand for new, revolutionary technologies. A goal for political change should be to
guide the industry's evolution in a manner that would allow for the "policy window" to
open should economic and technical feasibility for complete NUTS arise. In the generation
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segment of the industry, this was accomplished by creating political constituencies (QFs).
In transmission, partial Nutcos could fill that role.
Looking at the micro-level, we can ask: how could new technologies be stimulated? One
option, which would be easier to implement if the ISO were given responsibility for
procuring all ancillary services (as opposed to allowing self- or third party-provision),
would be to build incentives for the use of new technologies into ancillary service provision
auction processes. Similarly, if new transmission capacity is eventually provided through
an auction process, the use of innovative transmission technologies could be given
(favorable) treatment similar to that of renewable resources in generation capacity auctions.
Another option, which would take an opposite approach, would be to design the industry
structure so that as many "potential" partial NUTS functions are in fact provided through
competitive mechanisms. This approach assumes that partial Nutcos would develop (or
would provide a market for suppliers of) new technologies in order to gain competitive
advantage.
In short, while it is highly likely that transmission systems will retain natural monopoly
characteristics for at least the next decade if not perpetually, allowing competition in some
transmission functions -- through competitive bidding of ancillary services, new
transmission construction and ownership, and the creation of secondary markets -- would
enhance the potential for the eventual emergence of a complete NUTS industry, and could
create a vibrant, and socially beneficial partial Nutco industry. In the process, new
technologies and unintended positive outcomes could occur. By making decisions today
that would allow, rather than foreclose upon the development of NUTS, policy-makers
could allow future generations the benefits of a more efficient system.
Chapter 12
Conclusions
Whii the laws of suppty and ademandand the invisibre hand are very powerful they
are not more powerful than the laws of physics and can operate efficiently only by
accommodating physical realities.1
-- PaulL. Joskow (1996)
12.1 EVALUATION WITH RESPECT TO THE CRITERIA
This thesis examines five proposals for partially deregulating the electric power industry
with respect to their predicted impact on long-term economic efficiency in transmission.
Several conclusions emerge from our evaluation.
12.1.1 Evaluation and Ranking of Proposals
We examine two types of proposals: four state-level ones, which seek restructure all
industry components within a state, and the March 1995 Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission (FERC) Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on Transmission Access (Mega-
NOPR), which would open the wholesale power market to full competition and would
demarcate the transmission segment of the industry in the formulation of the state-level
proposals. 2
Our evaluation finds some significant problems with the Mega-NOPR. In particular, the
transmission pricing structure, although unclear, would appear to lead to inefficiencies
caused by its non-reliance on marginal cost pricing principles, its potential for conflicting
pricing structures, and its overall incoherence in pricing incentives.
In the California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC) December 1995 decision that
selected the foundation for its restructuring efforts, we find that the CPUC chose the most
efficient state-level restructuring proposal (California Final) of those examined in this
thesis. The second-most efficient proposal appears to be the California POOLCO proposal.
We say "appears to be" because of the significant number of important details that are
1Joskow, 1996, 69.
2 Jurisdiction of electric power regulation is split between the states and the FERC. It is believed that the
FERC has the authority to regulate all unbundled transmission sales.
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absent from it. Depending upon how these details would be settled, the POOLCO proposal
could be as efficient as the California Final proposal. On the other hand, it could easily be
surpassed by the next most efficient proposal (California Bilateral), which also lacks many
important details. The most inefficient proposal is the Wisconsin Plausible Extreme model.
While the California Final proposal appears to be the preferable one, we do not find the
magnitude by which it is the best choice.3 This is a significant problem because our criteria
only address one of many issues that need to be balanced when restructuring the industry. 4
Therefore, while we establish a rank order, it must be recognized that this ranking is
subject to high sensitivity with respect to undetermined proposal details and only represents
one piece of a larger puzzle. In short, the thesis affirms the Commission's choice, but does
not give it a "ringing endorsement."
But then one might ask, what is the value of this thesis if it can only give relatively fuzzy
answers with regard to one part of a larger puzzle? We attempt to answer this question in
the remainder of this section and chapter.
12.1.2 Raises Important Issues
This thesis raises issues that are seldom, if ever discussed in the restructuring debate. For
example, although our proposal ranking is qualified, we do find that there are important
issues regarding economic efficiency in transmission which have at least some "answers."
For example, while there are unresolved debates as to what type of transmission pricing
structure would strike the best balance between accuracy and functionality,5 we find that
economic principles can be brought to bear on these discussions. Even if the economic
principles cannot conclusively determine the "best" method of transmission pricing, they
can identify ones that are clearly inferior, and inform decision-makers of trade-offs.
Even more unique to the debate is the discussion of transmission technology dynamics in
the thesis. Essentially all debates of issues such as transmission pricing efficiency 6 are
premised on the static case. We find, however, that there are benefits in evaluating the
situation more dynamically. We find that technological change, an instrumental catalyst in
3This is due to the qualitative nature of our criteria and the lack of details of the "competing" proposals.
4For example, if the California Final proposal is only slightly superior to the Bilateral proposal in terms of
long-term economic efficiency in transmission, but the latter is far more efficient with respect to
generation, it could easily be argued that the Bilateral proposal would be the one that should be chosen.
5Especially in light of the understanding that there may not yet exist a completely self-consistent pricing
framework.
6Which themselves are at the fringe of the larger deregulation debate.
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the current deregulation activity, is worth considering so that a more efficient future
industry could be created, if technologies and economics would allow. Consideration of
these issues now is important so that technological change can be stimulated, or at least not
inhibited by the restructuring decisions that are being made today.
12.1.3 The Details Are More Important Than the Framework
A corollary to evaluating the five specific proposals is to determine whether any of the
restructuring frameworks7 are superior or inferior to the others with respect to their impact
on long-term economic efficiency in transmission. Yet, one of the most important reasons
for the superiority of the California Final proposal is that it is more "complete" than the
others. The California POOLCO and California Bilateral proposals have some efficient
characteristics, however, their overall impact on efficiency is rather unclear because they do
not outline important determinants of efficiency, such as transmission pricing structures.
As a result, while we find that the California Final proposal -- a "hybrid" of a Pool-based
and bilateral-based structure -- is preferable to the California POOLCO and Bilateral
proposals, we cannot reasonably conclude that the hybrid framework is inherently better
than a pool- or bilateral-based framework. Likewise, the state-wide or regional
transmission company framework may not be less efficient than the other frameworks; it
just happened that the specific transmission pricing rules proposed in the Wisconsin
Plausible Extreme model make the specific model inferior to the others. Put in other terms,
our analysis does not identify a framework that is clearly superior or one that is clearly
inferior. At the same time, it also does not preclude the existence of either of these.
This brings us to another important finding -- the details of the proposals appear to have a
larger impact on efficiency than the frameworks of which they are a part. This finding is
corroborated by our analysis of the FERC Mega-NOPR. There too, we find that its
efficiency problems have their roots in its specific details rather than in the proposal's
framework itself. The most significant implication of this discussion is that the decisions
made when the details are developed -- mundane or boring to the masses as they may be --
are predicted to be more important in determining the efficiency of transmission in the
restructured industry than the decision whether to adopt a pool- or bilateral-based
framework.
71n Chapter 10 we make the following differentiation between a proposal and a framework: A framework is
here considered to a broad category of deregulation proposals, such as: pool-based, bilateral contract-based,
single transmission company-based model. Within each framework would be a number of specific
proposals. For instance, POOLCO was just one of several pool-based proposals (many of which were quite
similar) that were bantered about in California. Similarly, PG&E proposed a bilateral model which would
be within the same framework as the California bilateral model, but differ in details.
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From this discussion we can make two hypotheses. The first is that for a superior
framework (if one exists) to produce superior efficiency results, it must be accompanied by
optimal details. 8 A second hypothesis is that none of the proposals evaluated in the thesis
have the combination of both of these items.
12.1.4 Innovation in Transmission Technology Has Been Ignored
It is distressing to note that only two of the five proposals give even vague mention to the
possibility that innovations may occur in transmission technologies, and none of them
attempt to consider the implications of technological change or explicitly foster innovation.
In short, all five proposals are built upon the static case and assume that it will continue ad
infinitum. When one considers that throughout its history the electric power industry has
been marked by significant technological innovation, and that the current restructuring is
the result of improvements in generation and information technologies, this disregard of
transmission technology innovation is most unfortunate. However, this neglect is not
unexpected. Little attention has been paid to the transmission system in the rush to
deregulate the generation segment of the industry, 9 and much of that attention has revolved
around transmission access. Even by those, such as Prof. William Hogan, who have
championed the cause of transmission, there has been a dearth of ideas on how the
transmission system might evolve with new technologies.
The danger of this neglect of consideration for technological development is that it could
stymie the development of technologies and institutional structures that would be more
efficient in the long term. These changes, if allowed to occur, could extend beyond the
transmission segment and impact the way that the whole industry is structured.
12.2 KEEPING THE OPPORTUNITY OPEN FOR THE NEXT INDUSTRY
RESTRUCTURING
The industry restructuring that is now occurring is largely the result of the overturning of
an assumption that the electric power industry has been built upon for the past half-century:
economies of scale in generation. This upheaval has resulted from changes in technology,
but also was possible only through policy changes. The new industry structure that is
8This discussion is of course simplistic, in the sense that the way that a proposal is implemented plays a
significant role -- probably equal to if not greater than design -- in the ultimate success of a proposal.
While implementation can be facilitated by the design of a proposal, it cannot be mandated. Source: Jones,
1984, 164-195.
9 Although the POOLCO vs. Bilateral debate in California did bring more attention to the grid than had
been paid to it previously.
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being developed is based upon a fundamental assumption of natural monopoly
characteristics of transmission. This almost inherently suggests that transmission should
be operated as a regulated, common carrier monopoly ad infinitum. In the short term, this
is an appropriate strategy -- transmission systems appear to have several significant natural
monopoly characteristics. Furthermore, it may also be that this is the appropriate long-term
structure of the industry.
But then again, it may not. We explore three technologies, currently under development,
that hold the potential to overturn this fundamental assumption. If, in fact, these become
developed to their full potential, we could see another major restructuring of the industry,
should that lead to an even more efficient structure -- but only if the policy framework
would allow it. While it is nearly impossible to envision what "transmission" would look
like in several decades, or what the potential benefits of non-utility transmission systems
(NUTS) might be, we must remember that when PURPA became law 17 years ago, few
envisioned the way that the industry has evolved. Given that the undercutting of the
transmission natural monopoly assumption would be as drastic as the one we are currently
experiencing and realizing the potential benefits of the current restructuring, it would be
desirable not to foreclose upon that possibility.
The caveat, however, is that these technologies would need to be allowed to be developed
and adopted in order for this to occur. The development of technology is evolutionary and
path dependent.10 So too is the path of public policy development. 11 Currently, there are
some clear technology and policy barriers to the adoption of these technologies. With
transmission being provided by a natural monopoly, and given the long service life of
transmission assets, there is good reason to believe that barriers to the wide-spread
adoption of new transmission technologies exist. This is somewhat akin to the alleged
situation of the generation industry prior to the passage of PURPA. The bottom line is that
while these technologies may have the potential for fundamental restructuring, their
development may be stunted and transforming capabilities muted without a policy structure
that encourages their development or allows them to transform the industry. Thus, by
neglecting technological change in transmission -- both the potential for it to occur and the
impact that it would have on industry structure -- today's decision-makers could be
dooming future generations to a sub-optimal electric power industry structure and
technology base.
10 Arthur, 1990.
1 1Kingdon, 1995, 222-225.
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One way to prevent foreclosure of another industry restructuring -- which would possibly
result in complete NUTS -- is to make transmission service (broadly defined) as
competitive as possible in the new industry structure. This could be done through the use
of an independent system operator structure and through active competitive solicitations for
ancillary services and new transmission capacity. While the ISO is a "framework" level
issue, the competitive solicitation issues are at the "proposal," or even the "detail" levels.
12.3 CONCLUSIONS IN PERSPECTIVE
The focus of this thesis is to evaluate a representative sub-set of the proposals for electric
power industry deregulation based upon their economic efficiency in the transmission
segment. There are several considerations that one must be mindful of when performing
such an analysis.
12.3.1 Other Issues and Industry Segments are Important
One consideration is that transmission is just one component of a highly-interconnected,
larger industry and economic efficiency is just one of many criteria that can be used to
evaluate a proposal. While transmission plays a vital role in the functioning of electric
power systems, its direct economic impact (in terms of costs) is relatively minor -- those
who are looking for significant monetary savings from restructuring will not find them in
the transmission industry segment. Therefore, a case could be made that economic
efficiency in transmission should not take priority over other efficiency issues, such as
economic efficiency in generation. In fact, such a view is difficult to refute.
There are also measures other than economic efficiency by which the proposals could be
evaluated. For example, we see in our evaluation of the Wisconsin Plausible Extreme
model that a state's desire to create an electric power export business, or conversely, to
minimize the in-state environmental damage of electric plants, could be reasons for
operating the grid in an economically inefficient manner.
The bottom line is that our analysis should be valuable to bring to the table in the proposal
formulation process, but it should be balanced with other metrics.
12.3.2 The Role of Politics
Politics will play an important role in the deregulation process. While rational,
comprehensive analysis should be used as a tool in the process, policy-making gravitates
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toward incrementalism, or in the words of Lindbloom, "the science of muddling
through" 12 -- especially in our American, democratic society. Political compromise (rather
than reliance on pure technical analysis) is the vehicle by which decisions are made. This is
especially true in the electric power restructuring, since powerful interests are being
brought to bear on a $200 billion per year industry. Furthermore, there is no "right" way
to handle many of the issues (although there are likely many "wrong" ones), such as how
to distribute the cost of transmission fixed costs, and perhaps, according to the findings of
the thesis, even the selection of the overall framework. As such, these decisions can only
be made politically.
12.3.3 Uncertainty of the Predicted Future
Our evaluation inherently assumes that we can predict the impact that the proposals would
have on economic efficiency by testing them with our criteria. This is an assumption that is
not entirely correct, for a couple of reasons.
12.3.3.1 Evolutionary Nature of Systems
First, the new industry structures created in the current wave of deregulation will not
remain constant, instead, they will continue to evolve over time. New technologies,
personalities, and external events enter the picture and fundamentally change the predicted
conditions. We witness this in the case of PURPA and in the stories of the natural gas and
telephone industry deregulations. Evolution should not be surprising in the case of natural
gas, where the process of deregulation itself was very incremental and occurred over a long
time period. In the case of the telephone industry, however, the major deregulation event
(AT&T's divestiture) literally changed the industry overnight. While one could postulate
that an abrupt change to a new system (such as the divestiture of AT&T) would lead to
predictable outcomes, that has not been the case. Peter Temin reminds us, "do not expect
to predict accurately any large change in industry structure. Despite the extensive
regulatory proceedings, legislative hearings, litigation, and academic analysis, the MFJ did
not have anything like the effects anticipated for it at the time." 13
12.3.3.2 Errors in Criteria and Analysis
Beyond this natural tendency for the industry to evolve in unexpected ways, we must
recognize that our criteria and analysis are also subject to error. Therefore, while we have
12 Lindbloom, 1959.
13Temin, 1994, 13.
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indicated the anticipated impact of these proposals, these evaluations are subject to
uncertainty.
12.3.3.3 Implications
Two implications arise from these uncertainties. First, it is important to create an industry
structure that can accommodate and encourage beneficial change. For example, we
specifically call for leaving the opportunity open for the development of non-utility
transmission systems. Second, what we bring to the policy-making table should be
recognized for what it is, an educated and well-thought through prediction of what might
occur. Although it contains significant uncertainties, it can be used to assist a political
process. As Eric Hirst and Brendan Kirby note,
Ultimately, decisions on industry structure will be largely judgmental, based on
incomplete facts and analysis. But we have an obligation to ensure that decision
makers understand well the consequences of the choices they face, based on the
best incomplete data and imperfect analysis we are able to provide them.14
In the end, regardless of all the lessons that can be learned from other industries and
economic principles, the way that proposals are implemented, technological developments,
and other external impacts will play an important role in their outcomes.
12.4 GOVERNANCE IMPLICATIONS
In California, the Executive and Legislative branches have openly desired an opportunity to
review the CPUC's restructuring decisions in order to adequately consider the
Commission's conclusions and "react with any legislative initiatives deemed in the public's
interest." 15 In many, if not all other, states the Legislature has some degree of oversight of
the process because it will eventually be asked to amend the Public Utilities Code in order
to incorporate the changes necessary for restructuring. Depending upon the specifics of
each state's Code -- how much independent authority is given a utility commission -- the
Legislature would have varying degrees of necessary actions to take. In some cases this
explicit oversight might be only to change the funding process for public purpose
programs. In other cases, the Legislature may be required to make more fundamental
changes in the authority granted to the Commission.
A significant implication for policy-making comes from our finding that the details are more
important than the overall deregulation framework in determining the efficiency of the
resulting proposals with respect to transmission. While we have witnessed that this is the
14 Hirst and Kirby, 1995,18.
15CPUC, May 1995, 1.
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case for the transmission segment of the industry, it does not take a large leap of faith to
conclude, or at least responsibly speculate, that this is true beyond the narrow case we have
studied, and that overall, the broad frameworks differ relatively little in their impacts on
efficiency. Instead the meaningful efficiency differences occur in the proposal details
which are likely to be "fleshed out" over time. This implies that the rules set by the non-
elected staff and commissioners (and perhaps the unintended consequences of the
decisions) are as, if not more important than any actions which may take place by
democratically elected representatives. 16 For example, although the California Legislature
has essentially demanded final say on the restructuring matter, its input on the matter will
be merely window-dressing unless it is willing to retain oversight of the process beyond 29
March 1996 (the date by which the CPUC requested the legislative provide input on its
December decision).
12.5 POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
Based upon the conclusions presented in this chapter we make the following policy
recommendations.
12.5.1 Oversight of the Details
Since proposal details can have a larger impact on the economic efficiency impact of the
proposals than the proposal selection decision ithself, it is important that the same standard
of public participation that has characterized the debate in the vanguard states17 continue
once the broader market structure is set and the policy-making process moves into the more
arcane and tedious detail development stage. It is heartening to note that the California
Final proposal already includes many of these important details (which were absent from
previous ones);, nevertheless, it too is incomplete and the decisions that have yet to be made
are significant. It is further encouraging to observe that both the California Public Utilities
Commission and the Wisconsin Public Service Commission explicitly mention their intent
to keep their respective legislatures and the public included in the proposal development
process.
16The rush of lobbyists to the Federal Communications Commission, which is responsible for writing the
rules for the Telecommunciations Act of 1996, would appear to corroborate this assertion. Source: "The
FCC Is Besieged As It Rewrties Rules In Telecommunications."
17For example, the California Public Utilities Commission mentioned in the California Final Proposal and
Commissioner Knight mentioned in the California Bilateral Proposal that the restructuring debate was
marked by an unprecedented level of public participation. Sources: CPUC, D.95-12-063, 1, 18-24; and
Knight, 1995, 13-16, 117. The Wisconsin Public Service Commission has emphasized the important
give-and-take that must occur between the regulatory body; the Legislature, and the stakeholders in the
process. See: Wisconsin Public Service Commission, 22 February 1996.
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12.5.2 Improve the Mega-NOPR
Currently the FERC is in the latter stages of the rulemaking process for stranded cost
recovery and transmission access which was started by the Mega-NOPR. 18 Based upon
our findings, we strongly recommend that the FERC reexamine the proposition and the
consequences of non-marginal cost transmission pricing and the potential inefficiencies
inherent in its utility-by-utility transmission tariff structure.
12.5.3 Policies That Could Stimulate the Development of NUTS
We reaffirm the conventional wisdom that an attempt to create a fully competitive
transmission service market is currently infeasible, since some transmission functions
appear to have natural monopoly characteristics. However, we identify some technologies
that, over time, could transform this integrative part of the industry and could eventually
lead to another radical restructuring of the industry. While these technologies may never
bear fruit, either economically or technologically, it seems prudent to at least leave the
opportunity open for them to do so. Five policies which should not be detrimental to short-
term economic efficiency and might stimulate transmission technology innovation and
adoption are identified.
12.5.3.1 The Use of An Independent System Operator
The establishment of an ISO-based industry structure would allow for many of the
subsequent recommendations because of its unbundling of transmission services and its
establishment of a "fairer" competitive system. For example, if the system operator were to
be connected to those who provide unbundled transmission services, a relatively large
opportunity for self-dealing would be created. This is especially true for some of the
ancillary services, where their ability to be provided in a competitive fashion is dubious.
Thus, it is fair to assume that for regulatory reasons, competition would be overly
constrained in a non-ISO environment, and with it, the prospects for innovation would
diminish.
12.5.3.2 Competitive Provision of Ancillary Services
To the extent that it is possible to unbundle ancillary services in a manner which retains
system technical reliability, it would be desirable to have the ancillary services provided
through a competitive process.
18 Actually, the process was started 9 months earlier with the filing of a NOPR on stranded cost recovery,
which was revised in the Mega-NOPR.
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12.5.3.3 Competitive Provision of New Transmission Capacity
Following the passage of PURPA, non-utilities began to provide new generation capacity.
If an ISO takes over system operation, there is little reason that non-utilities could not
construct new transmission capacity as well. One possible mechanism would be to follow
the PURPA model of the late-1980s -- have competitive solicitations for new transmission
capacity when it is needed.
12.5.3.4 Secondary Markets for Transmission Capacity
Another policy recommendation is to create a secondary market for transmission capacity.
While these secondary markets could take varying forms, it would be desirable to create
them in a manner that would provide consistent and efficient incentives for grid use and
construction. Secondary markets would reduce the market power of transmission owners
and would create additional pressures for more efficient options, should they become
available.
12.5.3.5 Stimuli for Transmission Technology Development
In the case of PURPA we see how an attempt to stimulate new generation technologies
through the requirement of mandatory purchases from alternative energy and cogeneration
plants led to a drastic change in the economies of scale of generation and, in turn, of the
industry structure. A similar approach could be tried with respect to new transmission
technologies -- those who would construct transmission capacity using new technologies
(perhaps only when the capacity is needed) would receive priority in some sort of a bidding
process, and/or would earn subsidized rates of return. It should be noted, though, that this
set-aside/subsidy approach was characteristic of the general regulatory climate of the era
which was ending at about the time of PURPA, and is in many ways antithetical to the
prevailing regulatory winds. The use of "alternative transmission facilities" would also be
more technically complicated than "alternative energy generators," because generators are
relatively 19 isolated entities at the end of network "spokes," whereas transmission lines
connect the nodes in a complicated, integrated system. Thus, this idea is presented here as
more of a policy option, than an actual recommendation.
While it is impossible to know whether, or in what form it might occur, these policies may
lead to a future restriicturing of the industry.20 As such, they would represent a
responsible policy approach by giving future generations the opportunity for even more
efficient electric power systems.
19 Although there is still an intimate connection with the entire system.
20 And provide another generation of MIT students with exciting thesis topics.

Afterword
The electricity industry is extremely important to the country, and is a principal
example of a complicated mix of diverse private enterprises and complex government
responsibilities. The success of electricity market restructuring is important; the
prob*ems are challenging, and the process isfascinating.1
AF.1 INTRODUCTION
Two regulatory events occurred while final revisions were being made to this thesis which
have significant implications for it. A decision was made to not alter the thesis to
incorporate them, because doing so would require significant additional revisions. Instead,
this afterword briefly examines these regulatory developments and the implications they
might have for the thesis' findings.
AF.2 FERC ORDERS 888 AND 889 AND RM96-11
On 24 April 1996, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) issued a 1000
page2 final rulemaking on transmission access and wholesale stranded costs. This
rulemaking consisted of two decisions (Orders 888 and 889) and a new Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking (RM96-11).
AF.2.1 The FERC's Actions
AF.2.1.1 Order 888
The purpose of Order 888, "Promoting Wholesale Competition Through Open Access
Non-discriminatory Transmission Services By Public Utilities" is to place the open access
principles of the Energy Policy Act of 1992 (as interpreted by the FERC) into a functional
federal regulation. Let us now briefly discuss several of the Order's provisions which are
particularly applicable to this thesis.
AF.2.1.1.1 Open Access
In a reiteration of the pblicy proposed in the Mega-NOPR, Order 888 requires "open access
transmission by all public utilities that own, operate, or control interstate transmission. '"3
1Hogan, November 1995, 50-51.
2Source: "U.S. Rule Order Electric Concerns To Widen Access."
3FERC, 24 April 1996a, 5.
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Furthermore, transmission utilities "must file tariffs that offer others the same transmission
services they provide themselves, under comparable terms and conditions. Utilities must
take transmission service for their own wholesale transactions under the terms and
conditions of the tariff.",4 These open access requirements also apply to power pools and
other coordination agreements among utilities. The Order outlines a pro forma tariff that
describes minimum terms and conditions for network and point-to-point transmission
service. Transmission rates, however, will be proposed by the utilities (and approved by
the FERC).
AF.2.1.1.2 Ancillary services
One of the significant policy changes from the Mega-NOPR is Order 888's redefinition of
ancillary services (see Table AF.1).
Table AF.1: Comparison of Mega-NOPR and Order 888 Ancillary Services
Mega-NOPR Ancillary Services Order 888 Ancillary Services
* Reactive power/voltage control * Reactive supply and voltage control from
generation sources service
* Loss compensation * Regulation and frequency response service
* Scheduling and dispatching * Scheduling, system control, and dispatch
* Load following * Operating reserve -- spinning reserve
service
* System protection * Operating reserve -- supplemental reserve
service
* Energy Imbalance * Energy imbalance service
Sources: FERC, April 1995; and FERC, 24 April 1996, Press Release, 13.
Not only were the ancillary services redefined, the provisions for uniform ancillary service
rates were also scrapped. Instead, Order 888 requires each utility to submit its own pricing
schedule for ancillary services which allows it to recover its costs.
AF.2.1.1.3 Independent system operators
Another important change from the Mega-NOPR is Order 888's treatment of independent
system operators (ISOs). The Mega-NOPR was premised upon the continuation of utility
ownership and operation of transmission systems (although it would have mandated
functional unbundling), and was silent on the issue of ISOs. In contrast, while Order 888
is designed for the base case of continued utility ownership and operation of transmission
systems (it does not require utilities to turn their assets over to an ISO), it provides a
4Ibid.
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flexible enough structure to handle ISOs. Furthermore, it establishes eleven principles for
ISOs which it intends to use in its review of ISO applications.5
AF.2.1.1.4 Stranded investment
The Order retains the stranded investment recovery provisions of the Mega-NOPR. In
short, the states are responsible for policy- and decision-making with respect to stranded
investments caused by retail wheeling (unless a state commission explicitly lacks the
authority to do so), and the FERC will have domain over stranded investments that result
from wholesale wheeling.
AF.2.1.1.5 Jurisdiction
Order 888 maintains that the FERC has "exclusive jurisdiction over the rates, terms and
conditions of unbundled retail transmission in interstate commerce up to the point of local
distribution."' 6 The FERC will defer to the states on the determination of which specific
assets are transmission and which are distribution, provided that the state commissions
employ the seven "local distribution indicators" put forward in the Order,7 and another
relevant facts in their decision-making.
AF.2.1.1.6 Capacity Reservation and Reassignment
Transmission customers are eligible to reserve as much capacity as they wish (unless the
Commission determines that they are hoarding it), and will not lose their rights to firm
capacity simply because they do not use it. Furthermore, they are eligible to reassign (sell)
point-to-point transmission service (but not network service) to other users directly,
provided that the assignees meet the transmission provider's reliability criteria. However, a
price cap will be placed on transmission resales, which will be the highest of:
* the original price charged to the transmission customer (assignor);
* the transmission provider's maximum stated rate in effect at the time of
reassignment; and
* the assignor's own opportunity costs capped at the cost of expansion.
This is a change from current practice (and the Mega-NOPR's proposed reassignment caps)
of capping the reassignment price at the price originally paid to the public utility (i.e. the
first bullet). The Order also provides guidelines for prioritizing and curtailing service
reservations.
5For a listing of the eleven principles, see: FERC, 24 April 1996a, 22-23.
6FERC, 24 April 1996a, 4.
7 For the listing of the seven indicators, see: FERC, 24 April 1996a, 18.
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AF.2.1.1.7 Functional Unbundling
Order 888 retains the Mega-NOPR's requirement that utilities functionally unbundle their
transmission and power marketing functions -- it does not require divestiture of any assets.
AF.2.1.2 Order 889
Order 889, "Open Access Same-Time Information System and Standards of Conduct,"
establishes the rules and standards of conduct for open access same-time information
systems (OASIS), which the FERC had previously referred to as real-time information
networks (RINs). The Order requires utilities to post transmission tariffs via OASIS
mechanisms and establishes standards of conduct to prevent functionally unbundled,
utility-affiliated power marketing employees from receiving preferential transmission-
related information. It also sets the OASIS's information reporting standards and proposes
a timetable for further refinement of the standards.
AF.2.1.3 Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NOPR) RM96-11
In Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NOPR) RM96-11, the Commission seeks an
immediate revisitation of some of the pricing issues that are included in Order 888. The
FERC is doing this because, "in analyzing the comments in the Open Access proceeding, it
became apparent that a single service open access tariff might better accommodate
competitive changes occurring in the industry..." 8 The FERC is going through this two-
stage process -- Rule 888 followed by RM96-11 -- because the intent of the former was to
require nondiscriminatory access to the transmission network, not to modify traditional
tariff design.9 Thus, with the open access issue resolved, at least in terms of policy-
making, the FERC is turning its attention to new pricing mechanisms.
The heart of the proposal is to replace "network" and "point-to-point" transmission service
tariffs with a capacity reservation tariff (CRT) that would accommodate the needs inherent
in both of the two former tariffs. Network tariffs are use-based while point-to-point tariffs
are reservation-based. The FERC has been persuaded that having two bases for pricing is
an inferior option (to a single basis) and believes that a reservation-based tariff would better
meet the needs of the emerging competitive industry. As the Commission explains, "Under
the CRT, all transmission customers would specify the amount of power to be received and
delivered at multiple receipt and delivery points, and would have substantial flexibility in
8FERC, 24 April 1996b, 4.
9Ibid.
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rearranging these receipt and delivery points. '' 10 The FERC lists many advantages to
having a reservation-based CRT mechanism, including: 11
* Compatibility with the OASIS requirement that customers know how much
capacity is available;
* Placement of all jurisdictional customers on the same basis;
* A more flexible framework for accommodating industry innovations and pricing
reforms;
* Difficulty of reselling load-based service and the potential consequence of
having a shallow transmission market;
* Potential inability to unbundle load-based transmission from generation;
* Facilitation of transmission planning; and
* Ease of placing retail transmission functions on the same footing as wholesale
customers.
From the perspective of transmission users, the CRT would work as follows:
Under the CRT... all firm transmission users ... would nominate and reserve
transmission capacity; they would nominate and reserve firm rights to receive
specific amounts of power at specific grid PORs [points of receipts] and to
deliver specific amount of power at specific grid PODs [points of delivery]. 12
The transmission utility would then be required to set aside sufficient capacity to allow for
any potential combinations of power receipts and deliveries between the PODs and PORs.
In short, the FERC would establish a tariff framework based upon power injections and
withdrawals, and would allow utilities, ISOs, etc. to develop consistent, non-
discriminatory pricing mechanisms and capacity definition protocols that account for power
flows. However, the FERC would not abdicate its authority over those tariffs -- the
Commission would still approve them (it also proposes 15 CRT principles) -- but the
framework would be more flexible since the tariff proposals would not have to include both
network and point-to-point services, nor meet their particular definitions.
AF.2.2 Impact on Efficiency
AF.2.2.1 Evaluation With Respect to Our Recommendations
In this thesis we make several policy recommendations that are relevant to the FERC's
orders. We now evaluate the conformance of the FERC's orders with several of our
recommendations.
AF.2.2.1.1 The FERC should reexamine the proposition and the consequences of non-
marginal cost transmission pricing.
The FERC takes a step in this direction through its CRT proposal. However, this would
be an indirect step, in the sense that it anticipates that innovative pricing mechanisms would
10Ibid., 5-6.
11 Summarized from: FERC, 24 April 1996b, 8-16.
12FERC, 24 April 1996b, 16.
384 Afterword
be facilitated by the CRT (which could include marginal cost pricing), but it does not call
for a marginal cost-based CRT.
AF.2.2.1.2 The FERC should reexamine the potential inefficiencies inherent in its utility-
by-utility transmission tariff structure.
The orders and the rulemaking would continue the practice of utility-by-utility transmission
pricing structures.
AF.2.2.1.3 An ISO-based industry structure should be developed
Although Order 888 does not require utilities to turn control of their transmission systems
over to ISOs, it makes the formation of ISOs much easier. The FERC does this by altering
several of the Mega-NOPR's provisions to accommodate ISOs and by promulgating
principles for ISOs. Given the evolutionary nature of industry restructuring, this may well
be the most prudent action for the FERC to take at this juncture, since mandating the
creation of ISOs would be a highly disruptive event in the transition process. Instead, the
FERC's decision to eliminate unnecessary restrictions and to let the other industry
participants debate the details should lead to more efficient structures, and could well result
in an ISO-based industry structure. 13
AF.2.2.1.4 A secondary market for transmission capacity should be created.
The change in the price cap of transmission capacity reassignment should have a significant
impact on the likelihood of an active secondary transmission capacity market developing.
Some trading of capacity would have likely occurred under the Mega-NOPR suggested
price cap, but it would have been limited to excess capacity sold to minimize losses. Under
the price cap of Order 888, a profit-driven market could develop.
AF.2.2.2 Evaluation With Respect to Our Criteria
Our intent is not to undertake a comprehensive or definitive evaluation of the FERC's
orders based upon our criteria, but rather, to highlight several of the issues of particular
importance to the discussion of this thesis.
While the FERC's redefinition of ancillary services and new pricing mechanisms for their
provision may still be open to some debate within the industry as it tries to determine more
precise technical definitions of ancillary services, the new definitions would appear to be a
move in the right direction. Furthermore, allowing the utilities to file their individual tariffs
should help ensure that an adequate "amount" of ancillary services are provided, and could
13 For a discussion of the trend toward ISOs, see "The Midwest ISO: The Next Generation."
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lead to prices that more accurately reflect the marginal cost of their provision. On the other
hand, there is an efficiency risk of allowing utilities to propose the prices -- at least in the
context of the near-term industry structure of continued ownership and operation of
transmission systems by utilities (which is Order 888 base case scenario). In the Order's
industry paradigm, the transmission utility, in its role as system operator, would determine
the amount of ancillary services necessary by each customer (which is necessary since
ancillary services are largely collective/public goods). The transmission utility would also
provide most of the ancillary services -- some, because the FERC deems them technically
best provided by the system operators, others due to a "shallow supply" market for
ancillary service provision (at least in the short run). Furthermore, many of the ancillary
services are generation-based. As such, they are part of a joint production process (with
competitive megawatts generation), 14 but would be a "guaranteed" stream of income. The
effect of these factors could be to give utilities an incentive to "over-provide" and over-price
ancillary services. To some extent the problem is intractable to cost-of-service regulation,
and demonstrates the benefits of ancillary services partial NUTS, especially in generation-
based services.
The CRT framework should more readily allow for the use of new, innovative pricing
mechanisms as they are developed, since they would not have to fit into the "boxes" of
point-to-point and network service.
AF.2.2.3 Other Issue
It is interesting to note, especially in light of our finding that technological change in
transmission has been ignored frequently by policy-makers, that the FERC lists
"technological innovation" as one of the other "non-quantifiable benefits" that are expected
to result from the Orders. 15
One potential efficiency problem with the CRT proposal is its suggested oversight of
overuse (i.e. a transmission customer exceeding its CRT) penalties. The proposal appears
to fail our criterion of having regulatory oversight be performed by a body able to regulate
with a system perspective since the proposal delegates the assessment of overuse penalties
to the states. Given that future, innovative pricing mechanisms (such as multiple-path,
flow sensitive pricing schemes) would likely cover multi-state areas, and that such penalties
14And, in terms of accounting, the FERC ruled that all production costs would be credited toward the cost
of generation because of the difficulties in separating them and the relative insignificance of the ancillary
service provision cost. Source: FERC, 10 May 1996a.
15FERC, 24 April 1996a, 6.
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are the mechanisms that would "entice" market participants into purchasing an efficient
amount of CRT quantity, we suggest that the FERC reconsider ceding penalty-setting
authority to the states.
While the FERC's proposal of the CRT appears to be a move toward increasing efficiency,
much work yet remains on the issue. At this juncture, issues regarding the definition of
CRT capacity, 16 tariff structure, and cost allocations are all open questions. The challenge
for the FERC, and those who give the Commission policy and technical input, is to answer
these questions in a manner that creates a useful tariff structure in the transition era, while
allowing the CRT to serve as an effective basis for continuing improvements in tariff
efficiency in the long-term.
AF.2.3 Impact on NUTS
We now briefly examine the potential impact of the FERC's orders on the development of
non-utility transmission systems (NUTS).
AF.2.3.1 Order 888
The change in the transmission reassignment price cap provisions (between the Mega-
NOPR and Order 888) should have a significant impact on stimulating secondary markets
for transmission services. The ability to reassign (sell) transmission service for a higher
price than it is purchased for should encourage entities to acquire capacity reservations with
the intent of selling them at a profit. Thus, transmission resale partial Nutcos would be
likely to develop.
AF.2.3.2 Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NOPR) RM96-11
The CRT proposal contains several principles that have implications for NUTS. The first
is that CRTs would offer "standardized transmission products and services." 17 This is
significant because, in the presence of reassignment rights (which is another principle), it
would offer transmission customers a good that could be resold. Furthermore, because of
the increased flexibility (over point-to-point service) that is created by having capacity
based upon an array of injection and withdrawal points, rather than pairings of specific
transaction points (and perhaps even a contract path), a transmission service reseller partial
Nutco could presumably balance the needs of numerous customers simultaneously.
16The concept of "transmission capacity" itself is not well defined. See: Ilic' et al, August 1996.
17FERC, 24 April 1996b, 23.
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Another relevant principle regards opportunity cost pricing, which would facilitate
mechanisms such as congestion contracts, which, as we describe in Chapter 11, could
create incentives and resources for non-utility transmission line construction.
AF.3 CALIFORNIA
On 29 April 1996, the three major California utilities -- Pacific Gas and Electric, Edison
International (Southern California Edison), and Enova (San Diego Gas and Electric) --
made three joint filings with the FERC:
* to create an independent system operator (ISO);
* to create a power exchange (PX) for the California ISO grid; and
* to determine boundaries between transmission and distribution.
This was done in order to meet the California Final Proposal's deadline for these issues.
The content of the filings was developed through the Western Power Exchange (WEPEX),
an organization consisting of a variety of stakeholders in the process, including the three
utilities. The proposal was significant because, as the New York Times' Agis Salpukas
noted, "It would mark the first time that a state's utilities directly competed with other
producers in a vast region and yielded control of their transmission systems." 18
AF.3.1 Independent System Operator 19
The first filing would establish an ISO, which would be a non-profit, public benefit
California corporation. The filing proposes extensive details regarding ISO governance,
functions, pricing, and operating protocols. It also specifies which transmission system
operations are in the domain of the ISO, and which would be performed by the
transmission owners (TOs). In particular,20
* The ISO would administer tariffs;
* The ISO would have sole authority to direct the operation of all facilities under
its control that affect the reliability of the transmission system. TOs would be
responsible for carrying out the ISO's orders regarding physical operation of
the system (i.e. TOs are responsible for opening/closing circuits at the request
of the ISO, analogous to a generating plant's control room receiving dispatch
order from the system operator);
* The ISO would approve requests (from TOs) to take transmission equipment
out of service; and
* The ISO would set priorities for restoring transmission facilities after an
emergency.
The ISO would not own or build transmission facilities.
18Salpukas, April 1996.
19The content for this section comes from: Pacific Gas and Electric et al, 29 April 1996a; and Western
Power Exchange, 29 April 1996.
20Summarized from: Pacific Gas and Electric et al, 29 April 1996a, 14-17.
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AF.3.2 Power Exchange
The second filing would establish the Power Exchange (PX), which would be a non-profit,
public benefit California corporation. The PX would "establish a competitive spot market
for electric power through a day-ahead and an hour-ahead auction of generation and
demand bids using transparent rules and protocols." 21 The filing lays out the power
exchange's responsibilities, governance, bidding rules, and bid evaluation procedures.
AF.3.3 Transmission Pricing and Ancillary Services
Embedded in the ISO filing are a transmission pricing scheme and an ancillary services
definition and pricing proposal. The non-ancillary services transmission pricing
mechanism would include three parts:
* An access charge, which would be designed to cover the transmission owner's
revenue requirements or embedded costs. Transmission customers who
withdraw power from the grid would be assessed this charge as a fixed rate at
their interface with the ISO grid;
* A usage charge that is paid by parties who use paths between congestion
management zones; and
* A transmission losses charge, based upon the marginal impact of each grid
user.
The congestion management zones mentioned above are regions in the state where
congestion is not expected to occur. Thus, they would be designed around more highly
congested areas in a way that interzonal transactions would be through congested areas.
The zone boundaries would be reviewed periodically so that they match the actual
congestion on the grid. WEPEX chose this congestion pricing mechanism, as opposed to
more complicated ones, because it promotes efficiency while minimizing the number of
different prices that customers see and simplifying administration.
In addition, a transmission congestion contract (TCC) scheme, which is still under
development, would be used. This scheme would provide contract holders with revenue
streams from congested situations that could be used to construct new capacity. It would
also provide those who are paying congestion charges with an incentive to construct new
transmission capacity.
There would be two processes for constructing new capacity: economically-driven and
reliability-driven. The former would be signaled through the congestion fees, while the
latter would be the result of load growth or other events that might impair reliability absent
additional capacity.
2 1Western Power Exchange, 29 April 1996.
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The ISO filing goes into great detail in defining22 the ancillary services and the process
through which they would be provided. 23 The ISO would contract out, through a
competitive process, the ancillary services that it would make available to transmission
customers. A daily auction would be the mechanism used for many of the services.
Others, such as reactive power support and black start, would be provided to the ISO
through longer (perhaps annual) contracts. Transmission customers would have the option
of procuring those ancillary services which can be unbundled from the ISO or a third party,
or self-producing them.
AF.3.4 Evaluation of Filings With Respect to the Thesis's Recommendations
AF.3.4.1 To The Extent That It Is Possible To Unbundle Ancillary Services In A Manner
Which Retains System Technical Reliability, It Would Be Desirable To Have The Ancillary
Services Provided Through A Competitive Process.
The filings would appear to meet this criterion. Careful examination was given to each
ancillary service in terms of definition, ability to be unbundled, and mechanisms through
which it could be provided competitively.
AF.3.4.2 An ISO-Based Industry Structure Should Be Developed
Per the California Final proposal, the filings are premised upon an ISO-based industry
structure.
AF.3.4.3 A Secondary Market For Transmission Capacity Should Be Created.
The filing states that the transmission congestion contracts (although they are not fully
developed) will designed in a manner so that they can be traded.
AF.3.5 Impact on NUTS
The further resolution of details (vis-a-vis the final order) regarding the ISO and PX which
is embodied in the filings has several implications for the potential development of NUTS.
The ISO filing's provisions that many of ancillary services be provided competitively to the
ISO through a daily auction would lead to the emergence of "ISO-supplying ancillary
service partial Nutcos." Furthermore, the filing's explicit call for self-provision and third
party provision of unbundleable ancillary services would facilitate the emergence of third
party ancillary services partial Nutcos.
22 Pacific Gas and Electric et al, 29 April 1996a, 51-55.
23 Pacific Gas and Electric et al, 29 April 1996a, Appendix D.
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The ISO filing's provisions that new capacity could be signaled by congestion contracts or
congestion fees could lead to the development of transmission ownership partial Nutcos.
However, the filing's statement that "the owner of the transmission system to be expanded
has the ultimate obligation to build," 24 and other similar ones might be construed to prevent
non-utility transmission construction. Also, the provisions that transmission owners
would be also responsible for physical operation of the transmission system would tend to
reduce, at least slightly, the likelihood of transmission partial Nutcos since investors would
also need to have (or hire) experience in physically running transmission assets. However,
due to the significant staff reductions that are occurring in the utility industry, one would
assume that hiring the necessary expertise would not be difficult, and therefore, the
continued bundling of ownership and operation is likely a 2nd or 3rd order deterrent to
transmission operation Nutcos.
AF.4 CONCLUSIONS
Based upon our cursory review of the FERC's final orders on transmission access and the
WEPEX's filings on the transmission system in a restructured California electric power
industry, it appears that the industry is moving in a direction that would promote long-term
economic efficiency in transmission and which could immediately spawn partial Nutcos,
with the potential for more non-utility functions in the long-term.
These proposals also demonstrate how quickly major changes are occurring in the industry,
and have not been the only recent occurrences of note. On 1 May 1996, New Hampshire
began its first-in-the-nation retail wheeling experiment, 25 and the Massachusetts
Department of Public Utilities (DPU) issued its own Restructuring Proposal, which
proposes a basic industry structure for the Commonwealth and will now be subject to
public comment.26 (This is analogous to the May 1995 CPUC decision.) This proposal, if
adopted, could have an interesting implication. The DPU's proposal, at the macro level,
appears to be very similar to the California Final proposal as it is based upon a hybrid
framework. Several months ago this would have been surprising, since the conventional
wisdom had been that the New England electric power industry would be based upon a
bilateral framework. It will be interesting to see whether this signals a rapid convergence to
one industry restructuring framework. While this would make the aggregate national
process much more simple, the structure homogeneity would negate the benefits of having
24 Ibid., 111.
25 Source: "DPU Details Plan to Spur Competition to Cut Power Rates," 72.
26 Massachusetts Department of Public Utilities, 1 May 1996.
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multiple "real time" regulatory "experiments" as the industry moves through its transition
state.
APPENDICES
Appendix A
Principles of Deregulation Proposals
Electricity production is possibly the only just in time commodity -- it is consumed
virtually as it is produced'
-- Charles G. Stalon andEric C Woychik(1995)
A.1 FERC MEGA-NOPR GOALS2
* Facilitate competitive wholesale electric power markets;
* Prevent unduly discriminatory practices in transmission access; and
* Address transition costs associated with open transmission access.
A.2 CPUC "BLUE BOOK" FUNDAMENTALS FOR VISION OF INDUSTRY 3
* California's consumers gradually enjoy direct access to generation suppliers,
marketers, brokers and other service providers in the competitive market for energy
services;
* All of California's consumers have a reasonable and fair opportunity to enjoy the
benefits of an increasingly competitive electric services industry;
* California's consumers enjoy direct access to the most efficient, environmentally
sound electric services infrastructure available;
* Competitive electric services make a significant contribution to growth,
productivity, competitiveness, and job creation throughout the state's economy; and
* All Californians enjoy universal access to a basic and affordable package of electric
services which reflects and keeps pace with innovation taking place in the broader,
competitive market for electric services.
A.3 CALIFORNIA POOLCO PROPOSAL OBJECTIVES 4
* Reduce the price California consumers pay for electric services;
* Where competition exists, or can be fostered, replace command and control
regulation with the discipline of the market; in the absence of competition,
supplant traditional cost-of-service regulation with alternatives better focused on
performance;
* Benefit all customer classes;
* Continue electric service that is safe, reliable, environmentally sensitive and
available to all customers;
* Retain safety standards;
* Improve the environment and encourage diversity of energy sources; and
* Honor past commitments, do not compromise the financial integrity of utilities, and
continue to provide utilities with a reasonable opportunity to earn a fair profit.
1Stalon and Woychik, February 1995, 9.
2FERC, April 1995, 17663-17664.
3CPUC, 20 April 1994, 12.
4CPUC, 24 May 1995, 3-4.
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A.4 CALIFORNIA DIRECT ACCESS PROPOSAL GOALS AND
COMMITMENTS 5
* Deliver safe, reliable and reasonably priced electric service;
* Maintain universal service;
* Maintain the utilities' reasonable opportunity to earn a return on investment;
* Continue public purpose, environmental, and resource investment programs, as
guided by the California Legislature;
* Lower rates for California consumers;
* Foster innovation;
* Encourage entrepreneurship;
* Foster economic growth and development; and
* Improve California's competitiveness in the global market and with neighboring
states.
A.5 CALIFORNIA MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING PRINCIPLES 6
* Support the rapid development of a vigorous competitive market in the supply of
generation services;
* Promote the efficient utilization of the region's generation and transmission
capacity;
* Provide comparable access to and obligations to pay for transmission and network
support services;
* Avoid cost shifting between customer classes and among California's distribution
utilities;
* Preserve the benefits of low-cost power imports for California customers;
* Minimize transactions costs; and
* Give all customers the opportunity to share in the benefits of competition.
A.6 CALIFORNIA "FINAL" DECISION GOALS7
* To offer customers greater choice in their purchases of energy services;
* To allow competition for traditional monopoly services to flourish where conditions
are ripe;
* To replace CPUC rate-of-return oversight of industry segments that are not subject
to competitive pressures with performance-based ratemaking;
* To reduce the price California customers pay for electricity;
* To continue to deliver safe, reliable, and environmentally sensitive energy services;
* To maintain universal, nondiscriminatory availability of electric services to all
California citizens;
* To maintain the financial integrity of the utilities and provide them with a
reasonable opportunity to earn a fair return on their investments;
* To continue to further the public good, as perceived by the Legislature and this
Commission, by improving the environment, encouraging the diversity of energy
sources, and maintaining a variety of important public purpose programs.
5Knight, 1995, Executive Summary Page 4.
6Southern California Edison, 1995, 2-3.
7CPUC, D.95-12-063, 201-202.
P in .z -r. . .r .s . 3.
A.7 WISCONSIN OVERARCHING RESTRUCTURING PRINCIPLES s
Principles Implications for Transmission
(1) To create a system that sends accurate Would likely lead to a switch to unbundled
price signals to customers resulting in the most and marginal cost pricing.
economically efficient use of the resource.
(2) To create a system which maximizes, Move to allow competition in some
within the public interest, the number and transmission services would be supported.
diversity of service offerings to customers.
(3) To create a system in which providers No clear ones.
maximize economic efficiency and
environmental stewardship.
A.8 RHODE ISLAND COLLABORATIVE INTERDEPENDENT PRINCIPLES 9
* Reliable and safe electric service should be maintained;
* Fairness and consistency in transition to new industry and beyond should occur;
* All customer classes should benefit;
* Existing commitments should be honored;
* Utilities should recover legitimate and verifiable stranded costs;
* Near-term rate relief should be provided;
* Electric services should be unbundled;
* Customer choice should exist at the retail level;
* A spot market for electricity should be developed;
* Regulators should streamline administrative processes;
* The New England Power Pool (NEPOOL) should be reformed;
* Deregulation should lead to improved cumulative generation emissions;
* Cost-effective DSM programs should be retained through a non-bypassable, non-
discriminatory charge;
* Fuel and technology diversity should be financially supported;
* Electricity service should be provided to all customers;
* Performance-based regulation should be used in parts of the industry that cannot be
deregulated; and
* The new industry structure should allow for entities that can attract capital at a
reasonable cost.
A.9 MASSACHUSETTS ROUNDTABLE INTERDEPENDENT PRINCIPLESlO
* Reliabhle and safe electric service should hbe maintained. with customers
determining the degree of firmness of service that they desire;
Fairness and consistency in transition to new industry and beyond should occur;
All customer classes should benefit;
Contractual rights and obligations should be enforced;
Utilities should have a reasonable opportunity to recover net, nonmitigatable,
strandable costs;
Near-term rate relief should be provided;
Electric services should be unbundled;
Customer choice should exist at the retail level;
A spot market for electricity should be developed;
8Wisconsin Public Service Commission, July 1995, 3-4.
9Electric Industry Restructuring Collaborative, 1995,
10Electric Industry Restructuring Roundtable, 1995.
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* Regulators should streamline administrative processes;
* The New England Power Pool (NEPOOL) should be reformed;
* Deregulation should lead to improved cumulative generation emissions;
* Cost-effective DSM programs should be retained through a non-bypassable, non-
discriminatory charge;
* Fuel and technology diversity should be financially supported;
* Electricity service should be provided to all customers;
* Performance-based regulation should be used in parts of the industry that cannot be
deregulated;
* The new industry structure should allow for entities that can attract capital at a
reasonable cost; and
* Restructuring should occur through consensus and settlements, as opposed to
litigation, whenever possible.
A.10 MASSACHUSETTS DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC UTILITIES NOTICE OF
INQUIRY OBJECTIVES 11
* Reduce electricity costs over time for all customer classes;
* Develop an efficient industry structure and regulatory framework that minimizes
long-term costs and maximizes service reliability;
* Improve the ability for Massachusetts industries to compete nationally and
internationally;
* Enhance choices for Massachusetts electricity consumers; and
* Preserve society's ability to pursue other important public policy goals (low-income
consumer protection, energy efficiency, environmental protection, energy security,
fuel diversity, and research and development).
A.11 ELCON PRINCIPLES FOR ACHIEVING COMPETITIVE, EFFICIENT,
AND EQUITABLE RETAIL ELECTRICITY MARKETS 12
Principles Implications for Transmission
(1) Market forces can do a better job than any Transmission functions that are not natural
government or regulatory agency in monopolies should be opened to competitive
determining prices for a commodity such as forces.
electricity.
(2) Laws and regulations which restrict the Careful examination should occur to see if
development of competitive electricity there are any transmission functions that could
markets should be rescinded or amended. The be made competitive.
need for burdensome regulation will be reduced
where competitive electricity markets are
allowed to flourish.
(3) The benefits from competition will never New, generation-independent institutions
fully materialize unless and until there is should be developed to provide system control
competition in both wholesale and retail and coordination services.
electricity markets. But not all retail services
are natural monopolies, and therefore, they
should not be regulated as such.
11Massachusetts Department of Public Utilities, 1995, 1-3.
12Electricity Consumers Resource Council, 1994.
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(4) The owners and operators of transmission a. Transmission and coordination system
and distribution facilities, and the providers service should be provided on a
of coordination and system control services, nondiscriminatory basis.
should be required to provide access to those b. Ownership and use of the facilities should
facilities and services to any buyer or seller on be separated, at least functionally.
a non-discriminatory, common-carrier basis. c. "Obligation to serve" -> "obligation to
provide direct access."
d. Transmission (and distribution) "capacity
trading" should be allowed.
(5) Rates for the use of transmission and a. Cost of service pricing for transmission and
distribution facilities should reflect the cost distribution.
of providing the service. If the facility is a b. Comparable and unbundled rates.
natural monopoly, those rates should be based c. Ability to "repackage" bundled services.
on actual costs and the services provided on a
nondiscriminatory and comparable basis to all
users.
(6) Resource planning is not a natural Transmission capacity should be signaled by
monopoly. The types and market shares of pricing mechanisms.
generation and end-user technologies that
would be supplied in wholesale and retail
markets should be decided in the
marketplace.
(7) Legitimate and verifiable transition costs
that develop as a result of competition should
be recovered by an equitable split among
ratepayers, shareholders and taxpayers. The
costs of assets that were uneconomical in the
existing regulatory regime are not transition
costs.
(8) The potential for transition costs should
not be used as an excuse to prevent or delay the
onset of a competitive electricity market.
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The Electric Power Industry: From
Competition to Regulation and Back
If power generation is the heart6eat of power supply, transmission is its primary
circulatory system, an equalpartner that integrates a utility's generation with its load
centers... The heart of a power supply system must have a property functioning
circulatory system.1
-- American Electric Power (1991)
B.1 INTRODUCTION
The current structure of the electric power industry is the result of a complex set of
interactions between electric utilities and the government that have occurred over the past
century. In order to make efficient restructuring decisions for this highly regulated
industry, it is important to understand how the industry has evolved into its present form
and the distortions that have been created by its regulatory structure. Technological
development has also played an important role in the industry's evolution. In this appendix
we explore how the industry's history has been driven by a combination of politics and
significant technological innovation. We do this because these same forces must be
harnessed in order to create a restructured industry that is efficient in the long-run.
B.2 VERTICALLY INTEGRATED MONOPOLY TAKES SHAPE
B.2.1 Edison and Westinghouse
B.2.1.1 The Industry's Birth at the Pearl Street Station
The electric power industry was born on 4 September 1882, when Thomas Edison began
operation of the Pearl Street Station in Lower Manhattan. Power flowed a short distance
from the station to a carefully selected group of customers: the financial brain trust of Wall
Street.2 Edison's Pearl Street and subsequent systems generated and transmitted direct
current (DC) power. Following Edison's success at Pearl Street, the electric power
industry quickly began to grow as generators sprouted up across the country.
1American Electric Power, 1991, 7, 12.
2Flavin and Lenssen, 1995, 44.
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B.2.1.2 The Battle Between Edison and Westinghouse
George Westinghouse, another electricity pioneer, built systems that generated and
transmitted alternating current (AC) power.3 A fierce public battle of the systems quickly
ensued between Edison and Westinghouse as they sought to establish their technology as
the industry standard.4 While Edison had garnered the first-mover advantage, a weakness
of DC systems was that DC power can only be transmitted efficiently over a relatively short
distance. The problems with AC power included a higher health hazard and the initial lack
of an AC motor. Attempting to influence the system adoption process using fear tactics,
Edison focused his public attacks against Westinghouse systems on AC's health hazards.
For this, Edison enlisted the help of Harold Brown and Arthur Kennedy, 5 who performed
and publicized experiments during which they electrocuted vicious dogs and large animals,
such as cattle. 6 Brown's research group also invented an AC-powered electric chair.
When the State of New York was looking for a more humane way to execute criminals in
the late 1880s, Edison eagerly proposed that Brown's invention be used and that an
execution by electrocution be called being "Westinghoused."7 Despite Edison's public
relations efforts, he eventually lost the battle of the systems once an AC motor was
successfully developed.
B.2.2 Early City Systems
The earliest electric power systems were built and operated under the purview of local (city)
governance. Municipalities issued permits to electric companies, but in most cases, cities
would not grant an exclusive franchise territory to these companies. For example, forty-
seven franchises were granted between 1890 and 1905 in the city of Chicago, several of
which were city-wide. 8 As a result, the fledgling electricity companies competed
vigorously with each other and multiple distribution lines were strung along many streets.
In 1910 Delos Wilcox commented, "competition was so thoroughly recognized at the
beginning of the industry as proper and possible that in some cases general franchises were
granted to all companies desiring to supply electric light and power."'
3For a good discussion of the differences between these two, and the properties of electricity, see: Kelly et
al, 1987, 271-280.
4The account in this thesis is based on: Hughes, 1983, 106-139.5Kennedy would later become a Professor of Electrical Engineering at MIT and Harvard.
6Brown and Edison gleefully noted that cows are significantly larger than humans.
7However, when others suggested that Brown's name be attached to the machine, Brown quickly disappeared
from the scene.
8Wilcox, 1910, 143.
9Wilcox, 1910, 142.
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B.2.3 Regulation and Consolidation
In about 1900, people began to see the benefits of a more consolidated industry structure.
A leader in this recognition was Chicago's Samuel Insull, who combined engineering,
business, and political savvy to rationalize the industry's ownership structure so that firms
could take advantage of economies of scale. 10 A 1902 Census Bureau report illuminated
some of these scale benefits.
When plants are brought under one management all the supplies for them are
bought in common and consequently are cheaper, the employees are subject to
sharper discipline, and the engineering supervision is more careful than in the
separate plants; therefore, the plants, as a whole, are likely to be in much better
condition and also much more progressive than they were as scattered units... 11
In order to take advantage of scale economies, cities began to grant electric companies
franchise rights, in return, the utilities were subject to economic regulation. Thus, the
regulatory compact was born. Consolidation also allowed for the aggregation of power
demand into larger loads, which allowed the benefits of increasingly larger, cutting-edge
technology plants to be harnessed. As the decade of the 1900s drew on, the increased
capabilities of long distance transmission, combined with consolidated ownership
structures, transformed the industry into one that was "interurban or state-wide in character
and not easily amenable to local control." 12
B.2.4 Vertical Integration and Natural Monopoly
During this time period, two fundamental characteristics of the industry emerged: vertical
integration and natural monopoly.
B.2.4.1 Vertical Integration
Vertical integration is the consolidation of the various steps of a production process into the
control of a single firm. Vertical integration has the potential to reduce costs in the
following situations:13
* Successive stages of production are technologically interdependent;
* Individuals in successive stages can share information more easily within a
vertically integrated company;
* The costs of negotiating and enforcing contracts between vertically separate
firms are large compared to the costs of decision making within a vertically
integrated firm; and
* Substantial monopoly power exists at successive stages, and vertical integration
would eliminate the incentive of each separate firm to exercise its monopoly
power over the other.
10 Hughes, 1983, 201-226.
11Cited in Wilcox, 1910, 138-139.
12Wilcox, 1910, 142.
13FERC, 1989, 83.
401
402 Appendix B
The electric power industry14 has, or at least had, each of these characteristics. The first
characteristic was, is, and for the foreseeable future will continue to be true -- the
generation, transmission and distribution functions are intimately related in a real-time
manner. Because of the coordination inherent in operating an electric power system, the
second characteristic (information sharing) was true in the past, although it is being
diminished, if not eliminated by rapid advances in information technologies. For similar
reasons, the third characteristic (costs of contracts) was also more relevant in the past than
today. With regard to the fourth characteristic (monopoly power in successive stages),
most people believe that (natural) monopoly power still exists in transmission and
distribution. Until recent years, there was also a wide-spread belief that generation was a
natural monopoly. For these reasons, the electric power industry took on a vertically-
integrated structure.
B.2.4.2 Natural Monopoly
The second fundamental characteristic of the electric power industry has been natural
monopoly, which exists when the marginal production cost is always lower than the
average production cost for the total quantity demanded by customers. 15 More specifically,
a natural monopoly exists when:
* The production of a good exhibits decreasing average costs up to or beyond the
quantity demanded by consumers 16 and/or there are overwhelming economies
of scope; 17
* It is possible for one firm to produce the good less expensively than multiple
firms; 18 and
* There are high barriers to entry and exit.
Because a industry that is a natural monopoly has the attribute of declining costs per unit
output over the quantity demanded, vigorous competition amongst competing suppliers is
expected to occur that would continue until only one firm remains in the industry. Once the
others have exited, the (natural) monopolist raises prices and restricts output, resulting in
economic inefficiency. Starting in the early 1900s, it was believed that natural monopoly
economies of scale existed at both the plant and system level in the electric power industry.
A society has three alternatives for organizing a natural monopoly industry: (1) private,
unregulated monopoly; (2) private, regulated monopoly; and (3) government ownership.
In the first option, the government does not intervene -- it allows the market to dictate the
14 Assuming that generation, transmission, and distribution are considered to be three production steps.
15Pindyck and Rubinfeld, 1992, 352.
16Warren, 1975, 50-51.
17 Samuelson, 1985, 522.
18In economic jargon, the cost of production is sub-additive. Source: Berg and Tschirhart, 1988, 21-23.
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number of firms in the industry (which will converge to one) and the prices and terms by
which that the firm(s) serve customers. Because the creation of an unregulated monopoly
is expected to cause significant allocative efficiency losses, this is not a viable alternative.
While almost every other country chose the option of government ownership; the United
States has by-in-large chosen the second option -- government regulation of private sector
firms. While there are many exceptions -- public power agencies and cooperatives --
investor-owned utilities generate and supply slightly more than three-quarters of America's
electricity.19 Richard Vietor comments on the "distinctively American" choice of market
structure in industries such as electricity:
While nearly all other countries chose to nationalize assets deemed vital to the
pubic interest, the United States kept them private -- despite near total economic
failure during the Great Depression. The state could intervene, to provide
stability and encourage distributive equity, but its authority was bounded by a
unique commitment to private property, due process, and the ideal of the
market. 20
This reliance on the private sector was also the result of foresight by turn of the century
utility executives, most notably Samuel Insull, who lobbied for such an arrangement.21
As these two fundamental principles -- natural monopoly and vertical integration -- were
reshaping the electric power industry after the turn of the century, the industry underwent a
consolidation, which eventually resulted in the formation of huge utility holding
companies.
B.3 HOLDING COMPANIES, PUHCA, AND THE FEDERAL POWER ACT
B.3.1 The Holding Companies and Their Abuses
B.3.1.1 Limitations on State Regulation
By 1930, almost half of America's power production was controlled by the three largest
holding companies 22 and nearly three-quarters was produced by the largest eight.23 Years
before, these companies had outgrown local regulation. Even though two-thirds of the
states had created regulatory commissions by 1916,24 these commissions quickly became
too small to regulate the ever-aggrandizing utilities. An event that further hampered state
regulators was the Supreme Court's landmark 1927 decision, Rhode Island Public Utilities
Commission vs. Attleboro Steam and Electric Co., which held that "states could not
19Energy Information Administration, November 1993, 3.
2 0Vietor, 1994, 330.
2 1Hughes, 1983, 205-208.
2 2Energy Information Administration, March 1993, 19.
23 Hyman, 1988, 74.
24 The first three state commissions were formed in 1907 in Massachusetts, New York, and Wisconsin.
Source: Hughes, 1983, 207.
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regulate the price of electricity generated in one state and sold in another."25 This decision
left a large regulatory void -- while states were not allowed to regulate interstate
transactions, there was no federal agency empowered to do so. Therefore, states were
given authority over a relatively small part of an interconnected system. The result was
predictable -- the large, multi-state holding companies were able to run circles around the
under-staffed, jurisdiction-constrained state regulators through devious practices such as
elaborate transfer pricing schemes and corporate pyramids that injured both customers and
investors. 26 While the utilities made a lot of money while this structure lasted, in few
places was the Depression-era backlash to 1920s-style croynism felt harder than in the
utility business.
B.3.1.2 Holding Company Abuses -- The Deck of Cards Collapses
The legislation that ended the holding company era, the Public Utility Holding Companies
Act of 1935 (PUHCA), enumerated holding company abuses:
It is hereby declared that the national public interest, the interest of investors in the
securities of holding companies and their subsidiary companies and affiliates, and
the interest of consumers of electric energy and natural and manufactured gas, are
or may be adversely affected --
(1) when such investors cannot obtain the information necessary to appraise the
financial position or earning power of the issuers, because the absence of uniform
standard accounts...
(2) when subsidiary public-utility companies are subjected to excessive charges ...
or enter into transactions in which evils result from an absence of arm's length
bargaining or from restraint of free and independent competition...
(3) when control of subsidiary public-utility companies affects the accounting
practices and rates, dividend, and other policies of such companies so as to
complicate and obstruct State regulation of such companies...
(4) when the growth and extension of holding companies bears no relation to
economy of management and operation or the integration and coordination of
related operating properties; or
(5) when in any other respect there is lack of economy of management and
operation of public-utility companies or lack of efficiency and adequacy of service
rendered by such companies, or lack of effective public regulation, or lack of
economies in the raising of capital.
When abuses of the character above enumerated become persistent and wide-
spread, the holding company becomes an agency which, unless regulated, is
injurious to investors, consumers, and the general public; and it is hereby declared
to be the policy of this title, in accordance with which policy all the provisions of
this title shall be interpreted, to meet the problems and eliminate the evils as
enumerated in this section... 27
25 Cited in: Energy Information Administration, March 1993, 21.
26 Kanner, 1996, 37-38.
27 PL74-687, 803-804.
The Electric Power Industry: From Competition to Regulation and Back 405
B.3.2 PUHCA: The "Death Sentence" Correction
The sternness of the accusations listed in the law were matched with equally stern
sanctions; PUHCA numbered the days of the holding companies by mandating,
the simplification of public utility holding company systems and the elimination
therefrom of properties detrimental to the proper function of such [electric
power] systems, and to provide as soon as practicable for the elimination of
public-utility holding companies except as otherwise expressly provided in this
title.28
The Act defined a "public utility holding company" as a firm that controls 10% or more of a
public utility company's voting shares, or a person that can exercise a "controlling
influence over the management or policies of any public utility holding company."' 29 An
"electric public utility company" is one that "owns or operates facilities used for the
generation, transmission, or distribution of electric energy for sale."30 Exempted from this
definition are public utilities that operate within a single state,31 and entities that produce all
of their electric power for their own consumption (i.e. industrial facilities that generate their
own power) or for the consumption of in-state affiliates.32
Over the ensuing two decades, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) broke up
the large holding companies -- in total, 759 utilities were separated from holding company
systems. 33 The SEC broke up the holding companies so that the resulting utilities no
longer met the definition of "holding company," and therefore were free of PUHCA
regulation. However, not all of the holding companies were completely disassembled;
approximately a dozen utilities have remained in the category of "registered holding
company"34 and function within the rigid confines of PUHCA. 35 Once the SEC finished
disassembling the holding companies, PUHCA faded into the background for about three
28PL74-687, 803.
29Ibid., 806.
30Ibid., 804.
31Not exempt from the definition of a public holding company, but exempt from becoming "registered
holding companies" are utilities that only operate in the state they are organized and in states contiguous
thereto. Source: Ibid., 804-805.
32Ibid.
33Hyman, 1988, 83.
34Currently, the registered holding companies include: Allegheny Power System, American Electric Power,
Central and South West Corp., Eastern Utilities Associates, Entergy, General Public Utilities Corp., New
England Electric System, Northeast Utilities, the Southern Company. Sources: Energy Information
Administration, January 1993, 617-619; and "SEC Supports Repeal of Law That Restricts Some Big
Utilities."
35These include: approval by the SEC of all acquisitions; limitations on: board membership, political
contributions, transactions within the same company, geographical service territory, and Congressional
testimony; close monitoring of contracts; additional reporting requirements by directors; and empowerment
of the SEC to become the trustee of the company and/or break it into pieces at the SEC's discretion.
Source: PL74-687.
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decades (1955-1985).36 It nevertheless made its mark; PUHCA set the industry's
geographical framework by creating an array of relatively small utilities that serve a limited
region. PUHCA also essentially precluded outside firms from entering the electric power
(and natural gas) business due to the significant limitations it places on the business
operations of registered holding companies and the way that holding companies are
defined.
B.3.3 The Federal Power Act
In the same piece of legislation as PUHCA was the Federal Power Act (FPA), which has
served as the "centerpiece for federal economic regulation of the electric utility industry" 37
ever since. In wake of the 1927 Attleboro decision, there was no mechanism for regulating
interstate sales of electricity -- the court's decision put this responsibility in the hands of the
Federal Government, but there were no federal laws to govern interstate electricity sales nor
regulatory agencies to enforce them if any such laws were passed.
The FPA had two major provisions. First, it created the Federal Power Commission
(FPC), which was terminated in 1977 and replaced with the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission (FERC), and charged it with federal regulatory oversight of the electric power
and gas industries.
Second, the FPA established the basic framework and principles for federal regulation of
electric power. The FPA stated,
It is declared that the business of transmitting and selling electric energy for
ultimate distribution to the public is affected with a public interest, and that
Federal regulation of matters relating to generation ... and of that part of such
business which consists of the transmission of electric energy in interstate
commerce and the sale of such energy at wholesale in interstate commerce is ...
in the public interest.38
The Act defined "electric energy in interstate commerce" as: "electric energy ... transmitted
from a state and consumed at any point outside thereof;" 39 and a wholesale sale as: "a sale
of electric energy to any person for resale."40 The Act also established federal regulatory
36However, as is seen in Appendix B.6.4.2, PUHCA became an issue again after 1985 when outside firms
wanted to form independent power producers (IPPs). In response, the Energy Policy Act of 1992 reduced
the impediments to entering the generation segment of the industry.
37Energy Information Administration, March 1993, 21.
38PL74-687, 847.
39 Ibid., 848.
40Ibid.
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oversight of some electric utility business practices. Furthermore, the Act established
several principles to guide federal regulators in their work:41
* All rates and charges made, demanded, or received by any public utility for or
in connection with the transmission or sale of electricity ... shall be just and
reasonable, and any such rate or charge that is not just and reasonable is hereby
declared to be unlawful; and
* No public utility shall, with respect to any transmission or sale subject to thejurisdiction of the Commission, (1) make or grant any undue preference or
advantage to any person or subject any person to any undue prejudice or
disadvantage, or (2) maintain any unreasonable difference in rates, charges,
service, facilities, or in any other respect.
The FPA created a bifurcated regulatory structure -- states maintained regulatory authority
over the industry's generation and the distribution functions, while federal regulators
received jurisdiction over the middle piece, transmission. The Act attempted to draw a line
between these two jurisdictions when it stated, "such Federal regulation, however should
(sic) extend only to those matters which are not subject to regulation by the States."42
Unfortunately, separating the purview of state and federal regulators is not simple for both
technical and political reasons. As a result, there have been jurisdictional conflicts that even
today are not entirely resolved. In several cases, the Supreme Court has broadly
interpreted the FPC/FERC's authority, which has been interpreted (although not by all) to
mean that the FERC has regulatory authority over all wholesale electricity sales and the
pricing of unbundled transmission services.43 The conflicting jurisdictional claims and
policy incongruence that can result from a bifurcated structure are significant obstacles in
restructuring the industry.44
B.4 THE GOLDEN ERA
The several decades following the enactment of PUHCA and the FPA can aptly be called
the golden era of the electric utility industry. 45 During this era, the industry was dominated
by vertically-integrated investor-owned utilities (IOUs) that operated monopolies in a rate-
of-return regulatory environment. The industry was driven by a series of incremental (yet
substantial) improvements in generation, transmission, and distribution technologies.
These improvements (which had been occurring since the start of the industry) led to
tremendous improvements in productivity. During the period 1899 to 1953, the industry's
41Ibid., 851.
4 2 PL74-687, 847.
4 3 For a discussion of the case law on this see: FERC, April 1995, 17713-17716.
4 4 See, for example: Kemezis, 1996; "NARUC-FERC Dialog Spotlights Jurisdiction;" "Moler Rattles
Peace Saber at NARUC Meeting;" and "Fessler, Tomasky Have a Friendly Joust on Jurisdiction."
4 5We will refrain from calling it the golden era of the electric power industry, however.
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average annual growth of total factor productivity was 5.5%, the highest rate of total factor
productivity growth of any major American industry. 46 (See Table B.1) Between 1937
Table B.1: Total Factor Productivity Gains in Selected Industries
Average Annual Total Factor Productivity
Industry Increase (%), 1899-1953
Electric Power 5.5
Manufactured Gas 4.7
Chemicals 2.9
Fabricated Metals 2.6
Railroads 2.6
Electric Machinery 2.2
Natural Gas 2.0
Telephone 2.0
Machinery, non-electric 1.7
Farming 1.1
Source: Kendrick, 1961, 136-137.
and 1948 the annual growth was 6.6%. While productivity growth slowed slightly after
1948, 47 substantial technological and performance improvements continued until about
1970. Consequently, from the birth of the industry until the early 1970s, electric power
rates fell in both real and nominal terms, while the use of electric power skyrocketed (see
Figures 3.1 and 3.2).
B.5 THE ERA ENDS
B.5.1 The Energy Crisis
Figures 3.1 and 3.2 illustrate a significant change that occurred in the 1970s -- the price of
electricity stopped declining, and instead began to rise in nominal and real terms. The
contrast between the "golden era" and the new era was stark -- in 1963, only three
American electric utilities sought rate increases while 114 did in 1975.48
The energy crisis was a major cause of electricity rate escalation. When the Arab oil
embargo hit in 1973, the electric utility industry was still heavily dependent upon petroleum
4 6 This 1960 study by the National Bureau of Economics examined 33 industries -- from the mining,
manufacturing, transportation, agriculture, and utility segments of the economy. Source: Kendrick, 1961,
136-137.
4 7 The average electric and gas utility total factor productivity growth was 4.9% between 1948 and 1966.
Note, though, that gas utility productivity is added into this figure (we do not know if this inflated or
deflated the number.) Source: Kendrick, 1973, 79.
4 8 Persons, 1995, 36.
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as a fuel source for electric power generation. 49 As a result, skyrocketing oil prices led to
significant increases in electricity production costs, which were then passed along50 to
consumers. As Peter Navarro comments, "In the 1970s, an 'energy crisis' turned this
industry upside down, sent electricity prices soaring, and all but unraveled a regulatory
compact that had delivered blue chip dividends to shareholders and ever decreasing rates to
consumers for over fifty years." 51 While it was perhaps the most significant problem
facing utilities, the energy crisis was only one of many problems that utilities faced during
the 1970s and early 1980s.
B.5.2 Problems Faced by Utilities
Although other underlying problems were not recognized immediately, they started to
become obvious in the late 1970s. In 1981, William Berry, then-President and Chief
Operating Officer of Virginia Electric Power Company, gave a ground-breaking speech to
the Edison Electric Institute which laid out many of the industry's woes.
You all know only too well what's happened to this industry in the last decade
or so: inflation accelerated, interest rates rose, productivity growth slowed, fuel
prices rose dramatically, growth in demand stopped, and the cost of meeting
environmental and safety regulations soared. For utilities that was truly a
devil's brew. Unless conditions change and change soon, our financial
infirmities will destroy our ability to provide reliable electric service.52
More noteworthy than his diagnosis of the industry's ills was his prognosis for their cure:
"I think the answer lies with competition. Electric power generation is no longer a natural
monopoly. Let's open electricity generation to competition -- with free entry, no
franchises, and no obligation to serve." 53 With these words, Berry became the first
president of a major utility to endorse competition in the industry.54 Let us briefly explore
the problems included in his diagnosis, as well as several others.
B.5.2.1 Declining Labor Productivity
Indicative of the industry's problems was its labor productivity, 55 which had grown at an
annual rate of 4.1% between 1958 and 1978. However, it reached a peak in 1977, and
49In 1973, slightly more than 35% of electric power was generated from either natural gas (18%) and other
petroleum products (17%). In 1994, natural gas alone accounted for 10.0% of generation and other
petroleum accounted for 3.1%. Source: Energy Information Administration, July 1995a, 233.
50At least in part.
51Navarro, 1995, 347.
52Berry, 1995, 22.
53Ibid., 23.
54Ibid.
55See Figure 4.5 for a graphical presentation of this. It should be noted that in Appendix B.4 we discuss
total factor productivity (instead of labor productivity). Hence, and discrepancies in numbers are likely due
to the use of closely related, but not identical statistics.
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actuallyfell at an average annual rate of (-)1.5% between 1978 and 1983. By 1982, utility
industry labor productivity was only 89.3% of what it had been one half decade earlier.56
It was not until the mid-1980s that productivity began to make measurable gains. By 1994
it stood at 120% of its 1977 level. 57
B.5.2.2 Over-Building Generation Capacity
Berry mentioned that growth in the demand for electricity stopped; actually, instead of
growing at the Post World War II average annual rate of 7.5%, annual growth was a
relatively flat 2.5%.58 This was caused by the higher electricity prices, conservation
efforts, and diminished industrial output that occurred in wake of the energy crisis.
However, utility planners projected that demand growth would continue into the 1980s at a
7% pace and were slow to adjust to 2.5%, viewing it at first as an aberration rather than the
start of a new trend.59 As a result, utilities continued to build generating plants which had
ten year lead times in order to fulfill the projected demand. Not surprisingly, a large
generation capacity surplus had developed by the early 1980s.
Figure B.1 Average Prime Interest Rate and Inflation Rate, 1960-1994
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Source: United States Bureau of the Census, various years
56 Bureau of Labor Statistics, 1985, 249.
57Bureau of Labor Statistics, 1995.
5 8Calculated from data in Edison Electric Institute, Statistical Yearbook of the Electric Utility Industry,
various years.
5 9For example, see: Cohen, 1994, 75.
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B.5.2.3 Inflation and Interest Rates
Another problem faced by utilities was the high inflation and interest rates of the late 1970s
and early 1980s. (See Figure B.1) During this time period, utilities were in the midst of
ambitious construction projects of large coal and nuclear plants. The high inflation rates
caused the actual costs of these plants to significantly exceed their expected costs. The high
interest rates had a similar effect -- the utilities had to raise capital at a higher rate than
expected,60 which made the plants more expensive to build than expected.
Another complication of the high interest rates was that investors required higher returns on
their capital investments (i.e. the utilities needed to have higher rates-of-return in order to
attract capital), which put an upward pressure on rates. However, since fuel price
increases were already placing unprecedented upward pressures on electricity rates,
commissions typically dragged their feet in raising the authorized rate-of-return, 61 if they
did not outright refuse the increases.
B.5.2.4 Disincentives to Utility Construction
The result was that during the late 1970s and early 1980s, many public utility commissions
set electricity rates at a level below what the utilities needed to recover the cost of their
capital with a "sufficient" rate-of-return. In some cases, utilities were not allowed an
authorized rate-of-return high enough to attract capital. In other cases, commissions broke
with tradition62 and scrutinized the prudence of utility plant construction expenses. When
expenses were deemed imprudent, utilities were not allowed to recover part or all of the
imprudent capital costs through the rate-base. Nuclear plants, in particular, were subject to
prudence reviews. Between 1985 and 1992, electric utilities were forced to write down
$22.4 billion of nuclear plant investments. 63
This era of "rate suppression" led to an era of "capital minimization" on the part of
utilities.64 In contrast to the massive expansion projects started in the late 1970s, utilities
began to postpone new plant construction. In some cases, utilities even energetically
turned to non-utility PURPA plants to meet their new capacity needs. As Peter Navarro
comments,
6 0 Since utilities typically do not begin to recover the costs of plants until they are operating, the
construction costs compounded much more rapidly than anticipated.6 1Joskow, 1989, 158-162.
6 2Between 1945 and 1975 there were less than a dozen prudence reviews. Source: Joskow, 1989, 160.6 3FERC, April 1995, 17669.
64 Navarro, 1995, 350.
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In this era of rate suppression, utility executives, in turn responded almost
uniformly with a 'strategy of capital minimization.' ... The practical result of
this 'rate suppression-capital minimization syndrome' was the almost total
abdication by the industry of its traditional role as builders of new capacity. 65
B.5.2.5 Nuclear Power Plant Debacles
Dozens of nuclear power plants were under construction at the time of the March 1979
accident at the Three Mile Island Nuclear Plant. In response to the accident, the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission issued numerous safety regulations that resulted in significant
construction delays and expensive modifications to the plants. The financial problems that
resulted were literally compounded by the aforementioned high inflation and interest rates
of the period. On average, the final cost of a nuclear plant built during this era was
approximately 5 times its anticipated cost when construction began.66 Several plants' costs
were an order of magnitude higher than anticipated. 67 While mismanagement and special
political situations68 were responsible for at least some of these cost overruns; the lethal
combination of high interest rates, high inflation, and nuclear plant construction
modifications and delays created a seemingly uncontrollable chain reaction of red ink and
rate increases that mushroomed during the middle and late 1980s.
B.5.2.6 The Limits of Technology
While not fully realized yet at the time of Berry's speech, the industry had reached a plateau
with respect to improvements in generation technologies. From the earliest days of the
industry, generators that were bigger were better. It was the success at making incremental
improvements in generators and pushing the envelope on economies of scale that propelled
the industry's golden era. However, thermodynamic limits of the Rankine Cycle were
reached by innovations in the 1960s.69 It was not understood that an asymptote had been
reached, however, and a new generation of coal and nuclear plants were developed and
constructed in the 1970s that experienced reduced performance to scale. 70 They (large
nuclear and supercritical coal plants) were more complicated to build and were less reliable
(which heightened operating costs).71 In addition, the nuclear plants had higher capital
6 5Ibid.
6 6Energy Information Administration, March 1986, 15.
6 7 Ibid., 1.
6 8 Such as the Seabrook plant which faced massive, relatively effective political resistance.
6 9Yeager, 1994.
7 0 Incidentally, many of the plants that contributed to the capacity glut fit into this category.
7 1joskow and Rose, 1985. Although they were more complicated to build, the coal plants did display
decreasing construction costs to scale, but the nuclear plants did not (as is seen in Appendix B.5.2.5).
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costs per unit of power output than earlier, smaller plants.72 In short, the technological
developments that had propelled the industry had reached their limits and further
improvements could only occur through a new trajectory of technological development.
B.5.2.7 Environmental Regulations
The environmental movement of the late 1960s and 1970s resulted in new environmental
regulations for utilities, and in particular, for generating plants. It has been estimated that
by 1980, environmental regulations increased the capital cost of new coal plants by at least
20%.73
The summation of these problems set the stage for significant changes to occur in the
industry. However, the industry was firmly entrenched, and therefore, change was not
guaranteed. It took a relatively obscure provision in President Carter's 1978 national
energy policy to serve as the catalyst that set in motion the forces for restructuring the
industry.
B.6 THE RISE OF NUGS
B.6.1 The Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978
In 1978, as part of President Carter's extensive national energy policy, Congress passed
the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978 (PURPA). The act was intended to be
an intrusive instrument to force electric utilities into more energy efficient practices. Its
main focus was to promote conservation in regulatory policies -- particularly in electric rate
structures and inter-utility transmission connections. The only currently relevant
provisions of the Act, however, are those regarding small power production and
cogeneration, which reside in Section 210 of PURPA.74 "Although it was little noticed
and not controversial during the legislative process, section 210 of PURPA turned out to be
the most far-reaching of the NEA's [National Energy Act's] electricity initiatives." 75
Section 210 requires utilities to:
SPurchase electric energy from such facilities ... at rates that shall be just and
reasonable to the customers of the electric utility and in the public interest and
that shall not discriminate against qualifying cogenerators or small power
producers;76
72 Energy Information Administration, 1986. Although part of this increased cost is the result of the issues
covered in Appendix B.5.2.5.
7 3Joskow and Rose, 1985, 24.
74 Joskow, 1989, 162.
7 5Richardson and Nordhaus, 1995, 66.
7 6Excerpted from: PL95-617, 3144.
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* Interconnect their transmission facilities to qualifying cogenerators and small
power producers; 77 and
* Sell electric energy to qualifying cogeneration78 facilities and qualifying small
power production facilities.79
The cogenerators and small power producers that became eligible for this favored treatment
became known as qualifying facilities (QFs).80
One intent of PURPA Section 210 was to reverse the long-term trend away from industrial
cogeneration (and its energy conservation benefits). In 1950, 15% of total power produced
in America was generated by industrial cogenerators. When the Congressional hearings on
what became PURPA were held in 1977, this number had fallen to 4%, 81 and bottomed
out at 3% in 1979.82 Industrial facilities which had cogenerated their own power were
lured onto utilities' power grids during the 1950s, '60s and early '70s by the low rates that
resulted from the continuing improvements in central station generation technology and
economies of scale of utility electric power systems -- it had simply become cheaper to buy
from the utility than to self-produce power. PURPA also sought to encourage the
development of renewable energy technologies.
B.6.2 PURPA's Impact
The impact of PURPA has been significant indeed; in essence PURPA opened the door to
the development of an independent electric industry. As one commentator said,
This initially overlooked section [PURPA's Section 210] all but created the
independent power industry, laid the groundwork for the Energy Policy Act's
mandate of transmission access, and created the "stranded investment" issue
that is frightening segments of the electric generation industry.83
Prior to the enactment of PURPA, an unintegrated independent generating sector was
essentially nonexistent.84 Since then, the rise of non-utility generators (NUGs) in the
77 Excerpted from: PL95-617, 3135.
78Cogeneration is the use of waste steam from power production for another use -- the production of
electricity using conventional steam plants (coal and nuclear) is approximately 33% efficient, which means
that about 2/3 of the energy put into the process is lost through waste steam.
79PL95-617, 3144. The law essentially defined qualifying small power producers as renewable energy
generators. To "qualify" as a small power producer or cogenerator, a plant needed to meet a number of
ownership and technical criteria. For the detailed requirements, see: PL95-617, 3134-3135.
80Per the FERC's implementation regulations of PURPA.
8 1Bardin, 1977, 191.
82Energy Information Administration, March 1993, vii.
83Wagman, 1994.
84 Joskow, 1994, 18.
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Figure B.2 Purchases by Electric Utilities of
Non-Utility Produced Power, 1978-1994
209
189
166
139
116
90
68
40
50
26
1813
1 1 1 1 6 '
co 0)
Year
Source: Energy Information Administration, July 1995a, 28.
electric power industry8s has paralleled the rise of mini-mills in the steel industry.86 There
are many similarities between NUGs and minimills; they are small, lean producers,87 which
employ new technologies88 and innovative human resource policies89 to displace the
85The emergence of minimills has been described as a rise from the ashes of an industry decimated in the
1980s. Likewise, NUGs have emerged in a once-proud industry humbled in the 1970s and 1980s. They
have also arisen from the ashes of President Carter's ill-fated National Energy Policy, which was built upon
the assumption that oil prices would continue to escalate through the 1980s and beyond instead of dropping
after their 1980 peak.
8 6The story of the rise of minimills is told in Robert W. Crandall and Donald F. Barnett's book, Up from
the Ashes. See: Crandall and Barnett, 1986. See also: Collins, 1994.
87 See, for instance: "International Conference on the Future of Industry in Advanced Societies, Conference
Report," 6-7.
8 8In both cases, the "new" technologies (electric arc furnaces in steel and gas turbines in electric power)
have dramatically reduced the economies of scale of the respective industries.
8 9For examples of the actions taken by specific companies, see: "A Power Producer Is Intent on Giving
Power to Its People;" and "International Conference on the Future of Industry in Advanced Societies,
Conference Report," 6-7. A good overview of industry practices can be found in: "Compensating
Employees."
250
200
150
100
50
0
415
416 Appendix B
vertically integrated firms that had dominated their respective industries. 90 Several statistics
capture the growth of NUGs. In 1980, only 2% of total generation capacity additions were
made by NUGs, while they added 69% of new capacity in 1994.91 Between 1985 and
1992 non-utility generation increased at an average rate of approximately 17%.92 (See
Figure B.2) Between 1989 and 1993, the number of QF facilities rose from 576 to 1200,
with generation capacity rising from 27,429 MW to 47,774 MW.93 The success of these
firms, which is partially indicated by these statistics, led to a rethinking of the electric
power industry's fundamental structure. As the FERC notes, "the rapid expansion and
performance of the QF industry demonstrated that traditional, vertically integrated public
utilities need not be the only sources of reliable power."94
By creating a viable NUG industry, PURPA set into motion a series of events that is now
transforming the industry. The rest of this chapter, and in many ways, the rest of this
thesis is dedicated to examining these events.
B.6.3 Causes of the Changing Paradigm
By catalyzing numerous factors that were in the industry in the 1980s, PURPA was the
impetus for changing the industry's paradigm from reliance on vertically-integrated,
monopoly utilities to one which allowed for increasing competitive opportunities that have,
in the past several years, led to a rethinking of the industry's fundamental structure. Let us
explore some of the other factors for change.
B.6.3.1 Utility Problems of the 1970s and Early 1980s
Above we chronicle some significant problems of the electric utility industry in the 1970s,
many of which continued in the 1980s. These problems account for some, but not all of
the factors that made the industry ripe for restructuring.
B.5.3.2 Excess Capacity
The overbuilding of generation capacity caused by poor utility planning in the 1970s led to
excess generating capacity in the 1980s. By 1982, the U.S. aggregate capacity margin, the
amount of excess capacity at the demand peak, stood at 33%, up from 21% in 1973. 95
9 0For a more complete discussion of this phenomena in these two industries see: Lester, forthcoming.
9 1Tedmon and Roeder, 1995, 61.
9 2Energy Information Administration, June 1994, vii.
9 3 FERC, April 1995, 17670.
9 4 Ibid.
9 5Energy Information Administration, January 1995, 31.
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The presence of excess capacity in the 1980s changed the industry's supply/demand
balance. In particular, the glut of high-fixed cost, relatively low incremental cost
generation capacity created an incentive for utilities to trade power. At first this situation
increased the willingness of utilities to enter into coordination contracts -- short-term
agreements to buy and sell power. For example, if one utility had surplus generating
capacity and a neighboring utility had higher-cost capacity, they would enter into a
coordination contract by which the lower cost utility would produce power for the higher-
cost utility and they would split the benefits. Typically, though, these exchanges were
short-term in nature. Utilities were responsible for providing (i.e. generating) enough
power to serve their customers in the long-run.96 Thus, the low-cost utility would sell
power sold to the higher-cost utility only until its own demand increased sufficiently to
eliminate its surplus capacity. At this point in time, because of technological innovations,
the "high-cost" utility would often have a new, lower-cost plant on-line. Such transactions
had occurred for many years 97 in order to ensure economical and reliable use of their
facilities.98
The size, duration, and expense of overcapacity in the 1980s made the situation different
than before. As mentioned above, instead of aggregate peak reserve margins of 20%, they
rose to 33%.99 Since demand growth was much slower than in the past, it would take
considerably longer for this overcapacity to be eliminated. Furthermore, the new plants
had large capital costs, some of which were being borne by the utilities' shareholders, not
the ratepayers, due to unfavorable prudence review decisions. Consequently, as long as a
utility was able to sell power for more than its marginal generation cost, it had an incentive
to produce aid sell it (to other utilities). The increased use of coordination contracts and
other exogenous influences eventually led to a shift in industry mind-set. Excess capacity
was no longer seen as merely a necessary expense of running a reliable system, but also as
a resource from which revenues could be extracted. Coordination contracts became more
integral to the business -- rather than only occurring by favorable happenstance, these
transactions became part of the business strategy of utilities. Consequently, coordination
9 6Consequently and reciprocally, utilities did not build plants to serve the customers of other utilities and
utilities could not plan to be served by others in the long-run.
9 7 For a history of coordination activity, see: FERC, 1981, 5-14.
9 8 Joskow, 1989, 131.
9 91It should be noted that peak margins of 30% translate into an average load factor of about 60%. Source:
Edison Electric Institute, Statistical Yearbook of the Electric Utility Industry 1994, 13.
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contracts have become longer-term in nature and the sale of excess power has evolved
toward the development of a market for wholesale power.
B.6.3.3 Municipal Revolt 00oo
Only about 10% of municipal power agencies and cooperatives produce their own
power.10 1 Instead, they buy it from utilities under wholesale requirements contracts. At
one time, these municipal agencies were "captive" customers of their local utilities.
Eventually, some municipal agencies began to look beyond their local utility to other
sources for their power, but were often blocked from doing so by utilities that refused to
wheel the power for them. With time, though, wholesale requirements customers made
strides in expanding their ability to "shop" for power. In the 1980s, as the aforementioned
new, expensive power plants came on-line, 102 wholesale requirements customers
(especially those with high-cost host utilities) had a renewed interest in increasing their
wheeling capabilities. As a result, they placed increasing amounts of political pressure on
regulatory agencies to open up the transmission grid.
B.6.3.4 Technological Advance
During the 1980s, electric equipment manufacturers and NUGs adopted a new trajectory
for generation technology development that led to significant technological advances which
turned the economies of scale of electricity generation upside down. When they built new
plants, the new NUGs (and utilities to a lesser extent) frequently turned to new
technologies, including combined-cycle and advanced gas turbine generators. Quite
ironically, PURPA, a law intended to reduce reliance on fossil fuels, was serving as the
springboard for a new generation of gas-fueled technologies as many QF cogeneration
projects were gas-fueled.
B.6.3.5 Climate of Deregulation
Another cause of the industry's paradigm shift was that the above events occurred during a
period of changing political trends. Prior to the late 1970s, the American political climate
favored the benefits of government protection over the efficiencies of the market in
industries such as electric power. The deregulation of the civil aviation industry, which
was sparked by the start of a corresponding shift in intellectual climate about a half-decade
earlier, marked a sea-change in this balance. Three days before the Airline Deregulation
Act of 1978 was signed into law, President Carter asserted, "I'll predict that within the next
10 0For more on this topic see: Joskow, 1995.
10 1Pierobon, 1994, 19.
10 2Which, in turn, created large rate differentials between utilities.
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few years the Civil Aeronautics Board will find that its existence is no longer needed.
Consumers will benefit. Airlines will benefit. Our nation will benefit as well."103 He was
correct on at least three of the points -- (1) the Civil Aeronautics Board, which was retained
by the Airline Deregulation Act, went out of business several years later as deregulation
occurred even faster and more completely than expected; (2) ticket prices dropped and the
number of fliers skyrocketed; 104 and (3) the social welfare gains from deregulation have
been calculated to be positive. 105 Only the airline industry, which has undergone massive
losses and countless bankruptcies, has seen mixed benefits, although there is some
evidence that deregulation did produce a positive welfare gain for the airlines as well. 106
The success of airline industry deregulation served as a principle- and precedent-setting
example for other industries, 107 and catalyzed an intellectual and political climate change
that snow-balled with time. Two quotes of Alfred Kahn, a leading figure in the
deregulation movement, capture this change. In 1970, he commented on the forces that
expand regulatory power and purview; "So long as regulation imposes restraints on
competition, it will have to continuously widen and deepen its roots."'108 Yet, in 1994, he
described the forces reducing regulatory power; "once you begin to admit competition, it
introduces strains and distortions that can typically be resolved only by further
deregulation."' 109 Although these quotes may sound inconsistent, they are not. Rather,
they are the result of different assumptions. The former assumes the preeminence of the
regulatory bureaucracy; that regulation shapes the market. The latter assumes the
preeminence of the market; that regulatory structure is shaped to fit market imperfections.
While the former view of regulation and competition held sway in the public and
government following the Great Depression, the latter has eclipsed it in recent years. 110
B.6.3.6 Customer Revolt
In the 1980s, American industry and its workers became painfully aware of the rise of
global competition. In order to become more competitive, companies looked to save
money wherever possible -- including their electric bill, which until then had been largely
10 3 Carter, 1979, 1831.
10 4Gardner and Gilson, 1994,
10 5 Winston, 1993, 1284. See also: "On a Wing and a Fare."
10 6 Winston, 1993, 1284.
10 7 Kingdon, 1984, 200-204.
10 8Kahn, 1971, 28.
109 Kahn, October 1994, 27.
1 10 See Vietor, 1994, 330.
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ignored.I l l Large users, through entities such as the Electric Consumers Resource Council
(ELCON), began to actively lobby government for policies that would lead to lower
industrial electricity rates.
Closely coupled with this was a strong political desire to keep industrial companies
competitive. The significant decline of American industry in the 1980s 112 and the job
losses that accompanied it made governments at the local and the national level concerned
with industrial competitiveness. When high electricity prices were defined by users as a
problem that inhibits their industrial competitiveness, governments became interested in
taking action. 113 As Peter Navarro comments, "Much of the impetus for restructuring
comes from the growing realization among policy makers that both the cost and reliability
of electricity play key roles in creating -- and destroying -- competitive advantage in our
increasingly global economy." 114 This issue has recently been important in states such as
California and Massachusetts, where explicit rationale for their leadership in electric power
deregulation proposals has been to lower the (high) cost of electricity in order to make
manufacturers in these states more competitive with companies from other states115 and
around the globe.
B.6.4 Limitations of Flexibility in the Existing Structure
In 1990, non-utility generators achieved a significant milestone -- NUGs brought more
generating capacity on line than did utilities for the first time. 116 Despite their significant
growth, NUGs faced serious impediments to more extensive growth in the early 1990s.
B.6.4.1 Transmission Access
One of these impediments was lack of access to the transmission grid. TOUs could deny
non-utilities access to potential customers by denying use of their transmission lines. For
example, a TOU could halt a NUG upstart competitor if the NUG was planning to produce
power for a wholesale customer of the utility. It became clear that such market power
imbalances would not facilitate a truly competitive market. As a result, during the late-
1980s, the FERC began to employ transmission policies that facilitated competition;
specifically, the FERC required open access to the transmission systems of utilities that
1 11Tabors and Parquet, 1995, 7.
1 12 Detailed in Dertouzos et al, 1989; and MIT Commission on Industrial Productivity, 1989.
1 13For example, see: "Utilities Rewrite the Rate Card."
1 1 4 Navarro, 1995, 348. Also, for a study on the impact of electric power regulation on the
competitiveness of American and Japanese manufacturing companies, see: Navarro, 1989.
115 For example, see: Lester et al, 1995; and "What Do You Mean Taxachusetts?"
116Energy Information Administration, March 1993, viii.
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sought approvals for mergers or petitions for market-based pricing of wholesale power
sales. However, the FERC's "carrot and stick" efforts only impacted some utilities. By
the early 1990s, competitive forces had continued to build and the limits of the FERC's
carrot and stick policy were quickly reached.
B.6.4.2 PUHCA
At the turn of the decade, PUHCA was becoming increasingly burdensome to the growth
of the NUG industry. In May 1991, there were only two operating "pure" IPP plants. 117
In testimony before Congress, P. Chrisman Iribe, Executive Vice President of
PG&E/Bechtel Generating Company, 118 explained what his company faced. "We in the
industry refer to these projects [pure IPPs] which have received approval from the SEC as
PUHCA pretzels ... because of the tangled ownership and operating structure which is
required to avoid becoming a holding company." 119 The consequence to companies such
as PG&E/Bechtel was,
Our projects take years and millions of dollars to reach the point of financing
and being constructed (sic). They are carefully planned, financially sound, and
environmentally sensitive. Yet, after the investment of our time, our capital,
effort, and reputation in these projects, we would be forced to turn the operation
of that project over to someone else, unless we are willing to live under the
constraints of becoming a public utility holding company under the act.120
In short, because of the way that the industry was drastically changing from its 1930s-
based structure, the law enacted to simplify ownership structures was now leading to
ownership convolutions -- 1920s pyramids were causing 1990s pretzels.
B.7 TOWARD A COMPETITIVE INDUSTRY
B.7.1 The Energy Policy Act of 1992
The comprehensive Energy Policy Act of 1992 (EPAct) included several provisions that
were of great significance to electric power industry deregulation. EPAct conferred to the
FERC the authority to mandate wholesale wheeling, (although it explicitly withheld
authority from the FERC to mandate retail wheeling).'121 EPAct also created a category of
generating plants called "exempt wholesale generators" (EWGs), which allowed IPPs to
circumvent PUHCA's restrictions. An EWG is defined as:
117Iribe, 1991, 273. IPPs are NUG plants that do not meet the qualifications of QFs.1 18Now U.S. Generating Company.
119 iribe, 1991, 274.
120 Ibid., 273.
12 1PL102-486, 2915-2916.
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any person ... engaged directly, or indirectly through one or more affiliates ...
exclusively in business of owning or operating, or both owning and operating,
all or part of one or more eligible facilities and selling electric energy at
wholesale.122
The law also liberalized rules on the investments of American utilities in foreign electric
power projects.
In short, EPAct eliminated the most immediate impediments to continued NUG growth. It
accomplished this through wholesale power sales mechanisms, which inherently meant a
continued reliance on the old industry structure. To remove the next impediment to NUG
growth, the exclusiveness of utility sales to retail customers, would require a fundamental
restructuring of the industry.
B.7.2 Subsequent State and FERC Actions
Soon after the passage of EPAct, the FERC began its task of implementing the law's
provisions, and while doing so, attempted to divine the future direction of the industry.
The FERC was not the only regulatory body attempting to ascertain and direct the
industry's future. As EPAct was being deliberated in Congress, the California Public
Utilities Commission (CPUC) commissioned a study of the industry's past and future,
which was completed in March 1993.123 While this caused little more than a slight tremor
at the time, it was the precursor to a much larger event. In April 1994 the electric power
community was struck with an earthquake, 124 whose epicenter was located at the CPUC's
headquarters, near the San Andreas Fault. By then another precursor had been felt -- the
Michigan Public Service Commission proposed a limited experiment with retail wheeling a
week earlier. But the one in California, with its call for retail wheeling by January 1996 for
large customers, was the tremor that broke the dam restraining the competitive tides in the
industry. Within months, public utility commissions and legislatures across the country
were examining the issue of electric power industry restructuring. 125
In the midst of this state-level debate, the FERC weighed in with a Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking (known as the Mega-NOPR because of its length) on transmission access in a
competitive environment. This proposal was intended to codify its case-by-case
implementation of EPAct's transmission access provisions, to pre-empt the states and lay
12 2 PL102-486, 2905-2906.
12 3 Dasovich et al, 1993.
124Source: "Michigan Tremor Precedes Cal. Regulatory Earthquake."
125 See Chapter 5 for a much more complete discussion of this.
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down a common framework for retail wheeling proposals, and to catalyze debate on
important issues.
During the past two years, California has been the central battleground between interest
groups vying to have their ideas for industry restructuring adopted. 126 In May 1995, the
CPUC issued preferred and dissenting proposals, which touched off another round of
controversy. It was not until late December 1995 -- less than two weeks before it had
hoped to start implementation of its original proposal -- that the Commission made a final
ruling on the issue, which still leaves some important issues unresolved.
Several important issues and trends have developed as utilities, independent power
producers, regulators, and new entrants prepare for an industry whose only future certainty
is that it will look drastically different than it does today. Let us briefly examine several of
these issues and trends.
B.7.3 Reconsolidation of the Industry127
A plethora of mergers occurred in 1995 and early 1996,128 which included:
* The combination of two Washington D.C. area utilities: Baltimore Gas and
Electric and Potomac Electric; 129
* The merger of two large Southwestern utilities: Public Service Company of
Colorado and Southwestern Public Service; 130
* The creation of Primenergy from two well-positioned Upper Midwest utilities:
Northern States Power and Wisconsin Energy; 131
* A triple merger of three other Upper Midwest utilities -- Wisconsin Power and
Light, IES Industries, and Interstate Power -- into Mid America Energy;
* The failed hostile takeover of low-cost Pennsylvania Power and Light by high-
cost PECO Energy; 132
* The amalgamation of two Kansas City utilities: the entrepreneurial UtiliCorp
United and the conservative Kansas City Power and Light;133 and
* The merger of another Missouri utility, Union Electric, with one from across
the Mississippi River, Central Illinois Public Service, to form Ameren. 134
126 For more details, see: Holden, 28 November 1995.
127 A compreshensive discussion of this topic is found in: Diamond and Edwards, 1996.
12 8For example, see: "Power Playtime;"
12 9 Sources: "PEPCO to Merge With Baltimore Gas & Electric;" "Merger of Baltimore G&E, Potomac
Electric Planned;" and "Baltimore Gas and Potomac Electric Agree to $2.9 Billion Merger."
13 0Source: "New Utility Merger to Form Regional Giant."
13 1Sources: "Two Big Midwestern Utilities Plan to Merge in a $3 Billion Deal;" "NSP Merger Plans Win
Praise, Criticism from Market Analysts;" and "Northern States and Wisconsin Energy Reach Agreement for
$3 Billion Merger."
13 2 Sources: "A $3.8 Billion Takeover is Quite a Swan Song;" "Takeover Bids Made for Two Big
Utilities;" and "PECO Unveils Hostile Offer for PP&L; Union Electric to Merge With CIPSCO."
13 3Sources: "UtiliCorp, KCPL Announce $3 Billion Merger;" "UtiliCorp in $3 Billion Deal With Kansas
City Power;" and "UtiliCorp and Kansas City P&L Agree To Combine in a $1.35 Billion Merger."
134 Sources: "Takeover Bids Made for Two Big Utilities;" and "Business Bulletin," November 1995.
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There are two common threads in these mergers. The first is a desire on the part of utilities
to capitalize on "synergies" by creating larger, regional electricity companies that are better
positioned in a competitive market. Second, with the exception of the failed PECO merger,
these have been "mergers of equals."
Underlying reasons for mergers include the opportunity to obtain: a more diversified fuel
mix, undervalued assets, and/or larger transmission and distribution systems. 135 Recent
surveys of regulators and industry executives conclude that this is only the beginning of the
merger wave. For example, in a recent survey of utility executives, 48% of the
respondents believe that their company "will eat or be eaten by another company" in the
next decade; and 55% said that they are currently engaged in merger and acquisition
discussions.136
B.7.4 Public Power: Expanding or Contracting?
Just as investor-owned utilities are experiencing a time of great upheaval, public power
agencies are also at a crossroads.
B.7.4.1 Expanding?
Numerous cities are exploring the potential of creating municipal power agencies. At this
point in time, municipalization is attractive because: 137
* There are large disparities between the electric prices of different utilities; and 138
* Municipal systems enjoy huge tax, regulatory, and financing advantages. 139
The result is that some communities are attempting to create (or have created) a municipal
utility. For example, the residents of Las Cruces, NM voted by a 2-1 margin to
municipalize their city's distribution system.'14 The city has been served by the financially
struggling El Paso Electric Co., 141 whose rates are 94% higher than those of Southwestern
Electric Power Company, 142 the city's desired wholesale supplier. In another case, power
poles go down both sides of the street in Clyde, OH, where residents are served by the
135 Source: "Inside Utility Mergers: Trends Within the Trend."
136 Source: "Utilities Say Most Won't Be Here in Decade."
13 7 Source: "The Muni Vote," 42.
138 Under EPAct, municipal utilities have the ability to demand wholesale wheeling. Thus, a city served
by a high-priced utility can gain access to less expensive power (and this option is not available to
consumers on an individual basis.)
13 9 Including freedom from state utility commission oversight, access to government bonding authority,
and certain tax exemptions.
140Source: "Las Cruces Votes to Municipalize."
14 1Source: "El Paso Electric Co.: Proposal for Reorganization Clears Bankruptcy Court."
14 2Calculated from figures in: Energy Information Administration, November 1994.
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incumbent utility, Toledo Edison, and the new municipal Clyde Light & Power. 143 This,
like several other cases, occurred at the request of a large, local industrial firm (Whirlpool
in this case) seeking to have its electricity rates cut. The largest municipalization effort,
however, is occurring in New York state, where the Long Island Power Authority, a state
agency, is empowered to purchase part or all of the assets of an IOU, Long Island Lighting
Company (LILCO). If LILCO is purchased in whole, the move would create the largest
non-federal public power agency in the United States.144
B.7.4.2 Contracting?
While municipal agencies may currently be on the upswing, this trend could soon reverse
itself. It is quite possible that expanded competition will not be kind to public power --
municipal utilities, rural electric cooperatives (RECs), and the federal power agencies.
While the Energy Policy Act of 1992 gives municipal utilities unique advantages with
respect to wholesale power purchases, these would be negligible in the event of retail
wheeling. Entities sufficiently sophisticated to push for municipalization as a mechanism
for lower rates (such as Whirlpool) would likely be able to find even lower individual rates
in a retail wheeling environment. Hence, the same entities that have pushed for
municipalization could turn cold on it once retail competition begins since the current
interest in municipals is the result of regulatory distortions that could be eliminated in a
restructured industry.
There were proposals in Congress during 1995 to privatize some of the Federal Power
Marketing Agencies (PMAs). These proposals were supported by the Clinton
Administration because the sale would bring in an estimated one-time, $3 billion windfall to
the government treasury in an election year. 145 Eventually these proposals stalled in
Congress.
Another potential cause for a future decline of public power is that some market participants
and analysts believe that public power agencies would impede the efficient development of
a competitive industry. 146 Because public agencies have lower tax burdens and cheaper
access to capital, critics claim that an uneven playing field and efficiency distortions would
143 Source: "The Rebellion in 'Pole City'."
144Source: "Lilco Not a Typical Case in Public Takeover Drives."
14 5 Source: "Clinton May Revive Sale of PMAs in Budget Veto -- Ho Hum."
14 6Fyock, 1989; and Dahlberg, 1995.
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be created in a competitive market. These analysts and industry players call for the
privatization of all public power agencies.
If political pressures do not cause the decline of public power, economic pressures might --
especially for rural electric cooperatives (RECs). These agencies were established during
the Great Depression to electrify rural areas. In most cases, RECs are distribution-only,
TDUs. These entities face significant problems in a deregulated environment, many of
which are the result of having a customer-base dominated by small, physically disperse
electricity users, 147 which have relatively similar load profiles. Also, many RECs have a
relatively small number of customers, which means that overhead expenses are divided
among a relatively small group. To eliminate this problem, consolidation of RECs has
begun and is expected to continue as they fight for survival in a competitive
environment. 148
B.7.5 Power Marketers and Brokers
There has been a significant increase in the number of electric power marketers and brokers
in recent years. The first power marketer was certified in 1986149 and their ranks have
mushroomed since. In September 1995, one hundred sixteen companies had either
received permission or applied to FERC to be certified as power markers.150 By December
1995 that number had increased to nearly 150.151 Despite these large numbers, only about
ten had completed transactions as of December 1995.152 This relative inactivity should
change now that the New York Mercantile Exchange trades electricity futures contracts. 153
It is widely believed that power marketers and brokers, many of whom are armed with
experience in the natural gas industry, 154 will play an important role in aggregating supply
and demand in a restructured industry.
14 7 This is a synthesis of a phone conversation with Steven Healy, General Manager of Pierce-Pepin Rural
Electric Cooperative. Source: Healy, 1995.
14 8 Sources: "Power in Alliances;" and "Municipals to Join Together."
14 9 Stoddard, 8, 1995.
15 0 Source: "A Powerful Future," 18.
15 1Marier, 1995.
152Ibid.
153 Trading started 29 March 1996. Sources: "Exchange to Trade in Electricity Contracts;" and "Electricity
Futures Have Crackling Debut."
154 Enron is the quintessential example. For a good discussion of this company, see: Southerland, 1996.
In addition to firms from outside the industry, a number of utilities have also created power marketing
affiliates. Also see: "Chuck Watson's Power Play."
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B.7.6 Stranded Investment
Probably the most hotly contested restructuring issue is stranded investments (SIs).155
These "unused and useless" 156 assets are the casualties of a regulatory system that
discouraged, if not prevented utilities from responding to price signals. 157 Stranded
investments occur when facilities or contracts that were "economic" in the rate-of-return
regulatory environment become uneconomic (unrecoverable) in a competitive market. 158
There are four broad types of stranded investments: 159
* Stranded assets, primarily expensive power plants and excess capacity;
* Stranded liabilities, primarily power-purchase contracts (including those with
qualifying facilities) and deferred income taxes;
* Regulatory assets (whose value is based on regulatory decisions rather than on
market forces), including deferred expenses and costs for demand-side
management programs that regulators allow utilities to place on their balance
sheets; and
* Stranded public-policy programs, including tax collection, environmental
compliance beyond that required by law, demand-side management programs
paid for by all customers, special programs for low-income customers, and
support for energy research and development.
Estimates of stranded investment run from $20 billion to $200 billion. 160
There is significant disagreement about how to handle stranded investments. On one side
of the issue are utilities, which generally assert161 that they deserve full compensation for
their stranded investments. This claim derives from a fundamental agreement between state
commissions and utilities, commonly termed the "regulatory compact." By this tacit, if not
explicit agreement, utilities were given a monopoly service franchise; in return, utilities
were obligated to serve all customers within their franchise area, had their earnings capped,
and were required to plan and provide for all of the demand of their customers in a reliable
manner. Arguing on the basis of this regulatory compact, those in favor of stranded
investment recovery claim that the government is morally obligated to ensure the
opportunity for fair compensation for stranded investments. 162 They state five reasons for
this. The first is that in the absence of stranded investment recovery, utilities would face
asymmetric risks -- they would subject to unlimited losses now, while their ability to earn a
155Tabors Caramanis & Associates, 1995, 39.
156Michaels, 1994.15 7These distortions were exacerbated, at least in some cases, by bad luck and/or gross utility
mismanagement.158In the case of generation facilities, the power produced by these assets would not be able to be sold at a
price high enough for utilities to recover their full costs.
159Baxter and Hirst, 1995, 1-2.
160Baxter and Hirst, 1995.
161Some of the well-positioned utilities are opposed to stranded investment recovery, however.162This view is backed by some observers. For example, see: Kahn, 25 July 1994.
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return on them (when they were economic) was capped by the rules of the regulatory
structure that existed. Second, utilities had been serving the public under the expectation
that the state would allow them to earn a fair rate of return; and based upon that expectation,
the utilities invested in expensive, long-lived assets. Trust in the government would be
undermined if, as the state changes the rules of the industry, utility investors lose some of
their investments. Third, some of the stranded investments -- especially power purchase
contracts, regulatory assets, and public policy programs -- were forced upon the utilities. It
would not be fair to make the utilities liable for costs they did not want to incur, and often
vigorously fought. Fourth, most of the "uneconomic" investments were deemed by past
public utility commissions to be in the public interest when they were built. And finally,
these utilities believe that in order to be effective competitors in a deregulated industry, they
must be "made whole." If they are forced to bear losses from the "old era," an unlevel
playing-field would be created.
Large industrial users and those who wish to enter the generation market counter that these
assets should be considered economic "sunk costs." They argue that the investments have
been made, conditions have changed, and as in any other business, the utilities should be
responsible for their losses. 163 They further assert that any attempt to ameliorate these
losses would produce pricing inefficiencies and market distortions. 164 Robert Michaels
captures the arguments of this camp when he states, "SIC [stranded investment
compensation] is the last gasp of cost-of-service rate-making in the face of competition." 165
Aggravating this conflict is the widespread expectation that electricity demand will remain
relatively flat (annual growth is predicted to be between 0.8% and 1.7% over the next two
decades). 166 This makes the stranded investment debate a zero-sum game. Other
industries that have been deregulated have also faced transition issues, but in most cases,
their demand increased with time. 167 For example, the telephone industry is facing large
transition costs caused by the advent of competition in local service and the obsolescence of
163 For a good description of this point of view, see: Michaels, 1994.
164 In a recent article, Paul Joskow disputes this argument. Source: Joskow, April 1996.
165 Michaels, 1994, 20.
16 6Energy Information Administration, January 1995; and Energy Information Administration, January
1996.
167 A notable exception is the natural gas industry. For example, see: Strand, 1994, 35.
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some equipment that will result. 168 However, these costs are being absorbed without too
much difficulty due to the expected continuing boom in telecommunications. 169
But is the assumption of relatively flat electricity demand correct? If, as expected, prices
decline in a deregulated market, will not load grow in response? The long-run price
elasticity of demand for electricity is relatively high. (See Table B.2) However, there is an
important caveat: load will probably shift away from the most expensive (and stranded)
generating assets as customers take advantage of lower, off-peak rates. In short, lower-
cost facilities that sit idle during parts of a typical day will see their capacity factors rise.
This would not help some of the more expensive stranded plants. Therefore, demand
could rise precipitously without contribution to the resolution of the stranded investment
problem.
Table B.2: Long-Run Price Elasticity of Demand for Electricity
Customer Class Number of Range of Price Average Price Conclusion
_ _ _Studies Elasticities Elasticity
Residential 31 -.44 to -1.89 -1.01 slightly elastic
Commercial 8 -.56 to -1.60 -1.23 elastic
Industrial 9 -.51 to -1.82 -1.21 elastic
Source: Wisconsin Public Service Commission, July 1995, 128.
The stranded investment issue is of particular importance to the nuclear power sector.
While not the only source of stranded investment, uneconomic nuclear power plants are the
largest contributors to it.
Recently, the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) received the dubious distinction
of being the first entity to be charged a stranded investment fee, when it left the service of
Cambridge Electric Light Company by bringing its own cogeneration unit on-line.170 The
Massachusetts Department of Public Utilities assessed the fee, which is intended to cover
75% of the stranded investment costs that Cambridge Electric will incur over the first five
168 Six of the seven "Baby Bells" have taken major depreciation write-downs. See: "Pacific Telesis Plans a
Charge of $3.3 Billion."
16 9For example, see: "The Coming Telescramble." Similar costs were incurred for the AT&T break-up,
but they were recovered as a result of the significant increase in long distance calling volume that followed
divestiture.
17 0 Sources: "Massachusetts Orders Payment to Utility By User That is Switching Power Source;" and
"MIT Criticizes DPU Decision Charging $100,000 per Month."
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years that MIT is off Cambridge Electric's system. 171 While the $6.5 million involved in
the MIT case is relatively minor compared to the hundreds of billions of dollars of stranded
investment, the case has attracted much attention as it sets a precedent. The FERC denied
MIT's appeal of the ruling in Febraury 1996,172 and now MIT has requested that the DPU
reconsider its decision.173
With so much money at stake, in all likelihood: the debate will continue to be intense,
compromise will not be easily reached, and retail wheeling will not occur until a
"satisfactory" resolution is reached.
B.7.7 Overseas Expansion
Just as PURPA spawned unexpected changes in the industry, so too has the Energy Policy
Act. While it was expected that the two most significant provisions of the Act with respect
to electric power industry structure would be the creation of the EWG (Exempt Wholesale
Generator) category of plants and the open access transmission provisions, it could be
argued that the most important effect of the Act to date has been the provisions allowing
American utilities to invest in foreign operations. While demand in the United States is
stagnant and the country is faced with significant overcapacity, much of the rest of the
world is clamoring for electricity. 174 American firms with extensive operating experience
-- both IPPs and utility IPP affiliates -- are circling the globe. For example, the trade
publication Independent Energy has systematically tracked IPP investments since 1989.
During that year, foreign IPP activity was negligible. 175 In the first half of 1993,
seventeen percent of all American IPP deals occurred outside the United States; 176 by the
second half of 1995, it had risen to 71%.177
Not only are American companies building plants in the growing Third World,178 they are
also acquiring assets in relatively mature markets, such as the United Kingdom, Australia,
17 1The five year increment was chosen because at current Cambridge load growth rates, the 20 MW used by
MIT would be replaced through new demand in about 5 years.
172 Source: "FERC Upholds Stranded Cost Charge in MIT Cogen Case."
173 Source: "MIT Stranded Cost Flap Ain't Over 'til It's Over."
174 See, for instance: Javetski, 1996; Churchill, 1996; Rainbow, 1996; and Roseman and Malhotra, 1996.
175Marier, 1995, 2.
176 Ibid.
177 Anderson, 1996, 16.
17 8For a discussion of the booming, yet dangerous Asian market, see: "Asia Delivers an Electric Shock;"
and Burr, 1996.
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and Chile (all of which have undergone deregulation).179 One of the benefits of buying
into these markets is that organizational competencies can be gained from operating in a
competitive market that should be helpful when the American generation market is
deregulated. 180
Having explored some of the major trends in the industry, let us grapple with an
examination of the inefficiencies in the current system which provide the largest impetus for
industry restructuring.
B.8 SOURCES OF INEFFICIENCY IN THE CURRENT SYSTEM
B.8.1 Excess Capacity in the New Industry Paradigm
The generation overcapacity situation created by poor utility planning in the 1970s has been
reduced through a combination of load growth and substantial reductions in capacity
expansion, but it still remains an issue. In recent years, the capacity margin (calculated
using peak demand) has fallen back to 1973 levels, 181 but the annual load factor (a proxy
for capacity relative to average demand) has remained relatively low, at approximately
61%.182 While the absolute reserve margins and load factors were equivalent in 1973 and
1993, the context of the industry changed dramatically during the intervening two decades.
In 1973, capacity margins, and their costs, were viewed as being part of the price of high
reliability. While reliability concerns are important yet today, the existence of these large
capacity margins serves as an incentive to consummate wholesale power trades, as utilities
seek to minimize their expenses and efficiently utilize their assets. As a result, "excess"
capacity, even though it might be needed for reliability purposes, serves as a driver for
increased competition.
The FERC's Mega-NOPR is an attempt to remove the barriers that are now restraining the
industry's evolution into an active wholesale market. Furthermore, because of the
industry's changed mind-set, the downward price pressures caused by excess capacity are
one of the forces that could facilitate the creation of retail competition.
17 9 See, for example: "Pacificorp Joins Global Treasure Hunt;" and "In U.K. Electricity-Concern Takeover,
Up to $31.72 Billion May Change Hands."
180 "Source: U.S. Utilities Buy in Britain to Learn Deregulation for Home Use."
18 1Energy Information Administration, January 1995, 31.
182 Sources: "Gale: Beware the Permanent MW Surplus;" and Edison Electric Institute, Statistical Yearbook
of the Electric Utility Industry 1994, 85.
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Figure B.3 (Utility Sales for Resale and Non-Utility Power Sales) as a
Percentage of (Net Utility Generation and Non-Utility Power Sales)
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Sources: Energy Information Administration, 1990, 2.
Energy Information Administration, February 1993, 79.
Energy Information Administration, February 1994.
Energy Information Administration, November 1995a, 59.
B.8.2 Expensive Plants
The legacy of the expensive plants which initially caused the capacity surplus lives on in the
rate-base, since generating plants are depreciated over multiple decades. Even though the
incremental cost of power from these plants, especially the nuclear ones, is low, the cost of
capital recovery makes power from these plants uncompetitive in many cases.
B.8.3 Utilities as Vehicles of Social Programs
In recent decades, utilities became important vehicles for social programs, both in terms of
provision and funding. These programs have included electric vehicle R&D, demand-side
management (DSM) programs, renewable energy R&D, non-interruptable service for poor
people, and procurement practices that assist women- and minority-owned businesses.
Advocates have viewed electric utility rates as an efficient funding source for their pet
programs. From their perspective, the use of utilities as vehicles for these programs is
-+L-+-
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highly effective, "Happily, these costs could easily be absorbed by that inexhaustible
source of revenues, the rate base -- an invention more ruthlessly efficient in collecting taxes
than even the IRS,"'183 Vinod Dar observes. However, collecting what are essentially tax
revenues through electric rates produces economic distortions since the price that customers
pay for electricity can be substantially higher than the cost of its production. As Alfred
Kahn comments, "Economic welfare is a not a goal to be lightly dismissed, as it is all too
often by well-educated, well-to-do intervenors in regulatory proceedings."1 84 These
distortions have lead some industry stakeholders, most notably large electricity users, to
suggest that other mechanisms for achieving these social goals should be developed in a
restructured industry. 185
Because utilities have served as vehicles for a variety of social policies, resistance to
deregulation has produced some strange bedfellows. For example, the same
environmentalists who have consistently rebuked utilities on issues ranging from nuclear
power to acid rain, have marched in step with the utilities that are resisting the move to a
competitive industry.
B.8.4 New Technologies
A major impetus for competition has been the development of new technologies. In
particular, the technological development trajectory started in the 1980s has become
increasingly important in the 1990s. In the past 6 years alone, the heat rates of combined-
cycle gas turbines have improved by 20%.186 With thermal efficiencies now approaching
60%,187 these new technologies enable generators to obtain almost twice as much electrical
output from the same amount of energy input in more traditional plants (such as large coal
and nuclear plants). As a result, the gas turbines are more economically efficient and
environmentally responsible. These technologies also offer significant reductions in
emissions (compared with traditional coal plants).
In addition to their purely technical efficiencies, gas turbines are well suited to the current
power generation market conditions. One major benefit is that they come in relatively small
sizes, yet have per unit capital costs that are one-fourth those of large coal plants.188
18 3 Dar, 1994, 59.
18 4 Kahn, October 1994, 25.
1 85 Knight, 1995, 91.
186 Levy, 1996, 89.
18 7Source: "GE Develops Generator with 60% Efficiency."
188 Bayless, 1994, 21.
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Another benefit is that in an industry with relatively slow growth, gas turbines allow for
incremental capacity enlargements that are more appropriate for demand conditions than
larger plants. In other words, gas turbine plants have changed the economies of scale of
generation. In the 1980s it was presumed that 1000 MW coal plants would be the most
economically efficient, 189 but today it is 100 MW gas turbines that set the standard. 190 For
all of these reasons, the new technologies have led to a large gap between the cost of
electricity that they produce and the cost of electricity generated using older technologies.
Furthermore, the low capital costs of the new generation technologies (on the order of $100
million) make it possible for many firms and investors to contemplate entry into the
business. These same firms could not enter the industry in the past because scale
economies dictated that plants cost an order of magnitude more. This is significant because
competitive markets can develop more easily in an industry with many small competitors
than in one with a handful of large plants.
All of these reasons, combined with low natural gas prices, 19 1 have made gas turbines the
generation technology of choice in the 1990s and beyond. In the next decade, the amount
of new natural gas-fueled capacity is expected to be an order of magnitude higher than the
amount of new coal capacity.192
B.8.5 Expensive Wholesale Power Contracts
Another cause of current inefficiencies, quite ironically, is PURPA itself. If it were not for
its unanticipated consequence of catalyzing deregulation, PURPA could be viewed even
more unfavorably than the Energy Security Act of 1980 (probably the most expensive
18 9For example, see: "Coal-Fired Power Plants: Efficient and Reliable."
19 0For example, see: "Combined Cycle Lead Efficiency Race;" and Bayless, 1994.
19 1 However, there is one caveat that is rarely mentioned or evaluated -- the technologies that are
undermining the natural monopoly in generation are based upon natural gas fuel. Currently, natural gas is
relatively cheap and bountiful, but what would happen if sharp increases in demand or external events lead
to significantly higher prices? This is a question that few are asking and fewer are answering, Peter
Navarro, a strong advocate of deregulation (see: Navarro, 1996), believes that it deserves further
examination. He notes that current conventional wisdom asserts that these plants "truly spell the death of
natural monopoly in the generation market... This claim is a primary basis for the overall restructuring
efforts." Source: Navarro, 1995, 353. He goes on to say, "It is an open question, however -- and one that
should be put on the research agenda -- what the impact of a severe petroleum price shock might be on the
relative economics of these different power plant options. It may be that in a world of high gas prices, the
relative competitiveness of gas-fired plants may turn out to be an illusion." Source: Ibid., 357.
1 9 2 For aggregate statistics, see: Energy Information Administration, July 1995b, 11; and Energy
Information Administration, October 1995, 242. For detailed statistics, see: Energy Information
Administration, October 1995, 232-241.
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failure of President Carter's various energy policies). 193 PURPA's implementation by the
FERC and state commissions created a huge subsidy for non-utility generators. While this
subsidy helped create the NUG industry, it still continues, despite the growth and financial
health of NUGs. After uneconomic utility generation investments, PURPA-related
uneconomic power purchase contracts are the most significant component of the stranded
investments problem, 194 costing as much as $38 billion in above-market power
purchases. 195 As a result, there is significant pressure to repeal PURPA. 196 In addition to
the QFs that are receiving subsidies, there are many analysts who oppose PURPA repeal
since the Act was an effort to promote environmentally beneficial technologies and energy
security, not a law to promote deregulation. 197
B.8.6 Gap Between Embedded and Marginal Cost
These factors combine to create a situation where the embedded cost price of power (which
is currently the nearly-universal pricing method in the United States) is much higher than
the marginal cost of electricity. As Alfred Kahn notes, "If there is one principle in
economics that corresponds to the physical law that nature abhors a vacuum, it is that
society abhors a great gap between marginal cost and price." '198 Therefore, these factors,
along with political ones that are discussed elsewhere in this appendix, are driving today's
debate.
Having now explored the industry's past and present, let us briefly examine where the
industry restructuring appears to be heading.
B.9 THE FUTURE
While the precise path and pace of electric power industry restructuring cannot be
predicted, 199 it would appear that the continuing move to a less regulated industry is
inevitable. The industry's specific technological and economic characteristics will play a
role in shaping the future direction of the industry. However, an equal or greater
contribution to the industry's future direction and structure will result from the political
processes that determine the rules for the new competitive era.200
19 3 See, for instance: Salpukas, October 1994; Salpukas, April 1995; and "Engineer's Ice Plant Helps
Power County."
19 4Navarro, 1995, 371.
19 5 Burkhart, 1996, 38.
196 For an early 1996 update on these efforts, see: Schuler, 1996, 40.
197 For a thorough discussion of this viewpoint see: Cudhay, 1995.
198 Kahn, October 1994, 26.
199 Pierce, 1994, 349.
20 0Dar, 1994. See also: "Showtime for the Watchdog;" and Holden, November 1995.
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The challenge in creating an efficient industry structure is to make appropriate connections
between two "parallel universes": the technical operation of electric power systems and the
industry's financial workings. While the technical and financial "universes" function
separately, they cannot function independently. Decisions in one have implications for the
other. In a deregulated industry, the physical flows of electricity and the financial flows of
money could be very different,201 but they should be reconciled in a manner that signals
the efficient use of physical and financial resources in the short- and long-run. A further
complication is that the physical universe is constrained by existing massive infrastructures
which must obey the laws of physics and have generally been technically operated in a
laudable manner. Consequently, a restructuring objective should be to reconstitute the
industry's financial structures while maintaining (or making few changes to) its enviable
physical operation.
2 0 1For illustrative figures of the differences in path flows under different scenarios, see: Thesis Figure 3.4;
Hirst and Kirby, 1995, 13; Tabors et al, 1995, iii; and Massachusetts Senate Committee on Post Audit and
Oversight, 1995, A2-A7.
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Utility Response to Competition Data
An electric power system is the largest physicaffy interconnected system that man has
invented' -- FredSchweppe (1978)
C.1 EXPLANATION OF DATA
The appendix contains two series of data. The first 17 pages (one page per utility) consists
primarily of qualitative data, although the main quantitative findings are also in this series.
The second series of data, also one page per utility, is the "raw" quantitative data.
C.1.1 Series 1
* For the categories: Recognition of Competition, Downsizing, Reengineering,
and TQM a YES indicates that the utility shows evidence of this behavior and a no
indicated that it does not.
* For the 6 "Best Practice" qualities, a "0" means that there is no evidence of best practice,
a "1" indicates that there is evidence in at least some parts of the company, and a "2"
indicates the best practice characteristic appears to be widespread in the utility.
* The Rating on the Stage of Development is the Gardner-Gilson rating for the
utility.
* The # of employees, mWh sold, and mWh sold/employee categories should be
self-evident, although there are few entries in them and they are ignored in the analysis
of the data.
* The Price is the average price for all of the utility's customers.
* The Price/Region is the regional competitiveness ratio.
* The Dominant Theme is the dominant theme of the annual report.
C.1.2 Series 2
* In the Operating Company column are the operating companies of the given utility.
The sales of the operating company are broken down by state in the event that the
operating company serves multiple states. In some cases, there is just one entry (when
the utility consists of one operating company operating in only one state); however,
where there are holding companies, there are multiple entries.
* The State/% column indicates the state that the operating company serves, as well as the
percentage of 1994 sales that occurred in the state.
* The Revenue columns (for 1989 and 1994) indicate the revenue of each operating
company in each state. A "1" in the 1994 column indicates that all of the utility's
revenues were generated by one operating company in one state.
* The Price columns (1989 and 1994) indicates the price charged by the operating
company in the states in which it operates.
* The State Price columns (1989 and 1994) list the average price for the entire state.
* The Totals row indicates the total revenue for the utility for the year.
* The Average Rate (89 and 94) indicates the average rate of the utility for all of its
operations.
* The Ave local rate (89 and 94) is the weighted average rate of all of the states in which
the utility operates.
NOTE: Quantitative data came from: EIA, 1989 and 1994.
C2 PRESENTATION OF DATA
ISchweppe, 1978, 42.
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UTILITY: SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA EDISON 9
Year 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
Evidence of:
Recognition of
Competition no YES YES YES YES YES
Downsizing no no no YES YES no YES
Reengineering no no no no no no
TQM no no no no no no
Simultaneous
Improvement in
cost/quality/
service 0 0 0 2 2 0
Close to
Customer 2 2 2 2 2 2
Closer to
Suppliers 0 0 0 0 0 0
Technology for
Strategic
Advantage 0 2 2 2 2 0
Flatter/less
compartment.
organizations 0 0 1 2 0 0
Innovative
Human
Resource Pol. 0 0 0 0 0 0
Rating on
stage of
development 1.1 1.6 1.9 2.7 2.8 2.9
# of
Employees
mWh sold
mWh sold/
Employee ....
Price 10.0379 Price Change (1989-1994) 10.38
Price/Region 118.1% 3.4% 106.1%
Dominant Electric Conservat Competiti Competiti
Theme None Vehicles ion on on
Utility Response to Comvetiti 
ata
8 34 
Appendix 
C
UTILITY: AMERICAN ELECTRIC POWER
Year 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
Evidence of:
Recognition of
Competition no no YES YES YES YES YES
Downsizing no no no no no no_
Reengineering no no no no no no
TQM no no no no no no
Simultaneous
Improvement in
cost/quality/
service 0 0 0 0 0 0
Close to
Customer 0 1 1 1 1 2
Closer to
Suppliers 1 0 1 1 0 0
Technology for
Strategic
Advantage 2 2 2 2 2 1
Flatter/less
compartment.
organizations 0 0 0 1 0 0
Innovative
Human
Resource Pol. 0 0 2 0 0 2
Rating on
stage of
development 1.1 1.5 1.7 2.3 2.6 3.1
# of
Employees 22100 20800 20007 19660
mWh sold
mWh sold/
Employee
Price 4.82356 Price Change (1989-1994) 5.10755
Price/Region 88.0% # 5.9% 87.7%
Glowing Money
Promise Transmis- and Conservin
Dominant of Clean Energy sion Resources g Our New
Theme Coal Wise reliab-ility Together Future Directions
In 1991, for the 1st time since WWil, AEP was not building a plant
Zinner - nuclear turned coal plant that was not fully paid for
_________I 89-I I 4 I 6 .10
189-1174 90-1436 a0404 A0600 841 1071
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UTILITY: TEXAS UTILITIES
Year 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
Evidence of:
Recognition of
Competition no no YES YES YES YES
Downsizing YES YES YES YES YES YES no
Reengineering no no no YES YES no
TQM no no YES no no no
Simultaneous
Improvement in
cost/quality/
service 0 0 2 0 2 2
Close to
Customer 2 0 2 0 2 2
Closer to
Suppliers 1 1 2 2 2 2
Technology for
Strategic
Advantage 0 0 2 0 1 2
Flatter/less
compartment.
organizations 1 1 2 2 2 2
Innovative
Human
Resource Pol. 0 0 1 0 0 1
Rating on
stage of
development 1.3 1.3 2.8 3 3 3.2
# of
Employees
mWh sold
mWh sold/
Employee
Price 5.33778 Price Change (1989-1994) 6.67
Price/Region 93.6% 25.0% 103.9%
Customer The Stay Serving a
Needs in Commitm Commitm Competiti Dynamic Golden
Dominant the New ent ent to ve Energy Anniversa
Theme Decade Continues Service Tomorrow Future ry
93-1085 94-1225
89-1067 90-1307 434 605 874 1105
Utility 
Response 
to 
a
UTILITY: UNICOM (COMMONWEALTH EDISON)
Year 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
Evidence of:
Recognition of
Competition no no no YES YES YES
Downsizing no no no YES no no YES
Reengineering no no no no no no
TQM YES YES YES YES YES no
Simultaneous
Improvement in
cost/quality/
service 2 1 1 0 0 0
Close to
Customer 2 2 2 0 0 2
Closer to
Suppliers 2 0 0 0 0 0
Technology for
Strategic
Advantage 0 0 0 0 0 0
Flatter/less
compartment.
organizations 0 0 0 2 0 0
Innovative
Human
Resource Pol. 0 0 1 0 0 0
Rating on
stage of
development 1 1 1 1.3 1.8 2
# of
Employees
mWh sold
mWh sold/
Employee
Price 8.17647 Price Change (1989-1994) 7.92
Price/Region 109.0% -3.1% 106.9%
Emerging
Committe Stronger A Better
d to Responsibi for Idea for
Dominant i Customer lity and Trying Competiti the
Theme Vision s Rewards Year on Future
89-1200 90-1284 394 605 804 10461
1 44 
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UTILITY: PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC
Year 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
Evidence of:
Recognition of
Competition YES no YES YES YES YES
Downsizing no no no no YES YES
Reengineering no no no no no no
TQM no no no no no no
Simultaneous
Improvement in
cost/quality/
service 1 0 2 0 2 2
Close to
Customer 2 0 2 1 2 2
Closer to
Suppliers 0 0 0 0 0 0
Technology for
Strategic
Advantage 0 0 2 1 0 0
Flatter/less
compartment.
organizations 0 0 0 2 2 2
Innovative
Human learning
Resource Pol. center 2 0 2 2 0 0
Rating on
stage of
development 1.3 1 1.4 1.6 1.8 2.2
# of
Employees
mWh sold
mWh sold/
Employee
Price 8.70884 Price Change (1989-1994) 10.55
Price/Region 102.5% 21.1% 107.9%
On Course
in Blueprint
Dominant Employee Environme Successful Energy Changing for
Theme s nt Year Efficiency Times Success
develop
plans in $125M in
teams training
89-1377 90-1181 410 583 810 1134
A 
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C
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UTILITY: THE SOUTHERN COMPANY
Year 19891 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
Evidence of:
Recognition of 1
Competition YES YES YES YES YES YES
Downsizing no no YES YES no no no
Reengineering no no no no no no
TQM no no no no no no
Simultaneous
Improvement in
cost/quality/
service 2 2 1 2 2 2
Close to
Customer 2 2 2 2 2 2
Closer to
Suppliers 0 2 0 0 0 0
Technology for
Strategic
Advantage 0 0 0 2 1 1
Flatter/less
compartment.
organizations 0 1 0 0 2 1
Innovative
Human
Resource Pol. 2 2 0 2 2 2
Rating on
stage of
development 1.9 2 2.2 2.6 2.8 2.9
# of
Employees
mWh sold
mWh sold/
Employee
Price 5.90197 Price Change (1989-1994) 7.16682
Price/Region 95.8% 21.4% 97.8%
Industry - Problems
Our plan and New Today's
to shaping Challenge Success:
succeed our s, A
Dominant in the opportuni Selling Continued Powerful
Theme 1990s ties Mixed Efficiency Strength Future
In 1994, 18 states REQUIRE bidding for new power plants (p. 13).
So.Co. Real Time
College Pricing
Since 1973, large customers in GA have had the opportunity
to "shop " for power when they build a plant I
UTILITY: DUKE POWER
Year 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
Evidence of:
Recognition of
Competition YES YES YES YES YES YES
Downsizing no YES YES no no YES YES
Reengineering no no no no no YES
TQM no no YES YES YES YES
Simultaneous
Improvement in
cost/quality/
service 2 2 0 1 0 2
Close to
Customer 2 2 2 2 2 2
Closer to
Suppliers 0 0 0 0 2 0
Technology for
Strategic
Advantage 1 0 0 0 0 1
Flatter/less
compartment.
organizations 0 0 2 2 2 2
Innovative
Human
Resource Pol. 2 2 2 2 2 0
Rating on
stage of
development 1.8 2 2.6 2.6 3 3.2
# of
Employees 19449 18187 18274 17052
mWh sold
mWh sold/
Employee
Price 5.62593 . Price Change (1989-1994) 5.60932
Price/Region 93.4% -0.3% 88.3%
The Strategy Quality Making
Dominant Hurricane Company for the Company Improvem the Pieces
Theme Hugo of Choice Future of Choice ent Fit
Teams Was going to start a TQM
for suppliers
89-1354 90-1157 406 592 820 1061
A 
endix 
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UTILITY: FPLGROUP
Year 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
Evidence of: __
Recognition of
Competition YES YES YES YES YES YES
Downsizing no no YES no YES no no
Reengineering no no no no no YES
TQM YES no YES YES no no
Simultaneous
Improvement in
cost/quality/
service 2 0 1 1 1 1
Close to
Customer 2 0 2 2 2 2
Closer to
Suppliers 0 0 0 0 0 0
Technology for remote
Strategic meters/
Advantage 0 0 0 0 1 billing 2
Flatter/less
compartment.
organizations 0 0 2 2 2 2
Innovative
Human
Resource Pol. 0 0 0 0 0 0
Rating on
stage of
development 2 2 2.5 2.7 3 3.1
# of
Employees
mWh sold
mWh sold/
Employee ..
Price 7.39069 Price Change (1989-1994) 6.85
Price/Region 105.6% -7.3% 98.4%
Innovation Closer to An The
s in a Our Excellent Changing
Dominant Competiti Changing Customer Team Year for Landscap
Theme on Industry s Work FPL e
.. 95-1139
89-1376c 90-1199 406 593 825 10671
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t 
a
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UTILITY: ALLEGHENY POWER SYSTEM
Year 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
Evidence of:
Recognition of
Competition no no YES YES YES YES
Downsizing no no no no no no no
Reengineering no no no no no no
TQM no no no no no no
Simultaneous
Improvement in
cost/quality/
service 0 0 0 0 1 1
Close to
Customer 0 0 1 1 1 1
Closer to
Suppliers 0 0 0 0 0 0
Technology for
Strategic IT:
Advantage 0 0 1 1 1 1
Flatter/less
compartment.
organizations 0 0 0 0 0
Innovative
Human
Resource Pol. 0 0 0 0 0 0
Rating on
stage of
development 1 1 2 2 2.1 2.5
# of
Employees
mWh sold
mWh sold/
Employee
Price 4.52034 Price Change (1989-1994) 5.46467
Price/Region 72.4% 20.9% 80.1%
Eventful
Eventful Eventful and
Dominant Relatively Rate Eventful and Good and Good Productiv
Theme Good Year Relief Year Year Year e
Perceived and Denied the value of competition
Most BORING REPORTS!! ,
_89-1164a 90-1352 414 582 814 1055
Utilit 
R s 
ns to 
Com 
t
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UTILITY: ENTERGY _94_9
Year 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
Evidence of: _
Recognition of
Competition 'YES YES YES YES YES YESS1 YES. n
Downsizing no no YES YES no YES no
Reengineering no no no no no no
TQM YES YES YES no no no
Simultaneous I
Improvement in
cost/quality/
service 2 2 1 0 2 1
Close to large ones
Customer 2 2 0 0 1 1
Close to
Suppliers 0 0 0 0 0 0
Technology for help
Strategic customers
Advantage 1 use 2 IT 2 IT 2 IT 2 01
Flatter/less merge
compartment. nuke
organizations plants 1 2 2 2 2 2
Innovative I
Human Incentive Incentive Incentive
Resource Pol. pay 2 pay 2 0 0 pay 2 0
Rating on
stage of
development 2 2.1 2.8 3.2 3.4 .. 3.4
# of
Employees 13190 15543
mWh sold 89544
mWh sold/
Employee
Price 6.45332 Price Change (1989-1994) 6.402271
Price/Region 104.9% -0.8% .101!.4%
Creation: Are you The new Winning
Bringing Ready for Way to The
Dominant Salute to Ideas to the Year Look at Energy Why
Theme Innovation Reality 2000? Electric. Game Entergy?
Functional
lines
Sreorgan. ....
.. 89-1293b 90-1302 A0424 93-1077 94-1138 A1132
==u L-1 .R14 A nr % C' 1pT-lIhi RO~nnncw %-Ulf&n. gl i l n
UTILITY: DOMINION RESOURCES
Year 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
Evidence of:
Recognition of
Competition YES YES no YES YES YES
Downsizing YES YES no YES no YES YES
Reengineering no no no no no YES
TQM no no no no no no
Simultaneous
Improvement in
cost/quality/
service 0 0 0 0 0 2
Close to
Customer 0 0 1 1 0 2
Closer to
Suppliers 0 0 0 0 0 0
Technology for
Strategic
Advantage 0 0 0 1 2 1
Flatter/less
compartment.
organizations 0 0 0 0 0 0
Innovative
Human
Resource Pol. 0 0 0 0 0 0
Rating on
stage of
development 2.3 1.6 1.2 2 2.9 3.2
# of
Employees
mWh sold
mWh sold/
Employee
Price 6.14355 Price Change (1989-1994) 6.51
Price/Region 103.9% 6.0% 101.2%
Strength Prepared
Flexibility Now, and Our for a
Dominant & Evolving for the Business Changing Creative
Theme Strategy We Care Future is Electric. Industry Energy
Low cost strategy
Pacificcorp and Union Electric
189-1202 90-1157 A0424 A0606 A0865 A1081
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UTILITY: PACIFICORP
Year 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
Evidence of:_
Recognition of
Competition no no YES YES YES YES
Downsizing YES no no no no no YES
Reengineering no no no no no no
TQM no no no no no no
Simultaneous
Improvement in
cost/quality/
service 0 0 0 1 1 2,
Close to
Customer 0 1 0 1 0 0O
Closer to
Suppliers **h ** Through Ownership ****** ******
Technology for
Strategic
Advantage 0 0 0 0 0 1i
Flatter/less
compartment.
organizations 0 0 1 1 0 0
Innovative
Human
Resource Pol. 0 0 0 0 0 0
Rating on
stage of
development 1 1 1.1 1.4 2 3
# of
Employees
mWh sold
mWh sold/
Employee
Price 4.93042 . Price Change (1989-1994) 4.69941
-,i
Price/Region 101.0% -4.7% 98.0%
Dominant Achievem Energy Difficult Changing Competiti
Theme ent Utility none Year Industry on
restructuring
.. 89-1290 90-1287 A0434 A0616 A0853 95-1192
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UTILITY: CONSOLIDATED EDISON
Year 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
Evidence of:
Recognition of
Competition no no no YES YES YES
Downsizing no no no no no no no
Reengineering no no no no no no
TQM no no no no no no
Simultaneous
Improvement in
cost/quality/
service 0 0 0 0 0 0
Close to DSM prog. Reorganiz incentive
Customer 1 1 1 service 1 1 1 rates
Closer to for
Suppliers 0 0 0 0 0 0 business
Technology for
Strategic
Advantage 2 1 2 2 2 IT 2
Flatter/less
compartment.
organizations 0 0 0 0 0 0
learning learning learning
Innovative center/ center/ center/
Human women & women & women &
Resource Pol. 0 0 0 minor. 2 minor. 2 minor. 2
Rating on
stage of
development 1 1 1 1.2 1.6 2.1
# of
Employees
mWh sold
mWh sold/
Employee
Price 11.8459 Price Change (1989-1994) 13.2
Price/Region 133.1% 11.4% 120.9%
Energy The
Efficiency People World's
and Challenge working Greatest
Dominant Record Energy s and with Market
Theme Year Efficiency Good year Changes people place
The company managed 20% reduction in workforce between 1980 and 1994 through
attrition
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UTILITY: NIAGARA MOHAWK
Year 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
Evidence of:
Recognition of I
Competition !no YES no YES YES YES
Downsizing no YES YES YES YES YES !no
Reengineering no no no no YES YES
TQM no no no no no no
Simultaneous
Improvement in
cost/quality/
service 0 1 2 1 2 1
Close to
Customer 1 1 2 0 1 2
Closer to
Suppliers 0 0 0 0 1 0
Technology for
Strategic
Advantage 0 0 0 0 1 0_
Flatter/less
compartment.
organizations 0 2 2 2 2 1
Innovative gains
Human incentive bargaining
Resource Pol. 0 pay 1 1 1 1 0
Rating on
stage of
development 1 1.5 1.6 1.8 2.1 2.8
# of
Employees
mWh sold
mWh sold/ _.t..
Employee
Price 6.69 Price Change (1989-1994) 9.38.
Price/Region 75.2% 40.2% 85.9%
Become
the Most Building
Responsiv on a
e & The Right Tradition Challenge
7 Point Efficient People of Quality Strengths and
Dominant Plan for Energy and The and on Which Opportuni
Theme Prosperity Serv. Co. Right Org. Service to Build ty
Business
Units
89-1196 90-1249 A0413 A0594 A0827 A1110
UTILITY: NORTHERN STATES POWER
Year 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
Evidence of:
Recognition of
Competition YES YES YES YES YES YES
Downsizing no no no no no no
Reengineering no no no no no no
TQM YES no no YES no no
Simultaneous
Improvement in
cost/quality/
service 2 0 2 0 2 2
Close to
Customer 2 2 2 2 2 2
Closer to
Suppliers 1 1 0 0 0 0
Technology for
Strategic
Advantage 0 0 0 0 0 2 <- Info. T
Flatter/less
compartment.
organizations 2 2 0 2 0 0
Innovative
Human
Resource Pol. 2 2 0 0 0 0
Rating on
stage of
development 3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 3
# of
Employees 7580 7471 7414 7522
mWh sold
mWh sold/
Employee
Price 5.1412 Price Change (1989-1994) 5.7071
Price/Region 95.8% 11.0% 101.2%
as NSP is Working Energy to
Premiere People for its Make Energy
Dominant Energy Working Customer Things Provider NSP Is
Theme Company for You s Better of Choice Energy
89-1221 90-1294 402 598 814 1098
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UTILITY: PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC ...
Year 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 19941 1995
Evidence of: _
Recognition of
Competition no no no YES YES YES_
Downsizing no YES YES YES no YES
Reengineering no no no no YES YES
TQM no no YES YES YES no
Simultaneous I
Improvement in
cost/quality/
service 0 0 0 0 0 0
Close to
Customer 1 1 1 1 01 1
Closer to
Suppliers 0 0 0 0 0 0
Technology for
Strategic
Advantage 0 0 0 0 0 0
Flatter/less
compartment.
organizations 0 0 1 1 0 0
Innovative
Human (Sup. Dev. I ncentive
Resource Pol. 0 0 Acad.) 1 0 0 2 pay
Rating on
stage of
development 1 1.1 1.1 1.4 1.7 2
# of
Employees
mWh sold
mWh sold/
Employee
Price 9.09388 Price Change (1989-1994) . . 9.84
Price/Region 122.9% 8.2% 125.0%
Year of Challengin
Solid Continued Building a g
Dominant Environme Year of Accomplis Financial New Environme
Theme nt Contrasts hments Recovery Company nt
Outsource
ing 1st to
__do so
89-1194 90-1157 92-1260 93-1246 810 1051
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UTILITY: UNION ELECTRIC I
Year 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
Evidence of:
Recognition of
Competition NO DATA no no YES YES YES
Downsizing no no no no no
Reengineering no no no no no
TQM no YES no no no
Simultaneous
Improvement in
cost/quality/
service 2 2 2 2 2
Close to
Customer 2 2 2 2 2
Closer to
Suppliers 0 0 0 0 0
Technology for
Strategic
Advantage 0 1 1 0 2
Flatter/less
compartment.
organizations 0 1 1 1 0
Innovative
Human
Resource Pol. 0 0 0 0 0
Rating on
stage of
development 1 1 1.5 2.2 3
# of
Employees
mWh sold
mWh sold/
Employee
Price 6.63965 . Price Change (1989-1994) 6.2136
Price/Region 100.7% -6.4% 96.9%
Dominant Employee Exception Technolog Floods& Competiti
Theme s al Year y Taxes on
17% staffing cuts through 1994 (from 1987) all done through attrition
89-1470 90-1162 400 582 811 1051
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UTILITY: SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA EDISON .
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _I _ _
State State
Operating Company State/% Revenue Revenue Price Price Price Price
1989 1994 1989 1994i 1989 1994
Southern California Ed. CA 100 2362343 1 10.038 10.381 8.51 9.78
Totals 2362343 1
Averages 10.03794 10.38 8.50 9.78
Average Average Ave local Ave local
Rate 89 Rate 94 rate 89 rate 94
_ _ _ _ _ _ _..__ _._ _
1 _ _ _ _ _
4d.J; Avnpndiri C I Itilitu Rp-,znninq tn Cnm-nofitinn flnot
UTILITY:
Operating Company
Appalachian Power Co.
Columbus Southern
Indiana Michigan
Kentucky Power
Kingsport Power
Ohio Power
Wheeling Power
Totals
Averages
AMERICAN ELECTRIC POWER
State/%
VA 53
VW 47
OH 100
IN 83
MI 17
KY 100
TN 100
OH 100
WV 100
Revenue
1989
546690
508797
709103
628154
89792
446081
66893
1208477
84383
4288370
4.823564
Average
Rate 89
Revenue
1994
636704
582557
936377
726083
154597
250384
81373
1262271
78205
4708551
5.107553
Average
Rate 94
Price
1989
4.5726
4.7973
5.826
5.477
5.3482
4.0839
4.2051
4.3244
4.3099
5.4818
Ave local
rate 89
Price
1994
4.79
4.98
6.61
5.6
5.81
4.19
4.35
4.11
4.52
5.8248
Ave local
rate 94
State
Price
1989
5.9
4.8
5.7
5.4
6.8
4.8
5.4
5.7
4.8
State
Price
1994
6.2
5.25
6.19
5.25
7.09
4.26
5.23
6.19
5.25
t457
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UTILITY: TEXAS UTILITIES
State State
Operating Company State/% Revenue Revenue Price Price Price Price
1989 1994 1989 1994 1989 1994
Texas Utilities Elec. Co. TX 100 4051094 1 5.3378 6.67 ] 5.7 6.42
Totals 4051094 1
Averages 5.337778 6.67 5.70 6.42
Average Average Ave local Ave local
Rate 89 Rate 94 rate 89 rate 94
__________________________________________________ _ ________________.. ... ______________________ I__________________ __ __ __ __ __ __
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UTILITY: UNICOM (COMMONWEALTH EDISON)
State State
Operating Company State/% Revenue Revenue Price Price Price Price
1989 1994 1989 1994 1989 1994
Commonwealth Edison IL 100 5653948 1 8.1765 7.92 7.5 7.41
Totals 5653948 1
Averages 8.176467 7.92 7.50 7.41
Average Average Ave local Ave local
Rate 89 Rate 94 rate 89 rate 94
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UTILITY: PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC
State State
Operating Company State/% Revenue Revenue Price Price Price Price
1 1989 1994 1989 1994 1989 1994
Pacific Gas and Electric CA 100 5939474 1 8.7088 10.55 8.5 9.78
Totals 5939474 1
Averages 8.708844 10.55 8.50 9.78
Average Average Ave local Ave local
SRate 89 Rate 94 rate 89 rate 94
.. . . . .. .. .. . . ._______________________ I
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UTILITY: THE SOUTHERN COMPANY
State State
Operating Company State/% Revenue Revenue Price Price Price Price
1989 1994 1989 1994 1989 1994
Alabama Power AL 100 2089486 913146 5.6795 6.93 5.6 6.69
Georgia Power GA 100 3207699 1180358 6.1459 7.53 6.4 7.72
Gulf Power FL 100 408934 252598 5.3984 6.73 7 7.78
Mississippi Power MS 100 338446 124257 5.0364 6.46 6.2 7.06
Savannah Electric & Po GA 100 180409 90978 6.907 7.01 6.4 7.72
Totals 6224974 2561337
Averages 5.901969 7.166819 6.16 7.3267
Average Average Ave local Ave local
Rate 89 Rate 94 rate 89 rate 94
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UTILITY:I DUKE POWER
State State
Operating Company State/% Revenue Revenue Price Price Price Price
1989 1994 1989 1994 1989f 1994
Duke Power NC 2249720 2609858 5.7303 5.76 6.2 6.62
S_ 964530 1057007 5.3648 5.21 5.6 5.67
Nantahala Power & Light NC 100 42337 51391 6.0295 6.17 6.2 6.62
Totals 3256587 3718256
Averages 5.625926 5.609316 6.02 6.3499
Average Average Ave local Ave local
Rate 89 Rate 94 rate 89 rate 94
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UTILITY: FPL GROUP
State State
Operating Company State/% Revenue Revenue Price Price Price Price
1989 1994 1989 1994 1989 1994
Florida Power & Light FL 100 4677695 1 7.3907 6.85 7 6.96
Totals 4677695 1
Averages 7.390689 6.85 7.00 6.96
Average Average Ave local Ave local
Rate 89 Rate 94 rate 89 rate 94
2 
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UTILITY: ALLEGHENY POWER SYSTEM
State State
Operating Company State/% Revenue Revenue Price Price I Price Price
_ 1989 1994 1989 1994 1989 1994
Monongahela Power WV 91 369291 473489 4.58 5.48 4.8 5.25
VA 9 0 38628 0 5.541 5.9 6.19
Potomic Edison MD 65 281727 379639 4.1075 5 6 7.03
WV 18 93951 124075 5.54 5.89 4.8 5.25
VA 17 82543 126914 5.2431 6.32 5.9 6.2
West Penn PA 100 658332 921388 4.4274 5.47 7.4 7.87
Totals 1485844 2064133
Averages 4.520341 5.464669 6.24 6.8229
Average Average Ave local Ave local
Rate 89 Rate 94 rate 89 rate 94
2 Avendix" ("C Utilitu Resvonse to Comvetition Data463.
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UTILITY: ENTERGY
State State
Operating Company State/% Revenue Revenue Price Price Price Price
1989 1994 1989 1994 1989 1994
Arkansas Power and
Light AK 100 974589 1169101 7.0257 7.38 6.4 6.35
Mississippi Pow. & Li. MI 100 657718 797651 7.4683 7.61 6.2 7.06
Louisiana Power and
Light LA 100 1369429 1626496 5.3843 5.6 6 6.05
New Orleans Public
Service LA 100 368809 388697 7.1001 7.2 6 6.05
Gulf States Power LA 56 0 961059 0 5.93 0 6.05
TX 44 0 698019 0 5.46 0 6.52
Totals 3370545 5641023
Averages 6.453318 6.402269 6.15 6.3131
Average Average Ave local Ave local
Rate 89 Rate 94 rate 89 rate 94
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UTILITY: DOMINION RESOURCES
I 1
0i State State
Operating Company State/% Revenue Revenue Pririce ice Price Price
1989 1994 1989 1994 19891 1994
Virginia Power VA 95 3109406 0.95 6.145 6.51 5.9 6.42
NC 05 145394 0.05 6.1119 6.51 6.2 6.62
Totals 3254800 1
Averages 6.143552 6.51 5.91 6.43
Average Average Ave local Ave local
Rate 89 Rate 94 rate 89 rate 94
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JTILITY: PACIFICORP
)perating Company
Pacificorp
Totals
Averages
State/%
UT 33
OR 30
WY 18
WA 9
ID 7
MT 2
CA 2
Revenue
1989
698842
553550
285234
138317
110730
34383
51484
1872540
4.930415
Average
Rate 89
Revenue
1994
33
30
18
9
7
2
2
101
4.699406
Average
Rate 94
Price
1989
5.762
4.6959
3.7643
4.3513
3.6521
4.3709
7.303
4.88
Ave loca
rate 89
Price
1994
5.2
4.8
3.74
4.49
3.99
4.51
7.18
4.7952
Ave loca
rate 94
State
Price
1989
5.8
4.3
4.3
3.5
3.8
4.1
8.5
State
Price
1994
5.36
4.6
4.26
4.02
4
4.51
9.78
I --
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UTILITY:I CONSOLIDATED EDISON
Operating Company
Consolidated Edison
Totals
Averages
State/%
NY 100
Revenue
1989
4138323
4138323
11.84591
Average
Rate 89
Revenue
1994
1
1
13.2
Average
Rate 94
State
Price
1989
8.9
State
Price
1994
10.92
Price
1989
11.846
8.90
Ave local
rate 89
Price
1994
13.2
10.92
Ave local
rate 94
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UTILITY:
Operating Company
Niagara Mohawk
Totals
Averages
NIAGARA MOHAWK
State/%
NY 100
Revenue
1989
2236309
2236309
6.69
Average
Rate 89
Revenue
1994
1
1
9.38
Average
Rate 94
Price
1989
6.69
8.9
Ave local
rate 89
Price
1994
9.38
10.92
Ave local
rate 94
State
Price
1989
8.9
State
Price
1994
10.92
State
Price
1989
8.9
4AR;.
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UTILITY: NORTHERN STATES POWER
State State
Operating Company State/% Revenue Revenue Price Price Price Price
1989 1994 1989 1994 1989 1994
NSP-- Minnesota MN 89 1157297 1436997 5.1175 5.69 5.3 5.63
ND 06 81375 96557 4.974 5.45 5.7 5.77
SD04 55028 73059 5.5844 6.03 6 6.19
NSP - Wisconsin WI 97 223786 272796 5.1901 5.78 5.4 5.46
MI03 7359 8792 5.9113 6.38 6.8 7.09
Totals 1524845 1888201
Averages 5.1412 5.707098 5.37 5.6411
Average Average Ave local Ave local
Rate 89 Rate 94 rate 89 rate 94
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UTILITY: PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC
State State
Operating Company State/% Revenue Revenue Price Price Price Price
1989 1994 1989 1994 1989 1994
Philadelphia Electric PA 100 2912032 1 9.0939 9.84 7.4 7.87
Totals 2912032 1
Averages 9.09388 9.84 7.40 7.87
Average Average Ave local Ave local
Rate 89 Rate 94 rate 89 rate 94
UTILITY: UNION ELECTRIC _
State State
Operating Company State/% Revenue Revenue Price Price Price Price
1989 1994 1989 1994J 19891 1994
Union Electric IL 170211 12 4.7558 4.261 7.5 i  7.41
MO 1632372 88 6.8361 6.481 6.51 6.28
---1 1
_ _ _ _ _.1 _ _ _
Totals 1802583 100
Averages 6.639652 6.2136 6.59 6.4156
Average Average Ave local Ave local
Rate 89 Rate 94 rate 89 rate 94
} _ _,
11 .. . ._
[ _________________________________ ____________ __________________________ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ______
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
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Appendix D
Porter's Entry Framework
Any effort to make cheap power available to manufacturers in this State is one which
shoufd be welcomedandencouragedin every way consistent with the public interest.1
-- Massachusetts Boardof gas andElrectric Light Commissioners (1907)
D.1 OVERVIEW OF A DECISION WHETHER OR NOT TO ENTER A MARKET
The framework is based upon Porter's Chapter 16, and includes parts of other chapters.
Porter states, "The economics of entry rests on some fundamental market forces that are
operating whenever entry occurs. If these market forces work perfectly, in an economists
sense, then no entry decision can ever yield an above-average return on investment. This
startling statement is the key to understanding the economics of entry." As a result, one seeks
to enter where there are market imperfections.
A potential entrant must balance:
(1) The investment costs to be in the new business, such as investment in
manufacturing facilities and inventory;
(2) The additional investment required to overcome structural entry barriers, such as
brand identification and proprietary technology;
(3) The expected reaction of incumbent firms (in the form of retaliation); and
(4) The expected cash flows from being in the business.
Frequently unanticipated caveats include:
* The existence of subtle barriers to entry (brand name recognition, access to
distribution, etc.);
* The effect on the supply/demand balance of the entrant's new capacity; and
* The reactions of existing firms.
D.2 ANALYTICAL PROCESS
The analytical process is as follows.
D.2.1. Identify Target Industries (in this case locations)
- Industry is in disequilibrium;
- Slow or ineffectual retaliation by incumbents;
- Firm has lower entry costs than other firms;
- The firm has distinctive ability to influence the industry structure;
- There will be positive effects on a firm's existing businesses.
D.2.2 Perform a full structural analysis
D.2.3 Explicitly balance the four aforementioned parts and answer questions regarding the
bullet points.
D.2.4. Look at compatibility with a generic concept for entry.
1 Cited in Wilcox, 1910, 148.

Appendix E
Generation Entry Results
That transmission remains a naturalmonopoly neither requires norjustifies a departure
from microeconomic princip(es.1
--A ffredF. Mistr, Jr. (1996)
E.1 RETAIL (MERCHANT) PLANT ANALYSIS
E. 1.1 Profile of Scenarios Considered For Merchant Retail Wheeling Plant
POTENTIAL COMPETITORS
* Utilities
(a) Low cost/high cost
(b) competitive/non-competitive mind-set
* New Entrants
(a) low interest area/high interest areas
(b) aggressive/passive
POTENTIAL CONSUMERS
* Residential
- growing/constant/declining population
* Commercial
- Industrial
(a) electricity intensive/non-intensive
(b) highly profitable/struggling
- Non-industrial
* Satisfied/unsatisfied with current utility
POTENTIAL REGULATORY SCHEMES
* Consumer flexible/fixed (i.e. easy to change suppliers vs. hard to change)
(instantaneous purchases vs. bilateral)
CURRENT POSITION
* What other generation facilities do you own in the region?
REGION COST STRUCTURE
* High/low construction'costs
* High/low electricity prices
AVAILABLE CAPACITY IN REGION
* Surplus/Shortage of capacity?
1Mistr, 1996, 33.
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E. 1.2 Structural Analysis Of Potential Retail Plant Environment
CRITERIA AND ANALYSIS VALUE DATA NEEDED
I. THREAT OF ENTRY
A. Barriers to Entry
(1) Economies of scale -
* There might be some economies of scale in the II Where are other plants?
retailing process, such as in looking for customers, (the $
advertising, and handling bills, etc. Therefore, it amounts
would be desirable to build a merchant plant in an involved
area where one could sell a considerable amount of are likely
power. to be
* The market structure would make a difference. If relativel Market structure
one is selling to an aggregator, rather than soliciting y small,
customers directly, then there will be fewer costs however)
(which would minimize the effects of scale
economies.)
* There may also be a flexibility scale advantage -
there is a wider variety of ways to serve customers
with 2000 MW of production than 100. .. .
(2) Product Differentiation -
* In order to create a differentiated electricity I Where are other plants
product, it is likely necessary to have multiple owned?
plants. Therefore, locations in a region where there
are already plants- would be desirable. Without a
number of plants in service, the existing utility has an
advantage here.
* It should be noted that Porter defines product
differentiation in terms of brand identification and
customer loyalty...
With that definition, locating in an area where the I Surveys of utility
local utility has developed negative "brand customers -
recognition" would make potential customers less service ratings.
concerned about entrusting their electrical needs to a
"newcomer." Look for areas where there are
customers who are significantly displeased with the
local utility and are specifically looking for
alternatives.
* If one is an established IPP, locating in an area II Harder to measure -
where one has already been recognized as a solid respect within local
producer, such as Makowski in New England, would community - especially
take advantage, at least somewhat, of Porter's business community.
product differentiation objectives.
(3) Capital Requirements -
* Some areas have higher construction costs than II Cost data for other plants
others. Look for places where the costs are high - or in regions.
are at least far from low construction cost areas (so
that any differences in capital cost are offset by General construction cost
transmission inefficiencies). data (to protect against
* Location with respect to important infrastructure, II extreme plant cost cases)
such as transmission system (less significant) and
natural gas pipeline (if CCGT) is important. Locations of infrastructure
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(4) Switching Costs -
The industry structure, regulated by the states, could
be the source of significant switching costs or at least
barriers to switching. For example, how stranded
investment is handled could be very crucial. Look for
places where fixed switching charges are not assessed
up front. If switching charges are implemented,
perhaps look for a place where they are charged
every time a change in generators is made, it might be
better to be the first merchant IPP, so that those who
want to switch to an IPP do so, but have a charge to
pay if they leave you.
(5) Access to Distribution Channels -
In all states, currently, this is a fundamental barrier
to entry. One could only conceive of building a plant
where the PUC is considering, or already has,
changed the rules regarding direct sales to consumers.
(6) Cost Advantages Independent of Scale -
(a) Proprietary Product Technology - presumably,
this should not be a problem as, with the changing of
the economies of scale, existing firms will not have an
advantage.
(b) Favorable Access to Raw Materials - will it be
possible to get fuel easily?
(c) Favorable locations - are there any economically
desirable places to build a plant?
(d) government subsidies -Actually, government
mandated subsidies FROM utilities could be a barrier
to utility competition. Looking for places where QF
contracts are being upheld and/or other policies
where utilities are used as vehicles for public policy
will weaken their competitiveness.
(e) Learning or Experience Curve - The history of the
NUG business has shown that experience is not an
overwhelming factor in the ability to run a reliable
plant -hence this should not be a barrier to entry.
(7) Government Policy - Clearly, this is a
fundamental barrier to entry. Look for locations
where the PUC is considering (or has already
implemented) changes in direct access regulations.
I
III
II
III
II
III
I
Rules promulgated by
PUCs.
Rules or deliberations of
PUCs
???
Fuel supply
Zoning rules
Locations of transmission
lines and fuel supplies.
Details of competition
rules (PUC decisions)
Reliability data of plants
PUC policies or
deliberations
I Generation Entry Results 477II
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B. Expected Retaliation
The electric power industry, in general, has many of
the characteristics of one that is ripe for retaliation:
slow industry growth, established firms with a
commitment to the industry, and firms with
established resources to fight back.
However, given the desire to stimulate competition, II PUC rules on competition.
PUCs will likely watch closely to make sure it is not
squelched. However, differences in oversight will
mean differences in the ability to retaliate.
C. Entry Deterring Price
Given the lower costs of the new technologies, the
existing utility should not be able to (at least III Current regional costs.
economically) charge an entry deterring price.
Certainly this will be true in regions that are near or
above the national average in terms of current prices.
D. Properties of Entry Barriers
(1) They change for fundamental reasons - we are I PUC
seeing this in electric power, where the exclusive Decisions/deliberations
franchise concept is diminishing - in fact, this change
in entry barriers makes this discussion even possible.
(2) They change for company strategic decision II Stated intentions of
reasons - In some cases, the utility may decide to executives
abandon the generation business altogether. This
would bring a rush of new entrants -creating an Utility decisions
unstable market - but probably one with opportunity.
(3) Resources allow overcoming of entry barriers - II Utility cost structure
- once again, the newer, more efficient technologies
allow this to happen. The current utility generation
mix will impact the benefits of this barrier-
ameliorator.
E. Experience and Scale As Barriers - Limits
(1) Limit product differentiation - If a utility has few II # of plants operated by
plants, this might be true, otherwise, many big plants utility
are an advantage.
(2) Technological change punishes - definitely true - I Utility cost structure
extent will vary by region. (Stranded Investment)
(3) Impacts Mind-set - There are still some utilities I Statements of utility
that don't understand the competition thing. executives
F. Nullification of Experience Barriers
(1) Process innovations leading to a new experience III
curve - This is true in the utility industry, but it is
probably pretty universally true.
(2) Low cost through experience may cost product III
differentiation - the ability to differentiate will
probably increase with experience.
(3) Multiple firms using the experience approach may II Intentions of potential
prove fatal - Avoid areas where a multitude of firms competitors
will be entering with the hopes of garnering market
share, rather than short-terms profits, in order to
"learn."
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(4) Aggressive pursuit of cost declines through I If such utilities exist -
experience may draw attention away from then go after them!
developments - Look for regions where utilities are
still focused on improving big "old style" plants and
seem oblivious to the new technologies.
B. INTENSITY OF RIVALRY AMONG EXISTING COMPETITORS
1. Intensity is caused by:
(1) Numerous or Equally Balanced Competitors - I Potential entrants - but
Currently there are really no competitors anywhere. ?how does one know the
This will mean that whenever competition comes into intensity of interest in
being, it will be the established firm versus a variety entering the market?
of others. While very stable now, more imbalance
will occur when new firms come in -> intense
competition. Look for markets with fewer potential
entrants.
(2) Slow Industry Growth - competition will be less I Data on load growth by
intense in markets that are growing. region
(3) High Fixed or Storage Costs - this is a problem III
everywhere.
(4) Lack of Differentiation or Switching Costs - Look I Location of other assets
to areas where (1) You might be able to create a
differentiated product because of owning several Rules of the PUC
generation units and (2) away from areas where there
will be a substantial "transition charge" for those
leaving the utility.
(5) Capacity augmented in Large Increments - Larger II Energy supply within a
markets will be able to absorb the onslaught of new control area or region.
generators better than smaller control areas.
(6) Diverse Competitors - Look for areas where the II Profile of probable
competitors will be relatively homogeneous. competition.
Presumably there will be the utility in one category -
it would be desirable if the new entrants were
relatively similar (as opposed to some seeking to
build market share, others who want to develop a
new form of energy, others who want to make a quick
buck.)
(7) High Strategic Stakes - Look for areas where the II Attitudes of utility
utility does not view generation as vital to the management
essence of being a utility.
(8) High Exit Barriers - This will presumably be true II Degree to which plants
in all places, because of the specificity and high must still be paid for
fixed cost of the plants. Are there areas, though, within a region.
where more of the plants have been paid off (clearly
stranded investment is not equally spread). The
downside of this might be that in such areas, a utility
may be more willing to close the inefficient plant in
favor of building another, more.efficient one (maybe?)
B. Shifting Rivalry - since a retail market has yet to III
exist, let us not examine this characteristic now.
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C. Exit Barriers and Entry Barriers - look for areas II Regulations of an area
where entry barriers are high (yet can be cleared by
the particular investor) and exit barriers are low.
Look for areas where regulations make entry more
difficult (environmental laws/stranded investment
payments). This is likely not the case with CCGT
technology.
III. PRESSURE FROM SUBSTITUTE PRODUCTS
* There seem to be two ways by which a substitute I Status of DSM in area
could be found: self-generation and DSM. Look for
areas where: (1) for large numbers of customers it Load size of customers
would not be economically feasible to self-generate,
and/or (2) where DSM programs have been effective
at taking care of the easy energy savings.
IV. BARGAINING POWER OF BUYERS
A. Buyers are powerful if...
(1) Concentrated or purchases large volumes relative III This more of a marketing
to seller sales - Look for areas (or target buyers) who strategy rather than a
would compose a small fraction of ones customers. location one.
(2) The products it purchases from the industry I Demographics of local
represent a significant fraction of the buyer's costs or industry
purchases - look for areas where the industry tends to
be non-intensive.
(3) The products or purchases from the industry are I Location of other assets
standard or undifferentiated - Build in areas where
one can create product differentiation - specifically
because one owns other plants in the region.
(4) It faces few switching costs - Look for states where II PUC regulations
the PUC has inserted costs for switching suppliers.
(5) It earns low profits - Look for areas where the II Profiles of incumbent
economy is robust. For example, at the present time businesses and their
avoid areas where defense is a large % of industry. profitability.
The difficulty in this, though, is that one is making a
20 year investment. "Massachusetts Miracles" come
and go often within that period.
(6) Buyers pose a credible threat of backward I Size of price sensitive
integration - Avoid areas where price-sensitive customers
customers are large enough buyers to consider self-
generation - or potentially better yet, co-opt them in
the beginning and build co enerator with them.
(7) The industry's product is unimportant to the III
quality of the buyer's products or services - Look for
areas where electric quality is important. The
downside of this is that the incumbent utility will
probably take the position of, "why trust your service
to a new company when we've been around for 100
years."
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(8) The buyer has full information - Look for areas I Structure of deregulation
where the set-up is a longer term contract, with more
proprietary economic dispatch data. Avoid
electronic bulletin boards where buyers can purchase
energy easily.
B. Altering Buyer Power
Buyer selection - choosing a customer base, such as III This would be more of a
targeting of customers with little power to influence it target marketing
adversely, is one way that buying power can be approach than a location
altered by the supplier, decision basis as such
customers exist in
abundance nearly
everywhere.
V. BARGAINING POWER OF SUPPLIERS 2
Suppliers Can Exert Bargaining Power if...
(1) It is dominated by a few companies more I Competition among fuel
concentrated than the industry it sells to - Look for suppliers.
regions where there is an active market in natural gas
supply. 3
(2) It is not obliged to contend with other substitute I Your choice of plant type.
products for sale to the industry - The degree of
leverage vis-a-vis other fuel sources depends upon the
flexibility that one builds into their plant. Building
one that can run on either gas or coal would provide a
generator with more leverage.
(3) The industry is not an important customer of the I Excess capacity of
supplier group - Look for areas where the reliance on pipeline.
natural gas in other aspects of society is lower than
usual. Or, perhaps a better indicator of this is the
excess capacity of pipelines. 4
(4) The supplier's product is an important input to the II The characteristics of the
buyer's business - Clearly fuel is an important input plant and contractual
into power plants. Unless one builds a multi-fuel agreements.
plant or signs a long-term contract, this would be a
large source of leverage for the supplier.
(5) The supplier group's products are differentiated or III The characteristics of the
it has built up switching costs - This once again is a plant.
function of one's plant design. A multi-fuel plant
would reduce switching costs (make switching a
possibility).
2For the purpose of this discussion, we will limit suppliers to fuel supply. In the case of capital
equipment, there will be little, if any, temporal difference in suppliers.
3As important as the competition between suppliers that occurs is the general temporal differences between
states. In the Continental United States the average price charged to electric utilities ranges from $.97 per
thousand cubic feet to $5.80. Source: Energy Information Agency, December 1995, 58.
4Since a power plant would likely sign a long term agreement for some or all of its fuel supply, the current
excess capacity may be a sufficient indicator of the importance of a plant as a customer. It is easier to
predict this indicator for natural gas supply than for coal supply.
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(6) The supplier group poses a credible threat of I IPP activity of dominant
forward integration - Look for areas where the fuel fuel suppliers.
supply is dominated by relatively passive firms. For
example, Makowski (U.S. Gen.) in the Northeast
would be an example of an area to avoid.5
VI. GOVERNMENT AS A FORCE IN INDUSTRY COMPETITION
* As has been seen throughout, the local government I
is one of the most important factors in determining a
plant location. This is true because the industry we
are attempting to differentiate, is fundamentally
similar - it is only the buyers, sellers, and the
regulatory environment which makes a difference
from location to location.
E. 1.3 Question: From the Viewpoint Of A Potential New Merchant Plant Operator, What
Characteristics of a Location For a Retail Plant Would Be Favorable?
IDENTIFY TARGET INDUSTRIES (or in this case, locations)
CRITERIA AND ANALYSIS
1. Industry is in Disequilibrium -
(a) New Industries - This whole discussion is
completely moot unless the local regulatory
commission intends to, and eventually does, open up
the industry to retail competition.
(b) Rising Entry Barriers - Below is the criteria that
Porter uses to judge the wisdom of early entry. They
all appear to be more characteristic of the industry in
general, rather than concepts that could vary (or at
least predictably so) as a function of location.
Early Entry is desirable when:
* Image and reputation of the firm are important to
the buyer - It's hard to know how important this will
be.
* Early entry can initiate the learning process
(important when learning curve is significant) - the
learning curve probably is not too significant.
* Customer loyalty will be great - this probably will
not be true.
* Absolute cost advantages can be gained by early
commitment to resources - with natural gas prices at
such low levels, it is probably advantageous to sign
long-term contracts now. Hence, the ability to obtain
a guaranteed contract with a provider might be the
only regionally segmented characteristic.
VALUE
I
DATA NEEDED
Intentions/Decisions of
the PUC
Ability to negotiate with
natural gas suppliers.
5From the discussion in this section it should be clear that: (1) because of the importance and significant
cost of fuel; and (2) high switching costs -- especially if one does not build a plant that is capable of
burning multiple kinds of fuel -- it is important to protect oneself from supplier abuse by signing long-
term contracts for fuel supply. Doing so would significantly limit the potential for supplier abuse.
--
I
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Early Entry is Risky when:
* Early Competition and Market segmentation are on
a basis that will be different later in the
development of the industry - This is probably true -
although I don't know if "wrong" skills would be
developed in the process.
* Costs of opening up a market are great (customer
information, regulations) - This is probably a
characteristic of the retail market.
* There will be costly competition with small firms
while larger formidable ones will come in later -
with the economies of scale - and with the potential
for distributed generation, the inverse is probably
true
* Technological change will make early assets
obsolete - perhaps eventually, but there are many
current assets that will become obsolete first.
(c) Poor Information - If one knows a lot about a
specific area, it might have an advantage in
appraising the potential market and knowing how to
go about with competition (i.e. the local mind-set).
2. Slow or Ineffectual Retaliation - not included
below is the impact that regulators could have on
preventing retaliation.
(a) Incumbents cost of effective retaliation outweighs
the benefits - Look for areas where the utility has a
high cost structure and therefore, simply cannot
afford to retaliate.
(b) There is a paternal dominant firm or tight group of
long-standing leaders - Look for areas where the
utility is not yet in a competitive mind-set.
(c) The entrant can exploit conventional wisdom - If
there is a utility that is still in the mind-set of the
1970s and 1980s, this would be a good place to
compete.
(d) Incumbent's Costs of responding are great given the
need to protect their existing businesses - if the utility
has a good reputation, its attempts to "squash" the
new competition may be taken badly by the public -
thus losing an advantage. (This happened to AT&T)
(3) Firm has lower entry costs than other firms - If one
already operates a plant in a region, one might be
able to enter less expensively.
(4) The firm has a distinctive ability to influence the
industry structure- Look for situations where a utility
is seeking a NUG competitor/partner. The Destec-
PG&E deal would be a great example of this.
(5) There will be positive effects on a firm's existing
businesses- If one owned a potential cogen site, this
would be an asset to explore the use of.
I
I
I
I
I
II
II
I
One's knowledge of an
area
Regulators actions and
statements
Cost structure of utility
Statements/actions of .
management
Statements/actions of
management
Current feelings toward
utility
Other potential entrants
Feel for utilities'
strategies for dealing
with competition
What other businesses
own.
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E. 1.4 Structural Analysis Results
Let us now look explicitly at the important criteria, based upon Porter's Five Competitive Forces:
E.1.4.1 Threat of Entry
The threat of entry is higher with fewer barriers to entry. Hence look for areas where:
* One can create a differentiated product.
* The local utility is not in good standing with consumers.
* The PUC has given little, if any, stranded investment relief to the utilities.
* The new market structure makes it harder for customers to switch from one company to another.
* Willingness of the PUC to even allow retail sales.
* Utility operating costs are high (less able to meet prices - although they will also likely be less willing to
abandon market).
E.1.4.2 Intensity of Rivalry Among Suppliers
Look for areas where:
* There are likely to be few entrants.
* Demand is growing relatively quickly (so that new capacity can be absorbed -- at least partially).
* One can create a differentiated product.
E.1.4.3 Pressure From Substitute Products
* Past DSM programs have taken out much of the "easy" potential energy savings for customers.
* Self-generation is a viable option for few customers.
E.1.4.4 Bargaining Power of Buyers
* Areas where industry is less electricity intensive would have a lower price sensitivity and would therefore
be less willing to leave you quickly (even though you may need that as an entry strategy), since highly
price sensitive customers will likely bolt more quickly for a small price differential.
* Attempt to co-opt large, price-sensitive customers into a cogeneration project.
* Avoid market structures where the buyer knows and/or is able to get his hands on the money from market
inefficiencies.
* Create a differentiated product.
E.1.4.5 Bargaining Power of Suppliers
Look for areas where:
* Fuel prices are low and/or there is intense competition among gas sellers.
* Gas sellers are not interested in forward-integration.
* Much of the supplier's bargaining power can be eliminated through allowing yourself flexibility in fuel,
and locking in a long-term contract.
E. 1.5 Balance of Four Important Points
When entering, one must balance:
(1) the investment costs to be in the new business, such as investment in manufacturing facilities and
inventory
From this, we see that potentially desirable areas would include:
* Those where the regulatory body is open to retail competition;
* Those where a business currently operates: for potentially 3 reasons
- potential cogeneration
- extra knowledge about the region and its processes
- product differentiation through other plants;
* Those where the utilities have a high cost structure and/or are not prepared for a
competitive marketplace;
* Those where fuel supply competition is high (or where fuel prices are generally low); and;
* Those where an early entrant might be able to become part of an interesting market structure.
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* Look for locations where the cost of construction is low and economic accessibility to resources (natural
gas, transmission grid) is high.
* Look for areas where the regulatory climate is less intensive - specifically environmental regulation.
(2) The additional investment required to overcome structural entry barriers, such as brand identification and
proprietary technology
* Look for areas where customers are in open revolt against their local utility and avoid areas where the
utility is highly respected.
(3) expected reaction of incumbent firms (in the form of retaliation)
* Look for areas where the utility is either constrained from retaliation by regulation or economic necessity.
(4) expected cash flows from being in the business.
In locations where the price of electricity is higher relative to the rest of the country, several positive factors
will occur. (This price gradient item doesn't seem to fit in anywhere else.) (1) One's lower-priced, new
technology plants will have a higher profit margin, (2) its low price will be even more attractive to
consumers, and (3) one will be able to survive any price war which might develop because so much damage
will have to taken by the utility that it would probably not fight.
Frequently unanticipated caveats include:
(1) Subtle barriers to entry (brand name recognition, access to distribution, etc.)
* Avoid areas where the local utility might retain an ability to tie-up distribution, etc., due to insufficient
regulatory protection mechanisms.
* Avoid areas where the utility is well-liked.
(2) Effect of entrant's new capacity needs to be considered.
* Areas where one's new capacity will barely be noticed in the larger scheme of things will help to ensure
that no radical price changes occur to do entry, and its impact on the supply-demand equilibrium.
(3) Reactions of existing firms
* Look for an area in which the utility is not in a position to have a significant capacity expansion, and
where its financial situation will not allow it to perform massive cost-cutting or promotions.
E. 1.6 Generic Strategies for Entry
(1) Reduce Product Costs
(a) New Process Technology - Look for regions where I Current regional power costs
utility power is expensive due to use of old technologies.
(b) Larger plant (in order to reap economies of scale) - this III
is the opposite of what is needed in the industry today. . .
(c) More modern facilities - Once again, look for areas I Age and efficiency of plants
where the utility has older, less efficient plants.
(d) Shared activities with existing businesses that yield a I List of cogenerators
cost advantage - Look for areas where there might be Estimation of industrial sites
significant potential cogen sites. that would be good for
cogeneration.
(2) Buy In with Low Price - Presumably this will be the III
strategy wherever one enters (and fortunately, due to new
technology, there need not be a sacrifice of short run profits -
in fact profits may be high•er in short-run than in long-run.)
(3) Offer a Superior Product. Broadly Defined - In order to II Location of other generators
attempt this strategy, it would be necessary to locate in a
region where one owns multiple plants in order to offer a
differentiated product.
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(4) Discover a New Niche - Look for areas where there are II Profile of potential
significant classes of customers with similar needs that could customers
be met by a generator of the size one is thinking of
building?
(5) Introduce a Marketing Innovation - Are there new ways III Location of assets
that the entrant could bundle generation based upon the Competencies of entrant
capabilities of the firm and the needs of potential customers Needs of consumers
in the region?
(6) Use Piggybacked Distribution - If the potential entrant II location of
runs other businesses, locate in an area where it has multiple customers/suppliers
current customers/suppliers with whom it has a good
relationship.
E.1.7 General Conclusions
U
E.2 WHOLESALE PLANT ANALYSIS
E.2.1 Profile Of Scenarios Considered For Wholesale Bidding Situation
ASSUMPTION
* The addition of wholesale capacity will be brought about through a competitive bidding
auction which can include the utility, IPPs, or DSM programs.
CURRENT POSITION OF ENTITY IN QUESTION
* What other generation facilities do you own in the region?
BIDDING RULES
* Purely least cost/other items considered such as past experience, product differentiation.
* Are some fuel sources preferred or restricted (for environmental or fuel diversity)/strict,
traditional business criteria are only considerations
* Quantity of power for bid (single or multiple contracts available)
Based upon this process, criteria for determining a preferred area for building a
merchant retail plant are as follows:
* Before anything else, local regulators must be open to allowing retail competition.
* The local utility has many dissatisfied customers, especially due to high prices.
* The local utility is not prepared for competition, it has not undergone the changes necessary to compete
effectively, and is saddled with old, inefficient plants.
* Stranded investment costs are not so high that significant relief will be sought (which could be a barrier to
entry), yet not so low that the utility can enter into the market unscathed.
* The concentration is likely to remain high (few new entrants will emerge).
* A potential exists for a significant cogeneration facility.
* The regulatory structure allows for the producer, not the consumer, to retain any benefits from economic
inefficiencies.
* There is a possibility for creating product differentiation due to the location of other assets.
* Demand is growing relatively quickly.
* There are significant potential customers who are not hyper-price sensitive (they will be willing to jump
at significantly lower rates, but will not, in turn, dump you for marginal savings.)
* The customer base is likely to be somewhat diverse - avoid dependence on one customer or one large
industry.
* Avoid areas where "easy" energy savings can be made - DSM, etc. - by potentially prime customers.
* Look for opportunities to create new market structures.
* Look especially hard at regions that management knows well and has business contacts.
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OTHER COMPETITORS FOR BID
* Others intensely want to win bid for variety of reasons (may not be profit-maximizing)/more
"rational" economic bidders
* Many/few bidders in past/anticipated
* How well established is the bidding process - new/old
REGION COST STRUCTURE
* High/low construction costs
* High/low electricity prices
MISC.
* Potential for cogen sites
E.2.2 Structural Analysis Of Potential Wholesale Plant Environment
CRITERIA AND ANALYSIS VALUE DATA NEEDED
I. THREAT OF ENTRY
A. Barriers to Entry
(1) Economies of scale - There might be some II Specifications for bid
economies of scale in the bidding process. The cost of (small $
bidding will be less if one has bid in a region before, or compared History of bidding
if there are multiple bids out for the contract in to cost of process
consideration. project)
(2) Product Differentiation -
Per our last discussion...
* In order to create a differentiated electricity I Owned plants in area.
product, it is likely necessary to have multiple plants
serving an area. Depending upon the needs of the Needs of utility (base
utility, it might be advantageous in the bidding load vs. peak plant)
process to submit one with such flexibility.
* It should be noted that Porter defines product
differentiation in terms of brand identification and Bidding details
customer loyalty...
With that definition, locating in an area where one II Reputation (I guess one
has developed a reputation as a reliable supplier would know that from
would be helpful if the bidding process is not a pure experience)
"low cost" bid.
(3) Capital Requirements -
* Some areas have higher construction costs than II Cost data for other
others. If one has sufficient capital, look for places plants in regions.
where the costs are high - or are at least far from low
construction cost areas (so that any differences in General construction cost
capital cost are offset by transmission inefficiencies). data (to protect against
in order to eliminate more poorly capitalized extreme plant cost cases)
competitors.
* Location with respect to important infrastructure, II Location of Infrastructure
such as transmission system (less significant) and
natural gas pipeline (if CCGT) is important.
* What (if any) financial structure requirements exist II Specifications of RFP
- finance structures, etc.
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(4) Switching Costs -
The buyer is obliged not to switch - and even so, this is III
not a relevant concept in the bidding process.
(5) Access to Distribution Channels -
This should not really be an issue if one is planning on II Intent of owners
selling only to the local utility. However, if the
ideal plant site for a bid is outside the utility's Filings with FERC
territory, or if one anticipates substantial wholesale
wheeling, then it would be desirable to locate in a
region where the local utility's transmission policies
and pricing are clear (and favorable.) Even though
the FERC can mandate the wheeling, some utilities
will have more (or less) favorable arrangements.
(6) Cost Advantages Independent of Scale -
(a) Proprietary Product Technology - are there IPPs I Likely competition in
in a region that (a) are nurturing a new technology region
that. is supported by those in charge of the bidding
process, or (b) that offers an unbeatable low-cost
supply?
(b) Favorable access to raw materials - will it be II
possible to get fuel easily? Details of fuel supply
(c) Favorable locations - are there any economically II
desirable places to build a plant? Do potential Zoning rules
bidding competitors own prime spots? Locations of x-mission
lines and fuel supplies.
Land ownership of
(d) government subsidies - once again, avoid I potential competitors
situations where there are there competing
technologies that are likely to be automatically Agreements with
chosen in order to promote their development. utilities/QF companies
(e) Learning or Experience Curve - The history of the III
NUG business has shown that experience is not an
overwhelming factor in the determination of ability
to run a reliable plant - hence this should not be a Reliability data of
barrier to entry. plants
(7) Government Policy - Are there any fuel diversity I PUC policies or
rules that will likely help or hurt a potential bid? deliberations
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B. Expected Retaliation
* Retaliation is hard to predict in this bidding
process where the market is quite fragmented. I
suppose that if one were a utility from another part of
the country, and one put in a bid for a plant in another
part of the country, the powers that be in that area
might try to bid on the next plant in the instigator's
home territory - how likely that is, I don't know.
And I'm not sure if this is really retaliation as Porter
describes it (and one would have to be dominant in
another market already.)
C. Entry Deterring Price
Look at the values of past winning bids: If they are
low, unless something has changed - will they have a
high enough return to justify the effort?
D. Properties of Entry Barriers
(1) They change for fundamental reasons - not
relevant for competitive bid.
(2) They change for company strategic decision
reasons - not relevant for competitive bid.
(3) Resources allow overcoming of entry barriers -
not relevant for competitive bid.
E. Experience and Scale As Barriers - Limits
(1) Limit product differentiation - not relevant for
competitive bid - if any advantage from product
differentiation exists, it is with the firm that has a
larger scale..
(2) Technological change punishes - not relevant for
competitive bid - since it is not competing against
existing capacity - if it were (in retail case) then this
is clearly a big consideration.
(3) Impacts Mind-set - only relevant for competitive
bid if none of the other bidders employ new
technology - which is highly unlikely.
F. Nullification of Experience Barriers
(1) Process innovations leading to a new experience
curve - This is true in electric power in general,
probably not in a competitive bid.
(2) Low cost through experience may cost product
differentiation - product differentiation is not usually
important in the wholesale market.
(3) Multiple firms using the experience approach may
prove fatal - Avoid bidding situations where several
firms are trying to run many plants to gain experience.
I
III
III
III
III
III
III
III
III
II
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Past prices
Significant events in
industry/areas
Firms projected to enter
bid
Their strategies
Their other locations
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(4) Aggressive pursuit of cost declines through II Firms that usually bid in
experience may draw attention away from an area
developments - Look for areas where bidding is Openness to
usually done by exotic energy production companies (if "conventional" new
such areas are open to new, more conventional technologies.
supplies as well), then those attempting to gain
experience from exotic energy forms won't change to
meet your new technology.
II. INTENSITY OF RIVALRY AMONG EXISTING
COMPETITORS (will be high when:)
A. Numerous or Equally Balanced Competitors - I Past history of bidding
Presumably this will be the case for most bids - look process, # of bidders.
for areas where there is less interest in competitive
bids.
(2) Slow Industry Growth - Expanding markets will I Load growth for area.
make each particular bid less important for those
who are bidding - therefore look for areas with high
growth.
(3) High Fixed or Storage Costs - This is true III
everywhere.
(4) Lack of Differentiation or Switching Costs - This III
is generally a commodity situation.
(5) Capacity augmented in Large Increments - This II Quantity of power
would actually be helpful to the bid, as there would needed
be the potential for several winners.
(6) Diverse Competitors - This isn't significant in the III
bidding process.
(7) High Strategic Stakes - Avoid bidding in areas II Intent of potential
where a firm is placing a higher importance on bidders. (hard to get)
winning the bid than making a near-term profit -
(actually, it forgets about a profit on the project as a
whole in order to establish itself as a player.
(8) High Exit Barriers - Given that this is a fixed- III
term contract, I am unsure as to the relevancy of this
point.
B. Shifting Rivalry - It would appear that the IPP II Situation of Potential
industry is in a period of consolidation (Makowski + bidders
U.S. Gen.) It would be best to target areas where the
potential bidders seem solid, in terms of avoiding a
shake-out, because new ventures might be more apt to
want to expand at any cost.
C. Exit Barriers and Entry Barriers - the objective is to II Costs specific to a region
look for areas where entry barriers are high (yet can
be cleared by the particular investor) - this should
deter many bidders. Environmental regulations would
be an example. The exit barriers should not be an
issue for a fixed contract.
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III. PRESSURE FROM SUBSTITUTE PRODUCTS
* Potential competition would likely come from a II Cost of DSM programs in
low-cost DSM program. Avoid areas where low-cost a region.
DSM programs could undercut the bid price.
IV. BARGAINING POWER OF BUYERS
A. Buyers are powerful if...
(1) Concentrated or purchases large volumes relative III
to seller sales - Certainly in a competitive bid, this is
the case everywhere. The buyers do hold most of the
cards.
(2) The products it purchases from the industry III
represent a significant fraction of the buyer's costs or
purchases -
(3) The products or purchases from the industry are III
standard or undifferentiated -
(4) It faces few switching costs - III
(5) It earns low profits - III
(6) Buyers pose a credible threat of backward III
integration -
(7) The industry's product is unimportant to the III
quality of the buyer's products or services -
(8) The buyer has full information - III
B. Altering Buyer Power
At this point in time, with many potential bidders, it
is a buyers market.
V. BARGAINING POWER OF SUPPLIERS6
Suppliers Can Exert Bargaining Power if..
(1) It is dominated by a few companies more I Competition among fuel
concentrated than the industry it sells to - Look for suppliers.
regions where there is an active market in natural gas
supply.7
(2) It is not obliged to contend with other substitute I Your choice of plant type.
products for sale to the industry - The degree of
leverage vis-a-vis other fuel sources depends upon the
flexibility that one builds into their plant. Building
one that can run on either gas or coal would provide a
generator with more leverage.
(3) The industry is not an important customer of the I Excess capacity of
supplier group - Look for areas where the reliance on pipeline.
natural gas in other aspects of society is lower than
usual. Or, perhaps a better indicator of this is the
excess capacity of pipelines.8
6See footnote
7See footnote
8See footnote
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(4) The supplier's product is an important input to the II The characteristics of
buyer's business - Clearly fuel is an important input the plant and contractual
into power plants. Unless one builds a multi-fuel agreements.
plant or signs a long-term contract, this would be a
large source of leverage for the supplier.
(5) The supplier group's products are differentiated or III The characteristics of
it has built up switching costs - This once again is a the plant.
function of one's plant design. A multi-fuel plant
would reduce switching costs (make switching a
possibility).
(6) The supplier group poses a credible threat of I IPP activity of dominant
forward integration - Look for areas where the fuel fuel suppliers.
supply is dominated by relatively passive firms. For
example, Makowski (U.S. Gen.) in the Northeast
would be an example of an area to avoid.9
VI. GOVERNMENT AS A FORCE IN INDUSTRY
COMPETITION
Unless one is running a renewable energy bid, as a I
potential supplier of low-cost energy, one wants a
regulatory agency that will uphold the rights of the
IPP, while at the same time, not interfere with the
bidding process so that it is a price-drive decision-
making process.
E.2.3 Question: From The Viewpoint Of A Potential Bidder, What Characteristics Of A
Comvetitive Auction For New Wholesale Canacitv Would Be Favorable?
9See footnote 4.
From this we can see:
* Operating in an area where one already has facilities allows for product differentiation.
* There are some regions of the country where competition for bids is likely to be lower.
Avoiding places such as California, for example, would probably be a wise strategy.
* Unless one wishes to bid with renewable fuels it is wise to avoid bids where such programs (or
DSM) have historically been given preferential treatment.
IDENTIFY TARGET INDUSTRIES (or in this case, locations)
CRITERIA AND ANALYSIS VALUE DATA NEEDED
(a) New Industries - If a bid has never been put out in I Familiarity with locality
a state before, this provides the possibility of being
the first one in and likely facing less competition (or
at least none from those experienced in the process),
however, it also poses many risks as to process. One
should either have other businesses in a region or
some other means of being familiar with the locality
and its process.
I V, I I
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(b) Rising Entry Barriers - None of these seem
applicable
Early Entry is desirable when:
* Image and reputation of the firm are important to
the buyer - in places where there is some
"noneconomic" factors involved, early entry with
subsequent successful implementation may be helpful
for future bids.
* Early entry can initiate the learning process
(important when learning curve is significant) - this
is not a huge consideration - although as Joe Kearney
pointed out,10 there may be some learning that occurs
in the bidding process itself.
* Customer loyalty will be great - not likely
* Absolute cost advantages can be gained by early
commitment to resources - probably not for future bid
victories (which is what the potential benefit would
be seen to be by Porter.)
Early Entry is Risky when:
* Early Competition and Market segmentation are on
a basis that will be different later in the
development of the industry - at least, theoretically,
the contract should insulate the bidder from any
changes - with the institution of retail competition,
this would not be the case. (while potentially bid-
specific in the long term - it is hard to predict where
such would occur.)
* Costs of opening up a market are great -not much
marketing, etc. involved
* There will be costly competition with small firms
while larger formidable ones will come in later -
competition will probably not slow for a while
* Technological change will make early assets
obsolete - should not be an issue with a fixed contract.
(c) Poor Information - If one knows a lot about a
specific area, a company might be able to tailor a bid
to meet the specific needs/desires of a region and
better understand the potential paybacks.
2. Slow or Ineffectual Retaliation (likely to occur if:)
(a) Incumbents cost of effective retaliation outweighs
the benefits - retaliation is not really relevant in a
bidding situation.
(b) There is a paternal dominant firm or tight group of
long-standing leaders -
(c) The entrant can exploit conventional wisdom -
(d) Incumbent's Costs of responding are great given the
need to protect their existing businesses -
(3) Firm has lower entry costs than other firms- If one
already has a plant in the region, or was one of a
limited number of bidders in a past round, there might
be a cost (and experience) advantage.
I
III
III
III
III
II
Rules of the bidding
process
One's knowledge of an
area
History of company
Location of other plants
History of biding
10
"International Conference on the Future of Industry in Advanced Societies Conference Report," 6-7.
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(4) The firm has a distinctive ability to influence the II History of bidding
industry structure - If little bidding has been done in
the past, this might be an opening for shaping of the
structure and the potential for future bids.
(5) There will be positive effects on a firm's existing I Other assets in the area
businesses - If one owns another business with a
potential cogeneration site, this would be a chance to
lower electricity rates for it, while making money
elsewhere.
From this, we see that potentially desirable auctions would include:
* Those where a business currently operates: for potentially 3 reasons
- potential cogeneration
- extra knowledge about the region and its processes
- product differentiation through other plants
E.2.4 Structural Analysis Results
Let us now look explicitly at the important criteria, based upon Porter's Five Competitive
Forces:
E.2.4.1 Threat of Entry
* The ability to create a differentiated product may serve as a barrier to others.
* A propensity on the part of a regulatory commission to support certain types of generation
technology will serve as a barrier.
* If an area has traditionally produced low bids, is there any reason to think that will change?
- if not, then avoid.
E.2.4.2 Intensity of Rivalry Among Suppliers
* Areas where the load demand is growing allow for multiple winners
* Look for areas where the expected number of bidders is low.
E.2.4.3 Pressure From Substitute Products
* Avoid places where DSM is likely to be desired - either because of the bidding rules or
because it might be economical (if little DSM has been done in an area.)
E.2.4.4 Bargaining Power of Buyers
* This is, inherently, a buyers market
E.2.4.5 Bargaining Power of Suppliers
Look for areas where:
* Fuel prices are low and/or there is intense competition among gas sellers.
* Gas sellers are not interested in forward-integration.
Much of the supplier's bargaining power can be eliminated through allowing yourself
flexibility in fuel, and locking in a long-term contract.
From this, we see that potentially desirable auctions would include:
* There is the possibility of product differentiation
* DSM is not a strong substitute
* There are likely to be few bidders
* There is the possibility for multiple winners
* Pet energy projects are not important to those awarding the contracts
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E.2.5 Balance of Four Important Points
With this information in mind, let us now examine the four points that Porter suggests be
balanced.
When entering, one must balance:
(1) the investment costs to be in the new business, such as investment in manufacturing facilities
and inventory
Look for an area where construction and fuel source acquisition will be relatively inexpensive.
(2) The additional investment required to overcome structural entry barriers, such as brand
identification and proprietary technology
The biggest structural entry barrier is winning the bid.
(3) expected reaction of incumbent firms (in the form of retaliation)
As seen above, retaliation is not expected to occur anywhere (only perhaps in the most limited
of situations)
(4) expected cash flows from being in the business.
Look for auction environments where existing prices for bids are high (and will continue to
likely be high).
Frequently unanticipated caveats include:
* subtle barriers to entry (brand name recognition, access to distribution, etc.)
These should be marginal issues in a bid - if one has a good reputation, that can't hurt, however
(and it may allow some financing and structural agreements that would not otherwise be
possible.)
* effect of entrant's new capacity needs to be considered.
If one can enter a bid where it only captures a fraction of the total (there is more than one
winner) there is likely to be less cut-throat competition
* reactions of existing firms
The definition of reaction of existing firms, at least as defined by Porter (i.e. promotions,
advertising, temporarily lowered prices, wave of capacity expansion), appears to be
applicable more to an ongoing competitive market, rather than a one-time shot. Hence, this
variable is not significant.
E.2.6 Generic Strategies for Entry
(1) Reduce Product Costs
(a) New Process Technology - Look for regions where I Likely bidder profile
other bidders use older technologies. (where this
would be - I'm not sure!)
(b) Larger plant (in order to reap economies of scale) III
- the amount of needed power will be stipulated, so
sizes will be equivalent.
(c) More modem facilities - they will all be brand III
new. II
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(d) Shared activities with existing businesses that I List of cogenerators
yield a cost advantage - Look for areas where there List of potential
might be significant potential cogen sites. cogeneration sites
(2) Buy In with Low Price - This strategy presumably III
could be used anywhere - although the wisdom of it,
on a fixed contract, is probably questionable.
(3) Offer a Superior Product. Broadly Defined - Look II History of company and
for areas where one has a strong history of high region.
reliability compared with competitors and the
industry in the area in general.
(4) Discover a New Niche - In a bid, the market is III
pretty much defined.
(5) Introduce a Marketing Innovation - Makowski III
seems to have been somewhat successful at doing this,
but I'm not sure how location-dependent it is.
(6) Use Piggybacked Distribution - This isn't really a III
viable option given the constraints of the industry.
E.2.7 General Conclusions
, ;
Based upon this process, criteria for deciding whether or not to enter a competitive auction are
as follows.
* The number of expected bidders (the smaller the better)
* The number of expected "winners" (multiple are preferred)
* The knowledge of the local area and its processes (the more the better)
* The importance of DSM and renewable energy projects that may or may not be economical)
in the eyes of those who make the final decisions (the less the better)
* The ability to create a differentiated product - likely based upon other generating assets
in the region (the more the better)
A good competitive strategy is to do so through the construction of a cogeneration unit - either
tied to a plant owned by your company or owned by another firm with whom you partner.
Appendix F
Transmission Entry Results
The electricity utility industry is our nation's most vital exercising enormous influence
on our standard of living and on the competitiveness of 'U.S. 6usiness and its capacity
for jobs creation.1
-- Charles B. Curtis (1996)
F.1 SCENARIOS CONSIDERED FOR TRANSMISSION CONSTRUCTION
BY A FIRM OTHER THAN THE UTILITY IN WHOSE SERVICE
TERRITORY IT WOULD OCCUR
The fundamental question that is asked and answered in this section is: Under what conditions would it be
favorable for a new entrant to build transmission capacity in the service territory of a utility that is not-
affiliated with the new entrant? Specifically, we are looking for area(s) -- we will define an area as a state --
where it would be desirable to build the capacity. In order to answer the question, we will imagine several
scenarios.
F.1.1 Who Might Build the New Transmission Capacity?
* IPPs
* Other utilities
* Industry outsiders
- "Full service" energy companies
- General Investors
F. 1.2 Potential "Customers" of New Transmission Capacity
* The builder (generator/aggregator) would use it for its own sales
* The utility in whose service territory the assets would be built
* Users in adjoining regions that would use it to "bridge" large regional price differentials.
F. 1.3 Current Regional Conditions
* Congestion (or not) on the system
F.2 STRUCTURAL ANALYSIS OF THE TRANSMISSION MARKET
NOTE: Criteria that were deemed totally irrelevant to this discussion are not accompanied by any
"analysis."
CRITERIA AND ANALYSIS VALUE DATA NEEDED
I. THREAT OF ENTRY
A. Barriers to Entry
(1) Economies of scale -
* There are significant economies of scale in the III
transmission segment of the industry that probably do not
vary much by location.
1Cited in: "Power Pundits Make Their Pitches," 42.
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(2) Product Differentiation -
* It should be noted that Porter defines product differentiation
in terms of brand identification and customer loyalty. Using
that definition, locating in an area where the local utility has
developed negative "brand recognition" would make potential
customers less concerned about entrusting their transmission
needs to a "newcomer." Look for areas where there are
customers who are significantly displeased with the local
utility and are specifically looking for alternatives.
* If one (the entrant) has an established reputation in the
industry it would be easier to take advantage, at least
somewhat, of Porter's product differentiation objectives.
(3) Capital Requirements -
* Some areas have higher construction costs than others.
Look for places where the costs are low because the highly
capitalized transmission assets will not have a chance of
competing with existing equipment in place if they are
expensive to build.
(4) Switching Costs -
The industry structure, regulated by the states, could be the
source of significant switching costs or at least barriers to
switching. For example, how stranded investment is handled
could be very crucial. Look for places where fixed switching
charges are not assessed up front. If switching charges are
implemented, perhaps look for a place where they are charged
every time a change in transmission providers is made, once
a customer switches they will have a charge to pay if they
leave you.
(5) Access to Distribution Channels -
In all states, currently, this is a fundamental barrier to entry.
One could only conceive of building a competitive
transmission line where the PUC is considering, or already
has, changed the rules regarding direct sales to consumers.
(6) Cost Advantages Independent of Scale -
(a) Proprietary Product Technology - With transmission
lines being so long-lived, this should not be an advantage of
incumbents.
(b) Favorable Access to Raw Materials -
(c) Favorable locations - States differ significantly on the
process for siting lines. Look for "easier" states.
(d) government subsidies -
(e) Learning or Experience Curve - Unless the entrant is a
company with experience in operating transmission systems,
look for states where ISOs will be running the system.
(7) Government Policy - Clearly, this may a fundamental
barrier to entry. Look for locations where rules do not
foreclose upon transmission construction or that are
progressive in deregulation.
II
I
I
III
ifi
I
m
II
I
Surveys of utility customers -
service ratings.
Harder to measure - respect
within industry.
Cost data for other projects in
region.
Rules promulgated by PUCs.
Rules or deliberations of
PUCs
Zoning rules
Rules of Public Utility
Commissions and other state
agencies.
State plans for deregulation
PUC policies or deliberations
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B. Expected Retaliation
With transmission rates likely to continue to be regulated, M.
this should not be an issue in the foreseeable future.
C. Entry Deterring Price
Once again, with regulated rates, the established utility has
limited ability to charge an entry deterring price. li
Furthermore, if utilities are functionally or corporately
unbundled, they will not be able to "subsidize" transmission
operations to keep competitors out.
D. Properties of Entry Barriers
(1) They change for fundamental reasons - we are seeing this I PUC Decisions/deliberations
in electric power, where the exclusive franchise concept is
diminishing. It is this change in entry barriers (in
generation) that makes this discussion even possible.
(2) They change for company strategic decision reasons - In II Stated intentions of
some cases, the utility may decide to abandon the executives
transmission business altogether. This would bring in a
new entrant - maybe two - creating an unstable market, but Utility decisions
probably one with opportunity.
(3) Resources allow overcoming of entry barriers - I Location of other
If the entrant were the owner of a neighboring transmission transmission assets.
system, this might be possible. Also, if an investor were
willing to pour huge amounts of money into this for a
strategic reason.
E. Experience and Scale As Barriers - Limits
(1) Limit product differentiation - This should not be a III
problem (for the incumbents) -- bigger utility systems may
even make for more product differentiation.
(2) Technological change punishes - only if new Ill
technologies are available.
(3) Impacts Mind-set - These economies of scale perceptions m
are still justified.
F. Nullification of Experience Barriers
(1) Process innovations leading to a new experience curve - III
This would not vary spatially.
(2) Low cost through experience may cost product III
differentiation - The ability to differentiate will probably
increase with experience.
(3) Multiple firms using the experience approach may prove II Intentions of potential
fatal - Avoid areas where a multitude of firms will be competitors
entering with the hopes of garnering market share, rather
than short terms profits, in order to "learn." Not a likely
scenario though.
(4) Aggressive pursuit of cost declines through experience Il
may draw attention away from developments - This would
only be possible if significant new technologies were to
become available.
B. INTENSITY OF RIVALRY AMONG EXISTING COMPETITORS
1. Intensity is caused by:
(1) Numerous or Equally Balanced Competitors - Currently M
there is not competition anywhere. This would mean that
whenever competition comes into being, it will be the
established firm versus a variety of entrants (probably not
more than one).
(2) Slow Industry Growth - competition will be less intense I Data on transmission usage
in markets that are growing. growth by region
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(3) High Fixed or Storage Costs - this is a problem IIm
everywhere.
(4) Lack of Differentiation or Switching Costs - A state may II PUC regulations regarding
require that all transmission assets be run by an independent ISOs.
system operator, which would reduce differentiation.
(5) Capacity augmented in Large Increments - Larger markets II Energy supply within a
will be able to absorb new transmission capacity better than control area or region.
smaller control areas.
(6) Diverse Competitors - There would not likely be more MI
than one or two new entrants in any location.
(7) High Strategic Stakes - Look for areas where the utility I Attitudes of management of
does not view transmission as vital to the essence of being a utility
utility.
(8) High Exit Barriers - This will presumably be true in all II Degree to which existing
places, because of the specificity and high fixed cost of capacity must still be paid for
transmission equipment. Are there areas, though, where within a region.
more of the transmission assets have been paid off.
B. Shifting Rivalry - since a retail market has yet to exist, M
let us not examine this characteristic now.
C. Exit Barriers and Entry Barriers - the objective is to look II Regulations of an area
for areas where entry barriers are high (yet can be cleared by
the particular investor) and exit barriers are low. Look for
areas where regulations make entry more difficult -- siting.
III. PRESSURE FROM SUBSTITUTE PRODUCTS
* At this time there is no substitute for transmission except II Percent of power consumed in
for on-site generation. Areas where the major (potential) a region that is self-generated.
customers have already turned to this option would be more
desirable, in that there would not be the potential for loss of
power being transmitted.
IV. BARGAINING POWER OF BUYERS
A. Buyers are powerful if...
(1) Concentrated or purchases large volumes relative to
sales - The larger the number of generators, small
distribution companies, and aggregators (in a restructure
industry) the better.
(2) The products it purchases from the industry represen
. .. .
. . .
9 1 1
Number of generators and
aggregators/distribution
companies in a region.
Demographics of local
significant fraction of the buyer's costs or purchases - look industry
for areas where the industry tends to be electricity intensive,
which mean that their price elasticity is higher. Whether
such facilities would be willing to trade lower price for less
reliability (which is how a new entrant would be painted by
the incumbent utility) is difficult to know.
(3) The products or purchases from the industry are standard III
or undifferentiated - transmission service is spatially uniform
in its differentiation.
(4) It faces few switching costs - This would be determined III
by the types of contracts that one signs and how one agrees
to provide service. If you have customers sign long-term
contracts and disconnect themselves from other transmission
lines there would be higher switching costs.
(5) It earns low profits - Look for areas where the economy II Profiles of incumbent
is robust. For example, at the present time avoid areas businesses and their
where defense is a large % of industry. The difficulty in profitability.
this, though, is that one is making a 30+ year investment.
"Massachusetts Miracles" come and go often within that
period.
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(6) Buyers pose a credible threat of backward integration - II Size of price sensitive
Avoid areas where there are many price-sensitive customers customers
that are large enough buyers to consider self-generation.
(7) The industry's product is unimportant to the quality of mI
the buyer's products or services - Look for areas where
electric quality is important. The downside of this is that
the incumbent utility will probably take the position of,
"why trust your service to a new company when we've been
around for 100 years."
(8) The buyer has full information - Look for areas where the II Structure of deregulation
set-up is a longer term contract, with more proprietary
economic dispatch data. Avoid electronic bulletin boards
where buyers can purchase energy easily. This would not be
possible if the FERC Mega-NOPR comes to fruition.
B. Altering Buyer Power
Buyer selection - this does not vary spatially. ,ll
V. BARGAINING POWER OF SUPPLIERS
Suppliers Can Exert Bargaining Power if... .
(1) It is dominated by afew companies more concentrated TIT
than the industry it sells to - Except for the companies that
build the transmission equipment (which would be national
in scope) there are no real suppliers to the industry. It is
more appropriate to think of transmission as a conduit
between two transmission customers.
(2) It is not obliged to contend with other substitute products Il
for sale to the industry - This is not a regional issue.
(3) The industry is not an important customer of the supplier III
group - this is not really an issue, and to the degree that it
is, it is not a region-based one.
(4) The supplier's product is an important input to the TIT
buyer's business - This is spatially invariant.
(5) The supplier group's products are differentiated or it has III
built up switching costs - this is not a regional issue.
(6) The supplier group poses a credible threat offorward in
integration - This is not reasonable to consider.
VI. GOVERNMENT AS A FORCE IN INDUSTRY COMPETITION
* As has been seen throughout, the local government is one I State policies on
of the most important factors in determining a transmission transmission siting and
line location. This is true because the industry we are progressiveness toward
attempting to differentiate, is fundamentally similar - it is deregulation.
only the buyers, sellers, and the regulatory environment
which makes a difference from location to location.
F.3 WHAT CHARACTERISTICS OF A LOCATION WOULD MAKE IT
FAVORABLE FOR BUILDING NEW TRANSMISSION ASSETS?
IDENTIFY TARGET INDUSTRIES (or in this case, locations)
CRITERIA AND ANALYSIS VALUE DATA NEEDED
1. Industry is in Disequilibrium -
(a) New Industries - This whole discussion is completely I Intentions/Decisions of the
moot unless the local regulatory commission is willing to PUC
allow other companies into the transmission business.
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(b) Rising Entry Barriers - Below is the criteria that Porter
uses to judge the wisdom of early entry. They would all
appear to be more characteristic of the industry in general,
rather than concepts that could vary (or at least predictably
so) as a function of location.
Early Entry is desirable when:
* Image and reputation of the firm are important to the buyer
* Early entry can initiate the learning process -
* Customer loyalty will be great -
* Absolute cost advantages can be gained by early
commitment to resources -
Early Entry is Risky when:
* Early Competition and Market segmentation are on a basis
that will be different later in the development of the industry
* Costs of opening up a market are great (customer
information, regulations) - Yes, everywhere.
* There will be costly competition with small firms while
larger formidable ones will come in later
with the economies of scale -
* Technological change will make early assets obsolete -
perhaps eventually, but there are many current assets that
will become obsolete first.
(c) Poor Information - If one knows a lot about a specific
area, it might have an advantage in appraising the potential
market and knowing how to go about competing in accord
with local customs.
2. Slow or Ineffectual Retaliation
(a) Incumbents cost of effective retaliation outweighs the
benefits - Look for areas where a utility has newer (relatively
unpaid for) transmission lines and therefore, simply can not
afford to retaliate.
(b) There is a paternal dominant firm or tight group of long-
standing leaders - This is rather characteristic of the general
utility industry.
(c) The entrant can exploit conventional wisdom - Building a
competitive transmission line would be contrary to the
conventional wisdom everywhere.
(d) Incumbent's Costs of responding are great given the need
to protect their existing businesses - if the utility has a good
reputation, its attempts to "squash" the new competition
may be taken badly by the public - thus losing an advantage.
(3) Firm has lower entry costs than other firms - If one
already operates in a region, most especially if it is a
transmission utility in the region, it might face lower
barriers to entry. Also, being a transmission utility in
general might allow for lower costs. At the same time,
though, not being in the utility industry might allow for a
more lean operation.
(4) The firm has a distinctive ability to influence the
industry structure - Building a transmission line might give
an IPP or an outside company a chance to change the
paradigm of the industry.
III
II
II
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I
One's knowledge of an area
Age of existing transmission
assets
Current feelings toward
utility
Builder's strategy for the
restructured industry.
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(5) There will be positive effects on a firm's existing I What other businesses one
businesses - An existing IPP or utility may view the owns.
construction of a new transmission line as a way of
facilitating demand for existing or expanded generation
capabilities. Others, such as energy service companies
might see opportunities as well.
F.4 CONSOLIDATION OF RESULTS
Having gone through the detailed sets of criteria, let us now consolidate the important results.
F.4.1 Structural Analysis Results
F.4.1.1 Threat of Entry
The threat of entry is lower with fewer barriers to entry. Hence look for areas where:
* The local utility is not in good standing with consumers.
* There are no policy-mandated switching costs.
* Transmission siting procedures are relatively easy.
* The PUC would allow a transmission line to be built by an entity other than the franchised utility.
* One has a presence in it already (IPP or other industry) or nearby (a neighboring transmission system).
* Willingness of the PUC to allow retail sales
F.4.1.2 Intensity of Rivalry Among Suppliers
Look for areas where:
* There are many distribution companies/aggregators.
* Demand is growing relatively quickly (either in the region or that passes through the region's transmission
lines.)
F.4.1.3 Pressure From Substitute Products
There are no significant findings here.
F.4.1.4 Bargaining Power of Buyers
Look for areas where:
* There are many distribution companies/aggregators.
F.4.1.5 Bargaining Power of Suppliers
There are no significant findings here.
F.4.1.6 Govemment As a Force In Industry
* Look for areas where the state regulators are progressive with regard to deregulation.
F.4.2 Location Characteristics Results
Look for areas where:
* Regulatory commissions are progressive with regard to utility regulation.
* Existing businesses could be enhanced by the construction of a transmission line. Likely scenarios
include a power aggregator or generator that would benefit from increased access to markets or a neighboring
transmission company that would be looking to expand its system.
* One could create new market structures through the construction of a line. This would be especially true
for an IPP or an aspiring comprehensive energy services company.
opportunities.
F.5 BALANCE OF FOUR IMPORTANT POINTS
When entering, one must balance:
(1) the investment costs to be in the new business, such as investment in manufacturing facilities and
inventory
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* Look for areas where the cost of construction is low.
* Look for areas where the siting process is less intensive and where compensation for externalities (such as
environmental remediation) is low.
(2) The additional investment required to overcome structural entry barriers, such as brand identification and
proprietary technology
Clearly an new entrant is in a difficult position, since there is already an established firm in place which has
a natural monopoly.
* Look for areas where large customers are highly dissatisfied with their local utility and avoid areas where
the utility is highly respected.
(3) Expected reaction of incumbent firms (in the form of retaliation)
* Look for areas where the utility is constrained from retaliation by regulation (probably everywhere).
(4) Expected cash flows from being in the business.
Transmission lines that carry power between regions between which there is a high price gradient would be
expected to have the potential for high power and cash flows.
Frequently unanticipated caveats include:
(1) Subtle barriers to entry (brand name recognition, access to distribution, etc.)
* Avoid areas where the local utility might retains a strangle-hold on generation or distribution (i.e. there are
few IPPs, aggregators, or public distribution systems).
* Avoid areas where the utility is well-liked
(2) Effect of entrant's new capacity needs to be considered.
* Areas where one's new transmission capacity will barely be noticed in the larger scheme of things will
help to ensure that no radical price changes occur to do entry, and its impact on the supply-demand
equilibrium. This might be wishful thinking, however, due to system economies of scale, the reserve
margins that are standard in the industry, and the large blocks that transmission capacity is built in.
(3) Reactions of existing firms
* Look for an area in which the utility is not in a financial
expansion.
position to have a significant capacity
F.6 GENERIC STRATEGIES FOR ENTRY
(1) Reduce Product Costs
(a) New Process Technology - When new technologies M
become available, opportunities will not vary spatially.
(b) Larger plant Look for areas where high voltage lines II Knowledge of the grid and the
have not been needed in the past but now are needed. (This voltages of lines.
might also be a sign of growth).
(c) More modern facilities - Look for areas where the I Age and efficiency of
utility has older, less efficient lines in need of replacement. transmission assets.
(This may not be likely, however due to the durability of
transmission equipment).
(d) Shared activities with existing businesses that yield a II Needs of other companies.
cost advantage - Are there cogenerators or other IPPs that are
looking for more transmission access?
(2) Buy In with Low Price - This is very difficult due to the Il
high capital costs of transmission assets.
(3) Offer a Superior Product, Broadly Defined - It would be I
nearly impossible, barring technological breakthroughs, to
offer a superior product, broadly defined when one enters the
transmission business.
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(4) Discover a New Niche - Look for areas where there are I Profile of potential customers
significant classes of customers with similar needs that could
be met by a specific transmission line.
(5) Introduce a Marketing Innovation - Are there new ways III Location of assets
in which the entrant could bundle transmission based upon Competencies of entrant
the capabilities of the firm and the needs of potential Needs of consumers
customers in a region?
(6) Use Piggybacked Distribution - If the potential entrant II location of
runs other businesses, then locate in an area where it has customers/suppliers
multiple current customers/suppliers with whom it has a
good relationship. ,
F.7 GENERAL CONCLUSIONS
Based upon this process, criteria for determining a preferred area for building a
transmission line are as follows:
* Before anything else, the local authorities must be open to progressive regulatory policies.
* The state has a relatively easy transmitting siting process.
* The cost of line construction, including compensation for environmental externalities, is low.
* The local utility has many dissatisfied customers.
* New transmission capacity would facilitate a company's existing business, whether it be an IPP,
neighboring utility, or an energy services company that faces constraints or unfavorable terms.
* Demand is growing relatively quickly - whether it be in the immediate region or as a result of being
located between regions with high electricity price differentials.
* There are many distribution companies/aggregators and/or non-concentrated ownership of generators in the
region.
* An IPP or other energy supplier views an opportunity to create a new market structure in the region
through the construction of a transmission line.
* Look for particular places where an additional line might be needed to meet the needs of a niche users.

Appendix G
Porter's Acquisition Framework
The Industry wi((have winners andlosers, champions and faten giants who facked the
vision to compete.
-- Entery)AnnuaIfport (1993)
PORTER'S ACQUISITION STRATEGY
CHAPTER 3 - A FRAMEWORK FOR COMPETITIVE ANALYSIS
Forecasting acquisitions can be done in the same logic as forecasting potential
entrants.
(which are)
* Firms not in the industry but who could overcome entry barriers particularly
easily.
* Firms for whom there is obvious synergy from being in the industry
* Firms for whom competing in the industry is an obvious extension of corporate
strategy
* Customers or suppliers who may integrate backward or forward
CHAPTER 9 - FRAGMENTED INDUSTRIES
One approach to consolidation
In some industries there may ultimately be some advantages to holding a significant
share, but .it is hard to build share incrementally because of the causes of
fragmentation. If local contracts are important, this would be the case... If an
acquisition allows one to reach a threshold share, it can allow for significant
advantages of scale.
CHAPTER 16 - ENTRY THROUGH ACQUISITION
"Entry through acquisition is subject to a completely different analytical framework
than entry through internal development because acquisition does not add a new
firm to the industry in the direct sense." (p. 350)
The critical point is the recognition that the price of an acquisition is set in the
market for companies. An efficient market for companies works to eliminate any
above-average profits. (and Porter indicates that this is the case now in the U.S.)
'Entergy, 1993, B.
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Generally, the seller has the option to continue or to sell. This creates a floor price.
The analysis suggests that it is quite hard to win at the acquisition game.
Acquisitions will most likely be profitable if:
1. The floor price created by the seller's alternative of keeping the business is low
2. The market for companies is imperfect and does not eliminate above-average
returns through the bidding process.
3. The buyer has a unique ability to operate the acquired business
"It is crucial to note that the bidding process can eliminate the profitability of an
acquisition even if the floor price is low. Thus favorable conditions in at least two of
the areas are necessary for success."
Also, it is important to understand the motives and situations of other potential
bidders.
Appendix H
Generation Acquisition Results
As our eperience with long distance, gas and local telephone service showed, once the
notion of a 'natural monopoly' is chatTenged it is only a matter of when -- not if --
competition will come... The fact is that no 'unnatural monopoly has ever successfully
fought off competition once it has started1
-- Dan Schaefer (1996)
H.1 CONSIDERATIONS REGARDING UTILITY GENERATION SALES
H. 1.1 Why Would A Utility Want To Sell Its Generation Assets?
* It must by law;
* To escape an unfavorable regulatory situation;
* It does not feel that it could effectively compete in a competitive
generation business;
* It wants to focus on what it thinks it can do best (T&D); and
* It views generation as becoming a commodity business, with sub-standard
returns to its shareholders.
H. 1.2 Types Of Utility Buyers
* Utility that operates contiguously to the acquired;
* Utility whose operation is not contiguous, but is within the same
jurisdiction (as the acquired);
* Utility in the same NERC region (as the acquired); and
* Utility that is not in close proximity to the acquired.
H. 1.3 Types Of IPP Buyers
* IPP within service territory of utility;
* IPP within same jurisdiction as utility;
* IPP within same NERC region as utility; and
* IPP entering into new area.
H. 1.4 Types Of Buyers Who Are Not "Currently in The Business" (Non-utilities, Non-
IPPs)
* Closely-related electric companies (such as GE, Bechtel);
* Closely-related non-electric companies (gas companies); and
* Unrelated companies.
- large electricity users
H. 1.5 Assumptions About The Region
* Constricted/surplus capacity within NERC region;
* High/low cost electricity within NERC region;
* State regulatory environment favorable/unfavorable to retail wheeling;
and
* Many/some/few significant players that are competitively-oriented.
1Cited in: "Schaefer Wants EEI 'Honesty' on Competition Legislation."
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H.2 QUESTION: FROM THE VIEWPOINT OF A CURRENT UTILITY, UNDER
WHAT SITUATIONS WOULD IT BE DESIRABLE TO PURCHASE THE
GENERATION ASSETS OF ANOTHER UTILITY?
H.2.1 Analysis
ENTRY THROUGH ACQUISITION I I
CRITERIA AND ANALYSIS VALUE DATA NEEDED
FAVORABLE CONDITIONS IN 2 OF THE FOLLOWING THREE (I. - III.) ARE NECESSARY
I. THE HEIGHT OF THE FLOOR PRICE (will be low if...)
1. The seller feels a compulsion to sell
(a) The seller has estate problems - This does not III
seem like a problem for a utility.
(b) The seller needs capital quickly - This may not be I Financial situation of
capital for expansion (although it conceivably company
could). It may be money needed to keep the utility
afloat. Even now there are a few utilities "near the
brink." As competition continues there might be a
desire to sell off generation assets in order to stay
liquid.
(c) The seller has lost key management or sees no III Departures of key
successors for existing management - In a public utility managers and the
this should not be a problem. In an organization that succession process
large they would likely look outside when
management leaves if there are not capable successors
on the inside. In fact, as the business is rapidly
changing, a Board might want be inclined to look
outside anyway.
What is not here, yet is clearly applicable is that a I
utility might be forced to sell by law (as may yet New state regulations
happen in CA)
2. The seller is not optimistic about its ability to
continue to run the business.
(a) The seller perceives capital constraints to II Company finances
growth- Look at the financial situation of the utility.
(b) The seller recognizes its managerial weaknesses- I Profiles of management
Look for utilities where the upper management is all
from a utility background and/or does not seem There public comments -
comfortable with the new competitive environment, perhaps even material in
the company quarterly and
annual reports.
II. IMPERFECTIONS IN THE MARKET FOR COMPANIES
1. The buyer has superior information - A utility from II Location vis-a-vis other
the same jurisdiction or region MIGHT have a better bidders
ability to know the potential for growth than those
from further away. However, such benefits will
likely be marginal. Also, there could be market
share problems with such a bid as well. (Although
from the point of view of PUHCA it might be
desirable.)
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2. The number of bidders is low - Look for assets that I General feel of interest
attract little attention. (However, there might be
reasons for this lack of attention.)
3. The condition of the economy is bad - Utility assets II Economic statistics
that are freed during an economic downturn would
likely be more desirable. Especially since the freeing
of assets may be due to regulatory reasons, rather
than economic ones, they might be cut loose at
"opportune" times for a potential buyer (provided
that the buyer is in a sufficiently sound position to
bid.)
4. The selling company is sick - Look for companies on I Information about company
the verge of bankruptcy (or in bankruptcy.) health
5. The seller has objectives besides maximizing the II Intangible sentiments of
price received for the businesses - It is POSSIBLE current management
that a utility acquirer might have a slight
advantage over IPPs or outsiders in that management
might feel a desire to keep some vestige of utility
ownership or a belief that a utility might cut fewer
employees. However, given that IOUs are large
public corporations sentiments probably are not very
significant.
III. UNIQUE ABILITY TO OPERATE THE SELLER
1. The buyer has a distinctive ability to improve the I Operational capability of
operation of the seller - A well-run utility would be "buyer" utility
able to have an advantage over other potential
buyers given its successful experience at operating a
large amount of capacity.
2. The firm buys into an industry that meets the
criteria for internal entry from last discussion we
found these to be:
* regulatory body open to competition - I
* region where a business currently operates - I
* where the other utilities are not competitively- I
oriented -
* where an entrant might be able to take advantage I
of a unique market structure -
3. The acquisition will uniquely help a buyer's positio I Location of utility assets
in its existing businesses - A close-by utility's assets vis-a-vis acquirer's assets
could be particularly appealing, especially if they
would increase the ability to create a differentiated
product.
Also, if the "seller" utility had some generation I Competencies of the
competencies that were lacking in the "buyer's" seller's generation assets
repertoire. vis-h-vis those in the
buyers
IV. CAUSES OF "IRRATIONAL BIDDING"
1. The bidder sees a unique way to improve the I Examine qualities of other
acquisition target - are there "logical" bidders potential bidders.
because of a unique ability to improve the utility
assets?
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2. The acquisition will help the bidder's existing I Intentions of other
business - Is there a company, such as a natural gas companies in region
company, that is seeking to become a "full service
energy service" company.
3. The bidder has goals or motives other than the
maximization of profit -
* growth potential - is there an IPP or utility in the I Intentions of other IPPs or
region that is known to desire growth utilities. Perhaps, also,
look for companies such as
US Gen. who might be
seeking entry into an area.
* one-shot financial gain - is there is major user of I Intentions of major
electricity in a region that might see this as a way of industrial users
lowering rates and creating an income stream? (This
is probably most likely in the event that generation
assets are sold piece-meal rather than in large
blocks.)
* management idiosyncrasies - is there someone III
around who desperately wants to run old generators -
this is very unlikely because they could enter,
probably for less hassle, via a new plant.
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H.3 QUESTION: FROM THE VIEWPOINT OF A CURRENT IPP, UNDER
WHAT SITUATIONS WOULD IT BE DESIRABLE TO PURCHASE THE
GENERATION ASSETS OF A UTILITY?
H.3.1 Analysis
ENTRY THROUGH ACQUISITION,
CRITERIA AND ANALYSIS VALUE DATA NEEDED
FAVORABLE CONDITIONS IN 2 OF THE FOLLOWING THREE (I. - II.) ARE NECESSARY
I. THE HEIGHT OF THE FLOOR PRICE (will be low if...)
1. The seller feels a compulsion to sell
(a) The seller has estate problems - This does not III
seem like a problem for a utility.
(b) The seller needs capital quickly - This may not be I Financial situation of
capital for expansion (although it conceivably company
could). It may be money needed to keep the utility
afloat. Even now there are a few utilities "near the
brink." As competition continues there might be a
desire to sell off generation assets in order to stay
liquid.
(c) The seller has lost key management or sees no III Departures of key
successors for existing management - In a public utility managers and the
this should not be a problem. In an organization that succession process
large they would likely look outside when
management leaves if there are not capable successors
on the inside. In fact, as the business is rapidly
changing, a Board might want be inclined to look
outside anyway.
What is not here, yet is clearly applicable is that a I
utility might be forced to sell by law (as may yet New state regulations
happen in CA)
2. The seller is not optimistic about its ability to
continue to run the business.
(a) The seller perceives capital constraints to II Company finances
growth- Look at the financial situation of the utility.
(b) The seller recognizes its managerial weaknesses- I Profiles of management
Look for utilities where the upper management is all
from a utility background and/or does not seem There public comments -
comfortable with the new competitive environment, perhaps even material in
the company quarterly and
annual reports.
II. IMPERFECTIONS IN THE MARKET FOR COMPANIES
1. The buyer has superior information- An IPP from II Location vis-at-vis other
the same jurisdiction or region MIGHT have a better bidders
ability to know the potential for growth than those
from further away. However, such benefits will
likely be marginal. Further, there could be some
market-power concerns with an IPP in a region
purchasing large amounts of utility capacity.
2. The number of bidders is low - Look for assets that I General feel of interest
attract little attention. (However, there might be
reasons for this lack of attention.)
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3. The condition of the economy is bad - Utility assets II Economic statistics
that are freed during an economic downturn would
likely be more desirable. Especially since the freeing
of assets may be due to regulatory reasons, rather
than economic ones, they might be cut loose at
"opportune" times for a potential buyer (provided
that the buyer is in a sufficiently sound position to
bid.)
4. The selling company is sick - Look for companies on I Information about company
the verge of bankruptcy (or in bankruptcy.) health
5. The seller has objectives besides maximizing the II Historical relationship
price received for the businesses If an IPP has had a between companies
historically-good relationship with the utility via
power-purchasing contracts with a utility it might Intangible sentiments of
have a slight advantage. However, given that IOUs current management
are large public corporations sentiments probably are
not very significant.
III. UNIQUE ABILITY TO OPERATE THE SELLER
1. The buyer has a distinctive ability to improve the I IPP's capability to run
operation of the seller - An IPP with high competence efficient generation
in efficient operations would have an advantage over plants.
less operationally competent bidders.
2. The firm buys into an industry that meets the
criteria for internal entry from last discussion we
found these to be:
* regulatory body open to competition - I
* region where a business currently operates - I
* where the other utilities are not competitively- I
oriented -
* where an entrant might be able to take advantage I
of a unique market structure -
3. The acquisition will uniquely help a buyer's I IPP market strategy
position in its existing businesses - If a local IPP is
looking to expand market share, product
differentiation, or if a remote IPP is attempting to
enter a new area (and see such a strategy as vital for
future success), acquisition would be one route.
IV. CAUSES OF "IRRATIONAL BIDDING"
1. The bidder sees a unique way to improve the I Examine qualities of other
acquisition target - are there "logical" bidders potential bidders.
because of a unique ability to improve the utility
assets?
2. The acquisition will help the bidder's existing I Intentions of other
business - Is there a company, such as a natural gas companies in region
company, that is seeking to become a "full service
energy service" company.
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3. The bidder has goals or motives other than the
maximization of profit -
* growth potential - is there an IPP or utility in the
region that is known to desire growth
* one-shot financial gain - is there is major user of
electricity in a region that might see this as a way of
lowering rates and creating an income stream? (This
is probably most likely in the event that generation
assets are sold piece-meal rather than in large
blocks.)
* management idiosyncrasies - is there someone
around who desperately wants to run old generators -
this is very unlikely because they could enter,
probably for less hassle, via a new plant.
I
I
III
Intentions of other IPPs or
utilities. Perhaps, also,
look for companies such as
US Gen. who might be
seeking entry into an area.
Intentions of major
industrial users
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H.4 QUESTION: FROM THE VIEWPOINT OF AN "ELECTRICITY
OUTSIDER," UNDER WHAT SITUATIONS WOULD IT BE DESIRABLE
TO PURCHASE THE GENERATION ASSETS OF A UTILITY?"
H.4.1 Analysis
ENTRY THROUGH ACQUISITION
CRITERIA AND ANALYSIS VALUE DATA NEEDED
FAVORABLE CONDITIONS IN 2 OF THE FOLLOWING THREE (I. - III.) ARE NECESSARY
I. THE HEIGHT OF THE FLOOR PRICE (will be low if...)
1. The seller feels a compulsion to sell
(a) The seller has estate problems - This does not III
seem like a problem for a utility.
(b) The seller needs capital quickly - This may not be I Financial situation of
capital for expansion (although it conceivably company
could). It may be money needed to keep the utility
afloat. Even now there are a few utilities "near the
brink." As competition continues there might be a
desire to sell off generation assets in order to stay
liquid.
(c) The seller has lost key management or sees no III Departures of key
successors for existing management - In a public utility managers and the
this should not be a problem. In an organization that succession process
large they would likely look outside when
management leaves if there are not capable successors
on the inside. In fact, as the business is rapidly
changing, a Board might want be inclined to look
outside anyway.
What is not here, yet is clearly applicable is that a I
utility might be forced to sell by law (as may yet New state regulations
happen in CA)
2. The seller is not optimistic about its ability to
continue to run the business.
(a) The seller perceives capital constraints to II Company finances
growth- Look at the financial situation of the utility.
(b) The seller recognizes its managerial weaknesses- I Profiles of management
Look for utilities where the upper management is all
from a utility background and/or does not seem There public comments -
comfortable with the new competitive environment, perhaps even material in
the company quarterly and
annual reports.
II. IMPERFECTIONS IN THE MARKET FOR COMPANIES
1. The buyer has superior information - A company II Location vis-a-vis other
from the same region MIGHT have a better ability to bidders
know the potential for growth than those from
further away. However, such benefits will likely be
marginal.
2. The number of bidders is low -Look for assets that I General feel of interest
attract little attention. (However, there might be
reasons for this lack of attention.)
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3. The condition of the economy is bad - Utility assets II Economic statistics
that are freed during an economic downturn would
likely be more desirable. Especially since the freeing
of assets may be due to regulatory reasons, rather
than economic ones, they might be cut loose at
"opportune" times for a potential buyer (provided
that the buyer is in a sufficiently sound position to
bid.)
4. The selling company is sick -Look for companies on I Information about company
the verge of bankruptcy (or in bankruptcy.) health
5. The seller has objectives besides maximizing the II Historical relationship
price received for the businesses - Perhaps, if the between companies
outside company has had a good business
relationship with the utility there might be a bit of Intangible sentiments of
an advantage. However, given that IOUs are large current management
public corporations sentiments probably are not very
significant.
III. UNIQUE ABILITY TO OPERATE THE SELLER
1. The buyer has a distinctive ability to improve the III
operation of the seller - It is likely that there are
IPPs or other utilities who are better positioned to
operate a large existing set of plants.
2. The firm buys into an industry that meets the
criteria for internal entry from last discussion we
found these to be:
* regulatory body open to competition - I
* region where a business currently operates - I
* where the other utilities are not competitively- I
oriented -
* where an entrant might be able to take advantage I
of a unique market structure -
3. The acquisition will uniquely help a buyer's I Goals of the particular
position in its existing businesses - Given that these acquirer
assets already exist, there would be less incentive for
a company such as GE, Bechtel, or a natural gas
supply company to purchase the assets than in
building new ones. However, a company that is
striving to be a full-service energy services provider
might see utility generation assets as a segue into a
market it wishes to capture.
IV. CAUSES OF "IRRATIONAL BIDDING"
1. The bidder sees a unique way to improve the I Examine qualities of other
acquisition target - are there "logical" bidders potential bidders.
because of a unique ability to improve the utility
assets?
2. The acquisition will help the bidder's existing I Intentions of other
business - Is there a company, such as a natural gas companies in region
company, that is seeking to become a "full service
energy service" company.
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3. The bidder has goals or motives other than the
maximization of profit -
* growth potential - is there an IPP or utility in the
region that is known to desire growth
* one-shot financial gain - is there is major user of
electricity in a region that might see this as a way of
lowering rates and creating an income stream? (This
is probably most likely in the event that generation
assets are sold piece-meal rather than in large
blocks.)
* management idiosyncrasies - is there someone
around who desperately wants to run old generators -
this is very unlikely because they could enter,
probably for less hassle, via a new plant.
Intentions of other IPPs or
utilities. Perhaps, also,
look for companies such as
US Gen. who might be
seeking entry into an area.
Intentions of major
industrial users
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Transmission Acquisition Results
Despite the enormous importance of the electricity transmission system in the V.S. and
its key role in creating more competitive power markets, surprisingly few people know
much about the physicalfchfaracteristics of the networkand the costs to operate it.'
-- ýRrsource Data International (1995)
1.1 CONSIDERATIONS REGARDING UTILITY TRANSMISSION SALES
In this appendix we use Porter's framework to determine when it would be attractive for a buyer
to purchase the transmission assets of a utility (i.e. when a buyer would be able to purchase
them for a sub-economic price.) First let us establish several scenarios for this to occur.
I.1.1 Why Would A Utility Sell Its Transmission Assets?
* It must by law;
* To escape an unfavorable regulatory situation; or
* Strategic purposes.
I.1.2 Who Might Purchase Transmission Assets?
* IPPs;
* Other Utilities: or
* New Transcos
- Other energy companies
-Owned by transmission equipment builders
- A government established one
1.1.3
*0
Assumptions 
About 
Th 
n
Constricted/surplus capacity within the region.
1.2 UNDER WHAT CONDITIONS WOULD IT BE DESIRABLE FOR A NEW
ENTRANT TO PURCHASE A UTILITY'S TRANSMISSION ASSETS?
1.2.1 Analysis
S"Transmission Markets in the U.S.," 1995, 3.
ENTRY THROUGH ACQUISITION
CRITERIA AND ANALYSIS VALUE DATA NEEDED
FAVORABLE CONDITIONS IN 2 OF THE FOLLOWING THREE (I. -II.) ARE NECESSARY
I. THE HEIGHT OF THE FLOOR PRICE (will be low if...)
1. The seller feels a comulgion to sel
(a) The seller has estate problems - This does not III
seem like a problem for a utility.
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(b) The seller needs capital quickly - This may not be I Financial situation of
capital for expansion (although it conceivably company
could). It may be money needed to keep the utility
afloat. Even now there are a few utilities "near the
brink." As competition continues there might be a
desire to sell off transmission assets (which some
believe to be worth more than their embedded cost) in
order to stay liquid.
(c) The seller has lost key management or sees no III Departures of key
successors for existing management - In a public utility managers and the
this should not be a problem. An organization that succession process
large would likely look outside when management
leaves if there are no capable successors on the inside.
In fact, as the business is rapidly changing, a Board
might want be inclined to look outside anyway.
What is not included in Porter's framework, but is
clearly applicable is that a utility might be forced I
by law to sell its transmission assets. New state regulations
2. The seller is not optimistic about its ability to
continue to run the business.
(a) The seller perceives capital constraints to II Company finances
growth- Look at the financial situation of the utility.
Much of the capital of transmission lines is already
invested and long-lived.
(b) The seller recognizes its managerial weaknesses- II Profiles of management
Look for utilities where the upper management is all
from a utility background and/or does not seem There public comments -
comfortable with the new competitive environment, perhaps even material in
the company quarterly and
annual reports.
II. IMPERFECTIONS IN THE MARKET FOR COMPANIES
1. The buyer has superior information - A company in II Location vis-a-vis other
the same jurisdiction or region MIGHT have a better bidders
ability to know the potential for growth than those
from further away. However, such benefits will
likely be marginal.
2. The number of bidders is low - Look for assets that I General feel of interest
attract little attention. A government mandated
Transco would obviously cause only a single bid.
3. The condition of the economy is bad - Utility assets II Economic statistics
that are freed during an economic downturn would
likely be more desirable. Especially since the freeing
of assets may be due to regulatory reasons, rather
than economic ones, they might be cut loose at
"opportune" times for a potential buyer (provided
that the buyer is in a sufficiently sound position to
bid.)
4. The selling company is sick - Look for companies on I Information about company
the verge of bankruptcy (or in bankruptcy). IIhealth
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5. The seller has objectives besides maximizing the III
price received for the businesses - Due to the
regulated nature of the business and the focus that is
now being placed on the industry, a utility that
attempts to sell based upon intangible criteria would
face serious scrutiny -- especially if the sale would
have implications for the recovery of stranded
investments.
III. UNIQUE ABILITY TO OPERATE THE SELLER
1. The buyer has a distinctive ability to improve the II Capital of investor.
operation of the seller - The only benefit that a true
outsider might bring would be a substantial influx of
capital to replace aging facilities, etc.
In the case of a state-Transco, it would allow a
greater coordination of the grid (combining the I State regulations
multiple utilities in a state).
2. The firm buys into an industry that meets the
criteria for internal entry in Appendix D we found
these to be:
* regulatory body open to competition - I * PUC decisions
* region of rising transmission growth (due to I * Statistics on transmission
transmission within or across region) growth
* Ownership of transmission capacity would I * Buyer's strategic plan
facilitate a company's existing business - for example, and current situation
it could create natural gas pipelines over wires.
* where a new transmission entrant might be able to
create a new market structure - This could be the I * Buyer's strategic plan
event that opens transmission ownership to anyone. and current situation
A government mandated Transco certainly would.
3. The acquisition will uniquely help a buyer's positio I Intent of the new entrant.
in its existing businesses - Given that these assets
already exist, there would be less incentive for a
transmission construction company than to build new
ones. However, a company that is striving to be a full-
service energy services provider might see utility
generation assets as a segue into a market it wishes to
capture -- transmission assets could be viewed as
natural gas pipelines on wires.
IV. CAUSES OF "IRRATIONAL BIDDING"
1. The bidder sees a unique way to improve the I Examine qualities of other
acquisition target - are there "logical" bidders potential bidders.
because of a unique ability to improve the utility
assets - particularly is there a utility in the region
with an excellent transmission service history or that
could take advantage of economies of scale?
2. The acquisition will help the bidder's existing I Intentions of other
business - Is there a company, such as a natural gas companies in region
company, that is seeking to become a "full service
energy service" company?
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3. The bidder has goals or motives other than the
maximization of profit -
* growth potential - is there a market player in the
region that sees transmission ownership as a key to
growth - perhaps by having a steady revenue stream?
* one-shot financial gain - is there is major user of
electricity in a region that might see this as a way of
lowering rates and creating an income stream? (The
size and nature of such an investment, however,
would make this somewhat unlikely.)
* management idiosyncrasies - is there someone
around who desperately wants to run a transmission
system?.
Intentions of other players.
Intentions of major
industrial users
1.2.2 Results
1.3 UNDER WHAT CONDITIONS WOULD IT BE DESIRABLE FOR AN IPP
TO PURCHASE A UTILITY'S TRANSMISSION ASSETS?
1.3.1 Analysis
ENTRY THROUGH ACQUISITION I
CRITERIA AND ANALYSIS VALUE DATA NEEDED
FAVORABLE CONDITIONS IN 2 OF THE FOLLOWING THREE (I. - III.) ARE NECESSARY
I. THE HEIGHT OF THE FLOOR PRICE (will be low if...)
1. The seller feels a compulsion to sell
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(a) The seller has estate problems - This does not III
seem like a problem for a utility.
(b) The seller needs capital quickly - This may not be I Financial situation of
capital for expansion (although it conceivably company
could). It may be money needed to keep the utility
afloat. Even now there are a few utilities "near the
brink." As competition continues there might be a
desire to sell off transmission assets (which some
believe to be worth more than their embedded cost) in
order to stay liquid.
(c) The seller has lost key management or sees no III Departures of key
successors for existing management - In a public utility managers and the
this should not be a problem. An organization that succession process
large would likely look outside when management
leaves if there are no capable successors on the inside.
In fact, as the business is rapidly changing, a Board
might want be inclined to look outside anyway.
What is not included in Porter's framework, but is
clearly applicable is that a utility might be forced I
by law to sell its transmission assets. New state regulations
2. The seller is not optimistic about its ability to
continue to run the business.
(a) The seller perceives capital constraints to II Company finances
growth- Look at the financial situation of the utility.
Much of the capital of transmission lines is already
invested and long-lived.
(b) The seller recognizes its managerial weaknesses- II Profiles of management
Look for utilities where the upper management is all
from a utility background and/or does not seem There public comments -
comfortable with the new competitive environment, perhaps even material in
the company quarterly and
annual reports.
II. IMPERFECTIONS IN THE MARKET FOR COMPANIES
1. The buyer has superior information - An IPP from II Location vis-a-vis other
the same juris'diction or region MIGHT have a better bidders
ability to know the potential for growth than those
from further away. However, such benefits will
likely be marginal. It may be because it has plans to
increase the use of the transmission system for its own
purposes.
2. The number of bidders is low - Look for assets that I General feel of interest
attract little attention.
3. The condition of the economy is bad - Utility assets II Economic statistics
that are freed during an economic downturn would
likely be more desirable. Especially since the freeing
of assets may be due to regulatory reasons, rather
than economic ones, they might be cut loose at
"opportune" times for a potential buyer (provided
that the buyer is in a sufficiently sound position to
bid.)
4. The selling company is sick - Look for companies on I Information about company
the verge of bankruptcy (or in bankruptcy). health
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5. The seller has objectives besides maximizing the III
price received for the businesses - Due to the
regulated nature of the business and the focus that is
now being placed on the industry, a utility that
attempts to sell based upon intangible criteria would
face serious scrutiny -- especially if the sale would
have implications for the recovery of stranded
investments.
III. UNIQUE ABILITY TO OPERATE THE SELLER
1. The buyer has a distinctive ability to improve the I IPP's capability to run
operation of the seller - An IPP with high competence efficient generation
in efficient operations would have an advantage over plants.
less operationally competent bidders.
2. The firm buys into an industry that meets the
criteria for internal entry In Appendix D we found
these to be:
* regulatory body open to competition - I * PUC decisions
* region of rising transmission growth (due to I * Statistics on transmission
transmission within or across region) growth
* Ownership of transmission capacity would I * Buyer's strategic plan
facilitate a company's existing business - and current situation
* where a new transmission entrant might be able to I * Buyer's strategic plan
create a new market structure - and current situation
3. The acquisition will uniquely help a buyer's I IPP market strategy
position in its existing businesses - An IPP might view
the acquisition of transmission lines as a way of more
effectively reaching customers.
IV. CAUSES OF "IRRATIONAL BIDDING"
1. The bidder sees a unique way to improve the I Examine qualities of other
acquisition target - are there "logical" bidders potential bidders.
because of a unique ability to improve the utility
assets - particularly is there a utility in the region
with an excellent transmission service history or that
could take advantage of economies of scale?
2. The acquisition will help the bidder's existing I Intentions of other
business - Is there a company, such as a natural gas companies in region
company, that is seeking to become a "full service
energy service" company?
3. The bidder has goals or motives other than the
maximization of profit -
* growth potential - is there a market player in the I Intentions of other players.
region that sees transmission ownership as a key to
growth - perhaps by having a steady revenue stream?
* one-shot financial gain - is there is major user of II Intentions of major
electricity in a region that might see this as a way of industrial users
lowering rates and creating an income stream? (The
size and nature of such ah investment, however,
would make this somewhat unlikely.)
* management idiosyncrasies - is there someone III
around who desperately wants to run a transmission
system?
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1.3.2 Results
From wesee that potentially beneficial asset-specific situatoios ' would Iclade:
SWlity isi poorkmuancial shape.
* dives nt.iý forcedby law (this does not come :specifically from Porter'sinitial criteria-.)
* When ther :aie few potential bidders
AND
* If •the :transmission purchase would enabl.e ,new industry structures that .would open the transmission
industry to IPPs and other non-utilities.
* If trans'minownership would help facilitate sales from existing or future plants.
IDesirable characteri tics of the region where the utility assetw ure locatedk inude:
*.where an entan tmight beAbli totake advantage of a unique market structtre
regiow rtI roperates
*regulatory.body open to competition
'regionofgwthfor transmissiondemand (wheheritbe in orthrouh the reion):
Sitautej toavoid (b to be wary 'f efcessive bids
A p ith region se transmission ownershp0-as a key to gt grow&
:A util- t: tiian ecltansmiss utility o igb~ want toexp its service territoryrwho
could beefitfomn econloiesWofscale.through a merger of transmission90 1 0
* Anotercompany sees these asets as the ability to become a full-service rgservices co a :to
owe ."I"'. Ad.i.: al, source.
oweriowneetrical bill'whilecreating ,,additional revenuesource
1.4 UNDER WHAT CIRCUMSTANCES WOULD IT BE DESIRABLE FOR A
UTILITY TO PURCHASE THE TRANSMISSION ASSETS OF ANOTHER(UTILITY)?
1.4.1 Analysis
ENTRY THROUGH ACQUISITION
CRITERIA AND ANALYSIS VALUE DATA NEEDED
FAVORABLE CONDITIONS IN 2 OF THE FOLLOWING THREE (I. - III.) ARE NECESSARY
I. THE HEIGHT OF THE FLOOR PRICE (will be low if...)
1. The seller feels a compulsion to sell
(a) The seller has estate problems - This does not III
seem like a problem for a utility.
(b) The seller needs capital quickly - This may not be I Financial situation of
capital for expansion (although it conceivably company
could). It may be money needed to keep the utility
afloat. Even now there are a few utilities "near the
brink." As competition continues there might be a
desire to sell off transmission assets (which some
believe to be worth more than their embedded cost) in
order to stay liquid.
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(c) The seller has lost key management or sees no III Departures of key
successors for existing management - In a public utility managers and the
this should not be a problem. An organization that succession process
large would likely look outside when management
leaves if there are no capable successors on the inside.
In fact, as the business is rapidly changing, a Board
might want be inclined to look outside anyway.
What is not included in Porter's framework, but is
clearly applicable is that a utility might be forced I
by law to sell its transmission assets. New state regulations
2. The seller is not optimistic about its ability to
continue to run the business.
(a) The seller perceives capital constraints to II Company finances
growth- Look at the financial situation of the utility.
Much of the capital of transmission lines is already
invested and long-lived.
(b) The seller recognizes its managerial weaknesses- II Profiles of management
Look for utilities where the upper management is all
from a utility background and/or does not seem There public comments -
comfortable with the new competitive environment, perhaps even material in
the company quarterly
and annual reports.
II. IMPERFECTIONS IN THE MARKET FOR COMPANIES
1. The buyer has superior information - A utility in II Location vis-a-vis other
the same region MIGHT have a better ability to know bidders
the potential for growth than those from further
away. However, such benefits will likely be
marginal. It may be because it has plans to increase
the use of the transmission system for its own
purposes.
2. The number of bidders is low - Look for assets that I General feel of interest
attract little attention.
3. The condition of the economy is bad - Utility assets II Economic statistics
that are freed during an economic downturn would
likely be more desirable. Especially since the freeing
of assets may be due to regulatory reasons, rather
than economic ones, they might be cut loose at
"opportune" times for a potential buyer (provided
that the buyer is in a sufficiently sound position to
bid.)
4. The selling company is sick - Look for companies on I Information about
the verge of bankruptcy (or in bankruptcy). company health
5. The seller has objectives besides maximizing the III
price received for the businesses - Due to the
regulated nature of the business and the focus that is
now being placed on the industry, a utility that
attempts to sell based upon intangible criteria would
face serious scrutiny -- especially if the sale would
have implications for the recovery of stranded
investments.
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III. UNIQUE ABILITY TO OPERATE THE SELL TR
1. The buyer has a distinctive ability to improve the I Operational capability of
operation of the seller - A well-run utility would be "buyer" utility
able to have an advantage over other potential
buyers given its successful experience in operating The existence of an ISO
transmission systems. This would be mitigated in an and what it is responsible
ISO scenario, however -- especially if a utility does for.
not even do O&M work on the transmission system.
Also, an adjoining utility may be able to take
advantage of economies of scale by purchasing a I
neighboring transmission system. Location of utility
2. The firm buys into an industry that meets the
criteria for internal entry In Appendix D we found
these to be:
* regulatory body open to competition - I * PUC decisions
* region of rising transmission growth (due to I * Statistics on
transmission within or across region) - transmission growth
* Ownership of transmission capacity would I * Buyer's strategic plan
facilitate a company's existing business - and current situation
* where a new transmission entrant might be able to I * Buyer's strategic plan
create a new market structure - and current situation
3. The acquisition will uniquely help a buyer's I Location of utility assets
position in its existing businesses - A close-by vis-a-vis acquirer's assets.
utility's assets could be particularly appealing, for
PUHCA reasons and to create a larger transmission
system.
Also, if the "seller" utility had some transmission Competencies of the
competencies that were lacking in the "buyer's" seller's generation assets
repertoire. vis-a-vis those in the
buyers
IV. CAUSES OF "IRRATIONAL BIDDING"
1. The bidder sees a unique way to improve the I Examine qualities of other
acquisition target - are there "logical" bidders potential bidders.
because of a unique ability to improve the utility
assets - particularly is there a utility in the region
with an excellent transmission service history or that
could take advantage of economies of scale?
2. The acquisition will help the bidder's existing I Intentions of other
business - Is there a company, such as a natural gas companies in region
company, that is seeking to become a "full service
energy service" company?
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3. The bidder has goals or motives other than the
maximization of profit -
* growth potential - is there a market player in the
region that sees transmission ownership as a key to
growth - perhaps by having a steady revenue stream?
* one-shot financial gain - is there is major user of
electricity in a region that might see this as a way of
lowering rates and creating an income stream? (The
size and nature of such an investment, however,
would make this somewhat unlikely.)
* management idiosyncrasies - is there someone
around who desperately wants to run a transmission
system?
Intentions of other
players.
Intentions of major
industrial users
Appendix J
Supplemental Economic Issues
Material
At the core of economics is the concept of efficiency.1
-- Hfarvey £ei6enstein (1966)
J.1 INTRODUCTION
This appendix presents a number of sets of economics-related issues that are not central to
this thesis, but were studied in its development, and in most cases, had some impact on the
thinking of the document. This appendix is intended to lay out these issues for
background/further reading purposes. It is not intended to flow from section to section,
nor to lead the reader to a specific point, as should occur in the text of the thesis.
J.2 IMPORTANCE AND HISTORY OF ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY
Eminent MIT economist Paul Samuelson makes no attempt to understate the importance of
economic efficiency to his discipline, "efficiency is a central (perhaps the central) concept in
economics." 2 (emphasis original) Tersely defined, "efficiency means there is no waste." 3
While these statements may exalt the concept of economic efficiency, they are too abstract
to use as a template for evaluating proposals for industry restructuring. Yet to develop a
more tangible definition is not a simple task -- despite the importance of efficiency, a useful
working definition for the concept is elusive. As Rowley commented on important
economic concepts, "the closer our scrutiny, the more elusive and intangible the concept
appears to be."4
The abstract concept of efficiency dates back to Paraeto, who posited that there is a "point
of maximum ophelimity for the community." s Upon continual refinement on the part of
economists, this definition has been sharpened and is manifest in the concept of allocative
efficiency.
1 Leibenstein, 1966, 393.
2 Samuelson and Nordhaus, 1985, p. 28.
3 Ibid., p. 28.
4 Rowley, 1973, p. 7.5paraeto, 1935, 1467. While quote is on page 1467, pages 1459 through 1479 are helpful in understanding
Pareto's thinking on the issue, in terms of economics, sociology, and political economy.
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Allocative efficiency is present when all markets are in long-run competitive
equilibrium. Each good is produced as long as consumers value it more than
the alternative goods that might be produced with the same resources. No unit
of the good is produced if a more valuable alternative must be foregone, and if
any reallocation of resources toward differently goods or different combinations
of goods ... would not benefit any one person without hurting someone else6.
J.3 TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE AND INTERNATIONAL CONVERGENCE
Recent studies have indicated that technological development is essential for the economic
development of Third World countries. Political scientists and economists have long
postulated a convergence theory -- that nations are gradually converging both economically
and politically. In the political realm, the demise of the Soviet Empire and corresponding
rise in democracy has leant credence to this theory. However, in the economic domain, the
evidence for convergence is mixed at best. Although some countries have begun to "catch-
up" to the developed ones, many more have not.7 Recent research suggests that a major
factor in the cases where less developed countries do catch-up (i.e. convergence) is the
effective utilization of technology.8
J.4 FURTHER DISCUSSION OF INCREASING RETURNS
(This section continues and expands upon the discussion that occurs in Section 9.5.1). If
there is truth in the theory of increasing returns, some serious problems and dilemmas
result. The first of these is that once a network technology is chosen, it is hard to uproot.
This does not pose a problem if the "superior" technology (both in the short- and long-
term) is chosen. However, if it is not -- either because an inferior technology is explicitly
chosen over a superior one, or because a superior new technology develops later -- there
are negative efficiency consequences. As David and Bunn observe,
Where network technologies are involved, one cannot justifiably suppose that
the system which has evolved is really superior to others which might have
been developed further, but were not. Nor should we comfort ourselves with
the presumption that the 'right economic reasons' were responsible for the
emergence of a technological system that has in fact turned out to be superior to
any of the alternatives available.9
The implication of this discussion is that future technological changes in electric
transmission systems will not be deterministic -- the most efficient technology need not be
the one selected for use. This is a troubling finding. But one might ask, 'What would the
6 Gwartney and Stroup, 1987, 442.
7 Verspagen, 1993.
8 Boyer, forthcoming.
9 David and Bunn, 1988, 169-170.
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potential consequences of choosing an inferior technology be'? and 'Hasn't the electric
power industry been a leader in productivity improvements'?
Although perhaps extreme, the early struggle between Westinghouse and Edison over the
use of AC or DC current (essentially a fight to "lock-in" their technologies) is very
illustrative. 10 . Westinghouse eventually won this struggle and AC became the industry
standard. The consequence of this "victory" has been enormous -- the choice of AC over
DC profoundly influenced the future of the industry.
Edison's low-voltage, DC system would have required many small generating
stations and short distribution lines. The high-voltage Westinghouse AC
system promoted development of long-distance transmission networks that
deliver electricity efficiently from large, remote power plants. The economies
of scale involved led directly to the emergence of today's vertically integrated
utilities.11
While traditional economists would argue that this outcome proves that the "invisible hand"
worked, network economists would argue that it was the result of good technology and
strategy on the part of Westinghouse, as well as luck in developing complementary goods.
They would argue that Edison winning the battle is not an inconceivable outcome. For
example, had the development of a practical AC motor taken a decade longer than it did,
"the scales" might have tipped to DC (for which there was a functional DC motor).
Although this story elucidates the potential risks that are at stake in network/increasing
returns technology adoption, David and Bunn also use the story to present a more
comforting finding. They argue that one of the events that disturbed a delicate balance of
market advantages based upon heterogeneous user needs' 2 was the introduction of a
gateway technology -- the rotary converter -- that made the demand needs more
homogenous, thus making the lower transmission cost of AC current a relatively more
valuable characteristic. Thus, the development of gateway technologies 13 may push the
balance towards superior technologies.
Nevertheless, the basic trade-off between improved technology (and its benefits today) and
the potential for future technological change presents a paradox: one could (at least in
theory) delay adoption of a network technology in order to prevent making an inferior
choice; but doing so would delay the use of improved technologies. It is analogous to
buying a personal computer in today's rapidly changing technological environment: one
10See Appendix B.2 for more on this.
11 Stahlkopf, 1995, 33.
12 David and Bunn, 1988, 198.
13 Incentives should exist for the development of these gateways by those both within and outside the
industry.
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must decide when she will buy it with the understanding that she will see a better model on
sale for a less expensive price in a month. The situation that results, according to Paul
David, is that "where there are alternative emerging network technologies to choose
among... the public goods problem (the need for others to select it as well) tends to retard
the adoption of any one of them."14
Having laid out the issues, a significant problem remains, how do we ensure, through
institutional structures, that inferior technologies will not be chosen? The answer is that in
many ways it is an impossible task to accomplish. 15 However, one conceivable way to
reduce the incentives for this to occur would be to divorce the financial interests of those
choosing the technologies used with those who develop them. The Edison/Westinghouse
battle vividly demonstrates the extremes to which people are willing to go in order to
protect their financial interests. As long as transmission lines are not owned by companies
that develop transmission equipment, some of the risk that a user would adopt an inferior
technology is eliminated. 16 Secondly, some suggest that this is not an issue at all; that
while network effects are pervasive in the economy, there is little evidence that network
externalities exist, or if they do, that they lead to only minor distortions such as over- or
under-supply of a good, rather than the selection of inferior technologies. 17
J.5 ECONOMIC RESEARCH REGARDING TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE
We now discuss a potpourri of economic research related to technological change.
J.5.1 Large-Scale Systems
One area of study that is particularly relevant for transmission systems regards
technological change in large-scale systems. In his extensive research in this area, Paul
David has identified several barriers to new technology adoption inherent in technologies
with characteristics similar to that of transmission systems.
14 David, 1986, 385.
15 Katz and Shapiro argue that "we are [still] far from having a general theory of when governments
intervention is preferable to the unregulated market outcome," with regard to systems competition and
network effects. Source: Katz and Shapiro, 1994, 113.
16 Although this statement is not entirely correct. Such a conclusion is consistent with Katz and Shapiro's
model that finds that in the presence of no sponsors, the technology that is superior today (at the time of
adoption) will be the one selected. What it ignores, however, is the situation where competing standards are
BOTH sponsored, which Katz and Shapiro argue leads to long-run superior adoption. However, if there are
asymmetries in sponsorship, the inferior technology has a chance of being adopted. Source: Katz and
Shapiro, 1986.
17 Liebowitz and Margolis, 1994, 149.
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First, in projects characterized by larger fixed costs for state-of-the-art plant and
equipment, where offsetting savings in variable cost become significant only at
high throughput rates, a critical issue is the scale of output that the enterprise
can anticipate maintaining with the production facility in question. 18
This would indicate that new transmission technologies would be more likely to be adopted
if they would increase the scale economies of the transmission system -- a trend that is at
odds with what is occurring in generation and with the future concept of "distributed
generation."'19 Secondly,
While an old plant may be technologically obsolescent, prevailing product
prices in the industry may permit variable costs to be covered and so make it
rational for profit-maximizing firms to defer the date of capital replacement.
New technologies are placed at a distinct disadvantage in competition with their
predecessors whenever they come embodied in or are technically interrelated
with indivisible capital goods that will burden the used with heavy fixed-cost
charges. This is especially so when the old techniques are embedded in
extremely durable physical plant with low maintenance requirements ...
Durable facilities surviving from earlier epochs may pose barriers to the
introduction of best practice methods that, in pathological cases, cannot be
surmounted by the workings of normal competitive market processes."20
Both of these findings are disturbing as they suggest that there is a serious inherent bias in
large systems -- such as electric power transmission -- against revolutionary changes in
technology. 21
This discussion, and the one that preceded it, have potentially disturbing consequences for
technological development in transmission. This research should give pause for thought to
those economists have held a comforting assumption that the "invisible hand" will steer the
market and create a world of maximum efficiency. 22 At the same time, however, these
economic theories are still relatively nascent and must be treated with at least some degree
of caution.
J.5.2 Number and Size of Firms
J.5.2.1 Economic Theory and Studies
A question of significant interest to economists is: Do large firms in a relatively
uncompetitive environment spawn more technological innovation than smaller firms that
18 David, 1986, 381.
19 Lamarre, 1993.
20 Ibid.
21 For this purpose, we will define this as a technology that would replace a previous one before the latter
was physically obsolete.
22 David and Bunn, 1988, 169.
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exist in a highly competitive environment? This question has arisen from the
"Schumpeterian hypothesis" which essentially states:23
* There is a relationship between innovation and monopoly power with its concomitant
above normal profits; and
* Large firms are more than proportionately innovative than small firms.
In Schumpeter's words,
As soon as we go into details and inquire into the individual items in which
progress was the most conspicuous, the trail leads not to the doors of those
firms that work under conditions of comparatively free competition but
precisely to the doors of the large concerns -- which, as in the case of
agricultural machinery, also account for much of the progress in the competitive
sector -- and a shocking suspicion dawns upon us that big business may have
had more to do with creating that (improved) standard of life than with keeping
it down.24
Similar sentiments were expressed by John Kenneth Galbraith;
A benign providence who ... has made the modem industry of a few large firms
an almost perfect instrument for inducing technical change. It is admirably
equipped for financing technical development. Its organization provides strong
incentives for undertaking development and putting it into use. The competition
of the competitive model, by contrast, almost completely precludes technical
development.25
Galbraith went on to say, "there is no more pleasant fiction than that technical change is the
product of the matchless ingenuity of the small man forced by competition to employ his
wits to better his neighbor. Unhappily, it is fiction." 26 These views were provocative
since they were in direct opposition to the neoclassical economics of their day. As a result,
a plethora of studies have examined the relationship between firm size and R&D effort.27
The results of these have been mixed and much research is still needed to be done in the
area. Good surveys of the literature include: Kamien and Schwartz, 28 for early research;
and Cohen & Levin,29 for more recent research. Although no crystal-clear theories have
emerged, several general findings have gained some credence. The first is that firms that
are small/medium-sized are the best equipped to make innovations -- that after a relatively
small threshold size, there is a diminishing returns to inventive productivity with respect to
firm size.30 Similarly, those industries with moderate competition are more conducive to
innovation than those that have low or high concentration. 31 With time there has also
23 Kamien and Schwartz, 1982, 22.
24 Schumpeter, 82, 1962.
25 Galbraith, 1952, 91.
26 Ibid.
27 Acs and Audretsch, 1991, 52.
28 Kamien and Schwartz, 1982.
29 Cohen and Levin, 1989.
30 Acs and Audretsch, 1991, 55.
31 For example, see: Futia, 1980.
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become a growing belief that issues such as consumer tastes, technological opportunity and
appropriability are also of significant importance in determining the innovativeness of an
industry. 32 In this view, firm size is only one variable (perhaps even a relatively
unimportant one).
J.5.2.2 Application in Semiconductor Industry
In the forum of applied policy, this debate has been especially important and lively during
1980s and 1990s in several industries -- most notably the semiconductor industry. As the
Japanese rapidly replaced the United States as the dominant nation in this "industry of the
future" during the 1980s, there was a large block of opinion that supported a consolidation
of the American industry. It was felt that in the battle of numerous small, entrepreneurial
American Davids against the Goliath of Japan Inc.'s oligopoly of vertically integrated
electronics corporations, David would not win. 33 However, the resurgence of the
American industry, which has been fueled by entrepreneurialism and technological
advance, has shifted opinion on the topic, even among those who once were strong
proponents of the large-company model. 34 Furthermore, the paradigm of technological
advance through "predictable" improvements in DRAM production35 has been supplanted
by one by which technological advance occurs in a more diffuse fashion. (This has
occurred, at least in part, because of the significant increases in cost of cutting-edge
manufacturing equipment. This financial necessity means that the whole industry must, to
some extent, innovate together.)36
J.5.3 Firms with R&D Capabilities
Closely related to the discussion on firm size and the number of firms in an industry is the
concept of some firms possessing special R&D characteristics. One group that agrees with
this conclusion are in the Schumpeter camp -- monopolies allow for profits that can be put
back into research and development. A classic example of this is discussed in the chapter
on AT&T. As Vietor observes,
32 Cohen and Levin, 1989, 1095.
33 For example, see: Lester, forthcoming.
34 A classic example of this is Charles Ferguson, who renounced his earlier thesis that the United States
semiconductor industry must become part of a tightly-woven, vertically integrated industrial network (see:
Ferguson, 1988 and Ferguson, 1990) in his 1993 co-authored book: Computer Wars: How the West Can
Win in a Post-IBM World. In this, he described these previous pieces as: "The case for pessimism for
American computer-makers; superseded by the discussion here." Source: Ferguson and Morris, 1993, 260.
35 This was the mind-set that dominated the industry in the 1980s and which lead to such great concern
when the United States was obliterated in this technology in the mid-1980s. See, for example: National
Advisory Committee on Semiconductors, 1989, 9-10; and Dertouzos et al, 1989, 250.
36 Barrett, 1996.
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In basic science and engineering, Bell Laboratories was an extraordinary
innovator. Only the protected earnings produced by AT&T's regulated
monopoly made such a research effort possible.37
IBM (Watson Labs), RCA (Sarnoff Labs), and Xerox (PARC) are three more examples of
large corporations who possessed incredible research facilities. A common thread in each
of these labs is that they have faced cut-backs as their parent companies faced stiffening
competition.38 Those that argue this viewpoint could also find support for their claims in
the electric utility industry. In 1993 alone, electric utility R&D has dropped by one-third,
with those cuts coming most from states at the vanguard of the competition movement.39
In another camp are those who argue that smaller, more nimble firms posses more energy,
less bureaucracy, and more incentives (one product failure could spell imminent doom for
the company) than larger firms and are therefore more innovative. Such a view is laid out
in Ferguson and Morris' Silicon Valley model which is discussed in Computer Wars.40
Here the concept of a firm is more fluid.
Regardless of what type of an environment these firms operate in, there do appear to be
some firms that have a culture for innovation -- and these cultures cannot be replicated as
efficiently through other research arrangements, such as cooperative research ventures
(although they can be complimented by them).41 This is because there are obtaining and
adsorption costs.42 When a firm has a solid R&D base, the cost of absorbing research
information is lower because the firm is continuously monitoring and assessing new
technologies. 43 As a result, firms with advanced R&D capabilities are able to have more
rapid and less expensive technology transfer -- they can take new ideas and discoveries and
turn them into product innovations more efficiency -- than those who do not posses them.
There are two implications to this. The first is that if these capabilities are lost, they are not
readily emulated in through other mechanisms, such as research consortia, etc. Second,
while one might think that stronger firms have less to gain by participating in consortia, the
37 Vietor, 1994, 319.
38 Sarnoff labs, in fact, was given away to a private firm when General Electric bought out RCA in 1987.
Source: Dertouzos et al, 1989, 227.
39 "High Noon for R&D," 60.
40 Ferguson and Morris, 1993.
41 This has been seen recently in the semiconductor industry where SEMATECH, a research consortium,
has played an important, but intangible role in the industry's revival. While none of the participating firms
are willing to credit SEMATECH with market share gains, almost all feel that they have benefited from it.
Sources: Hamilton, 1991, 23; and "Uncle Sam's Helping Hand."
42 For example, a 1976 study by Teece found that 19% of the costs (of 26 technology-transfer projects) was
accounted for by: pre-engineering information exchanges, engineering costs associated with transferring the
necessary designs, R&D personnel, and pre-start-up training, learning and debugging. Cited in: David,
1986, 382.
43 Mowery, 1983.
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opposite may be true. By being able to more rapidly utilize technological advances than
less sophisticated competitors, they may very well have more to gain. This conclusion was
demonstrated in a National Science Foundation program evaluation regarding cooperative
research,44
The more substantial participation has come from the large research-oriented
companies that can understand and use the research outputs of the cooperative
efforts. Companies with little research background, such as the utilities and
furniture companies, are traditionally conservative with respect to new
technology and are traditionally dependent on their suppliers for whatever
changes they adopt. 45
The last sentence indicates that this discussion may not be significantly important to our
discussion of the transmission industry, since individual utilities have done little
individually in terms of significant technological advances in transmission technology. As
a result, the potential for damage to the research capabilities of transmission utilities during
restructuring should not be a primary consideration in developing proposals.
J.6 HISTORICAL IMPEDIMENTS TO TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE IN THE
ELECTRIC POWER INDUSTRY
J.6.1 Earliest Development: Chicago vs. London
Thomas Hughes 46 contrasts the rapidly growing, technologically advanced, and low-cost
Chicago electric power system prior to World War I with London's relatively backward
system. For example, the per capita electricity use in Chicago was approximately 3 times
that in London in 1913. 47 The advanced state of Chicago's system was due in large part to
the efforts of Samuel Insull. In the mid-1890s, Chicago's electricity supply bore little
likeness to the system that would evolve over the following two decades. Between 1890
and 1905, as many as 47 franchises were granted to provide electricity to part or all of
Chicago.48 Ihi the midst of this chaotic situation, Insull was among the first to understand
the large-scale systemic benefits of an electric power system. Thanks to a combination of
engineering and economic skills, Insull recognized the value of load diversity and the
fundamental economic importance of load factor. He also appreciated the benefits that
accrue from taking advantage of continuously improving technologies and from generation
scale economies. These economic and technological factors acted synergistically to
improve the economics of the industry while encouraging technological advance.49 In
addition to his economic and engineering prowess, Insull also appreciated the importance
44 This is with regard to the 1970s University-Industry Cooperative Research Centers Experiment.
45 Cited in Mowery, 1983, 35.
46 Hughes, 1983, 201-261.
47 Hughes, 1983, 228.
48 Wilcox, 1910, 143.
49 U.S. Census, 1902, 28.
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of politics in system-building. With this understanding, Insull undertook a consolidation
of the disparate clusters of generators and load into a true electric power system. After
outmaneuvering a group of local cronies, he was able to purchase a 50-year service
franchise for Chicago. With the franchise in hand, and having observed the experiences of
other "utility" industries in the corrupt Chicago environment, Insull realized that in order to
maintain a stable electric system, the state should become responsible for regulating service
and rates. After a 10 year fight, he was able to persuade the National Electric Light
Association (NELA) to support the concept of state regulation in 1907. That year, three
states established regulatory agencies, and 33 states had such bodies by 1916.50 With
regulatory authority in the hands of the states, electric companies were then free to grow
and take advantage of economies of scale, exempt from the fragmentation and potential
corruption of municipal regulators.
In contrast to Chicago, the governing structure of London was balkanized. The authority
for governing utilities was both horizontally and vertically complicated. There were at least
three levels of local government to contend with, with forces at the lowest level being least
amenable to the creation of a system -- each borough government adamantly maintained
control over its area. Within the domain of the London city council, there were 28
boroughs and twenty-eight utilities,51 and in Greater London area there were 65 utilities.
Hughes comments, "London's pluralistic and historic administrative structure deeply
affected the growth of the electric supply industry there."52 This structure had a deleterious
effect on the development of new technology. The best example of this was the failure of
the Deptford power station. This station was to employ the latest technologies and to be the
first English attempt at taking advantage of economies of scale. However, the Balkanized
political environment reduced the size of the plant's franchise territory and allowed for
competition within it. Since it was a "leading edge" plant, Deptford experienced technical
glitches. As a result, three-quarters of its customers switched to competing, "more
reliable" suppliers. 53 Despite being "considered as the forerunner of all modern central
power-stations," 54 the plant eventually failed due to lack of financial support from its
investors, 55 and with the plant, so too did England's attempt to stay at the technological
frontier in electric power systems. While in the short-term, the ability of customers to
access alternative power supplies was efficacious; in the long-term loss -- in terms of cost
50 Hyman, 1988, 68.
51 Hughes, 1983, 236.
52 Ibid., 229.
53 Ibid., 145.
54 Singer et al, 1958, Vol. V, 200.
55 This was because the plant had lost most of its customers
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(the plants that survived were small and out-of-date) and national technological leadership
-- was high. More than a decade later, in 1905, an attempt was launched to unify the
London system (i.e. economies of scale were still not being utilized). Despite the
persuasive technical arguments for unifying the system, the strength of the local
governments prevented it from happening. As a result, in 1913, while power for the cities
of Chicago and Berlin was supplied by 6 central stations apiece, 64 stations supplied power
to London.56 Between the late 1880s and early 1910s, in large part due to its Balkanized
governance, London had gone from being one of the world's most advanced cities to being
one of the laggards (in terms of electrification).
The most significant lesson from these stories is that in order for a system to operate
efficiently and take advantage of technological opportunities, the bodies that regulate the
system should be composed in such a manner that they can regulate with a system-wide
perspective.
J.6.2 Market Structure Studies In Electric Power
Joskow and Rose57 found that there were significant economies of scale and experience
effects associated with generating unit construction costs. These economies are due, at least
in part, to the recognition that "power plants are not standardized pieces of equipment
manufactured in factories, but are brought into operation as a consequence of large-scale
construction projects." 58
Several years later, the same duo (Rose and Joskow) examined the impact of firm size on
the adoption of two types of new generation technologies in the pre-competitive era of the
electric power industry (1960-1980). 59 Specifically, they studied the adoption of coal-fired
high pressure and very high pressure supercritical units. These were essentially two
generations of improvements on the industry standard technology (as opposed to
revolutionary technologies). Based upon their study of power plant data they made two
significant and relevant conclusions:60
SLarger firms were more likely to adopt the new technology units. As they note,
larger firms have more opportunity for incremental capacity needs, and since
most plants were built to fulfill those needs (as opposed to replacing old
capital), larger firms would have more of an opportunity to purchase new
56 Hughes, 1983, 257.
57 Joskow and Rose, 1985.
58 Joskow and Rose, 1985, 2.
59 Rose and Joskow, 1990.
60 Rose and Joskow, 1990, 371
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generation plants. Hence, they corrected their results for this fact and still
found that larger firms were more likely to opt for new technologies.
SInvestor-owned utilities were more likely to adopt new technologies than were
municipally-owned utilities or cooperatives; which, as they point out, is
consistent with the fact that utilities are more involved in industry R&D
organizations and activities.
These studies would indicate that consolidation in the industry would be beneficial for the
adoption of new technologies. However, the generation business has changed greatly
since these studies were conducted. The introduction of new generation technologies has
undermined the applicability of their conclusions in the generation segment of the industry.
The residual lesson may still be applicable for transmission, nevertheless (as it retains some
natural monopoly characteristics).
J.6.3 Accounting and Tax Rules
Financial (taxes and accounting) rules employed by the Internal Revenue Service,
regulators, and firms themselves can also serve as incentives or disincentives for the
adoption of new technologies. The discount and hurdle rates that firms use as their basis in
determining the economics of specific transactions and the tax rates and codes play a major
role in the investment decisions of firms.61 With regard to tax incentives, in general, when
investments are depreciated over a short period of time they are more attractive than when
they are depreciated over a longer period of time. 62 The determination of how long each
particular investment can be depreciated (for tax purposes) is made by the regulators who
prepare the tax codes. Given the long-lived nature of transmission investments, these tend
to be depreciated out over many years. Such practice, then, compounds the incentives for
transmission pwners to keep this equipment even in the face of new technologies. As a
result, one mechanism for assisting technological change would be for depreciation
schedules, etc. to treat transmission equipment that embodies technological innovation with
more favorable terms than traditional equipment.
Closely related to tax depreciation is the capital recovery period of utility investments, the
period of time over which the fixed costs of a utility investment are paid for by the rate-
payers. This too is not determined by firms, but by regulatory agencies. The longer period
over which this occurs, the greater the disincentives for their replacement by
technologically superior equipment. Vietor noted this with respect to AT&T. While Bell
61 Park and Sharp-Bette, 1990, 129; and Hatsopoulos and Poterba, 1992.
62 This is due to the diminishing value of money over time and opportunity costs associated with not being
able to use money.
Labs produced cutting edge technology, it was not quickly used in the system because
"regulatory accounting discouraged AT&T from modernizing its network quickly." 63
The internal accounting decisions made by firms can also have a great impact on investment
decisions. The minimum rate-of-return that a company uses to calculate the economics of
potential investments (hurdle rate) and the recovery period over which it intends to pay for
them have significant impacts on technology adoption. The relatively low hurdle rates of
Japanese firms are one explanation of why Japanese companies persisted in the long-term
development of some high technology products that American firms had pioneered but then
abandoned.64 Within the American electric power industry itself, research done on the
adoption of electric generating capacity in the 1970s indicated that the selection of
accounting practices with regard to capital and operating costs made a substantial difference
in the relative attractiveness of nuclear, coal, and solar energy generating sources.65 Given
that any improved transmission technologies will replace those that currently have only
about 3% power losses, it is quite likely that the benefits of new technology will be
marginal -- and thus will make adoption worthwhile only over a long time horizon. If
transmission firms operate on a short time horizon, not surprisingly, such technological
advances would not appear attractive (and therefore would not be adopted).
The lesson from this discussion is that new technologies are most likely to be adopted if tax
deprecation and rate recovery regulations allow for financial recovery in a relatively rapid
manner, and if firms employ low hurdle rates and have long-term vision.
J.6.4 The Slow "Productive" Use of Electric Power
In recent years, the delay in the "productivity-enhancing" use of information technology
(IT) has been one of concern and speculation for many economists. 66 Robert Solow is
reported to have said of the 'productivity paradox', "(w)e see the computers everywhere
but in the productivity statistics."67 Paul David has compared the current situation in IT to
that which occurred at the start of this century with regard to electric power.68 While some
engineers recognized the potential utility of electricity in manufacturing, it was not until
63 Vietor, 1994, 319.
64 Dertouzos et al, 1989, 55-56, 217-231; and Hatsopoulos and Poterba, 1992.
65 Spinrad, 1980.
66For example see "International Conference on the Future of Industry in Advanced Societies, Conference
Report," 17-20. However, after years of lagging productivity, there is some hope that these new
technologies are beginning to significantly improve productivity. Source: "Riding High."
67 Cited in David, 1990, 355.
68 David, 1990.
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organizations (and plants) were reconfigured to effectively utilize the new technology that
the pay-offs from the use of electricity were realized. The old factories were not
immediately replaced for two reasons. First, they represented large capital expenses and it
was not economical to replace plants that were still physically undepreciated. Second, the
physical and organizational concept of a factory needed to be redesigned for the significant
benefits of the technology to be realized. In an "old' mechanical factory, keeping
production steps in close proximity and building the factory vertically were essential given
the limited distance (without substantial power-loss penalty) that mechanical power trains
could operate. In contrast, electricity allowed for distributed power supply, which allowed
for optimization in terms of materials handling and process flow. Therefore, until the
distributed benefit of electricity was realized, a factory that replaced water power with
electricity would have merely traded one similar technology with another and few gains
would have been realized. It was through diverse experience, industrial growth, and
entrepreneurship that methods to harness the full potential of the technology were found.
When one examines the electric transmission industry segment at the dawn of the Twenty-
First Century, the situation is slightly different than with the harnessing of electric power.
In the latter case, those who had to adopt and adapt the new technology were a plethora of
diverse, entrepreneurial end-users. The ones who were successful built upon the
experience of others, recognized and developed the alternative organizational structures,
and did so in the context of growing markets. In contrast, in transmission systems of the
future, ownership will likely stay concentrated in the hands of regulated utilities (or
agencies) and construction will be limited (due to barriers to construction and low load
growth rates).
The lesson from this discussion is that the industry structure should be developed so that
transmission companies have incentives not to atrophy. How this is created, however, is
not readily apparent, although competition, at least in limited segments of the industry,
would appear to be one mechanism.
J.6.5 Does the Current Deregulation Create Disincentives for New Technologies?
One could look ahead and ask whether the current experience with deregulation, which has
resulted from technological innovations in generation, could stymie innovation in
transmission. After having witnessed how their industry has been transformed by
revolutionary generation and information technologies, it could be speculated that in the
future, those utilities which operate in segments of the industry that remain uncompetitive
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will be less than enthusiastic supporters of new revolutionary technologies in their industry
segments. While pure speculation, it does not seem unreasonable to at least suspect that
utilities would not quickly embrace a revolutionary technological change in transmission
because of the potential erosion of their monopoly position that could result.
J.7 TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE AND THE IMPORTANCE OF
EXAMINING A DYNAMIC MARKET
In the past several sections we have discussed the importance of technological change.
With that being the case it should be obvious that when we examine the future of the
industry, we should not look at a static picture, but one that is dynamic, incorporating
changes caused technological advance, market evolution and political changes.
J.7.1 Implications for Economic Analysis
Yet, as Klein notes, many of the principles of economics are based upon a static view of
the world.
The classical theory of competition can not explain how progress comes about
because it is premised on the assumption of a completely static world in which
firms act on the basis of perfect knowledge. Indeed, if firms acted as if their
knowledge were complete, no progress could ever occur.69
Schumpeter adds, "capitalism, then, is by nature a form or method of economic change and
not only never but never can be stationary."70 Rosenberg comments on the implications of
this statement,
It involves ... nothing less than the rejection of the competitive ideal itself, as
that ideal is enshrined not only by in economists' models but also in decades of
government regulation... In this view, textbook competition is not an ideal to be
pursued.71
What should be taken from this for the purpose of this thesis is that we should not limit our
understanding of the concept of efficiency to criteria grounded in the current state of the
industry.
J.7.2 Implications for Policy Development
Just as economic analysis should not be limited to static assumptions, neither should policy
decisions. As new technologies, business strategies, and policy decisions take on a life of
their own, the future is guaranteed to be different than both the present AND the forecast.72
In our discussion on the break-up AT&T we see how the technology employed in a
deregulated long-distance market was not that which was anticipated when the break-up
69 Klein, 1977, 9.
70 Schumpeter, 1962, 82.
71 Rosenberg, 1994, 51.
72 deNeufville, 1990, 273.
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was ordered. Within the electric power industry, we have seen how PURPA differed
greatly from its intent -- President Carter's National Energy policy was not intended to
promote competition, but yet it set a dynamic process into motion that now leaves us on the
threshold of a competitive industry. As technology improves and is placed into continually
evolving contexts (technical, policy, and business strategy) the possibilities for its use
constantly changes. When these new technologies are combined with intellectual advance,
the ability to harness technology is increased in unimaginable ways. It is important, then,
that decision-makers not presuppose technology in developing a system, but rather, as
Rosenberg concludes,
policy should be constructed to ensure that the technological path is as flexible
as possible, that resources are channeled toward those institutions which
consistently provide large social benefits, and that viable economic
opportunities are available to those who push out the technological frontier.73
(emphasis original)
J.8 CONTRACTS AND FIRMS
As mentioned previously, the "old" industry was premised upon the belief that electric
power production and delivery constituted an integrated natural monopoly. The
restructuring that is occurring today is largely a result of those assumptions being
undermined, at least in parts of the industry. One of the primary expected outcomes of
restructuring is that services which are currently bundled -- electric transmission,
distribution, and generation (and perhaps even finer graduations of these), will become
unbundled. When this occurs, instead of being provided by one company, where internal
decision-making and ordering guide the production process, these services will be provided
through a series of contracts. With that being the case, let us examine the concepts of firms
and contracts.
J.8.1 The Concept of a Contract
In a market economy, contracts are consummated under four primary circumstances: 74
fundamental and complex uncertainty, asset specificity, infrequency of interchange, and
likelihood of opportunistic behavior. Contracts can, in turn, be divided into four types:75
planning, promise, competition, and private ordering. While contracts provide security,
and thus allow the economy to function, they also create transaction costs, which are the
economic equivalent of friction in a physical system.76 These are the costs of entering into
73 Rosenberg, 1994, 228.
74 Joskow and Schmalensee, 1983, 27.
75 Williamson, 1986, 177.
76 Williamson, 1986, 176.
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contracts, such as negotiations expenses, and the expenses of maintaining them, i.e.
monitoring compliance, enforcement, and opportunity costs.
If the electric power production process were to be broken down into a series of contracts,
physical and financial contract terms would likely need to be written for the following
functions:77
* Cost of energy;
* Cost of transmission;
* Power quantity;
* Reliability;
* Duration (of contract);
* Delivery points; and
* Contingencies.
In addition to having contracts written for these items, the contract process must be
auditable (especially with regard to congestion charges and disallowed potential
transactions due to congestion)78 and it must be made impregnable to tampering. White
collar crime is a problem in any industry and power stealing could become a sophisticated
and lucrative endeavor due to the intimate relationships between competitors on an electric
power system. Consequently, tools would need to be developed to protect against "power
theft" if contracts would become the medium by which the industry is run.
The market seeks to find the path of least resistance, in this case, the lowest transaction
costs (while considering the risks of not having contracts). Because different arrangements
and types of "products" have different characteristics, the contracts (and transaction costs)
that result can vary greatly. It must be realized that contractual parties might be in different
positions ex ante than ex post. In the case of electric power, a utility or IPP is in a much
different position vis-a-vis a potential buyer before it signs a contract than after it builds a
plant. Ex ante, they are in relatively equivalent positions. However, after the large
investment has been made, a utility/IPP is in a subordinate position. As a result, a
generator seeks a guarantee from customers to protect its investment. In the old regime this
took the form of the regulatory compact. Today, IPPs seek this security through long-term
sales contracts.
In the past, the potential transaction costs in the electric power industry were very high. As
a result, as we discuss below, the industry was organized to eliminate the need for many
77 Tabors, 20 October 1995; and Joskow and Schmalensee, 1983, 113-114.
78 Such concerns are already being addressed. For example, Coopers and Lybrand is continually auditing an
ABB project to write a load flow optimization program that is being designed for use in a competitive
market. Source: Masiello, 19 October 1995.
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contracts (and the transaction costs that accompany them). However, rapid advances in
information technologies have made possible transactions that were unthinkable a decade
ago and have greatly lowered the transaction costs in some parts of the industry. For
example, there are at least seven commercial real-time information systems for transmission
that are currently available, most of which can be run on a Microsoft WindowsTM system.79
Therefore, from a transaction costs perspective, the industry's coefficient of transaction
cost friction is becoming smaller, and is expected to continue to do so as metering
equipment advances and prices continue to fall.80
The implicit assumption in a perfectly competitive market is that transaction costs do not
exist, which has implications for industry structure. Oliver Williamson comments, "if
transaction costs are negligible, then the organization of economic activity is irrelevant,
since any advantages one mode of organization appears to hold over another will simply be
eliminated by costless contracting." 81 However, when they are not negligible, such as has
been the case in the electric power industry, it is often more efficient to have disparate
economic activities organized into one entity, a firm.
J.8.2 The Concept of a Firm
A firm exists when it is "more economical to organize and operate processes through
central control of some kind rather than through the market." 82 This is because the
operation of the market has transaction costs associated with it83 and in cases where these
costs are high, an entrepreneur replaces multiple contracts with singular contracts with each
of his employees. 84 Thus, within a firm, resource allocation decisions are made through
command-and-control, not market mechanisms. In special cases, there can be economies
of integration within a firm. However, physical connections do not necessarily
demonstrate economies of integration. 85
Even when there are economies of integration, these can be off-set by the benefits of
competition. For example, in the natural gas industry Order 636 (which required the
unbundling of pipeline service and gas sales) eliminated the economies of integration that
had been present within firms for decades. For example, instead of being able to call the
79 Source: "Real Time Networks: A Peek at Tomorrow's Transmission Market."
80 Willis, 20 October 1995.
81 Williamson, 1979, 233.
82 McKie, 1970, 11.
83 Coase, 1952, 338.
84 Ibid., 336-337.
85 McKie, 1970, 12.
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pipeline operator on an inside line or walk over to his desk, an affiliated sales agent now
must obtain pipeline information through the same mechanism as outsiders. This change
was made because the benefits of competition came to outweigh the benefits of integration.
The electric utility industry took on its vertically-integrated form because it was believed to
be less expensive to have one firm running generation, transmission and distribution
functions. One reason for this is that large amounts of information must be known on a
real-time basis to keep an electric power system together. Until recently, when information
technologies have made the sharing of information much simpler and less expensive, the
cheapest, and perhaps only way for an electric power system to be operated was through a
centralized firm. However, as in the case of the natural gas industry, today it is widely
believed that it would be more efficient to incur the higher transaction costs of unbundling,
because they would be offset by increased efficiencies from a more competitive market.
One of the challenges of deregulation will be to ensure that the replacement of internal
control mechanisms with contract ones does, in fact, increase efficiency. Because of the
opportunism that could arise in some cases (i.e. if some functions were unbundled) it
would be possible that the contract written to protect against it (the opportunism) would
result in de facto re-integration through contract, which would likely be less efficient, since
it would include transaction costs.86
J.8.3 Efficiency Lessons
From this discussion we can draw two efficiency lessons:
* For those parts of the industry which become disintegrated, mechanisms for a
sufficient contracts (that replace the vertical linkages) should be developed; and
* While retaining the necessary contract protections, market structures should be
designed to economize on transaction costs, and remain sufficiently flexible to
adjust to new technologies, while preventing re-integration through contract.
J. 9 MARKET POWER. TRANSMISSION, AND EFFICIENCY
At least two types of market power abuse could be perpetrated by transmission owners. A
utility that owns transmission capacity and excess generation capacity could attempt to
block a potential wholesale power transaction (where a competitor would provide
generation service) either by refusing transmission service (although EPAct has granted the
FERC the authority to prevent this) or by charging rates that make the transaction
uneconomical. 87 Another form of market power exists when the transmission owner is the
only conduit through which a transaction can occur. Except for the case when the
86See: Joskow and Schmalensee, 1983, 126-127.
87 FERC, 1989, 72; and Rogers, 1994, 6-7.
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transmission owner's affiliated generators would be hurt by the use of its lines, the
transmission owner has an incentive to allow a wheeling transaction to occur. Despite this
incentive, if it were to operate unchecked by regulation, the transmission company would
be able to price the service in a way that captures most of the economic rent in the
agreement. Although this would not diminish overall allocative efficiency, it would be a
deterrent to investment in new generation facilities (since the generators would realize few
of the profits from their investment and would be in an inferior negotiating position
throughout the life of the plant).88
J.10 MORE TRANSMISSION PRICING ISSUES
Let us now discuss a number of pricing issues. In doing so, we should note that
transmission pricing issues are currently a topic of hot debate. This discussion is not
intended to look at the issues in depth, but rather, to discuss them in brief.
J. 10.1 Reactive Power
Despite the attention that wire resistance-induced transmission line losses receive, reactive
power losses are significantly larger in certain circumstances. William Hogan argues that
reactive power flows should be incorporated into electricity marginal cost pricing in order
to ensure that appropriate price signals are sent. 89 Such price signals would work to ensure
that the true costs of transmission would be borne by all who use the grid and would
provide market participants with proper incentives for installing reactive power support.
Not all analysts believe that reactive power pricing is necessary for an efficient system,
however. This counter view is taken by Edward Kahn and Ross Baldick, who claim that
these costs are relatively minor, and not worth taking into account.90
J.10.2 Ancillary Services Pricing
As mentioned in a previous chapter, ancillary services are those transmission system
functions that are essential for maintaining its reliability. In a decentralized environment,
market-clearing electricity prices will not necessarily be economically or technically efficient
unless the marginal costs of ancillary services are billed in a non-subsidizing, transparent,
temporal, and spatial manner.91 As they are not the usable megawatts that can purchased
and used by a customer, one can not safely assume that they will be paid for in a
88 FERC, 1989, 74-77.
89 Hogan, 1993, 175.90 Kahn and Baldick, 1994.
91 Ilic' and Graves, August 1995, 3.
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competitive industry. 92 This is because these services have quasi-public good
characteristics in that they generally benefit the system as a whole, instead of any particular
individual. They are necessary for the system to work, but it is not easy to fairly
appropriate their costs. If they are to be adequately provided in a competitive environment,
sufficient incentives and penalties must be developed.93
Ilic' et al 94 and Kirsch and Singh95 suggest that these services be provided in a competitive
fashion, whenever possible.96 However, the approach of these two groups differs. Ilic' et
al suggest that an independent system operator be responsible for putting the services out
to bid through an iterative process. On the other hand, Kirsch and Singh would have the
operator assign responsibility for the services and these responsibilities could be
competitively traded, much like the Clean Air Act emissions limits are traded.
Regardless of the details, it would appear that having a technically and economically
efficient mechanism for the provision of ancillary services is an important detail in
restructuring proposals that is often overlooked in discussions of the topic.
J. 10.3 Node Pricing and Auditing
In addition to being a chief proponent of POOLCO,97 William Hogan has developed an
elaborate system of node pricing and transmission rights called the network contract
model.98 This is very comprehensive in nature and has its grounding in Spot Pricing of
Electricity. An essential characteristic of the model is the concept of nodal pricing -- at each
node on a system there is an individual production price.99 The transmission price is the
difference between the prices at the nodes connected by a transmission line. This has the
obvious advantage that it equalizes marginal costs across the grid. The theory is not
accepted by all, however. A fierce battle has been waged against it by researchers at the
University of California-Berkeley. They present a litany of concerns with the proposal,
including: 100
92 At least as it is currently being forecast as a provider of a commodity - usable power. See, for example:
"The Inevitable Commoditization of Electric Power Markets."
93 Ilic' et al, October 1995, 11.
94 Ilic' et al, October 1995.
95 Kirsch and Singh, 1995.
96 Exceptions would be distributed capacitors for reactive power support. Kirsch and Singh would also not
include reactive power generation in a competitive market because of the local nature of and the monopoly
power considerations that could arise.
7For example, see: Hogan, September 1994; and Garber, Hogan and Ruff, 1994.
98 This is outlined in: Hogan, March 1993.
99 At least a theoretical price, not all would agree that attempts should be made to calculate the price at each
node.
100 Wu et al, 1994; and Oren et al, 1995.
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* Non-correlation between a transmission link's investment incentives and it
associated rent;
* A single grid owner would have an incentive to degrade the network;
* Non-congested links may accrue congestion rents; and
* Firm transmission rights are incompatible with efficient dispatch.
If these concerns are overcome and such a system develops, it will be important that an
audit function develops with it. This is especially true if asymmetries of information
continue since only certain players would know for sure what the costs were without an
audit function. Even if information becomes more open, there still should be an audit
function so that the nodal prices accurately reflect the system's costs. 101 Significant
changes in institutional structures may be required to effectively run such a pricing
system.102
J. 10.4 Tradable Transmission Rights
Still others suggest that the creation of secondary markets and tradable transmission rights
would help create efficient price signals. 103 A tradable transmission rights system would
create a secondary market for transmission capacity, in which transmission service could be
bought and sold independent of transmission line owners. There are a variety of proposals
at various stages of development. Secondary markets would greatly reduce, if not
eliminate, a transmission utility's market power over its system. Because of the potential
profound implications that this type of pricing system would have, one observed notes,
"these mechanisms could supplant many of the needs for regulation [of transmission]."1°4
J.10.5 Congestion Pricing
In concept, a congestion charge is part of the opportunity cost of having one participant use
a transmission line, thus denying its use and having other impacts on other users (or
potential users). 105 There are several reasons for pricing congestion. First, when one puts
power over a congested grid, she is preventing others from using the line and is dissipating
the power of the others who are using it as well. Second, congested lines can lead to out-
of-merit dispatch, where a cheaper plant(s) is prevented from producing and in its place,
power must be provided by a more expensive one. 106 Third, the proceeds gained from
10lKahn and Baldick, 1994, 192.
102 Ruff, 1994.
103 Varying discussions include: Lively, 1994; Tabors Caramanis & Associates, 1995, 29-30; Hogan,
1992; Kleindorfer, 1995; and FERC, 1989, 77-80. The FERC document discusses the potential efficiency
results of these markets given different scenarios.
104 Woychik, August-September 1995, 79.
105 Kelly et al, 1987, 226.
106 Hogan, 1992, 218.
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congestion charges are an economically efficient mechanism for financing the construction
of new transmission capacity when short-run marginal cost principles form the basis of
pricing structures.
J.10.6 Loop Flows
A fundamental characteristic of electric power systems that is different than nearly any other
system is that the delivery of electrons across the grid is not intentionally directed. "By and
large, the electric grid was built purposely without "valves" to capture the huge reliability
benefits that come from allowing nature -- not contracts -- to manage the flow."' o07 As a
result, "loop flows" occur -- when one sends power over the grid, some of it will go along
the geographically "most direct" path, but some of it will go along other lines, following
the path of least impedance. The result is that the same deleterious impacts that are felt
along the "primary" path also occur along these parallel flow paths. However, if contracts
are written only so that the utility over whose transmission system the power is
theoretically wheeled -- along the legally-defined "contract [transmission] path" -- the
neighboring and parallel utilities, over whose lines some or much of the power might
actually flow, would not be fairly compensated. This would not only be unfair, but would
result in economic and technical inefficiencies. Therefore, it is important that whatever
pricing scheme is implemented take account of loop flows, either explicitly through
efficient loop flow pricing, or implicitly, through a reconceptualization of pricing
structure.10s
J. 10.7 More on Spot Pricing
In the past decade, the concept of variable pricing has emerged. The seminal work in this
field, Spot Pricing of Electricity, was written by a team of MIT researchers. 109 The basic
concept is that an hourly sport market for electricity would promote efficient pricing. The
price in such a market would be dependent upon the supply/demand conditions at that point
in time, in particular, with regard to:110
* Demand (in total and by location);
* Generation availability and costs (including purchases from other utilities); and
* Transmission/distribution network availability and losses.
The practical result of such a pricing system is that consumers purchase less electricity
during peak (most expensive to produce and consume) periods and shift some of that
demand into less expensive time periods. While time-of-use rates are considered a
107 Hogan, 1993, 19.
108 Hogan, October 1995; and Ruff, 1994.
109 Schweppe et al, 1987.
110 Ibid., 31.
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relatively new concept, they actually have their roots in the earliest days of the industry. A
1902 Census Bureau report stated,
From the fact that power circuits connected with central stations draw their
supply of current in the daytime, when a large proportion of the generating
machinery would otherwise stand idle, a great many central stations have felt
they could make concessions and inducements in the way of special rates for
current.111
J. 10.8 Long-Run vs. Short-Run Marginal Cost Pricing
Let us briefly explore the debate between proponents of long-run and short-run marginal
cost pricing in order to gain a better understanding of some important economic principles.
J.10.8.1 Short-Run Marginal Cost Pricing
Commodities that are bought and sold in a perfectly competitive market are theoretically
priced at their short-run marginal cost.112 In a transmission system, the primary short-run
marginal costs are the transmission line losses that occur and the cost of generation
adjustments due to a power flow, such as out-of-order dispatch. Also included in the
short-run marginal cost is the concept of congestion (which happens when a participant's
power transmission is curtailed to allow for another's to be transmitted). 113
In addition to being the theoretical standard for pricing, short-run marginal cost pricing has
several positive attributes. This pricing mechanism promotes good decision-making and
equalizes short-run marginal costs across the grid. 114 Furthermore, the expected theoretical
outcome of such a pricing scheme would be that both short-run and long-run operating
efficiency would be encouraged. 15
At the same time, though, there are several weaknesses to this approach. The first is that
short-run marginal cost pricing will not on its own (without adulteration) lead to the
construction of reserve transmission capacity, which historically has been valued in order
to ensure a reliable system. Secondly, it is difficult to predict the future with sufficient
accuracy because costs and demands can vary widely over time.116 Thirdly, this
congruence may not include a reasonable assumption about consumer behavior.
III Census Bureau, 1902, 28.
112 Gwartney and Stroup, 1987, 427.
113 FERC, 1989, 87.
114 Kelly et al, 1987, 167.
115 FERC, 1989, 94. In theory, the sum of the short-run marginal costs will equal the sum of the long-run
marginal costs. Put another way, the time-average of the short-run marginal cost = long-run marginal cost.
116 FERC, 1989, 94.
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It is not clear that customers could make rational forecasts of short-run cost-
based prices and arrive at expectations that correctly mimic long-run costs.
Customer myopia tends to mean that current prices are given disproportionately
greater weight when forecasting future prices.117
And finally, the presence of market power by transmission companies could provide
distortions that lead to non-economic outcomes.' 18
Despite the logistical weaknesses of short-run marginal cost pricing, economists who
adhere to its principles are quick to dismiss the other type of marginal cost-pricing, which
explicitly includes capital charges in the price structure, long-run marginal cost pricing.
Vickery comments, "To attempt to import into a pricing decision consideration of fixed
costs that will not be affected even indirectly by that is to chase a very wild goose
indeed." 119 Before we dismiss long-run marginal pricing, however, let us examine the
principles that supportive economists are chasing.
J.10.8.2 Long-Run Marginal Cost Pricing
In the context of some situations, there are economists who advocate the use of an
admittedly second-best alternative, long-run marginal cost pricing. One of these advocates
is Alfred Kahn, who favors the use of long-run over short-run marginal cost pricing when
one of several conditions are present.120 The first of these is when it is too difficult,
annoying, or expensive to compute the changing marginal congestion or opportunity costs.
Secondly, there may be cases when short-run marginal cost pricing does not cover the
average total cost over the life of a good, and therefore might require a public subsidy.
Thirdly, the variability inherent in a short-run marginal price in some cases might lead to
unacceptable uncertainties in attempting to make planning decisions.121 By their nature,
long-run prices will be relatively constant over time, while short-run prices will be much
more volatile. Considering that electric power equipment investments (whether they be
generation or load) are typically large in financial value and highly durable; there is an
inherent unwillingness to make investments in such equipment under uncertain price
conditions. Furthermore, this volatility cloud the transparent signals that prices are desired
to send in the long-term.
In order to solve these problems, proponents of long-run marginal cost pricing attempt to
explicitly include capacity charges in the pricing scheme. This pricing scheme includes the
117 Kelly et al, 1987, 183.
118 FERC, 1989, 94.
119 Vickery, 1985, 1333-1334.
120 Kahn, 1970, 88.
121 FERC, 1989, 105.
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costs of expanding the capacity of the transmission network as well as incremental running
costs. 122 Although long-run marginal cost pricing does not include a congestion
component, it does explicitly charge for the cost of expanding capacity enough to prevent
congestion. The FERC Transmission Task Force made a subtle distinction between long-
run marginal cost and incremental cost, in that the latter takes the current grid as a starting
point while the former bases pricing decisions on an optimally configured grid. 123 Under
long-run pricing, price signals are linked to the long-run costs of the transmission system,
not to its current running costs or state of congestion. As a result, the benefit of long-run
marginal cost pricing is that it encourages good long-run investment decisions in terms of
capital construction and energy supply alternatives. 124
However, given the unpredictability of needs, long-term marginal cost pricing faces serious
difficulties. First of all, it is nearly impossible to calculate long-term prices accurately
because so little is known about the future. "The best efforts to get the long-run marginal
cost properly reflected in rates will fail due to the inability to forecast long-term trends."'12s
Secondly, in times of excess transmission capacity, long-run marginal cost rates will be
artificially high, which will prevent some transactions from being consummated that would
otherwise be economic (in a short-run cost based pricing system). 126
J.10.8.3 Potential Resolution Of The Debate
The debate is one that could fill a thesis itself, and despite its importance, we do not spend
much time attempting to resolve it. Such a resolution might appear to be difficult, based
upon what has been mentioned thus far. However, if one moves away from ideological
purity, a workable resolution is possible.
It can be shown that in the long-run, appropriate short-term and long-term marginal cost
prices converge. 127 From this finding, one can surmise that there may not be significant
differences between the two types of pricing. Having said this, though, there are
limitations on this optimism. This theoretical convergence assumes that the grid is
configured optimally, consumers take long-term costs into account when making current
122 Kelly et al, 1987, 172.
123 FERC, 1989, 89-90.
124 Kelly et al, 1987, ix.
125 O'Neil and Whitmore, 1995, 73.
126 And for which there is no compelling efficiency reason that they should not occur. Source: Kelly et al,
1987, ix.
127 For a discussion of this, see Henderson et al., 1987, 181-184; and FERC, 1989, 92. The inherent
assumption is that the short-term marginal costs includes congestion charges that take account for scarcity.
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decisions, 12s and that there is no transmission over-building. 129 All three assumptions are
doubtful: the first because the system was not built using optimal economic efficiency
incentives; the second because consumers tend to discount future costs;130 and the third
because there are social benefits to having a robust, over-built grid.131
As seen in the previous sections, it is apparent that both long-run and short-run marginal
cost pricing mechanisms are imperfect. 132 As a result of these imperfections, a mixture of
the two types of pricing has been proposed. Such a "mixture" of short- and long-run
marginal cost pricing has been used in similar industries, such as natural gas, through the
use of combined spot and forward markets. The price set in the forward market is
essentially equivalent to the long-run marginal cost while the price in the spot market
approximates the short-run marginal cost. If mixed pricing does not develop through the
creation of actual markets, a similar result could be obtained by having short-run prices
charged for interruptable service contracts and/or short-term contracts and having long-run
marginal cost prices charged for long-term contracts. 133
J.10.9 Public Goods Pricing -- System Control
Transmission consumers must also be charged efficient prices for the system control
services (which will likely be unbundled from the transmission wires in a restructured
industry). A frequent analogy that is used when discussing the future of the industry is the
comparison of the air traffic controller in the airline system and the system operator in the
deregulated electric power system. 134 When one examines the technological state of the
nation's air traffic control system 135 and extends that analogy, it becomes quite clear that
incentives must be developed to allow for sufficient finances so that the system control
centers can continually be technologically upgraded. The latter is crucially important,
because the ability of the market to function effectively is dependent upon the control
center's use of state-of-the-art information technologies.136 Much of what will be needed,
in terms of information technology support, for the control of a deregulated electric power
128 Ibid.
129 FERC, 1989, 92.
130 Kelly et al., 1987, 183.
131 FERC, 1989, 92.
132 Kelly et al., 1987, 183.
133 Kelly et al, 1987, ix; and FERC, 1989, 106. It should also be noted that if these contracts are
transferable, it will take little time for the contract method to succumb to a formal or informal market.
134 Stalon, October 1995; and Masiello, 1995.
135 For example, see: "Austere Future Looms for F.A.A;" "Panel Approves Bill to Generate Funds for
FAA;" and "Who Pays for Air Traffic Control, and How?"
136 Masiello, 1995.
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market is based on information technologies developed in the past several years and in
some instances, technologies that must still be developed. Therefore, the use of obsolete
technologies in the control center (caused by insufficient funding) could lead to the stifling
of competition and the blocking of power transactions that would otherwise be economic,
due to heightened transaction costs or even technological deficiency.
Not only should pricing structures provide long-term incentives for the system operator,
they should provide short-term incentives as well. For example, Richard Tabors suggests
that an incentive-based regulatory scheme should be developed to give the ISO efficiency
incentives in the short-term. 137 This would provide the system operators with incentives to
lower the total grid cost, and in all likelihood would lead to the elimination of some reserve
margins and replace them with the creativity of the ISO.
137 Tabors, 13 November 1995.
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Speculations on the Development of
Complete NUTS
There is no guarantee that the particufar economic outcome selectedfrom among the
many afternatives will be the "best" one. Furthermore, once tandem economic events
select a particular path, the choice may become locked-in regardless of the advantages
of the afternatives. If one product or nation in a competitive marketplace gets ahead
by "chance," it tends to stay aheadandeven increase its Iead'
-- W. Brian Arthur (1990)
K.1 INTRODUCTION
In Chapter 11 we discuss the prospects for the development of non-utility transmission
systems (NUTS). In Section 11.7 we discuss, in vague terms, possible pathways --
industry events that individually or cumulatively could lead the industry down an
incremental path -- to complete NUTS development. We do not expand on some of these
pathways in Chapter 11, as doing so would be a highly speculative endeavor, that is bound
to be incorrect in many cases. However, in this appendix we engage in more speculative
behavior -- by giving more details on how those pathways might develop. In doing so, we
are not suggesting that these pathways will actually occur, but rather, the discussion is
intended to be mind stretching and opening.
K2 SECONDARY MARKETS
Secondary transmission markets and/or congestion contract rights 2 are one potential
pathway for NUTS development. William Hogan developed the most elegant secondary
markets formulation, the contract network model for transmission rights.3 This system
explicitly provides revenues to build transmission lines -- whether they be built by
transmission utilities or "outside" investors (Nutcos). 4 In a similar vein, Mark Lively
proposes that a real-time pricing scheme could allow a financier to offer a transmission
futures contract. In such a case, "when the expected RTP [real time price] difference
1Arthur, 1990, 92.
2 Which could take different forms and have varying degrees of efficiency.
3See Hogan, 1992; and Hogan, March, 1993.
4Hogan, March 1993, 27-28; and Hogan, 19 October 1995.
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[between two points on the grid] grows too large, the financier would invest in a
transmission line connecting the two geographic points. '" 5 Eric Woychik divines what
could result when ownership and operation of transmission assets are separated and
secondary markets are created.
If tradable transmission rights and congestion pricing can be market-based, and
third parties are allowed to invest, these mechanisms can supplant many of the
needs for regulation... Private entities in competition can then develop and can
offer other services.6
Tabors et aP7 envision an even more competitive transmission market -- where firm and
non-firm transmission service contracts would be consummated and an active spot market
for interruptable transmission service would develop. Transmission companies,
aggregators, and generation companies would buy and sell in the interruptable spot market.
In all of these scenarios, the finances and operation of the system would become
unbundled, new constituencies would emerge, and sources of transmission service revenue
would be created that could be captured by Nutcos.
The mere existence of secondary markets would not inherently lead to the efficient creation
of partial NUTS, however. For example, Bushnell and Stoft mathematically "prove" that
the rules used to develop and allocate transmission rights-based contracts would play an
important role in their ability to efficiently expand the grid.8 Inefficient expansion
mechanisms could serve as a significant impediment to investment in them. Conversely,
inefficient allocation rules might lead to the creation of NUTS, since incentives to
circumvent inefficient structures are sometimes more effective at creating partial NUTS than
the incentives created by an efficient structure. 9
These speculations and visions may soon come into being. The Mega-NOPR calls for the
development of secondary markets for firm transmission service, and the California Final
proposal also calls for an undefined system of transmission rights and congestion
contracts.
K3 UTILITIES ACTIVELY TURN TO NUTS FOR ADDITIONAL CAPACITY
In the generation segment of the industry, the emergence of IPPs was partially the result of
an "almost total abdication by the industry of its traditional role as builders of new
5 Lively, 1994, 31.
6 Woychik, August-September 1995, 79.
7 Tabors, Caramanis and Associates, 1995.
8Bushnell and Stoft, 1996, 74.
9 See Section 11.7.8.
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capacity"10l during the period of rate suppression. There are several circumstances that
could lead to similar behavior by transmission utilities (i.e. cessation of building new assets
or even the sale of existing ones), which would allow a segue for partial Nutcos.
K.3.1 To Reduce Exposure
Just as the regulatory risks and difficulties of building generating plants (e.g. prudence
reviews) helped lead some utilities out of the generation business in the 1980s, problems
with transmission siting, financing, permitting, and construction, as well as EMF lawsuits
could make utilities less enthusiastic about being in the transmission business." In the
extreme case, utilities could turn to outsiders to build and/or own new transmission lines in
an attempt to absolve themselves of legal difficulties or minimize their financial exposure.
However, because of their "boomerang" experience with generation -- outsourcing it, and
in the process, laying the foundation for industry competition -- utilities would likely be
reluctant to employ this strategy.
K.3.2 Utilities Sharpen Focus, to the Exclusion of Transmission
Another reason that some utilities might willingly turn to outsiders for transmission service
provision is that as they reposition themselves for competition, they may no longer view
transmission as part of their "mission." 12 These utilities could sell-off parts of their
transmission operations or they could make an internal decision not to build any new
capacity, which would create an opening for Nutcos when additional capacity is needed.
K.3.3 Industry Structure Uncertainty
Elsewhere we mention that the amount of transmission capacity being built has dropped
precipitously over the past several years as a result of the uncertainty that exists regarding
transmission capital recovery during this transition period. If this period of uncertainty,
and resulting underbuilding, would continue over an extended period of time, utilities
might turn to less risk-averse investors (Nutcos) to build additional, necessary capacity.
Likewise, if the FERC ends this period of transition uncertainty with an "unfavorable"
transmission service recovery decision, and new transmission capacity is subsequently
necessary, a utility could turn to Nutcos that are willing to gamble that the FERC would
eventually raise the allowed recovery rates.
10Navarro, 1995, 350.
1 1Roseman, 1991, 36.
1 2 It is doubtful that many utilities would forsake the relatively comfortable world of regulated
transmission, but a few might -- perhaps those that are in the upper echelon of generation efficiency.
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K.3.4 Utility Financial Weakness
Some utilities that are poorly positioned for competition could need to add transmission
capacity in order to accommodate outside suppliers that wheel power into their service
territories. Because these utilities would be in poor financial shape and losing customers,
they may lack sufficient financial credibility to attract the capital necessary 13 to construct
new lines. They could turn to more financially credible Nutcos to construct the new lines.
K.3.5 Utilities Add Transmission Capacity by Auctions
It is conceivable that auctions to build new transmission capacity could develop. 14 These
auctions would most likely occur if transmission capacity expansion would be planned by
an ISO or signaled by congestion contracts, rather than by the incumbent, vertically-
integrated utility. However, transmission auctions could occur even without these "radical"
moves. In the generation segment of the industry, many utilities hold auctions for new
capacity even though they still operate in the context and regulatory policies of the
traditional integrated utility industry structure. These auctions have emerged by the
voluntary choice of utilities in some cases, and by the directives of regulators in others. 15
Whether the result of congestion contracts, ISO planning, or utility or regulatory decision,
Roseman posits how these auctions could function.
One can conceive of utilities holding a solicitation for the construction and
ownership of a needed new power line between specific points. In such a
solicitation, the utility could conceivably arrange for the right-of-way and obtain
the regulatory approval. The wining bidder(s) would be required to finance,
construct, and operate the line in a manner consistent with the utilities'
standards for long-term reliability, in exchange for payment for every kilowatt-
hour that flowed on the line.16
K.3.6 Auctions as Mechanisms for Stimulating New Technologies
One way of stimulating the use of new transmission technologies would be to take an
analogous approach to what has been done with QFs and integrated resource planning.
Assuming that regulation is retained, public utility commissions could insert provisions into
the rules of transmission construction auctions that would favor bids that would employ
new technologies.
130r at least at a reasonable rate.
14 Such auctions already exist in Argentina. Source: Lalor and Garcia, 1996, 71, note 15.
15 For a history of this see: Joskow, 1989, 175-187. In 1994, 18 states required these auctions. Source:
The Southern Company, 1994, 13.
16 Roseman, 1991, 36.
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New transmission line capacity is not the only type of transmission service provision for
which there could be supply auctions. Proposals being developed for the provision of
ancillary services by auction. Once again, regulatory bodies could attempt to stimulate
technological development by tweaking the auction rules to favor new technologies. While
attempts to stimulate new technologies through these methods may not be economically
efficient in the short-term, they may lead to long-term efficiency increases. 17
K4 FISSURE BETWEEN OWNERSHIP AND OPERATION
Explicitly clear in the California POOLCO, Bilateral and Final proposals is the division
between transmission system dispatch and control (which would be performed by the ISO)
and ownership (utilities would continue to own their current assets). Less clear is whether
further separations should occur. For example, some analysts argue that transmission
ownership and maintenance functions be separated; 8 the ISO would lease and maintain
transmission lines and associated equipment from utilities. The result is a profound shift in
the nature of transmission ownership. In the past, the prerequisites for transmission
system ownership were (1) the ability to operate and maintain a transmission system and
(2) the ability to attract the capital necessary to finance its construction. The creation of an
ISO for system dispatch and control significantly weakens the former, and, it is eliminated
when the ISO also has the responsibility for system maintenance. The result of this
unbundling of technical and financial prerequisites is that there is no reason that any
company or group of investors could not own transmission lines. Thus, transmission line
partial Nutcos would be viable.
K5 CONTINUED INDUSTRY UNBUNDLING
The current industry restructuring features an unbundling of generation, which was once a
natural monopoly, from those functions that are still natural monopolies -- transmission and
distribution. In some conceptions of the industry, the latter would also be unbundled into
electricity sales (not a natural monopoly) and the monopoly wires aspect of distribution.19
The experience in other industries has been that unbundling is a progressive phenomenon --
functions once considered inseparable become unbundled over time.20 Given current
17Note the emphasis on "may." PURPA has caused some successes and some dismal failures. As
mentioned in Appendix B.8, significant stranded liability bills have been amassed as the result of pushing
PURPA technologies.
18Tabors, 13 November 1995.
19For example, see: Wisconsin Public Service Commission, October 1995, 9; and Tabors Caramanis &
Associates, 1995.
20Gottlieb and Colucci, 1995.
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technologies, some transmission system functions, such as system control, will likely
retain natural monopoly characteristics. However, there are some transmission system
functions that do not appear have natural monopoly characteristics and therefore could be
unbundled from those that do.
K.5.1 Ancillary Services
Some of the ancillary services are probably unbundleable. In the policy arena, the FERC
took the lead in calling for their unbundling and provision through competitive
mechanisms. In the technical community, several frameworks have been developed that
would allow for competitive bidding for ancillary service provision to ISOs.21 The
feasibility of going a step further (which has been advocated in the policy community) --
having ancillary services provided not only competitively to the system operator, but also in
competition with the ISO -- is still an open question, as is the feasibility of having specific
ones being provided competitively. This uncertainty, stemming from both technical and
economic considerations, is the result of ancillary services always having been provided as
part of an integrated, bundled package. From an economic standpoint, the public goods
nature of ancillary services makes their costs difficult to appropriate. From a technical
standpoint, the highly complicated, integrated nature of transmission systems makes
ancillary service functions difficult to separate. Due to the technical nature of some
ancillary services, they could be localized natural monopolies. For all of these reasons, it is
difficult to determine the extent to which each ancillary service could be unbundled,
especially prior to experience in a competitive industry environment. 22
Regardless of how far the competitive provision of ancillary services is taken immediately,
several hypotheses can be made. The first is that any unbundling of ancillary services is a
significant step in that it would create the potential for partial Nutcos to enter the industry.
Secondly, even if ancillary services competition is initially limited to provision to the
system operator of only a few of the services, experience gained in the unbundled
framework and increased technical sophistication would stimulate further competition --
both in terms of the number of services made competitive and the opportunity to compete
against the ISO for provision to customers.
While ancillary service provision is a minor part of the electric power industry; at $5-10
billion per year it could represent an attractive niche for some parties (ancillary services
2 1Ilic' et al. October 1995; Zobian, 1996.
2 2Zobian, 1996.
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partial Nutcos). For example, utilities with strong operating competencies could build or
purchase plants that are particularly well-positioned to provide ancillary services. Perhaps
even some that strategically retreat from the MW production market could thrive in the
ancillary services provision industry.
K.5.2 Transmission Construction and Ownership
While the lines in any given transmission corridor appear to have natural monopoly
characteristics; the ownership of the various lines in a transmission system does not appear
to be a natural monopoly.23 Any ownership scale economies that might exist would be
diminished if an ISO were to operate and control a transmission system, and would be
eliminated if the ISO were to also maintain the system. This is evidenced by the success of
tight power pools such as the New England Power Pool (NEPOOL), which function
effectively with a system operator and multiple transmission asset owners.24 This implies
that transmission ownership could be unbundled -- which could be manifested in market-
based processes for the construction and ownership of new transmission capacity.
K.5.3 ISO Construction of Transmission Facilities
Another closely related option is that the ISO could have responsibility for constructing
new transmission facilities. The California Final proposal gives some thought to having
the ISO collect congestion revenues for the purpose of the ISO (rather than utilities)
building future transmission lines.25 If this were to occur, an ISO could put out bids for
transmission capacity construction and/or maintenance (by independent or utility-affiliated
partial Nutcos) rather than enter into the transmission business itself.
K.5.4 Why Unbundling Matters
These three types of unbundlings could lead to a "hollowing out" of grid functions, where
the transmission "provider" changes from being an integrated transmission utility to a
collection of companies providing services that are coordinated by a system operator. We
postulate that a transmission system that includes multiple Nutcos would more readily
allow for the emergence of competing complete NUTS than would a transmission system
that is operated by a vertically-integrated transmission utility with a franchised service
territory. We postulate this for several reasons. First, the multiple Nutco situation would
23Put more tangibly, a transmission line from Boston to Hartford might be a natural monopoly, but
owning multiple lines: Boston/Hartford, Boston/Worchester, and Providence/Hartford likely does not have
natural monopoly characteristics.
24For a discussion of several multi-owner systems, see: Tabors, Caramanis and Associates, 1995, 33.
25CPUC, D.95-12-063, 95.
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build technical competencies in multiple players. Second, it would create new political
constituencies (partial Nutcos) who could then clamor for a "bigger piece of the action"
should new technology make it feasible. Third, a situation where multiple players would
be seeking competitive advantage would likely encourage technological development,
which could drive further change.
Biographical Note
Do something useful then forget about it andgo on to the next thing. Don't gloat
about it.1
-- DavidrPackard(1993)
Joseph Jerome (Joe) Bambenek was born on 6 April 1970 to Jerome Vincent and Mary Ann(Papenfuss) Bambenek in Minneapolis, MN. 2 Several days later he was taken to the
Bambenek home at 1306 West 21st Street in Hastings, MN, which he calls "home" to this day.
On 13 January 1973, he was joined by sister Catherine Marie (who is currently a graduate
student in the Department of Materials Science and Engineering). He attended kindergarten
at Pinecrest Elementary school in Hastings and went to Hastings Parochial School from 1st
through 8th grade. In 9th grade Joe was a student at the nationally recognized Hastings
Junior High School and attended 10th-12th grade at Hastings Senior High School. He was
baptized into St. Boniface Catholic Church on 19 April 1970, of which he remained a
member until 1987, when the church was merged with Guardian Angels to form St. Elizabeth
Ann Seton Church (of which he is now a member).
As a student at Hastings High School, Joe played in the band (clarinet, alto clarinet and bass
clarinet), participated in Math Team, Science Olympiad and Knowledge Bowl, played on the
football team, ran on the track team, was the scorekeeper for the basketball team, and
graduated as a valedictorian on 10 June 1988.
Joe attended Northeast Missouri State University (NMSU) in Kirksville, MO, from where he
graduate magna cum laude with a Bachelor of Science in Physics and minor in chemistry on
8 May 1993. He served on numerous university committees and participated in a variety of
organizations, including Society of Physics Students, OSCAR (the environmental club),
Student Ambassadors, and Student Senate -- of which he was the President during the 1992-
1993 academic year.
As a graduate student at MIT, Joe was an active member of the MIT Graduate Student
Council and the Tech Catholic Community. From January 1994 until the present, he worked
as a research assistant for Professor Richard K. Lester. The focus of Joe's work was assisting
Professor Lester with his forthcoming book, Regaining the Productive Edge. For his efforts
in the MIT Community, Joe was awarded the 1994 Alumni Award for Leadership and
Excellence in Technology and Policy (awarded in May 1995), and the Institutd's 1995 Karl
Taylor Compton Award.
Publications:
Continuing a Renaissance: Student Senate's Vision for the Future of the University. Kirksville,
MO: Northeast Missouri State University, April 1991.
"Improving the Accuracy of Institutional Assessment Results Through the Ten Principles of
Meaningful Assessment." Higher Education Management, 7 (1995), p. 355-362.
"Students As Assessors In Institutional Assessment," Assessment Update, May/June 1996.
1Cited in: "Silicon Valley's Class Act;" and "David Packard, 83, Pioneer of Silicon Valley, Is Dead."2Who are the children of Vincent Albert (1901-1983) and Sophie Cecelia Stanislawski (1907-1990)
Bambenek; and Victor William (1905-1992) and Margaret Elizabeth Hennessey (1905- ) Papenfuss.
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